ANTONIO CRUZ, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ONOFRE VILLA­LUZ, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH XVII, AND EFREN GARCIA, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction, to annul
and set aside the order of the respondent judge for the issuance of a writ of
execution in Civil Case No. Q-16356 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
entitled: “Antonio Cruz, plaintiff,
versus Efren Garcia, defendant”, as well as the order denying the
motion for its reconsideration.

The record shows that on March 13, 1972, the herein petitioner
Antonio Cruz filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
against the private respondent Efren Garcia and the Chief of Police of Pasay
City for the recovery of a “payloader”‘ valued at P48,000.00, the
possession of which had been allegedly withheld from him by the defendants.^[1]
Upon his filing of a replevin bond, the “payloader” was restored to
him on May 23, 1972.^[2]
After trial, a decision was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads,
as follows:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the preponderance of
evidence in favor of the defendant. This case is ordered dismissed without pronouncement as to costs. The plaintiff, having failed to pay the
rentals for the payloader for two (2) months, is ordered to pay the defendant
the sum of Twelve Thousand (P12,000.00) pesos. The payloader is ordered to be returned to the defendant.”^[3]

On October 25, 1974, the plaintiff Antonio Cruz filed a motion
for the reconsideration of the decision upon the ground that there is a
material contradiction and misappreciation of facts in the decision; indicating
therein the pertinent portions of the judgment which are not supported by the
evidence or which are contrary to law.^[4]
The defendant Efren Garcia likewise moved for the reconsideration of the
decision, asking for the payment of accrued rentals on the
“payloader” from May 23, 1972, when the said “payloader”
was returned to the plaintiff.^[5]
The plaintiff filed an opposition thereto, citing the grounds stated in his
motion for reconsidera­tion which he asked to be “incorporated and
likewise taken into consideration for purposes of stress, side by side this
opposi­tion”; and for the reason that the claim was not included in
defendant’s answer and counterclaim. Besides asking for the denial of the defendant’s motion, the plaintiff
further prayed that “his previous Motion for Reconsideration be duly approved
and the Decision aforesaid be duly set aside.”^[6]
On July 18, 1975, the respondent judge declared that the motions for re­consideration
of the parties, as well as the oppositions thereto, are deemed submitted for
resolution.^[7]

On July 25, 1975, the respondent judge issued the fol­lowing
order:

“Considering the allegations of, the issues raised and the
arguments adduced in the defend­ant’s motion for reconsideration dated October
3, 1974, as well as the opposition thereto, the Court finds the motion to be without
merit and therefore denies it.”^[8]

and on August 18, 1975, the defendant
asked for the issuance of a writ of execution.^[9]
The plaintiff opposed the execution of the judgment for being premature since
the motion for re­consideration of the decision filed by him has not yet been
resolved.^[10]
The respondent judge, however, granted the defendant’s motion, saying:

“Considering that the filing of a motion for reconsideration
does not stop the running of the period for filing an appeal, and consi­dering
the allegations of, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the
defendant’s motion for issuance of a writ of execution, the Court finds the
said motion to be merito­rious, the decision in this case having become final,
unappealable and executory.

“WHEREFORE, the motion for issuance of a writ of execution is
hereby granted. The Acting Deputy Clerk
of this Court is ordered to issue the writ of execution prayed for.”^[11]

When the respondent judge denied^[12]
the motion for the reconsideration of this order,^[13]
the plaintiff filed the instant peti­tion for certiorari, to annul and set
aside the order for the issuance of a writ of execution, as well as the order
denying the motion for its reconsideration. A writ of preliminary injunction was issued upon the filing of a bond in
the amount of P12,000.00 to restrain the enforcement of the questioned orders.^[14]

The only issue to be resolved, considering the above facts, is
whether or not the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the order for the issuance of a writ of execution.

