EMERSON LIM, OWNER AND PROPRIETOR OF IGACOS COCO TECHNOLOGY, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (EIGHTH DIVISION) AND ABRAHAM T. ALMENDRAS AND GEORGE LERASAN, R…
SANTOS, J.:[1]
The Antecedents
Petitioner is the owner and proprietor of Igacos Coco Technology located at Maag, Peñaplata, Island Garden City of Samal, which is engaged in the business of processing and exporting coco fiber.[7]
On 11 October 2010, private respondents Abraham T. Almendras (Almendras) and George Lerasan (Lerasan), together with Virgilio E. Segon (Segon) and Bonnie O. Dayon (Dayon), filed a Complaint before the NLRC, Regional Arbitration Branch XI, Davao City, against petitioner and Everbliss Human Resources (Everbliss) for underpayment of salaries, and non-payment of holiday pay, allowances, 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay.[8] Said Complaint was later amended on 10 February 2011 to include the claim for illegal dismissal.[9]
Private respondents Almendras and Lerasan claim that they were hired by petitioner as truck loader on 15 October 2008, and billing/packer on 07 October 2008, respectively,[10] while Segon and Dayon were both hired by petitioner as driers of coco fiber on 24 September 2009 and 15 June 2010, respectively.[11] All of them had a salary rate of Php150.00 a day.[12]
In their Position Paper filed before the Labor Arbiter, private respondents Almendras and Lerasan aver that until November 2009, petitioner’s supervisors were the ones overseeing their work. In the same Position Paper, however, they also claim that sometime in June 2009, a representative of Everbliss came to their workplace and made all workers sign a blank sheet of paper as a requisite for their continued employment. They allege that after they signed the same, they received a letter informing them that they have entered a contract with Everbliss for a period of five (5) months, and they were thereafter placed under the supervision of Everbliss.[13]
Sometime in the early part of 2010, private respondents allegedly complained to petitioner regarding some money claims, but they were allegedly told to leave their jobs if they were not satisfied with their pay. Subsequently, on 30 September 2010, petitioner allegedly posted a Memorandum addressed to all workers informing of a one (1)-week cessation of operations due to lack of materials to process. However, private respondents claim that when they checked the work premises after two (2) days, they found out that operations were never stopped but they were already replaced by other workers. Thus, they were constrained to file the Complaint they filed before the Labor Arbiter.[14]
As for petitioner, he avers that on 17 March 2010, he executed an Agreement with Everbliss, allegedly a legitimate job contractor, for the latter to supply reliever workers to perform various jobs in the production area of petitioner. According to petitioner, Everbliss has adequate capital, equipment and expertise for the conduct of providing management services to the public.[15] It is also duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and is a Registered Barangay Micro Business Enterprise (BMBE).[16] The Agreement between petitioner and Everbliss was to commence from 01 March 2010 to 01 March 2011.[17]
Petitioner points to Everbliss as the one responsible for the claims of private respondents, emphasizing that the former has admitted that the latter are its employees.[18]
Everbliss submitted copies of the Cash Vouchers to prove that it had paid private respondents’ holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay.[19] It also denies the claim for illegal dismissal allegedly because private respondents had resigned voluntarily[20] as shown by their resignation letters, proofs of receipt of financial assistance and Deeds of Release, Waiver and Quitclaim.[21]
On 28 April 2011, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, viz.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint of Virgilio E. Segon for lack of merit. Respondent IGACOS COCO Technology/EMERSON LIM, Owner, are hereby ordered to pay the above-named complainants the total amount of PESOS: FIFTY THREE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY ONLY (P53,750.00) representing separation pay, salary differential, allowances and 13th month pay plus ten percent (10%) of the award as attorney’s fees.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of basis.
