FABIAN PUGEDA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAFAEL TRIAS, MIGUEL TRIAS, SOLEDAD TRIAS, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND ANGEL SANCHES, CLARA TRIAS, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND VICTORIANO SALVANER…

The
subject of this action, which was appealed from the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, is certain lands acquired from the Friar Lands
Estate Administration known as lots Nos. 225, 226, 269, 311, 1803,
1814, 1816, 1832, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2282, 2284, 2378, 2412, 2682, 2683,
2685, 2686, 2688, 2722, 3177 and 3178 of the San Francisco de Malabon
estate located in General Trias, Cavite, a house of strong materials, a
barn (camarin) also of strong materials, and a store also of strong
materials in General Trias, Cavite and sets of household furniture.
The plaintiff claims participation in the said properties on the ground
that the same were acquired by him and ‘f the deceased Maria C. Ferrer,
with whom plaintiff contracted marriage in January, 1916 and who died
on February 11, 1934.

The defendants Rafael, Miguel, Soledad,
Clara, Constancia and Gabriel, all surnamed Trias are the children of
the deceased Maria C. Ferrer with her first husband Mariano Trias,
while the defendants Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda are children of
the plaintiff with said deceased Maria C. Ferrer.

The plaintiff
alleges that during the lifetime of the marriage between himself and
the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, they acquired with conjugal partnership
funds lots Nos. 273, 2650, 2680, 2718 and 2764 of the San Francisco de
Malabon estate with the following interest therein: 71% in lot No. 273,
82% in lot No. 2650, 77% in lot No. 2652, 77% in lot No. 2080, 64% in
lot No. 2718 and 76% in lot No. 2764; that plaintiff is the owner of
one-half of the said interest in the lots above-mentioned; that upon
the death of Maria C. Ferrer in 1934 plaintiff and defendants became
co-owners of said properties and defendants managed the properties in
trust as co-owners thereof. Plaintiff prays that the properties above
described, acquired as conjugal properties by the plaintiff and
deceased Maria C. Ferrer, be partitioned and one-half thereof be given
as share therein of plaintiff.

The defendants surnamed Trias and
Viniegra denied the claims of the plaintiff to the properties described
in the complaint, or that said properties had been administered by the
defendants in trust as co-owners with the plaintiff, and by way of
special and affirmative defense they alleged that the properties
subject of the complaint had been inherited by the defendants from
their deceased father Mariano Trias and deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer
and had been in possession and full enjoyment thereof for more than 10
years, peacefully, uninterruptedly, quietly and adversely under a claim
of ownership to the exclusion of all others, and that plaintiff is
estopped from claiming or asserting any rights or participation in the
said properties. Defendants Trias also denied for lack of knowledge and
belief the claim of plaintiff in his complaint that he was married to
Maria C. Ferrer and that the marriage continued up to the death of the
latter in 1934. They further presented a counterclaim against the
plaintiff for the sum of P40,000, this amount being what was
contributed by them in support of the candidacies of plaintiff when
running for the office of provincial governor of Cavite. They also
filed a counterclaim for 30 pieces of Spanish gold coins and P5,000 in
cash amounting in value to the total sum of P50,000 and a counterclaim
for P100,000 which is the value of four big parcels of land belonging
to the defendants which the plaintiff had appropriated for his own use.

The
defendants Pugeda joined the plaintiff in the latter’s claim that the
properties mentioned in plaintiff’s complaint were joint properties of
the plaintiff and the defendants. They also allege that the properties
had gone to the management and control of the defendants Trias who
should be required to answer for the fruits and profits thereof during
the administration by them of said properties. As crossclaim against
their co-defendants, they allege that they are each entitled to
one-eighth of the properties left by their mother as listed in the
first ten paragraphs of the complaint, as well as a share of one-eighth
each in lots Nos. 98, 2015 of the San Francisco de Malabon estate and
in a parcel of land in Lingad, Litlit in Silang, Cavite and in 60 heads
of cattle.

Plaintiff denied the counterclaim of the defendants
Trias and the defendants Trias, answering the cross-claim of their
co-defendants Pugeda, denied all the allegations contained in the
answer of the defendants Pugeda, and further alleged that the
cross-claim is improper as the same should be the subject of probate
proceedings, and the defendants ii Pugeda are estopped and barred by
prescription from claiming any further right to the properties left by
their deceased mother.

