G.R. No. L-38685. March 31, 1977
LIANGA LUMBER COMPANY AND NORTH ZAMBALES LUMBER COMPANY, PETITIONERS, VS. LIANGA TIMBER CO., INC. AND HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
ANTONIO, J.:
Petitioners filed the present appeal by certiorari from
the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated February 19, 1974 and May 9, 1974 in case CA-G. R. No.
37365-R,[1]
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, and at the same time as a special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the validity of the
same Resolutions.
The antecedent proceedings are summarized briefly as follows:
Petitioner Lianga Lumber Company is the
licensee of a timber concession in Agusan; while
private respondent Lianga Timber Co., Inc., is the licensee of another timber concession in Lianga, Surigao.
On October 13, 1959,
the petitioners filed a complaint
against the private respondent alleging, among others, that:
“3. That the Lianga
Lumber Company is the owner and possessor of an Ordinary Timber License, No.
1468-’54, originally issued on January 28, 1954, a photostat
copy of which is hereto attached as Annex ‘A’.
The license has been extended from time to time up to the present, the
latest extension being O. T. License No. 864-’59. The area included in the concession contains
a total forested area of about 10,000 hectares in the province
of Agusan,
Municipal Districts of Azpitia, Los Arcos, and Prosperidad. The
northeast corner of the concession is point ‘3’, which is the junction of the interprovincial road and the boundary between the provinces
of Agusan and Surigao, and
the eastern boundary is the Surigao-Agusan interprovincial road;
* * * * * * * * *
“6. That on or about September 13, 1959,
defendant corporation, thru its agents, entered into the above-described
concession of plaintiff, more particularly the place known as Sitio Tagabaca, Los Arcos, at a
place located south of the seat of actual
logging operations of the plaintiff, and outside the limits of defendant’s concession
and began marking trees therein, and on or about September 18, 1959 defendant
posted armed men on the said sitio and thru force,
intimidation and threats, prevented the laborers of plaintiff from entering
said place and logging therein. These
acts of defendant were committed with the peaceful objection of the plaintiff
and its agents;
“7. That said sitio of
Tagabaca is in the Province
of Agusan,
west of the Surigao-Agusan boundary, outside of
defendant’s concession, and within that of plaintiff’s;
“8. That on September 22, 1959, the plaintiff Lianga Lumber Company and the defendant, thru their
respective authorized agents, entered into an agreement whereby both parties
agreed to desist from logging within the disputed area pending the settlement
of the boundaries of the adjoining claims by the proper authorities, a copy of
which agreement is attached hereto and made an integral part hereof and marked
as Annex ‘B’;
“9. That notwithstanding the above-mentioned
agreement, the defendant, thru force, threats and intimidation, entered into
the disputed area on October 8, 1959, and started building a road towards the
same with a view to logging therein, in violation of the above-mentioned
agreement;
“10. That the
only way and manner in which plaintiffs can be protected in their right to log
over the area, is for this Honorable Court to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction commanding the officers, agents and laborers of the defendant to
leave the said place especially the place known as Sitio
Tagabaca, Los Arcos, Agusan,
and allow plaintiffs and their laborers to peacefully continue logging
operations therein;[2]
and praying, inter alia:
“(a) That the place invaded and
illegally occupied by the defendant and its agents be declared part of the
timber concession of the plaintiffs, and upon the fixing and approval of the
proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued by this Court ordering
the defendant’s officers, agents and laborers
to leave the above-mentioned sitio of Tagabaca, Los Arcos, Agusan, to
desist from interfering with, and preventing by force, intimidation and
threats, the logging operations of the plaintiffs, their agents and laborers,
and be prohibited from logging therein;[3]
* * * * * * * * *“
Private respondent filed an Amended Answer with Counterclaims alleging, among others, that:
“5. Defendant denies
the allegations con- tained in paragraph 7 of
plaintiffs’ complaint, the truth being that subject-area is within defendant’s
concession and is a territorial part of the Province
of Surigao;
* * * * * * *
* *
“AND BY WAY OF
COUNTERCLAIMS, defendant alleges that:
1. Defendant adopts, repleads
and reproduces the foregoing allegations material and pertinent to the instant
counterclaims;
2. By reason of plaintiffs’ repeated unlawful,
surreptitious and stealthy logging operation in defendant’s concession area,
defendant suffered losses in the form of:
(a) logs, yarded and taken out from defendant’s concession area
and loaded in the ship of plaintiffs’ customers totalling
an estimated 400,000 board feet which could be reasonably assessed and valued
at P40,000.00;
(b) 180,000 board
feet of logs ‘fall and back’ that is, logs already cut and topped by
plaintiffs, ready for yarding but still within the defendant’s
concession area which could be reasonably assessed and valued at P18,000.00;
3. By reason of plaintiffs’ aforesaid acts and
conduct:
(a) defendant’s
logging operations were disrupted as a result of which defendant shall suffer
monthly losses during the pendency of the instant
case in the amount of P15,000.00 until the defendant can resume operations;
(b) defendant shall incur losses in the amount of P60,000.00 for
failure to keep up with defendant’s November
15, 1959 commitment to ship to its buyers 650,000 board feet of
logs and shall incur the same amount of losses every month thereafter until
defendant can resume operations and fulfill its pending commitments with its
buyers.”[4]
and praying that
judgment be rendered in its favor by dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint and
ordering said party to pay defendant the sum of:
“a) P40,000.00 as payment for logs cut and yarded by
plaintiffs and loaded in their customers’ ship;
b) P18,000.00 for logs
cut and yarded by plaintiffs but still not loaded in their customers’ ship;
c) P15,000.00 a month
for disruption of defendant’s logging operations in the subject-area from
October, 1959 until defendant can resume operations;
d) P60,000.00 a month
starting in November, 1959 until defendant can resume operations and fulfill
its commitment with its customers;
e) P3,000.00 as
attorney’s fees;
f) Moral and exemplary damages;
g) Costs.”[5]
After due hearing on the application
of petitioners for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the trial
court issued an Order, dated November 12, 1959, granting said application,
which Order reads as follows:
“The plaintiffs came to this Court asking for a writ of preliminary
injunction against the defendant corporation which illegally entered a portion
of the area covered by their ordinary timber license, particularly, the place
called Tagabaca of Los Arcos, Agusan. The concessions covered by the timber
licenses of both parties are adjacent to each other, and their common boundary
is the provincial boundary line of Agusan and Surigao, West of this line is the forest concession of the
plaintiffs, located in the Province of Agusan, while
east thereof is the concession of the defendant which lies within the province
of Surigao.
“The boundary between Agusan and Surigao is fixed by law, specifically by Sec. 1 of Act 1693
of the Philippine Commission which reads as follows:
‘Section 1. There is hereby established a province which
shall be known as the Province of Agusan. It shall be composed of two subprovinces which shall be known as Butuan
and Bukidnon, respectively. The boundary line of the subprovince
of Butuan shall be a line beginning at the northern
point of the present boundary line between the provinces of Surigao
and Misamis and extending in a general southerly
direction along this line to the eighth parallel of north latitude; thence due
east along said parallel of latitude to the crest of the watershed between the
Agusan River Valley and the Pacific Ocean; thence in
a northerly direction along the crest of this watershed to the northern
extremity of the Island of Mindanao; thence along the sea coast to its point of
origin; the general purpose in establishing this boundary line being to include
within it all municipalities and settlements in the Agusan
River Valley and all settlements west of the crest of the watershed in the
northern peninsula of the province of Surigao.’
“From the above quoted legal provision, the crest of the
watershed between the Agusan River Valley and the
Pacific Ocean is the boundary between the two provinces of Surigao
and Agusan, and this crest which is the highest ridge
of the Diwata Mountain, was located by Mr. Justice
Labrador who personally went to the place to lay the corner of the
northeastern boundary of the plaintiffs’ concession. This ridge was recently located by the
District Forester of Agusan and actually measured as
8.501 kilometers from the Lianga beach (Exhs. A-1 and A-2). Plaintiffs constructed a logging camp west of
this ridge when the plaintiffs began their logging operations in 1956 and
their possession and logging operation were continuous and peaceful until the
month of September, 1959, when the defendants unlawfully entered a portion of
the area on the side, west of the logging camp and began cutting trees thereon
from hauling. In order to avert trouble,
the parties thru their respective representatives entered into an agreement,
Annex B to the petition, whereby they agreed not to touch the contested area
until after the same is finally adjudicated.