The petitioner contends that the controversial order for the
issuance of a writ of execution was premature since the decision sought to be
enforced is not yet final and executory as the respondent judge had not yet
resolved his motion for the reconsideration of the said decision. The respondent, Efren Garcia, upon the other
hand, contends that the facts and circumstances obtaining in the case show that
the plain­tiff’s motion for reconsideration of the decision was resolved by the
respondent judge in his order dated July 25, 1975; and that the plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration is a pro forma motion. Quoting the order of July 25, 1975, the
respondent argues thusly:

“From the reading of the Order, it is very clear that the
respondent judge consi­dered the Opposition of plaintiff dated Decem­ber 18,
1974. And in considering the said
Opposition, he also considered plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration because
plaintiff prayed that ‘In this connection, plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration aforesaid is here­by incorporated and likewise taken into con­sideration
for purposes of stress, side by side this opposition.’ And besides, the Notice
of Hearing dated June 30, 1975 spe­cifies the two Motions for Reconsideration,
that of plaintiff and defendant. Hence,
it cannot be said that the respondent judge did not consider plaintiff’s Motion
for Reconsi­deration dated October 25, 1974.”^[15]

There is merit in the petition. While it may be true that the plaintiff had asked the court that his
motion for re­consideration be incorporated in, and taken into considera­tion
with, his opposition to the defendant’s motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, and that the respondent judge had stated that the motions for
reconsideration of the parties, as well as their opposition, are deemed
submitted for consideration, the denial of the plaintiff’s motion for reconsi­deration
cannot be implied from the order of July 25, 1975. Only the defendant’s motion for reconsideration was explicitly
denied and no mention was made of the plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration. Neither could it be
implied from sub­sequent acts or orders since there is no order issued which
may be considered inconsistent with the granting of the re­lief sought in the
motion for reconsideration.

It is also claimed that the plaintiff’s motion for recon­sideration
is a pro forma motion intended merely to delay the proceedings
and does not interrupt or suspend the period of time for the perfection of an
appeal.

A motion for reconsideration is pro forma when it
does not specify the findings or conclusions in the judgment which are not
supported by evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to
the pertinent evidence or legal provisions, as expressly required in the third
paragraph of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.

In his motion for reconsideration, the plaintiff ques­tioned
specific findings and conclusions in the decision and had taken pains in
pinpointing the pages in the decision where the findings and conclusions
appear, the pages of the tran­script of stenographic notes where the alleged
contrary evi­dence is to be found, the names of witnesses whose testimo­nial
evidence is referred to, and the exhibit numbers of the documentary evidence
relied upon. By and large, there is
enough in the said motion for reconsideration to persuade an impartial observer
that there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the rules.

It is pointed out that the issues raised in the petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration is a “mere repetition of the issues already
passed upon by the trial court;” that these “matters were raised in
the trial and in the memorandum of the defendant dated August 18, 1974,”
and that the decision of the trial court is based on evidence and facts of the
case so that it “cannot be argued that said Decision is contrary to the
evidence or against the law.^[16]
We are not here concerned, however, with the correctness of the trial court’s
conclusion as to the ownership of the “payloader”. The question posed is the nature of the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and is whether it has sufficiently
complied with the require­ments of the Rules and therefore, not pro forma.

It results that the petitioner’s motion for the reconsi­deration
of the decision is not a pro forma motion and con­sequently,
tolled the running of the period for appeal. Hence, the respondent judge abused his discretion in ordering the
enforcement of the decision dated September 13, 1974.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the orders dated
August 25, 1975 and October 3, 1975 issued in Civil Case No. Q-16356 of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal are hereby annulled and set aside. The respondent judge is hereby ordered to
resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner on October 25,
1974 in the said case. The writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is made permanent. With costs against the respondent Efren
Garcia.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Santos, and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 26.

^[2]
Id., pp. 79, 167.

^[3]
Id., pp. 40, 44.

^[4]
Id., p. 45.

^[5]
Id., p. 78.

^[6]
Id., p. 166.

^[7]
Id., p. 173.

^[8]
Id., p. 85.

^[9]
Id., p. 86.

^[10]
Id., p. 88.

^[11]
Id., p. 90.

^[12]
Id., p. 100.

^[13]
Id., p. 91.

^[14]
Id., p. 107.

^[15]
Id., pp. 133-134.

^[16]
Id., p. 136.