EDUARDO E. PASCUAL, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Appeal taken by the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac in Civil Case No. 3277 entitled “Eduardo E.
Pascual vs. Director of Lands and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources”, of the following tenor:

“In view of all the foregoing, the Court renders judgment in this case to the following effect:

A.
Declaring as null and void the decision of the Director of Lands dated
May 21, 1955, as concurred in by the Undersecretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, in so far as the said decision denied to plaintiff
Eduardo E. Pascual the prior right of entry in the lands in question;

B. Declaring plaintiff Eduardo E. Pascual as entitled to the rights
granted in Section 102 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, thereby ordering
the defendant Director of Lands to allow plaintiff to file his
application over Lot Nos. 672 and 674 of the Cadastral Survey of Ramos,
in question, and allow him to show that he is qualified to be granted a
prior right of entry.

Without special pronouncement as to cost.”

It appears that several years before 1954 one Valente Ramos (now
deceased) leased from the government Lot Nos. 672 and 674 of the
Cadastral Survey of Ramos, Tarlac. On June 22, 1954, Eduardo Pascual
filed with the Office of the Director of Lands, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 102 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, a petition for
the cancellation of the lease contract aforesaid, on the ground that
Ramos had failed to pay the rentals on the lands for seven years and
the taxes thereon since 1947, and on the further ground that he and his
successors-in-interest had not cultivated the property nor introduced
improvements thereon, in violation of the terms and conditions of the
lease.

Acting on Pascual’s petition, the Director of Lands ordered the
Provincial Land Officer to investigate the case and submit his report
to the District Land Officer for appropriate action. After the
investigation, in the course of which Pascual and the heirs of Ramos
appeared and presented evidence, the Director of Lands, with the
concurrence of the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
ordered the cancellation of the contract of lease aforementioned on the
ground that Ramos had failed to pay the rentals and the land taxes from
1948 and 1947, respectively, but denied to Pascual the preferential
right of entry to the lands covered by the cancelled contract of lease,
on the ground that Ramos’ lease would have been cancelled irrespective
of Pascual’s petition. Pascual elevated the case to the Office of the
President but his appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. Thereafter he
commenced the present action for certiorari in the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac against the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to annul the aforementioned decision
insofar as it denied him the preferential right of entry over Lots, 672
and 674. The answer filed by the Director of Lands alleged that Pascual
had no priority right of entry over the lots in question and that, as
the decision had not yet been implemented by him, Pascual had no
personality to assail the same.

Upon the facts stated above, the decisive question to be determined
in this appeal is the correctness of the ruling of the trial court
upholding appellee’s claim to a prior right of entry. In this
connection, it appears that Section 102 of Commonwealth Act No. 141
provides that any person, corporation, or association may file an
opposition under oath to any application under the act, grounded on any
reason sufficient thereunder for the denial or cancellation of the
application or the denial of the patent or grant, and that should the
application be denied or the patent cancelled, the oppositor shall, if
qualified, be granted a prior right of entry for a term of sixty (60)
days from notice.

In disposing of the appeal interposed by appellee to the Office of
the President mentioned heretofore, the Executive Secretary, acting for
the Chief Executive, said the following:

“The preferential right of entry granted under
Section 102 of the Public Land Law applies where there was no prior
entry upon public land, or where the contestant or claimant Is at the
same time an occupant of the land and his contest Is founded, among
other things, on the ground of prior occupancy or cultivation of the
land in question.

“In the case at bar applicant, thru
tenants, has been in continuous occupation of the land in question
since 1919. As found in the investigation, he has never abandoned the
land, about more than half of which is planted to various food crops
such as rice corn, beans and tomatoes,

“Appellant, it is
true, proved that Ramos’ successors in interest have not paid the
rentals from March 6, 1949, up to and including March 6, 1955,
amounting to P6,318.32 and the real estate taxes thereon from 1947 to
1954 in the amount of P4,939.95. This delinquency in the payment of
taxes and rentals caused the cancellation and termination of the
contract of lease by the Director of Lands. Appellant now claims right
of entry by virtue of having proved grounds 1 and 2 of his protest.

“But
these facts are of public record and the Director of Lands could have
motu prorio caused the cancellation of the lease contract without
Pascual’s protest. Appellant is a stranger to the case, being neither
an applicant or an ,occupant. He merely brought to the attention of the
Director of Lands applicant’s continued delinquency in the payment of
rent and taxes.

“The policy in the disposition and concession
of public land is to give priority or preference to the actual
occupant. Thus, in cases of lease the law requires “that no lease shall
be permitted to interfere with any prior claim “by settlement or
occupation, until” the consent of the occupant or settler is first had,
or until such claim shall be legally extinguished * * *. (Section 33,
commonwealth Act No. 141). If anyone should be given prior right of
entry at all, it should be the actual occupants who have presented
several petitions for the subdivision and sale of the land to them.”

It is well settled that the contemporaneous interpretation given by
administrative officials to a law they are duty bound to enforce or
implement deserves great weight (Madrigal vs. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 423;
Government etc. vs. Municipality of Binalonan 32, Phil. 364). In the
present case, it appears that the trial court reversed not only the
decisions of the Director of Lands and of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources but that of the Office of the President, without
the record disclosing, in our opinion that the same are clearly
erroneous and unfounded. To the contrary, they appear to be in
consonance with the purpose of the law invoked by appellee, namely, to
give priority or preference to the actual occupant of public land—which
appellee is not. In view of the view we take of the case, we find it
unnecessary to decide the other points raised by appellants.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, with the result
that the complaint filed in the lower court is dismissed. With costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepción,
Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.