CORNELIO AGUILA AND LUCIANA ARROYO-AGUILA, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, VS. J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

This is one of the many cases that arose from the settlement of
the controversy between the Deudor family and the J.
M. Tuason Co., Inc., over a tract of land in Quezon City of about 50 quiñones,
in virtue of a Compromise Agreement said parties entered into on March 16,
1953. Being questioned here on appeal by the spouses Cornelio Aguila and Lucina Arroyo-Aguila, is the order of dismissal by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal of their complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-7801, filed against J. M. Tuason & Co., and
involving a lot covered in the aforementioned compromise agreement.

It appears on record that under date of April 2, 1958, J. Tuason
& Co., instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal
Civil Case No. Q-4275, recovery of possession of a portion of its land, of
about 1,000 square meters, in barrio Matalahib,
Quezon City,
to have been usurped by therein defendant Cornelio Aguila.  On September
8, 1959, judgment was rendered in the case, for the plaintiff, the
court ruling as follows:

“An examination of the evidence presented will reveal that
plaintiff has sufficiently established its cause of action against the
defendant.   In the first place, the
claim of the plaintiff is based on a title issued in accordance with the
Torrens System.  As such plaintiff is
entitled to the possession of the aforesaid parcel of land registered in its
name unless it has expressly authorized the defendant to possess the same.  In the second place, it has been admitted
that the possession of the defendant is made without the knowledge and consent
of the plaintiff.  How can now the Court
decree a judgment in favor of the defendant. 
To do so would be tantamount to violation of the cardinal principle
underlying the adoption of the Torrens System in this jurisdiction.  x x x.”

Consequently, defendant and all persons claiming under him were
ordered to vacate the premises and to remove the existing, construction there­on,
and to pay a monthly rental of P100.00 from September 3, 1959 until possession is restored to
plaintiff.

Having failed to perfect a timely appeal from this decision
therein defendant filed a motion for new trial and for the setting aside of
judgment, which motion was denied for being out of time.  Appealed to this Court, the lower court’s
order of denial of the said motion for new trial, was affirmed (L-16757,
November 29, 1963).

Thereupon, on February
10, 1964, the spouses Cornelio Aguila and
Lucina Arroyo-Aguila
commenced the present proceeding by filing a complaint in the Court of First
instance of Rizal (Civ.
Case No. Q-7801), praying for annulment of the judgment in Civil Case No. 4275,
the declaration of their right to purchase the land described therein at the
price prevailing at the time when they demanded the sale of said lot to them,
and for the reconveyance to plaintiffs, by the
defendant, of the title to that property.

Defendant J. M. Tuason S Co., Inc.
moved for the dismissal the complaint, raising the defenses of bar by former
judgment – referring to the final decision in Civil Case No. 4275 – and lack of
cause of action – on the basis of the aforementioned final judgment in the possessory action and of the ruling of this Court in the
case of J. M. Tuason & Co. vs. Sanvictores.^[1]
Sustaining the allegations of defendant, the court below issued the order of
dismissal subject of the present appeal.

Appellants dispute the correctness of the dismissal of their
complaint, contending that the decision in Civil Case No. 4275, on herein appellee’s right to possession of the lot, is not res judicata to the
issue involved in Civil Case No. 7801 which is an action for recovery of
ownership and annulment of judgment or for specific performance that the
rescission of the Compromise Agreement between the Deudors
and J. M. Tuason & Co. does not affect their
right to purchase the lot in dispute; and that for the defenses of res adjudicata and
lack of cause of action to cause the dismissal of a complaint, they must appear
on the face of that pleading, which allegedly is not so in this case.

We find this appeal without merit.

The lower Court correctly ruled that the present action is barred
by the final judgment rendered in the previous case of Tuason
& Co. vs. Aguila, Civil Case No. Q-4275, of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal.  The reason is plain: if the herein appellants
really had a preferential right to a conveyance of the land from J. M. Tuason & Co., or if the certificate of (Torrens) title
held by Tuason & Co. were truly void and
ineffective, then these facts should have been pleaded by these appellants in
the previous case (Q-4275), since such facts, if true, constituted a defense to
the claim of Tuason & Co. for recovery of
possession.  If appellants failed to
plead such defenses in that previous case, they are barred from litigating the
same in any subsequent proceeding, for it is a well established rule that as
between the same parties and on the same subject and cause of action, a final
judgment is conclusive not only on matters directly adjudicated, but also as
to any another matter that could have been raised in relation thereto.^[2]

The fact that Civil Case No. 4275, filed by appellee
against appellants was for recovery of possession of the lot, whereas Civil
Case No. 7801, brought by appellants against appellee
was for reconveyance or recovery of ownership of the
same property, and that the subject lot in the first case is smaller (1,000 sq,
m.) than that in the second (1,400 sq. m.), do not remove the present proceeding
from the operation of the principle of bar by former judgment.  As specifically stated in the decision in
Civil Case No. 4275, now final and executory, the
right of therein plaintiff (appellee herein) to
possession of the lot was based on a title issued to the latter in accordance
with the Torrens System.  In other words,
the recognition of the incidental right to possession of the property is
predicated upon the court’s recognition of appellee’s
right of ownership thereof.  And, a
change in the form of action or in the relief sought, it must remembered, does
not remove a proper case from the application of res
adjudicata.^[3]

We have also pointed out in our decision in Tuason
& Co. vs. Sanvictores, L-16836, January 30, 1962,
that the preferential right to purchase the lot in question (as now claimed by
appellants) was in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim in the previous
action for possession, and that the failure to set it up resulted in a waiver
thereof, the claimant being thereafter barred from invoking it after the
judgment in the possessory action became final.

Appellants assert in their reply brief (p. 7) that they did
assert such compulsory counterclaim in their answer in the previous suit, Case
No. Q-4275.  If such were the case, then
this counter­claim was decided adversely to them when the Court in that case
decided in favor of Tuason & Co. and ordered
defendants there (appellants Aguila here) to vacate
and restore the premises in question.  By
allowing that decision to become final, appellants are again estopped by res judicata from interposing the same facts and claim
in the present case.

Public policy is firmly set against unnecessary multiplicity of
suits; the rule of res judicata,
like that against splitting causes of action, are all applications same policy,
that matters once settled by a Court’s final judgment should not thereafter be
invoked again.  Relitigation
of issues already settled merely burdens the Courts and the taxpayers, creates
uneasiness and confusion, and wastes valuable time and energy that could be
devoted to worthier cases.  As the Roman
maxim goes, Non bis in idem.

The decision appealed from is, therefore, affirmed with costs
against appellants Aguila.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and
Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
G. R. No. L-16836, January 30, 1962.  It was held that the Compromise Agreement
between the Deudors and J. M. Tuason
& Co. was partially rescinded in view of the failure of the former to
comply with some of the terms and conditions thereof.

^[2]
Sec. 49 (b), Revised Rule 39; Peñalosa vs. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303; P.N.B. vs. Barretto,
52 Phil. 818, 824; Jalandoni and Ramos vs.
Martin Guanzon, 102 Phil. 869, 862, and cases cited
therein.

^[3] Clemente vs. H. E. Heacock
Co., G. R. No. L-23212, May 18, 1967;
Francisco vs. Blas, 93 Phil. 43.