The complaint of Bonnie O. Dayson is considered as settled and closed and dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.[22]
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed the said Decision to the NLRC on 01 July 2011.[23] However, on 21 February 2012, the NLRC issued a Resolution[24] dismissing petitioner’s appeal, thereby, affirming the Labor Arbiter’s Decision of 28 April 2011. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration[25] filed on 22 March 2012 was also denied in the NLRC’s Resolution dated 24 May 2012.[26]
Hence, petitioner resorted to the instant recourse before this Court with an application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI).[27]
In a Resolution[28] dated 24 January 2013, this Court denied the application for issuance of a TRO and/or WPI. Thus, the parties submitted their respective Memoranda.[29]
In this Court’s Resolution[30] dated 18 August 2014, the instant case was referred to the Philippine Mediation Center for mediation. However, because no settlement was reached, the instant case was referred back for judicial proceedings.[31]
The Issue
Petitioner raises the following as the sole issue to be resolved in the instant petition, viz.:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD FOR SEPARATION PAY, SALARY DIFFERENTIAL, ALLOWANCES AND 13TH MONTH PAY TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THEIR (sic) WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT THEY WERE EMPLOYEES OF THE PETITIONER DURING THE PERIOD FROM OCTOBER 15, 2008 TO MAY 31, 2009.[32]
This Court’s Ruling
Petitioner ascribes grave abuse of discretion upon the NLRC for affirming the Labor Arbiter’s ruling holding it liable for the money claims of private respondents allegedly because the latter’s employer is Everbliss who, in fact, categorically admits to being their employer, while there is allegedly no evidence showing that they were under petitioner’s employment for the period from 15 October 2008 to 31 May 2009.[33]
Petitioner’s position is bereft of merit. After an assiduous examination of the records, this Court cannot subscribe to petitioner’s contention that it is not the employer of private respondents, hence, not liable for the latters’ money claims for the said period.
In the following documents and pleadings, namely: a) Complaint[34] before the Labor Arbiter; b) Position Paper[35] before the Labor Arbiter; c) Affidavit[36] attached to said Position Paper; d) Comment[37] to the Memorandum of Appeal filed before the NLRC; and e) Memorandum[38] filed before this Court, private respondents consistently stated that “Abraham T. Almendras was hired by respondent IGACOS COCO TECHNOLOGY as a trucking (loader of coconut fiber to the truck used for transportation) sometime on October 15, 2008” while “George Lerasan xxx was hired by respondent IGACOS COCO as a billing (packer) for coconut fiber sometime on October 7, 2008.”[39]
On the other hand, for petitioner, while he adamantly denies the existence of an employee-employer relationship with private respondents, he admits that the latter were assigned and worked at his business establishment.[40] With such an admission, it strains credulity that private respondents Abraham T. Almendras and George Lerasan, truck loader of coconut fiber and packer of coconut fiber, respectively, which jobs are clearly necessary and related to the main business of petitioner which is the processing and exporting of coco fiber, would just be at petitioner’s workplace for no reason at all. It would be more in accord with logic and the natural course of things that they were there in order to work at said establishment. Hence, petitioner’s theory that private respondents were total strangers to him does not inspire belief.
Thus, weighing private respondents’ asseveration that they were the workers of petitioner vis-à-vis the latter’s denial of an employer-employee relationship, this Court is constrained to rule in favor of the former. While it may be true that in labor cases the burden to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship rests upon the employee especially when the employer denies the same,[41] the attendant circumstances in the present case compel this Court to rule that an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and private respondents, notwithstanding the seeming lack of substantial evidence proving existence of such work relationship. This is because, although private respondents’ proof of employment with petitioner mainly consists of allegations in their pleadings, and at best, a statement under oath in the form of an affidavit, the same was buttressed by petitioner’s own statement that private respondents were indeed assigned and worked at his business establishment.[42]
As already discussed, between petitioner’s lame denial and private respondents’ positive statement that they worked for petitioner which was supported by petitioners’ admission that they indeed were assigned and worked at his business establishment, this Court is convinced that, in the totality of things, the latter version is the truth. Besides, even assuming arguendo that there was no such admission by petitioner and neither party adduced any proof whatsoever of the presence or absence of an employment relationship, the doubt would nonetheless be weighed and resolved in the manner that would be favorable to labor,[43] in this case, the private respondents.
