JOVITO O. VITANZO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE BOARD OF LI­QUIDATORS, AS LIQUIDATORS OF THE DEFUNCT NATIONAL COCONUT CORPORATION, IL…

Vitanzo versus Republic of the Philippines

The Case

This is a direct appeal on pure questions of law brought by Jovito Vitanzo against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Board of Liquidators as liquidators of the defunct National Coconut Corporation, together with the purchasers at a sheriff's execution sale. Vitanzo sued for reconveyance of five parcels of land in Marinduque, asking that the levy and the execution sale be declared void because, he claimed, the levy was not made within the lifetime of the writ of execution. The case matters because it fixes, in plain terms, the rule every bar candidate must know: the lifetime of a writ of execution is measured by the period within which it must be returned, and a levy validly made within that period may be carried to sale even after the period has lapsed.

Procedural History

Vitanzo filed a complaint for reconveyance in the Court of First Instance of Marinduque. The defendants, Ildefonso Labao and the Board of Liquidators, moved to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss as to the Board of Liquidators and Labao. Vitanzo then brought the matter directly to the Supreme Court on appeal, raising only points of law, and the Supreme Court decided the appeal in November 1968.

Facts

Eusebio Arceo was the registered owner of five parcels of land in barrio Batansapa, Mogpog, Marinduque, covered by a certificate of title and designated as Lots 16, 17, 18, 21 and 25. A final judgment had been rendered against Arceo in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the liquidators of the National Coconut Corporation, for a sum of money with interest, costs and attorney's fees. To enforce that judgment, a writ of execution was issued on 2 February 1962.

The Provincial Sheriff of Marinduque received the writ on 7 July 1962 and, on that very same day, levied on the lands. The execution sale, however, was held only on 16 March 1963. Lots 16, 17, 18 and 25 were sold to Ildefonso Labao, Marcelo Mantala, Estefania Vda. de Muhi and Victorino Moreno, respectively, while Lot 21 was purchased by the Board of Liquidators in representation of the judgment creditor.

Almost one year later, on 13 February 1964, the lawful heirs of Eusebio Arceo, who had died in the meantime, executed a notarial deed of assignment in payment of debt conveying all their rights and interest in the lands to Jovito Vitanzo. On 21 February 1964, Vitanzo filed his complaint for reconveyance, claiming that the levy and seizure were not made during the lifetime of the writ and that no alias writ was ever issued.

Issues

• Whether or not the sheriff's levy on the lands was valid, considering that it was made on the same day the writ was received but the sale was held long after the sixty day period for its return.
• Whether or not the execution sale held beyond the sixty day return period is valid, the levy having been timely made.

Applicable Provisions

Section 11 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as then in force, provides:

Section 11. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution may be made returnable, to the clerk or judge of the court issuing it, at any time not less than ten nor more than sixty days after its receipt by the officer who must set forth in writing on its back the whole of his proceedings by virtue thereof, and file it with the clerk or judge to be preserved with the other papers in the case. A certified copy of the record, in the execution book kept by the clerk, of an execution by virtue of which real property, has been sold, or of the officer's return thereon, shall be evidence of the contents of the originals whenever they, or any part thereof, have been lost or destroyed.

This provision supplies the measure of the writ's lifetime, because the return must be made within a maximum of sixty days after receipt by the levying officer.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the levy was valid. The lifetime of the writ of execution includes the last day on which it is returnable, and the return must be made within a maximum of sixty days after its receipt by the levying officer. Since it was not controverted that the Sheriff of Marinduque made the levy on the same day he received the writ, the levy was properly made within the lifetime of the writ. The Court relied on its earlier ruling in Alagar versus Pio de Roda and Manalo:

The sheriff had no authority to make any attachments after the return day of said writ. If he had been unable to attach the property during the lifetime of the writ, it should have been returned and an alias writ issued.

On the second issue, the Court held that the sale held long after the sixty day period did not affect its validity. A valid execution issued and levy made within the period provided by law may be enforced by a sale thereafter. The Court explained the reason in the language it adopted from Government versus Echaus:

This rests upon the principle that the levy is the essential act by which the property is set apart for the satisfaction of the judgment and taken into custody of the law, and that after it has been taken from the defendant, his interest is limited to its application to the judgment, irrespective of the time when it may be sold.

Doctrine

First, the lifetime of a writ of execution includes the last day on which it is returnable, and under Section 11 of Rule 39 the return must be made within a maximum of sixty days after its receipt by the levying officer. A levy made within that period is timely and valid.

Second, the levy is the essential act. Once a valid execution has issued and a levy has been made within the period fixed by law, the property is set apart for the satisfaction of the judgment and taken into the custody of the law. The sale may follow even after the sixty day return period, and the delay does not invalidate the sale. What the sheriff may not do is attach property after the return day; if he could not attach during the lifetime of the writ, he must return it and secure an alias writ.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal and taxed the costs against Jovito Vitanzo.

Remember This

Memorize the line: the levy is the essential act, so a levy timely made within the writ's lifetime carries the sale even beyond the sixty day return period. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a levy after the return day, which is void absent an alias writ, and a sale after the return day, which remains valid.