There are two questions or issues raised
in the present case. The first is the alleged existence of a marriage
of Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The second is the claim of the
plaintiff to various lands acquired from the Friar Lands Estate under
certificates of sale issued first in the name of Mariano Trias and
later assigned to Maria C. Ferrer, but paid for in part during the
marriage of plaintiff and Maria C. Ferrer, A third but minor issue is
the claim for furniture alleged by plaintiff to have been bought by him
and Maria C. Ferrer during the marriage, which plaintiff claims is in
the possession of the defendants.

On the first issue, the
existence of marriage, plaintiff and his witness Ricardo Ricafrente
testified that in the afternoon of January 5, 1916, on the eve of
Epiphany or Three Kings, plaintiff and the deceased Maria C. Ferrer
went to the office of the Justice of the Peace, who was then witness
Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask the latter to marry them; that accordingly
Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the presence of two
witnesses one of whom was Santiago Salazar and another Amado Prudente,
deceased; that after the usual ceremony Ricafrente asked the parties to
sign two copies of a marriage contract, and after the witnesses had
signed the same, he delivered one copy to the contracting; parties and
another to the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer was at
that time the keeper of the records of the civil register. Plaintiff
and his witnesses explained that no celebration of the marriage was
held inspite of the prominence of the contracting parties because
plaintiff was then busy campaigning for the office of Member of the
Provincial Board and Maria C. Ferrer was already on the family way.

The
defendants denied the existence of the marriage and introduced a
photostatic copy of the record of marriages in the municipality of
Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January 1916, which showed that no
record of the alleged marriage existed therein; but this absence was
explained by the Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept
the register forgot to make an entry of the marriage in the registry.

Other
witnesses were introduced to the effect that after the marriage
plaintiff lived in the house of Maria C. Ferrer, which was the house of
spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. Evidence was also submitted
to the effect that the first issue was baptized on August 26, 1917 and
the one who acted as sponsor was a sister-in-law of Maria C. Ferrer.
The baptismal certificate submitted states that the baptized child was
the issue of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer. The
registry of said birth was also submitted and it states that the father
is Fabian Pugeda and the mother is Maria C. Ferrer.

It is also
not denied that after the marriage, plaintiff cohabited with the
deceased wife, as husband and wife, until the death of the latter,
publicly and openly as husband and wife. Lastly, a document entitled
“Project of Partition” (Exhibit 5-Trias) was signed by the parties
defendants themselves. The document contains the following significant
statement or admission.

“Whereas, the parties
hereto are the only children and forced heirs of the said deceased:
Rafael, Miguel, Soledad, Clara, Constancia, and Gahriel, all surnamed
Trias y Ferrer, are the children of her first marriage with Mariano
Trias, now deceased; and Teofilo and Virginia, both surnamed Pugeda y
Ferrer, are the children of her second marriage with Fabian Pugeda.

“x
x x That it is hereby agreed by and between the parties hereto that
Lots Nos. 3177 and 3178 known as the Buenavista property will be
administered by one of the parties to be agreed upon and for said
purpose they appoint Miguel F. Trias, and all earnings, rentals and
income or profits shall be expended for the Improvement and welfare of
the said property and for the payment of all claims and aecounts of our
deceased mother Maria C. Ferrer, and for the maintenance and education
of Teofilo and Virginia Pugeda y Ferrer.”

The
judge who heard the evidence, after a review of the , testimonial and
documental evidence, arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff Fabian
Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer on January 5, 1916, this
conclusion being borne out not only by the chain of circumstances but
also by the testimonies of the witnesses to the celebration of the
marriage, who appeared to be truthful, as well as by the fact that
plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer lived together as husband and
wife for eighteen years (1916-1934) and there is a strong presumption
that they were actually married.

On the competency of the evidence submitted by plaintiff to prove the marriage we cite the following authority:

“ART.
53. — As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other than a
certificate of the record in the civil register shall be admitted,
unless such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the
question arises in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be
proved by evidence of any kind.” (p. 27, Civil Code)

“The mere fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff’s natural father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis,
failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear
that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its validity were
not present, and the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate
not being one of said requisites.” (Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil., 1)

“Testimony
by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to
the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of
marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also
competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage.” (55 C.
J. S., p, 900).

