CCC INSURANCE CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION) AND CARLOS F. ROBES, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City) allowing insurance indemnification of plaintiff for his damaged
car and the payment of attorneys’ fees.

The following facts are not in dispute:

On 1 March 1961, Carlos F. Robes took an insurance, with the CCC
Insurance Corporation, on his Dodge Kingsway car against loss or damage through
accident for an amount not exceeding
P8,000.00 (Policy No. MC-1156).  On
25 June 1961, and during the effectivity of
the policy, the insured vehicle, while being driven by the owner’s driver, became involved in a
vehicular collision along Rizal Avenue Extension, Potrero,
Malabon, Rizal.  The car was damaged, and the repair was
estimated to cost P5,300.00.

As the insurance company refused either to pay for the repair or
to cause the restoration of the car to its original condition, Robes instituted
Civil Case No. Q-6063 in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for recovery not only of the
amount necessary for the repair of the insured car but also of actual and moral
damages, attorneys’ fees and costs. Resisting plaintiff’s claim, the insurance
com­pany disclaimed liability for payment, alleging that there had been
violation of the insurance contract because the one driving the car at the time
of the incident was not an “authorized driver”.

After due hearing, judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, and
defendant insurer was ordered to pay unto the former the cost of repair of the
car in the sum of P5,031.28; the sum of P150.00, for the hauling and impounding
of the car at the repair shop; P2,000.00 as actual damages; and P1,000.00 as
attorneys’ fees, plus costs.

The insurance company went to the Court of Appeals, raising inter
alia the questions of the qualification of
plaintiff’s driver to operate the
insured vehicle and the correctness of the trial court’s award to plaintiff of
the amount of P5,013.28 as cost of
repairs, and of actual damages and attorneys’ fees.  In its decision of 31
January 1966, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the lower court except the award of
actual damages in the sum of P2,000.00, which was
eliminated on the ground that it was too speculative.  Not content, the insurance company filed the
present petition for review of the aforesaid decision of the Court of Appeals
on two grounds: (1) that the proceedings observed in the trial court were
irregular and invalid; and (2) that the damage to the insured car was not
covered by the insurance policy because at the time of the accident it was
being driven by one who was not an authorized driver.

The second issue constitutes the main contention of herein appellant,
and will be considered first.  It is
vigorously urged by the insurer that the one driving the insured vehicle at the
time of the accident was not an authorized driver thereof within the purview of
the following provision of the insurance policy:

“AUTHORIZED DRIVER:

“Any of the following:

(a)          The insured;

(b)          Any person
driving on the Insured’s order or with his permission, provided that the person
driving is permitted in accordance with
licensing laws or regulations to drive the motor vehicle covered by this
Policy, or has been so permitted and is not disqualified by order of a court of
law or by reason of any enactment or regulation from driving such Motor
Vehicle.” (Underlin­ing ours)

It
has been found as a fact by the Court of Appeals that Domingo Reyes, the driver
who was at the wheel of the insured car at the time of the accident, does not
know how to read and write; that he was able to secure a driver’s license,
without passing any examination therefor, by paying
P25.00 to a certain woman; and that the Cavite agency
of the Motor Vehicles Office has certified not having issued Reyes’ purported
driver’s license No. 271703 DP.

In holding that the damage sustained by the car comes within the
coverage of the insurance policy, the Court of Appeals argued that since Reyes’
purported driver’s, license (Exhibit “A”) bears all the earmarks of a
duly issued license, then it is a public document, and petitioner insurance company
then has the burden of disproving its genuineness, which the latter has failed
to do.  In this respect, the Court of
Appeals ruled:

” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   The fact that the Cavite
Agency of the Motor Vehicles Office states that Driver’s License No, 271703 DP
was not issued by that office, does not remove the possibility that said office
may have been mistaken or that said license was issued by another agency.  Indeed, Exhibit 13 shows that a certain
Gloria Presa made the notation thereon “no license
issued” and which notation was the basis of the 1st Indorsement,
Exhibit 12, signed by the MVO Cavite City Agency’s
officer-in-charge.  Neither Gloria Presa nor the officer-in-charge Marciano
A. Monzon was placed on the witness stand to be
examined in order to determine whether said license is indeed void.  As it is, as heretofore pointed out, the fact
remains that Domingo Reyes is in possession of a driver’s license issued by the
Motor Vehicles Office which on its face appears to have been regularly
issued.”

In effect, the Court of Appeals found that the driver’s license
No. 271703 DP was genuine, that is, one really issued by the Motor Vehicles
Office or its authorized deputy; and this finding of fact is now conclusive and
may not be questioned in this appeal.

Nevertheless, the appellant insurer insists that, under the established
facts of this case, Reyes, being admittedly one who cannot read and write, who
has never passed any examination for drivers, and has not applied for a license
from the duly constituted govern­ment agency entrusted with the duty of
licensing drivers, can not be considered an authorized driver.