Additionally, the oft-repeated rule is that no particular form of evidence is required to prove the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be admitted. For, if only documentary evidence such as payslips and IDs would be required to show that relationship, no scheming employer would ever be brought before the bar of justice, as no employer would wish to come out with any trace of the illegality he has authored considering that it should take much weightier proof to invalidate a written instrument.[44]
Moreover, it is difficult to accord credence to petitioner’s contention that private respondents were the workers of Everbliss alone, to the exclusion of petitioner, considering that the Agreement[45] between them which is supposed to be the basis for the transfer of the employees to Everbliss, thereby making the latter the employer of private respondents, clearly provides that the “Agreement shall remain in full force and effect for a period of one year to commence on March 1, 2010 and will end on March 1, 2011.”[46] In other words, Everbliss came into the picture only beginning 01 March 2010. That brings to the fore the question of who then is private respondents’ employer prior to the date of effectivity of the Agreement with Everbliss? If petitioner’s position that he was not their employer would be believed, and considering that private respondents Abraham T. Almendras and George Lerasan were hired on 15 October 2008 and on 07 October 2008, respectively, it means that private respondents did not have any employer between the time of their hiring in October 2008 up to 28 February 2010 since Everbliss supposedly became their employer on 01 March 2010 only. Surely, such absurd scenario does not deserve this Court’s consideration at all.
Besides, the Agreement between petitioner and Everbliss has the following pertinent provisions, viz.:
WHEREAS, the CLIENT has agreed to hire the services of the CONTRACTOR in order to supply reliever workers to perform various jobs in the production area;
WHEREAS, EVERBLISS HUMAN RESOURCES is a duly licensed firm with adequate capital, equipment and expertise primarily engaged in the business of contracting for and providing management services to the general public;
WHEREAS, IGACOS Coco Technology hired the services and expertise of herein CONTRACTOR to provide reliever workers to do various jobs for them subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter agree[d] upon; xxx [47]
Considering the avowed purpose of the abovequoted Agreement which was for Everbliss “to supply reliever workers to perform various jobs in the production area” of petitioner, it is clear that Everbliss merely recruited, supplied, or placed reliever workers to perform jobs and activities which are directly related to the main business of petitioner. The fact that Everbliss was to supply reliever workers to petitioner presupposes that petitioner has his own set of “original” or regular workers before Everbliss came into the picture. It goes without saying then that the latter was to provide workers only to replace or substitute for those regular workers who cannot render work in particular day/s. Since Everbliss is tasked to supply reliever workers only, this means two (2) things, viz.: a) the reliever workers of Everbliss were to perform jobs similar to that of the regular workers, hence, their jobs were clearly directly related to the principal business of petitioner; and b) petitioner has his own set of regular workers to begin with. The latter, therefore, debunks petitioner’s position that it has never become an employer, thus, buttressing again private respondent’s position that they were the workers of petitioner prior to the takeover of Everbliss.
Furthermore, the records show that the work or services rendered by private respondents were necessary and directly related to the nature of petitioner’s business. As already mentioned, private respondents Abraham T. Almendras and George Lerasan were truck loader of coconut fiber and packer of coconut fiber, respectively, which jobs are clearly necessary and related to petitioner’s main business of processing and exporting coco fiber. As such, private respondents are clearly regular employees, as correctly ruled by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.
The definition of who is a regular employee vis-à-vis other categories of workers is provided in Article 280, Paragraph 1, of the Labor Code, viz.:
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employment.— The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing contemplates of two (2) kinds of regular employees, namely:
- those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; and
- those casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are employed.
Since the activities performed by private respondents were usually necessary or desirable in the usual business of petitioner, they clearly fall within the first category of regular employees.
As aptly held by the NLRC, thus:
In fact, the jobs undertaken by the complainants- Abraham T. Almendras, as a trucking loader of coconut fiber; George Lerasan, as a billing packer for coconut fiber – are undisputedly all related to the usual business and trade of IGACOS.