In our judgment the evidence
submitted shows conclusively that plaintiff Fabian Pugeda was in fact
married to Maria C. Ferrer, said marriage subsisting from 1916 until
1934, upon the death of the latter, and we affirm the finding of the
trial court to that effect.

On the second issue the evidence
introduced at the trial shows that the lands subject of the action were
formerly Friar Lands included in the San Francisco de Malabon Estate,
province of Cavite, which were acquired under certificates of sale in
the name of Mariano Trias in the year 1910 and later assigned to his
widow Maria C. Ferrer in the year 1916. The different lots, the dates
of their acquisition and assignment to said Maria C. Ferrer, widow, are
set forth in a table appended to this decision as Annex “A”.

On
the basis of the facts about their acquisition and assignment Judge
Lucero declared that the lots in question, were conjugal properties of
Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer, and consequently decreed that 1/2
thereof, should be adjudicated to Mariano Trias, as the latter’s share
in the conjugal properties, to be divided among his 6 children at the
rate of 1/6 each, and the other half to Maria C. Ferrer, as her share
in the conjugal properties, to be assigned to her children by both
marriages at the rate of 1/9 each and the balance of 1/9 to widower
Fabian Pugeda in usufruct. From this judgment the case was appealed to
the Court of Appeals.

When the case was before the Court of
Appeals, the attorneys for the defendants presented a motion for new
trial on the ground that they discovered copies of four documents
namely—Annexes “A”, “B”, “C”, “D” and “E” Record on Appeal, pp.
108-117, (The last document is a copy of a court order issued by Judge
Manuel V. Moran approving the project of partition in Case No. 860,
Intestate of Mariano Trias) which if admitted might alter decision. The
Court of Appeals granted the motion and remanded the case to the Court
of First Instance of Cavite for the consideration of said evidence.

Upon
the return of the case to the Court of First Instance, Judge Primitivo
Gonzales who then presided the court, rendered a new decision. Judge
Gonzales found that the total amount paid by Mariano Trias and Maria C.
Ferrer on the lots in question amount to only P8,911.84, while the
installments paid during the marriage of the spouses Fabian Pugeda and
Maria C. Ferrer totaled P35,146.46. He also found that lots 3177 and
3178 were paid for during the marriage of Pugeda and Ferrer in the
total sum of P16,557.32. Judge Gonzales therefore ruled that the two
marriages should participate in the ownership of the lands, according
to the actual contributions made by each marriage in the installments
in payment of the lands. The dispositive part of the decision, now
subject of the appeal is as follows:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, the Court hereby renders judgment:

1. That
   lots 2378, 225, 226, 269, 311, 1808, 1804, 1816, 1832, 2264,, 2265,
   2282, 2284, 2412, 2682, 273, 2650, 2652, 2680, 2718, 2764, (21 lots)
   are conjugal assets of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer in the proportion of
   percentage and indicated in each individual lot;
2. That lots 3177
   and 3178, since all the installments for the same were fully paid
   during the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer are hereby declared
   conjugal of the couple Pugcda and Ferrer; and even some of the
   installments for these two lots were paid after death of Maria G.
   Ferrer, they do not lose the character of conjugal property for
   payments were :nade from the crops thereof;
3. That since Mariano
   Trias during his marriage to Maria C. Ferrer contributed in the
   “payment for the installments of these 21 lots amounting to P8,911.84,
   half of which must be reimbursed in favor of the children or heirs of
   Mariano Trias to be paid from the mass of the hereditary estate of
   Maria C. Ferrer; the other half of P4,455.92 to be distributed among
   all the children of heirs of Maria C. Ferrer in her first and second
   marriage to be deducted from the mass of her estate;
4. That lots
   2266, 2683, 2685, 2686, 2688 and 2722 since all the installments for
   these six (6) lots were fully paid during marriage of Mariano Trias and
   Maria C. Ferrer, they are hereby declared to be conjugal between
   them—one half of which must go to the children or heirs of Mariano
   Trias, the other half must equally go to the children or heirs of Maria
   C. Ferrer in her first and second marriage;
5. That Miguel Trias
   as administrator of all the properties which commenced after the death
   of his mother who died on February 11, 1934, must render an accounting
   of his administration within three (3) months time from the date this
   judgment has become final.
6. That defendants Trias to pay the costs of this action.” (Record on Appeal, pp. 154-156)