The fatal flaw in
appellant’s argument is that it studiously ignores the provisions of law
existing at the time of the mishap. 
Under Section 24 of the Revised Motor Vehicles Law, Act 3992 of the
Philippine Legislature, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 587, 1204 and 2363^[1],

“An examination or demonstration to
show any applicant’s ability to operate motor ve­hicles may also be required in
the discretion of the Chief, Motor Vehicles Office or his deputies.”
(Emphasis supplied)

and
reinforcing such discretion, Section 26 of the Act prescribes further

“SEC. 26.  Issuance
of chauffeur’s license; professional chauffeur’s badge: If, after examination,
or without the same, the Chief, Motor Vehicles Office or his deputies,
believe the applicant to possess the necessary qualifications and knowledge,
they shall issue to such applicant a license to operate as chauffeur . . . . .
. . . . “ (Emphasis supplied)

It is thus clear that the issuance of a driving license without previous
examination does not necessarily imply that the license issued is invalid.  As the law stood in 1961, when the claim
arose, the examinations could be dispensed with in the discretion of the Motor
Vehicles Office officials.  Whether
discretion was abused in issuing the license without examination is not a
proper subject of inquiry in these proceedings, though, as a matter of
legislative policy, the discretion should be eliminated.  There is no proof that the owner of the
automobile knew that the circumstances surrounding such issuance showed that it
was irregular.

The issuance of the
license is proof that the Motor Vehicles Office official
considered Reyes, the driver of the insured-appellee,
qualified to operate motor vehicles, and the insured was entitled to rely upon
such license.  In this connection, it
should be observed that the chauffeur, Reyes, had been driving since 1957,^[2] and without mishap, for all the record shows. 
Considering that, as
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the weight of authority is in favor of a liberal interpretation
of the insurance policy for the benefit of the party insured, and strictly
against the insurer, We find no reason to diverge from the conclusion reached
by the Court of Appeals that no breach was committed of the above-quoted
provision of the policy.

The next issue assigned
is anchored on the fact that the decision of the trial court was based on evidence
presented to and received by the clerk of court who acted as commissioner, although, allegedly, there was no written court order constituting him as such commissioner; no written request for his commission was
made by the parties; he did not take an oath prior to entering into the
discharge of his commission; no written report of his findings was ever
submitted to the court; and no notice thereof was sent to the parties, contrary to the specific provisions of Rule 33 of the
Rules of Court.

Actually, there is
nothing basically wrong with the practice of delegating to a
commissioner, usually the clerk of court, who is a duly sworn court officer,
the reception of evidence of both parties and for him to submit a report
thereon to the court.  In fact, this
procedure is expressly sanctioned by Revised Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.^[3]
Petitioner’s objection in this case, however, is directed not against its
referral to the clerk of court but against the alleged non-observance of the
prescribed steps in connection with such delegation.

We find no cause sufficient to invalidate the proceedings had in
the trial court.  We note that this issue
was brought up by the appellant insurance company for the first time only in
its motion for reconsideration filed in the Court of Appeals.  It was not raised in the trial court, where
the defect could still be remedied.  This
circumstance precludes ventilation of the issue of validity of the hearing at
this stage; for, if such irregularity is to vitiate the proceeding, the
question should have been seasonably raised, i.e., either before the parties
proceeded with the hearing or before the court handed down its ruling.^[4]
It is a procedural point that can be waived by consent of the parties, express
or implied.^[5]

For the same reason, appellant cannot insist now on the annulment
of the proceeding on the basis of alleged lack of written consent of the
parties to the commission, or of an order appointing the clerk as commissioner,
or of notice of the submission of his report to the court.  Furthermore, appellant has presented no proof
that the clerk of court committed any mistake or abuse in the performance of
the task entrusted to him, or that the trial court was not able to properly
appreciate the evidence in the case because it was received by another
person.  If indeed there were errors at
all, they would be non-prejudicial and could not justify the holding of a new
trial, as urged by herein petitioner.^[6]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed, with costs against appellant CCC Insurance Corporation.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Subsequently replaced by Republic Act No. 4136 (1967).

^[2]
T.s.n., page 4; Record on Appeal, pages 36-38;
Appellant’s Brief, pages 15-16.

^[3]
Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, (1962) 6 SCRA 300;
Cruz vs. Malabayabas, 105 Phil. 708.

^[4]
Perlas vs. Ehrman,
53 Phil. 607.

^[5]
Luzon Stevedoring Corp. vs. PSC, I -5458, 16 September 1953; also Santos vs. De Guzman, 45 Phil. 646.

^[6]
See Gayon vs. Ubaldo,
L-7650, 28
December 1955.