IGACOS[’] argument that the complainants are “strangers” to its business company and are only “assigned at their premises” pursuant to a contract they executed with Everbliss Human Resources is only an attempt to muddle the issues. It must be pointed out that the arbiter a quo’s ruling was only for the granting of the employment benefits to complainants Abraham T. Almendras and George Lerasan for the period between October 15, 2008 to May 31, 2009 considering that they were, during this period, employed by respondent-appellant IGACOS plus their separation pays when their services were transferred to EVERBLISS sometime in June 2009. Thus, no reversible error was committed by the Labor Arbiter a quo.
The contention that there is no evidence to support that indeed IGACOS was the employer of complainants Abraham T. Almendras and George Lerasan for the period between October 15, 2008 to May 31, 2009 considering that they were not able to present payslips or identification cards to prove that they were employees of IGACOS is not meritorious. This is a common defense of employers who want to evade their responsibilities to their laborers. xxx[48]
This Court is not oblivious that private respondents have raised as an issue the legitimacy of Everbliss as a job contractor, contending that the latter is a labor-only contractor, which argument they proffered not only in their Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter,[49] but also in their Memorandum before this Court.[50] Strangely, however, private respondents did not appeal the ruling in the Labor Arbiter’s Decision of 28 April 2011 finding nothing illegal about petitioner’s alleged act of farming out a job or service to a contractor or subcontractor.[51] Consequently, that aspect has been rendered unrefuted, hence, final. It is, therefore, too late in the day to raise the same issue anew before this Court via their Memorandum after they have not appealed the same before the NLRC, the administrative body which could have been in the best position to restudy the matter of whether Everbliss is a legitimate job contractor or a prohibited labor-only contractor.
As matters therefore stand now, the said issue cannot anymore be tackled before this Court, especially since the instant recourse is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It is a well-settled rule that judicial review of decisions of the NLRC via petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as a general rule, is confined only to issues of lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC. This Court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC based their conclusions. The issue is limited to the determination of whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the resolution, except if the findings of the NLRC are not supported by substantial evidence.[52] Considering that private respondents did not bother to appeal the aspect of the status of Everbliss as a contractor, they cannot fault the NLRC for not ruling thereon, much less, for not granting them any relief as would have been concomitant if they were able to prove a labor-only arrangement between petitioner and Everbliss.
Since private respondents’ averment as to the dates they were hired, i.e., Abraham T. Almendras on 15 October 2008 while private respondent Lerasan, on 07 October 2008, was affirmed by the labor tribunals, petitioner’s monetary liability should be adjudged to commence from said dates, instead of the uniform date, i.e., 15 October 2008, used by the Labor Arbiter.[53]
Also, this Court cannot agree that petitioner’s liability should only be up to 31 May 2009, the supposed date before the supervisor of Everbliss took over on June 2009. It must be noted that the pegging of the reckoning date for the takeover by Everbliss on June 2009 was apparently based on an allegation of private respondents in their Affidavit[54] attached to their complaint. Obviously, it was based on what they can recall as the date when such event took place, or at least, their perception of it,[55] apparently accounting for the lack of a definite date in June 2009. On the other hand, the Agreement between petitioner and Everbliss clearly states that it became effective only on 01 March 2010.[56]
Therefore, petitioner’s liability should be held to cover the period from private respondents’ respective dates of hiring, i.e., on 15 October 2008 for Abraham T. Almendras, and on 07 October 2008 for George Lerasan, up to 28 February 2010, the last day before the Agreement with Everbliss became effective. The Labor Arbiter should therefore recompute the awards based on the foregoing.
Finally, this Court awards legal interest on the monetary awards granted to private respondents at six percent (6%)57 per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated 21 February 2012 of the NLRC, Eighth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, in NLRC No. MAC-09-012233-2011, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner EMERSON LIM, owner and proprietor of Igacos Coco Technology, is ORDERED to pay private respondents ABRAHAM ALMENDRAS and GEORGE LERASAN separation benefits and other monetary awards as may be finally recomputed by the Labor Arbiter from the private respondents’ respective date of hiring, i.e., on 15 October 2008 for private respondent Abraham T. Almendras and on 07 October 2008 for private respondent George Lerasan up to 28 February 2010, plus legal interest imposed thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until its satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
Lloren, J., Ch., and Contreras, JJ., concur.