Against
this ruling the appeal has come to this Court. Defendants-appellants
claim that Judge Gonzales had no power or authority to change the
decision of Judge Lucero, as it was not he but Judge Lucero himself,
who had heard the evidence. They have also assigned before Us a set of
errors which may be boiled down to the three main issues set forth
above. As the issue of marriage has already been considered we will now
pass to the second and more important question as to whether the lands
subject of the action may be considered conjugal properties of the
first marriage or of the second or of both.

A consideration of
the legal nature and character of the acquisition of the various lots
is necessary that the issues in the action may be justly determined.

A
study of the provisions of the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120 )
discloses that the friar lands were purchased by the government for
sale to actual occupants (actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands’ are acquired by the Government). (Paragraph 3 of Declaration of Purposes, Act 1120). The said act expressly declares that the lands are not public
lands in the sense in which this word is used in the Public Land Act,
and their acquisition is not governed by the provisions of the Public
Land Act (Par. IV, Declaration of Purposes, Id.)

The pertinent provisions of said Act No. 1120 are as follows:

“Sec.
12.—x x x. When the costs thereof shall hav« been thus ascertained, the
Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands shall give the said settler, and
occupant a certificate which shall set forth in detail that the
Government has agreed to sell to such settler and occupant the amount
of land so held by him, at the price so fixed, payable as provided in
this Act at the office of the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands, in
gold coin of the United States or its equivalent in Philippine
currency, and that upon the payment of the final installment together
with all accrued interest the Government will convey to such settler
and occupant the said land so held by him by proper instrument of
conveyance, which shall be issued and become effective in the manner
provided in section one hundred and twenty-two of the Land Registration
Act. x x x.”

“Sec. 13.—The acceptance by the settler and
occupant of such certificate shall be considered as an agreement by him
to pay the purchase price so fixed and in the installments and at the
interest specified in the certificate, and he shall by such acceptance
become a debtor to the Government in that amount together with all
accrued interest. x x x Provided, however, That every settler and
occupant who desires to purchase his holding must enter into the
agreement to purchase such holding by accepting the said certificate
and executing the said receipt whenever called on so to do by the Chief
of the Bureau of Public Lands, and a failure on the part of the settler
and occupant to comply with this requirement shall be considered as a
refusal to purchase, and he shall be ousted as above provided and
thereafter his holding may be leased or sold as in case of unoccupied
lands: x x x.”

“Sec. 15.—The Government hereby reserves the
title to each and every parcel of land sold under the provisions of
this Act until the full payment of all installments of purchase money
and interest by the purchaser has been made, and any sale or
incumbrance made by him shall be invalid as against the Government of
the Philippine Islands and shall be in all respects subordinate to its
prior claim.”

“Sec. 16.—In the event of the death of a holder of
a certificate the issuance of which isr provided for in section twelve
hereof, prior to the execution of a deed by the Government to any
purchaser, his widow shall be entitled to receive a deed of the land
stated in the certificate upon showing that she has complied with the
requirements of law for the purchase of the same. In case a holder of a
certificate dies before the giving of the deed and does not leave a
widow, then the interest of the holder of the certificate shall descend
and deed shall issue to the persons who under the laws of the
Philippine Islands would have taken had the title been perfected before
the death of the holder of the certificate, upon proof of the holders
thus entitled of compliance with all the requirements of the
certificate. In case the holder of the certificate shall have sold his
interest in the land before having complied with all the conditions
thereof, the purchaser from the holder of the certificate shall be
entitled to all the rights of the holder of the certificate upon
presenting his assignment to the Chief of the Bureau of Public Lands
for registration.” (Vol. III, Public Laws, pp. 315-316).

