CANDIDO SAN LUIS, COMPLAINANT, VS. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO, ETC., RESPONDENT.

On February 27, 1961, Atty. Candido San Luis filed a complaint
against Judge Gregorio D. Montejo of the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City charging the latter with serious inefficiency,
partiality, abuse of authority, ignorance of the law, and falsification
of public documents allegedly committed in connection with the
performance of his official duties. Respondent submitted an answer
explaining the action he has taken in the different cases mentioned in
the complaint which explanation tends to show that he has acted in good
faith and in accordance with law.

In a resolution entered on August 10, 1961, this Court designated
Justice Juan P. Enriquez of the Court of Appeals to investigate the
charges and on March 21, 1962, he submitted his report.

Justice Enriquez set the case for hearing on October 25, 1961
notifying thereof both complainant and respondent. On petition of
complainant on the ground that his witnesses could not be contacted on
time, the hearing was postponed to November 27, 1961. On October 3,
1961, respondent asked for postponement on the ground that if the
investigation should be held on November 27, his calendar for that day
will be disrupted and so he suggested that the hearing be postponed
towards the end of December. Acceding to the suggestion, Justice
Enriquez reset the hearing for December 18-19, 1961.

Complainant filed a third motion for postponement stating that his
witnesses were not willing to come to Manila to testify and asked that
subpoenas be issued for their appearance to which Justice Enriquez
again obliged by postponing the hearing to January 22 and 23, 1962 with
the warning that he would not entertain any further postponement of the
hearing and suggesting that if necessary the deposition of the
witnesses be taken. But before the scheduled date came complainant
filed a written manifestation stating that despite several letters he
sent to his witnesses the latter failed to see him or his lawyer
whereupon he was constrained to submit the case without evidence.

On January 22, 1962, when the case was called for hearing,
respondent and his counsel appeared. Justice Enriquez waited until
10:00 a.m. for complainant to appear, but he failed, which prompted the
investigator to again postpone the hearing for the next day to give an
opportunity to complainant to be present, but when this day came
complainant as well as counsel again did not show up whereupon the
investigator proceeded to receive the evidence of respondent.

One of the charges refers to Civil Case No. 256 wherein defendant
filed a motion for bill of particulars but which respondent failed to
resolve until after the lapse of seven months and that this inaction
notwithstanding respondent filed his certificate of service every 15th
day and end of each month during said period thereby committing a
falsification of public document. With regard to this charge, the
investigator made the following comment: “With respect to Civil Case
No. 256, CFI, respondent labored under the belief that a motion for
bill of particulars is not submitted for resolution even after the
filing of plaintiff’s objections and defendant’s reply thereto until
the motion is reset for hearing, although no evidence need be taken.
Considering that respondent holds court sessions for one month in
Zamboanga City and the next month in Basilan City and alternately
thereafter, the respondent was advised that upon resumption of court
sessions in either place, he should decide without delay all motions
submitted during his absence thereat.”

We agree to this observation. Moreover, respondent should be advised
that a motion for bill of particulars as well as the reply thereto need
not be set for hearing if the court finds it unnecessary to hear the
parties, and so the same should be acted upon without delay or within a
reasonable period of time. Herd respondent allowed seven months to
elapse before acting on the motion which we find unreasonable
especially if we consider the requirement that every 15th day a judge
is required to submit a certificate of service before he can collect
his salary.

With regard to Criminal Case No. 989, People vs. Hadain Sariol, the
investigator found: “Respondent should have convicted the accused of
attempted rape, and not for acts of lasciviousness under the facts of
the case. However, the penalty being the same for both offenses the
error did not work any substantial prejudice against any of the
parties.” It really appears that the court in said case found that the
accused “really attempted to commit the act of sexual intercourse on
the person of Morita Ambon” and yet it found him guilty only of the
crime of acts of lasciviousness. Evidently, respondent committed an
error not only in determining the nature of the crime committed but in
the application of the law as well.

Another charge refers to Criminal Case No. 810, People vs. Yakan
Boah Teguto, for rape. The comment of the investigator follows: “The
actuations of respondent in this case as can be gleaned from the
decision dated June 25, 1959 appear to have been unjustified. The
accused should not have been acquitted, but should have been sentenced
for attempted rape, if respondent did not believe that the offense was
consummated.” In his decision respondent made this finding: “The Court
x x x believes that there was an attempt made by the accused to disrupt
the virginity of the offended party, Morita Djurian, but an attempt is
not a crime of rape as stated in the information.” Indeed, respondent
committed a mistake in acquitting the accused for the charge being one
of rape the accused could have been convicted of attempted rape there
being a finding to that effect. This is a clear case of miscarriage of
justice.

With regard to Criminal Case No. 420, People vs. Moros Buisan, et
al., for murder with triple frustrated murder, the investigator makes
this comment: “Although the penalty imposed is erroneous, your
investigator offers no comment thereon, since the case is presently on
appeal.” It appears that the accused were found guilty as charged and
yet the penalty imposed on them was not the one prescribed by law. Here
again respondent committed an error in the application, of the penalty.

The foregoing findings show that respondent did not observe the care
and diligence required of a judge of first instance in the performance
of his duties which account for the errors he has committed in the
disposal of the cases subject of the present administrative complaint.
For this reason, this Court resolved to admonish him to be more careful
in the future with the warning that a repetition of similar errors will
not be countenanced and will be the subject of a stern disciplinary
action.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.