THE CORPORATE 3Q INCORPORATED REPRESENTED BY CARMELITA TAN, PETITIONER, VS. THE HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 24, AND PHELPS DODGE PHIL ENER…
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Corporate 3Q versus Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by The Corporate 3Q Incorporated, represented by Carmelita Tan, against the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24, and Phelps Dodge Philippines Energy Products Corporation. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to annul two orders of the trial court that denied its Omnibus Motion to Quash Search Warrant with Motion to Suppress Evidence, and that upheld the validity of a search warrant issued for the seizure of alleged counterfeit Phelps Dodge electrical wires and cables. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the complete checklist for a valid search warrant — probable cause, personal examination by the judge, particularity of the place to be searched, the one offense one warrant rule, and timely implementation — and because it teaches how much deference a reviewing court gives to a magistrate's finding of probable cause.
Procedural History
A police officer applied for a search warrant before the Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The respondent judge issued the warrant, and the search was carried out at the petitioner's premises. The petitioner then filed before the same trial court an Omnibus Motion to Quash Search Warrant with Motion to Suppress Evidence. In an order dated 29 January 2013, the trial court denied the motion and upheld the warrant. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the trial court also denied in an order dated 22 April 2013. The petitioner then went directly to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court denied the petition, and the two assailed orders stand.
Facts
The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the trading of electrical goods and other hardware products. The private respondent, Phelps Dodge Philippines Energy Products Corporation, manufactures electrical wires and cables and owns the trademark Phelps Dodge International Corporation, stylized, registered with the Intellectual Property Office.
On 25 June 2012, a police officer assigned to the Regional Public Safety Battalion Intelligence Group in Davao City applied for a search warrant before the Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to search the premises of the petitioner's company at Bacaca Road corner San Antonio, Davao City, where fake Phelps Dodge products were allegedly kept. The applicant and his witnesses testified that they had personally gone to the premises and made test buys, purchasing counterfeit Phelps Dodge electrical wires and cables. After examining the applicant and his witness through searching questions, the judge issued the warrant, and on 5 July 2012 counterfeit Phelps Dodge products were seized.
Earlier, on 20 July 2012, the private respondent had filed a complaint for violation of the Intellectual Property Code against the owners and operators of 3Q Marketing before the City Prosecutor's Office of Davao City, but that complaint was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence on 9 January 2013. Meanwhile, on 28 August 2012, the petitioner filed its Omnibus Motion to Quash Search Warrant with Motion to Suppress Evidence. It argued that probable cause was not established because the private respondent's quality assurance engineer and sample genuine wires were not presented; that the judge merely relied on affidavits; that the warrant named 3Q Marketing and not The Corporate 3Q Incorporated and did not state the lot number; that two warrants were issued for one offense; and that the warrant was implemented beyond ten days from its issuance. The trial court denied the motion and later denied reconsideration, bringing the matter to the Supreme Court.
Issues
- Whether or not Search Warrant No. 12-19713 is valid.
- Whether or not the applicant had authority to apply for a search warrant on behalf of the private respondent.
Applicable Provisions
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
This is the yardstick against which every ground raised by the petitioner is measured, from probable cause to particularity of the place and the one offense one warrant requirement.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held the warrant valid. Probable cause for a search warrant means such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought are in the place to be searched. It is concerned with probability, not absolute certainty, so the prosecution need not present proof beyond reasonable doubt at this stage. The applicant and his witnesses had personally gone to the premises and made test buys of counterfeit Phelps Dodge wires and cables, which confirmed possession and sale of the spurious goods. The failure to present the quality assurance engineer and sample genuine products did not make the evidence insufficient. The transcript of the hearing showed that the judge did not merely rely on the affidavits but examined the applicant and his witness through searching questions.
On particularity of the place, the Court ruled that a description is sufficient if the officer serving the warrant can, with reasonable effort, identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the community. The address Bacaca Road corner San Antonio, Davao City, unerringly led the officers to the target. The absence of a lot number did not make it general, since the petitioner did not claim that another Bacaca Road existed or that another entity occupied that corner. That the warrant named 3Q Marketing rather than The Corporate 3Q Incorporated was of no moment, because no provision requires the warrant to identify the occupant of the premises. The petitioner's own barangay certification listed its business address as Bacaca Road corner San Antonio, showing that 3Q Marketing and the petitioner are the same entity.
On the ten day period, the Court rejected the petitioner's claim. The petitioner itself admitted in its memorandum that the search was done on 5 July 2012, as shown by the certificate of orderly search. While allegations in a pleading are judicial admissions, the rule yields when the admitter sufficiently shows palpable mistake, and the private respondent satisfactorily explained that the date 25 July 2012 was a typographical error.
On the second issue, the Court held that the applicant had authority. The private respondent's board of directors had authorized its Vice-President to execute a special power of attorney appointing Renato as its representative in filing complaints for infringement and unfair competition. The authority to file complaints necessarily includes acts preparatory thereto, such as gathering supporting evidence through applications for search warrants.
Finally, the Court stressed that certiorari lies only to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, and that a magistrate's determination of probable cause is paid great deference by a reviewing court so long as there was substantial basis for it. It quoted with approval:
It is presumed that a judicial function has been regularly performed, absent a showing to the contrary. A magistrate's determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid with great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination.
Doctrine
A search warrant is valid when it satisfies four requisites: it issues upon probable cause; the probable cause is determined personally by the judge; the judge examines under oath or affirmation the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; and the warrant particularly describes the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. It must also relate to one specific offense. Probable cause is tested by the standard of a reasonably prudent man, not by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Particularity of place is satisfied when the description unerringly leads the serving officers to the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and the warrant need not name the occupant of the premises. The authority to file a complaint for infringement includes the authority to apply for a search warrant as a preparatory act. Certiorari will not disturb a magistrate's finding of probable cause absent grave abuse of discretion.
Disposition
The petition for certiorari was dismissed, and the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 24, dated 29 January 2013 and 22 April 2013, were affirmed; the private respondent prevailed.
Remember This
Memorize the line that probable cause for a search warrant is measured by the reasonably prudent man and not by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and that a magistrate's finding of probable cause is paid great deference absent grave abuse of discretion. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of a valid search warrant, the particularity of the place to be searched, the one offense one warrant rule, and the scope of a representative's authority to apply for a warrant.