A
study of the above quoted provisions clearly indicates that the
conveyance executed in favor of a buyer or purchaser, or the so-called
certificate of sale, is a conveyance of the ownership of the property,
subject only to the resolutory condition that the sale may be canceled
if the price agreed upon is not paid for in full. In the case at bar
the sale certificates were made in favor of Mariano Trias, and upon his
death they were assigned in accordance with Sec. 16, to his widow. But
the law provides that when the buyer does not leave a widow, the rights
and interests of the holder of the certificate of sale are left to the
buyer’s heirs in accordance with the laws of succession. In the case of
the Director of Lands, et al., vs. Ricardo Rizal, et al., 87 Phil.,
806, this court thru Mr. Justice Montemayor held:

“x
x x All this clearly and inevitably leads to the conclusion that the
purchaser, even before the payment of the full price and before the
execution of the final deed of conveyance, is considered by the !aw as
the actual owner of the lot purchased, under obligation to pay in full
the purchase price, the role or position of the Government being that
of a mere lien holder or mortgagee.

“x x x In conclusion, we
find and hold that in the sale of a Friar Lands lot or parcel under Act
1120, pending payment in full of the purchase price, altho the
Government reserves title thereto, merely for its protection, the
beneficial and equitable title is in the purchaser, and that any
accretion received by the lot even before payment of the last
installment belongs to the purchaser thereof.”

We
also invite attention to the fact that a sale of friar lands is
entirely different from a sale of public lands under the provisions of
the Public Land Act. In the case of public lands, a person who desires
to acquire must first apply for the parcel of land desired. Thereafter
the land is opened for bidding. If the land is awarded to an applicant
or to a qualified bidder the successful bidder is given a right of
entry to occupy the land and cultivate and improve it, (Sees. 22-28,
Commonwealth Act 141). It is only after satisfying the requirements of
cultivation and improvement of 1/5 of the land that the applicant is
given a sales patent. (Sec. 30)

In the case of friar lands the
purchaser becomes the owner upon issuance of the certificate of sale in
his favor, subject only to cancellation thereof in case the price
agreed upon is not paid. In case of sale of public ‘lands if the
applicant dies and his widow remarries both she and the second husband
are entitled to the land; the new husband has the same right as his
wife. Such is not the case with friar lands. As indicated in Section 16
of Act 1120, if a holder of a certificate dies before the payment of
the price in full, the sale certificate is assigned to the widow, but
if the buyer does not leave a widow, the right to the friar land is
transmitted to his heirs at law.

It is true that the evidence
shows that of the various parcels of land now subject of the action
none was paid for in full during the marriage of Mariano Trias and
Maria C. Ferrer, and that payments in installments continued to be made
even after the marriage of Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer on January 5,
1916. But it is also true that even after said marriage the
certificates of sale were assigned to Maria C. Ferrer and installments
for the lots after said marriage continued in the name of Maria C.
Ferrer; also all the amounts paid as installments for the lots were
taken from the fruits of the properties themselves, according to the
admission of plaintiff Fabian Pugeda himself, thus:

“Mr. Viniegra:
Q—	De los productos de esos terrenos, durante la administration por loa demandados, recibia Vd. su participacion?
A—	No, senor.
Q—	Nunca?
A—	Because I know there are obligations to be paid to the Bureau of Lands, and I have been informed that the obligations have been paid annually from the products of the land.
Q—	Therefore, from the products of these lands—the proceeds—the obligations to the Bureau of Lands are being discounted from the said proceeds and after the remainder, as in palay, are equally divided, is that what you mean to say?
A—	Perhaps they were following the practice that, from the products ofthe lands the obligations to the Bureau of Lands would be paid.
Court:
Q—	Pero Vd. no ha recibido ninguna cantidad, o sea les darian alguna participacion?
A—	No senor, porque estaba en Manila, but they informed me that the obligations to the Bureau of Lands were being paid from the products of the lands.
Mr. Viniegra:
Q—	You do not claim any participation in the remainder of the products after paying the Bureau of Lands?
A—	How would I ask for I knew they were still paying the obligations to the Bureau of Lands—that was until the Japanese time, and I knew some obligations were not paid, as a result of which the sales certificates of some big lots were cancelled.
Court:
Q—	Como se mantenia Vd?
A—	Mi Madre tenia la casa en Manila y ella recibia alguna renta. My mother helped me. (Session of November 20, 1951, before Judge A. G. Lucero, pp, 259-261, Matro.) (Brief for Defendants-Appellants, pp. 49-51).

