JESUS ALVARADO, IN BEHALF OF HIS BROTHER, ANICETO ALVARADO Y COMO, PETITIONER, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, RESPONDENT.

TUASON, J.:


This is a petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus
Alvarado in behalf of Aniceto Alvarado y Como, at present confined in
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal.

It is alleged that the petitioner was, on June 21, 1947, found
guilty of theft by the Court of First Instance of Manila and sentenced
to an indeterminate imprisonment of from four months and one day to two
years, four months and one day. Having appealed to the Court of
Appeals, the latter court affirmed the judgment in a decision
promulgated on March 29, 1948. Before and during the trial and the
appeal, the accused, petitioner herein, was in jail as a detention
prisoner.

The petitioner claims that having actually served two years, three
months and eighteen days, without counting the nearly one-year period
that he was under preventive imprisonment, and adding to this the good
conduct time allowance of four months and twenty-eight days to which he
is entitled pursuant to Article 97 of the Revised Penal Code, he has
garnered to his credit a total imprisonment of two years, eight months
and sixteen days as against two years, four months and one day which is
the maximum of his indeterminate penalty.

In his return filed in behalf of the Director of Prisons, the
respondent, the Solicitor General agrees that the petition should be
granted.

By Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 53 in relation to Section 17 of Rule
120, a judgment is entered 15 days after its promulgation, and 10 days
thereafter, the records are remanded to the court below including a
certified copy of the judgment for execution.

In the case of People vs. Sumilang, (44 Off. Gaz., 881,
883; 77 Phil., 764), it was explained that “the certified copy of the
judgment is sent by the Clerk of the appellate court to the lower court
under Section 9 of Rule 53, not for the promulgation or reading thereof
to the defendant, but for the execution of the judgment against him,”
it “not being necessary to promulgate or read it to the defendant,
because it is to be presumed that accused or his attorney had already
been notified thereof in accordance with Sections 7 and 8, as amended,
of the same Rule 53,” and that the duty of the Court of First Instance
in respect to such judgment is merely to see that it is duly executed
when in their nature the intervention of the Court of First Instance is
necessary to that end.

Following the above rule, it was unnecessary for the Court of First
Instance to set the decision of the Court of Appeals for reading or
promulgation for October 18, 1948, as it did, and it was error to make
the period of imprisonment commence on that date as was done in this
case. Inasmuch as the petitioner did not appeal from the decision of
the Court of Appeals, and since, as above stated, he was already in
prison at the time that judgment was promulgated, he was deemed to have
submitted himself for the execution of the said judgment as of the date
of its promulgation.

Computed, as above stated, the imprisonment expired on June 30,
1950, without good conduct allowance, or on March 30, 1950, with good
conduct allowance. In either case the petitioner is entitled to
discharge.

The respondent is ordered forthwith to release the petitioner from custody unless he is detained for some other lawful cause.

Moran, C. J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.