[1] The case was unloaded to the undersigned ponente pursuant to Office Order No. 03-14-JMBP dated 01 April 2014 as part of his initial caseload.
[2] Rollo, pp. 9-24.
[3] Id. at 28-32, Annex A, Petition; Penned by Commissioner Dominador B. Medroso, Jr., and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Bario-Rod M. Talon and Commissioner Proculo T. Sarmen.
[4] Id. at 57-61, Annex L, Petition; Penned by Labor Arbiter Miriam A. Libron-Barroso.
[5] Id. at 35, Annex B. Petition; Penned by Commissioner Dominador B. Medroso, Jr., and concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Bario-Rod M. Talon and Commissioner Proculo T. Sarmen.
[6] Id. at 141-145, Annex P, Petition.
[7] Id. at 12, Petition, p. 4.
[8] Id. at 43, Annex F, Petition.
[9] Id. at 108, Labor Arbiter Decision, Annex L, Petition.
[10] Id. at 92, Annex K, Petition.
[11] Id at 43, Annex F, Petition.
[12] Id.
[13] Id. at 92-93,Annex K, Petition.
[14] Id. at 93-94.
[15] Id. at 12, Petition.
[16] Id. at 41, 42, Annexes D and E, Petition.
[17] Id. at 38-39, Annex C, Petition.
[18] Id. at 13, Petition.
[19] Id. at 56-57, 64-78, Everbliss Position Paper, Annex I, Petition.
[20] Id. at 14, Petition; Id. at 79-80, Supplemental Position Paper of Everbliss, Annex J, Petition.
[21] Id. at 82-90.
[22] Id. at 113, Labor Arbiter Decision, Annex L, Petition.
[23] Id. at 114-122, Memorandum on Appeal, Annex M, Petition.
[24] Id. at 27-32, NLRC Resolution dated 21 February 2012, Annex A, Petition.
[25] Id. at 141-144, Motion for Reconsideration, Annex P, Petition.
[26] Id. at 35-36, NLRC Resolution dated 24 May 2012, Annex B, Petition.
[27] Id. at 9-24, Petition.
[28] Id. at 148-149, Petition.
[29] Id. at 150-165, 204-211.
[30] Id. at 214-215.
[31] Id. at 220, 223.
[32] Id. at 17-18, Petition.
[33] Id. at 18-21.
[34] Id. at 43, Annex F, Petition.
[35] Id. at 92, Annex K, Petition.
[36] Id. at 104, Affidavit, Annex A, Complainants’ Position Paper.
[37] Id. at 125, Annex N, Petition.
[38] Id. at 152, 153.
[39] Id. at 104, Affidavit, Annex A, Complainants’ Position Paper.
[40] Id. at 46, Petitioner’s Position Paper, Annex G, Petition.
[41] Tenazas v. R. Villegas Taxi Transport, G.R. No. 192998, 02 April 2014.
[42] Id. at 46, Petitioner’s Position Paper, Annex G, Petition.
[43] Chapter I, Article 4, Labor Code, Pres. Decree No. 442.
[44] Tenazas, supra at Note 41, citing Opulencia Ice Plant and Storage v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-98368, 15 December 1993.
[45] Rollo, pp. 38-40, Agreement, Annex C, Petition.
[46] Id. at 39, Agreement.
[47] Id. at 38.
[48] Id. at 31, NLRC Resolution dated 21 February 2012.
[49] Id. at 95-96.
[50] Id. at 157-159, Memorandum of Private Respondents.
[51] Id. at 111-112, Labor Arbiter’s Decision, Annex L, Petition.
[52] Tenazas v. R. Villegas Taxi Transport, G.R. No. 192998, 02 April 2014.
[53] Id. at 113, Labor Arbiter Decision, Annex L, Petition.
[54] Rollo, p. 167.
[55] Id. at 111, Labor Arbiter Decision.
[56] Id. at 39, Agreement, Annex C, Petition.
[57] Nacar v. Gallery Frames, G.R. No. 189871, 13 August 2013.