There
is another reason why the above conclusion must be upheld in the case
at bar, and that is the fact that in the proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased Mariano Trias, which was instituted in
August 1915, the inventory of the estate left fey said deceased
included the lots purchased from the Friar Lands Estates (Exh. 2,
Trias) and the project of partition in said especial proceedings
submitted to the court as Exh, 3-Trias adjudicated 1/2 of said lands as
the share of Mariano Trias in the conjugal properties, the other 1/2
being awarded to Maria C. Ferrer.

The above considerations,
factual and legal, lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the friar
lands purchased as above described and paid for, had the character of
conjugal properties of the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer.
But another compelling lejgal reason for this conclusion as against
plaintiff, is the judicial pronouncement : on said nature of the lands
in question. In the year 1915, even before the marriage of plaintiff
and Maria C. Ferrer took place, the latter was appointed administratrix
of the estate of her deceased husband Mariano Trias in Civil Case No.
860 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite (Exh. “1” Trias). An
inventory of the estate left by the deceased Mariano Trias, dated
January 15, 1929, was submitted by her and on April 10, 1929, the
project of partition of the properties was submitted. The project
includes the friar lands subject of the action, and in accordance with
it one-half of the properties listed in the inventory was adjudicated
to the deceased Mariano Trias as his share and f the other half
adjudicated to Maria C. Ferrer also as her share. The share of Mariano
Trias was decreed in favor of his children and heirs. This project of
partition was approved by Judge Manuel V. Moran in an order dated
February 11,1929, submitted to the Court of Appeals as Annex “E”, pp.
114-115 of the record on appeal.

The pendency of the above
intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Mariano Trias
must have been known to plaintiff Fabian Pugeda, who is a lawyer. It
does not appear, and neither does he claim or allege, that he ever
appeared in said proceedings to claim participation in the properties
subject of the proceedings. His failure to intervene in the proceedings
to claim that the friar lands or some of them belonged to himself and
his wife Maria C. Ferrer, shows a conviction on his part that the said
friar lands actually belonged to the spouses Mariano Trias and Maria C.
Ferrer, and that he had no interest therein. The project of
partition was approved as late as 1929, by which time plaintiff and
defendant had already been married for a period of 13 years. Plaintiffs
failure to assert any claim to the properties in the said intestate
proceedings during its pendency now bars him absolutely from asserting
the claim that he now pretends to have to said properties.

We
will now proceed to consider plaintiff’s claim that the lands in
question had, through the joint effort of himself and his wife,
increased in productivity from 900 cavans to 2,400 cavans of rice
because of the introduction therein of improvements such as a system of
irrigation for the lands. If, as admitted by plaintiff himself, the
installments remaining unpaid were taken from the produce or the yield
of the said lands and if it be taken into account that one-half of said
lands already belonged to the children of the first marriage, to whom
the lands were adjudicated in the settlement of the estate of their
father, the deceased Mariano C. Trias, the only portion of the products
or produce of the lands in which plaintiff could claim any
participation is the one-half share therein produced from the
paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer. How much of said produce
belonging to Maria C. Ferrer was actually used in the improvement of
the lands is not shown, but the fact that plaintiff was engaged in
continuous political campaigns, ever since his marriage in 1916 (he had
devoted most of his time while married to Maria C. Ferrer to politics),
portions of the products of the paraphernal properties of Maria C.
Ferrer must have been used in these political campaigns as well as in
meeting the expenses of the conjugal partnership. The value of the
useful improvements introduced on the lands, joint properties of Maria
C. Ferrer and her children, was not proved in court by plaintiff. Hence
the provisions of Article 1404 of the old Civil Code, to the effect
that useful expenditures for the benefit of the separate properties of
one of the spouses are partnership properties, cannot be applied. But
even if such useful improvements had been proved, the statute of
limitations bars plaintiff’s action to recover his share therein
because Maria C. Ferrer died in 1934, whereas the present action was
instituted by plaintiff only in the year 1948. After the death of Maria
C. Ferrer, plaintiff came to Manila, took a second wife, and was not
heard from for 14 years, that is, until he instituted this action in
1948. His claims for the improvements, if any, is therefore also barred.

