MANILA TRADING & SUPPLY COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. MANILA TRADING LABOR ASSOCIATION & COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, RESPONDENTS.

Manila Trading and Supply Company versus Manila Trading Labor Association

The Case

This is a petition for review by certiorari brought by the Manila Trading and Supply Company against the Manila Trading Labor Association and the Court of Industrial Relations. The Union, on behalf of nine of its members who worked as security guards, sought to collect additional compensation for work done on Sundays and holidays, claiming this was owed under an old award of the Court of Industrial Relations rendered in 1946. The Company resisted, arguing that the claim had long prescribed. The case matters because it fixes the period within which a final and executory award of the Court of Industrial Relations may be enforced by mere motion, and it teaches the distinction between enforcing a judgment and filing a fresh action to do so.

Procedural History

On July 23, 1946, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision in an earlier case granting, among others, the Union's demand that the Company pay its laborers and employees 100 percent additional pay for work done on Sundays and holidays. That decision became final and executory.

On December 15, 1958, the Union filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations, asking that the Company be ordered to pay the claimed additional compensation for the years 1946 to 1955. The Company moved to dismiss, invoking prescription under Republic Act 1993 and arguing that the claim could not be filed as a mere incident of the earlier case, which had already been finally decided. The Court denied the motion, holding that the prescriptive period was ten years under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, and that the petition was not a new action for overtime pay but a petition for implementation of the 1946 decision.

After hearing, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered its decision on June 14, 1960, ordering the Company to pay 100 percent additional pay for Sundays and holidays from 1946 to 1952, and 75 percent from 1952 to 1955. The Company's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court en banc on July 27, 1960. The Company then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by appeal by certiorari.

Facts

The Union represented nine of its members who had been employed by the Company as security guards since 1946 and 1947. In its 1946 decision, the Court of Industrial Relations had already granted the Union's demand for 100 percent additional pay for work done on Sundays and holidays. That award had become final and executory long before the present controversy.

Despite the award, the Company paid these employees nothing extra for Sunday and holiday work from 1946 to 1952. For the years 1952 to 1955, the Company paid them only 25 percent additional compensation. It was only in the succeeding years that the Company paid Sunday and holiday work in accordance with the 1946 award.

On December 15, 1958, the Union filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations to recover the unpaid additional compensation. The Company raised prescription and the finality of the earlier decision as defenses. The Court of Industrial Relations ruled for the Union, and the Company appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether or not the award made in favor of the Union members on July 23, 1946 may still be enforced on December 15, 1958, the date the petition for its enforcement was filed.
• Whether or not the petition for enforcement was correctly treated as a motion for execution, subject to the five-year period for execution by mere motion.

Applicable Provisions

Section 23 of Commonwealth Act Number 103, as amended by Section 6 of Commonwealth Act Number 559, provides:

In case of noncompliance with any award, order or decision of the Court of Industrial Relations after it has become final and executory, the same may be enforced by a writ of execution or any other remedy provided by law in respect to enforcement and execution of orders, decisions or judgments of Courts of First Instance.

This provision is the basis for treating the Union's petition as a motion for execution and for applying the rules on execution of judgments of Courts of First Instance.

Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as applied by the Court, provides:

A final judgment of a Court of First Instance may be ordered executed by mere motion only within five years from the date of its entry.

This fixes the five-year period within which the 1946 award could be enforced by mere motion.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court answered in the negative. The petition for enforcement was correctly considered by the Court of Industrial Relations as a motion for execution. Under Section 23 of Commonwealth Act Number 103, as amended, a final and executory award of the Court of Industrial Relations may be enforced by a writ of execution or any other remedy provided by law in respect to enforcement and execution of judgments of Courts of First Instance. Following its ruling in National Development Company versus Aralor, the Court held that Section 6 of Rule 39 applies to the execution of awards by the Court of Industrial Relations. The petition, filed on December 15, 1958, was filed long after the expiration of the five-year period from the entry of the 1946 award. It could no longer be enforced by mere motion.

On the second issue, the Court confirmed that the petition was in the nature of a motion for execution, and as such was barred by the lapse of the five-year period. The Court set aside the decision appealed from, but without prejudice to the claimants' right to enforce the 1946 award in the manner provided by law.

Doctrine

A final and executory award of the Court of Industrial Relations is enforced in the same manner as a judgment of a Court of First Instance. Under Section 23 of Commonwealth Act Number 103, as amended, noncompliance with such an award may be met by a writ of execution or any other remedy provided by law for the enforcement of judgments of Courts of First Instance. By force of Section 6 of Rule 39, a final judgment may be ordered executed by mere motion only within five years from the date of its entry. A petition filed after the lapse of that period, treated as a motion for execution, is time-barred. The remedy of the claimant is not extinguished altogether, but enforcement by mere motion is no longer available; the award may still be enforced in the manner provided by law.

Disposition

The Court set aside the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, without prejudice to the claimants' right to enforce the 1946 award in the manner provided by law, and without costs.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: a final award of the Court of Industrial Relations may be executed by mere motion only within five years from its entry, after which the remedy is a separate action. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a motion for execution and an independent action, and the application of the five-year period under Rule 39 to labor awards.