The
above ruling, that the action to demand his share in the value of the
improvements in the paraphernal properties of Maria C. Ferrer is
barred, is also applicable to the claim of the plaintiff herein for the
construction alleged to have been made and the furniture supposedly
bought by him and his spouse Maria C. Ferrer, and which had the
character of conjugal partnership property of said spouses. In the year
1935, defendant herein presented a project of partition to plaintiff
for his signature (the project of partition is dated March, 1935 and is
marked Exhibit “5”-Trias). In this project of partition of the
properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, mention is made of the
participation of the plaintiff’s children with the deceased Maria C.
Ferrer, but no mention is made therein of any participation that
plaintiff had or could have as usufruct or otherwise, or in any
building or improvement. This deed of partition was shown to plaintiff
but the latter did not sign it.

The express omission of the name
of plaintiff herein in the above deed of partition as one of the heirs
of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer was enough notice to plaintiff that
defendants had intended to deprive him of any share or participation in
the properties left by the deceased Maria C. Ferrer, even of the
usufruct that the law assigns to him. But in spite of his knowledge of
this fact no action was taken by him until February, 1948 when
plaintiff demanded his share in the properties and later brought this
action.

The period of around 13 years therefore elapsed before
plaintiff instituted this action. Consequently, whatever rights he may
have had to any portion of the estate left by the deceased Maria C.
Ferrer, as a usufructuary or otherwise, must be deemed to have
prescribed. As a consequence, we find that the order of Judge Lucero
granting to the plaintiff herein one-ninth share in the estate of the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer in usufruct should be set aside and the
objection to the grant of such share to plaintiff on the ground of
prescription is sustained.

Having disposed of the claims of
paintiff Fabian Pugeda, we will now proceed to consider the cross-claim
of his children, namely, Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda. Judge
Lucero decreed that the properties left by the deceased Maria C. Pugeda
be divided among her children, including the two cross-claimants
Teofilo Pugeda and Virginia Pugeda, and decreed one-ninth of the
properties of the said deceased Maria C. Ferrer to each of these two
children of hers with the plaintiff and assigning also to the plaintiff
one-ninth share in the said estate left by her in usufruct.

In
view of our finding that the claim of the plaintiff to any share in the
estate of his wife Maria C. Ferrer is already barred by the statute of
limitations, the decree entered by Judge Lucero declaring that heir
properties be divided into nine parts, one part belonging to each heir
and one to plaintiff in usufruct, is hereby modified, by eliminating
the share in usufruct of the plaintiff therein and increasing the share
of each of her heirs to one-eighth.

FOR ALL THE FOREGOING
CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff’s complaint is hereby dismissed, and the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio G.
Lucero, presiding, decreeing the division of the properties of the
deceased Maria C. Ferrer among her eight children and plaintiff, is
hereby modified in the sense that all of her properties be divided
among her eight children at the rate of one-eighth per child. As thus
modified, the judgment of Judge Lucero is hereby affirmed. Without
costs.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., and Padilla, J., took no part.

A N N E X “A”

Lands included in action—Dates of acquisition and assignment.

Lot	Date of Sale	Date	Certificate
Number	to Mariano Trias	Assignment to	of Title
		Maria C. Ferrer
225	April 30, I960	May 17, 1915	—
226	April 5, 1910	May 17, 1915	—
269	April 5, 1910	May 17, 1915	—
311	April 13, 1910	May 17, 1915	—
1808 (3)	April 13, 1910	May 15, 1915	—
1814	Not known	May 17, 1915	—
1816	April 13, 1910	May 17, 1915	—
1832	April 13, 1910	May 17, 1915	—
2284	Nov. 1, 1910	Not known	July 11, 1924
2265	Nov. 1, 1910	July 11, 1924	—
2266	Nov. 1, 1910	Not known	July 11, 1924
2282	April 30, 1910	Not known	July 11, 1924
2284	Nov. 1, 1910	Not known	July 11, 1924
2378	April 30, 1910	May 17, 1915	—
2412	April 30, 1910	May 17, 1915	—
2682	Nov. 1, 1910	Not known	July 11, 1924
2683	Nov. 1, 1910	Not known	July 11, 1924
2685	Nov. 1, 1910	Not known	July 11, 1924
2686	Nov. 1, 1910	Not known	—
2688	Nov. 1, 1910	Not known	July 11, 1924
2722	Jan. 1, 1913	Not known	—
3177	Jan. 25, 1913	May 17, 1915	—
3178	Jan. 25, 1913	May 17, 1915	—
Other l«ts included in the complaint on which evidence was submitted are the following:
273	April 30, 1910	May 17, 1915	—
2650	April 27, 1910	April 17, 1915	—
2672	April 30, 1910	May 17, 1915	—
2718	April 30, 1910	May 17, 1915	—
2765	April 30, 1910	May 17, 1915
Two other additional lots are the following:
2225	July 1, 1909	May 17, 1915	—
2226	July 1, 1909	—	Sept. 20, 1924
	Sold to Ignacio Ascano
	later to M. Trias on
	July 1, 1910

 

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RESOLUTION

July, 24, 1962

Labrador, J.:

This resolution concerns a motion for the reconsideration of the
decision rendered by this Court. The main argu­ment in support of the
motion is that the lots not fully paid for at the time of the death of
Miguel Trias, which lots were, by provision of the Friar Lands Act (Act
No. 1120), subsequently transferred to the widow’s name and later paid
for by her out of the proceeds of the fruits of the lands purchased,
and for which titles were issued in the name of the widow, belong to
the latter as her exclusive paraphernal properties, and are not
conjugal properties of her deceased husband and herself. In our
decision we laid down the rule that upon the issuance of a certificate
of sale to the husband of a lot in a friar lands estate, pur­chased by
the Government from the friars, the land be­comes the property of the
husband and the wife, and the fact that the certificate of sale is
thereafter transferred to the wife does not change the status of the
property so pur­chased as conjugal property of the deceased husband and
wife. The reason for this ruling is the provision of the Civil Code to
the effect that properties acquired by husband and wife are conjugal
properties. (Art. 1401, Civil Code of Spain.) The provision of the
Friar Lands Act to the effect that upon the death of the husband the
certificate of sale is transferred to the name of the wife is merely an
administrative device designed to facilitate the documenta­tion of the
transaction and the collection of installments; it does not produce the
effect of destroying the character as conjugal property of the lands purchased. Hence the issuance of
tne title, after completion of the installments, in the name of the
widow does not make the friar lands, purchased her own paraphernal
property. The said lands, notwithstanding a certificate of sale,
continue to be the conjugal property of her deceased husband and
herself.

The case of Arayata vs. Joya, et al., 51 Phil. 654, cited
by the movants, is not applicable to the case at bar be­cause it refers
to the superior rights of the widow re­cognized in Section 16 of Act
No. 1120 over transfers made by the husband which have not been approved by the Director of Lands. As a matter of fact the syllabus in said case is as follows:

“Widow’s Rights.—The widow of a holder of a
certificate of sale of friar lands acquired by the Government has an
exclusive right to said lands and their fruits from her husband’s
death, provided that the deceased has not conveyed them to another
during his lifetime and she fulfills the requirements prescribed by the
law for the purchase of the same.”

A minor ground for the reconsideration is that the de­cision of
Judge Lucero, having been set aside by the Court of Appeals, could not
be affirmed by Us. The setting aside of the said decision was due to
the fact that newly dis­covered evidence was found regarding the
partition of the estate of the deceased. The setting aside of the
decision was not aimed or directed at the judge’s ruling that the
properties acquired by the husband during his lifetime from the friar
lands estate were conjugal properties of the husband and the wife.

The third ground raised is that the lots were never partitioned as
conjugal assets of Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer. One of the
arguments adduced in favor of the claim of the movants that the
properties in question, which were acquired during the lifetime of
Mariano Trias, were never partitioned is that, according to the records
of the Register of Deeds and according to the friar lands agents, the
alleged partition of the said properties as conjugal properties of the
deceased Mariano Trias and Maria C. Ferrer had not been registered in
said offices. The failure to make the registration is perhaps due to
the neglect of the heirs. The fact, however, remains that the exhibits
presented in Court, especially Exhibit “3-Trias” and Annex “E”, which
are the project of partition and the approval thereof, cannot be
ignored by this Court. The neglect of the parties is not actually
partitioning the properties does not argue in favor of the fact that
partition was not actually decreed. Adjudications may be made pro indiviso without actual division or partition of the properties among the heirs.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is hereby de­nied and the judgment rendered declared final. So ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes,and Dizon, JJ., concur