But, before steps could be taken for the settlement of the dispute, the
defendant in violation of the agreement reentered the area on October 8, 1959, thereby forcing the
plaintiffs to seek injunctive relief against defendant.
“The evidence clearly established the following: that the contested area known as Tagabaca is part of the province of Agusan
being on ‘the west of the crest of the watershed between the Agusan River Valley and the Pacific Ocean; that this area
forms part of the timber concession of the plaintiffs and that on October 8,
1959 the defendant in violation of the agreement, Annex B to the complaint,
through the use of force and by taking the law into its own hands, entered the
place Tagabaca which had been in the possession of
the plaintiffs since 1956; that there is necessity of stopping the illegal acts
of intrusion, invasion and usurpation of the defendant in order to prevent
irreparable damages to the plaintiffs because of their commitments to supply
timber to foreign buyers. Injunction is
the only remedy here available to the plaintiffs to restrain the acts of
trespass and illegal interference of possession. The claim of the defendant that the contested
area is part of its lumber concession is not supported by evidence. In fact, its witness admitted that they do
not know the provincial boundary of Agusan and Surigao.
“WHEREFORE, it is
hereby ordered that upon the filing of the bond in the sum of P10,000.00, with
sufficient sureties approved by the Court, a writ of preliminary injunction
shall issue commanding the defendant corporation, its agents, officers and
laborers to leave the contested area of Tagabaca, Los Arcos, Agusan and
to restrain them from logging therein, and ordering them to desist from interferring with and preventing by force, intimidation and
threats the logging operations of the plaintiffs.”[6]
Likewise, after due trial
on the merits, the trial court rendered a Decision, dated June 1, 1965,
declaring the contested area or the place invaded by the private respondent as
part of the timber concession of the petitioners and awarded damages in favor
of the petitioners amounting to P47,578.75.
Said Decision reads:
“Plaintiff Lianga Lumber Co., is the
owner and possessor of an O. T. License No. 864-’59 issued for the year 1959, covering a forest concession which
is situated in the province of Agusan while adjoining
it, is another forest concession which belongs to the defendant Lianga Timber Co., located in the province of Surigao and covered by O.T. License No. 804-’59, likewise issued for the year 1959. The common boundary of the two concessions
is the interprovincial boundary line of Agusan and Surigao. West of this line is the forest area of the
plaintiff Lianga Lumber Co., comprised within the
province of Agusan, while east thereof, is the area
of the defendant Lianga Timber Co., which lies in the
province of Surigao.
“By agreement between the Lianga
Lumber Co. and the North Zambales Lumber Co., the
latter has been authorized to conduct logging operations in the concession of
the former without protest from any adjoining concessionaire and said
operations continued in the year 1959 on the area in the northeast corner of
the concession, west of the Agusan-Surigao boundary.
“On September 13, 1959; the defendant corporation thru its
agents entered the concession of the plaintiffs at Sitio
Tagabaca, Los Arcos, Agusan,
and, on September 18, 1959, the defendant posted armed men in said sitio and, thru force, threats and intimidation, prevented
the laborers of the plaintiffs from entering and logging there in. Against these acts of trespass, the plaintiffs
vigorously objected and protested.
“Efforts were exerted to settle amicably the dispute in order
to avert bloodshed between the parties and, on September 22, 1959, the plaintiff
Lianga Lumber Co., and the defendant Lianga Timber Co., thru their respective resident managers,
entered into an agreement whereby both parties agreed in writing to desist
from logging within the disputed area, pending the final settlement of the
conflicting claims, by proper authorities.
(Annex B to the complaint; Exhibit 7 of the defendant).
“By virtue of the above, agreement, there was cessation of
logging operations by the contracting parties in the disputed area but two
weeks later or to be exact on October 8, 1959, the defendant corporation by
force and intimidation, again entered the said area and started building a road
for the purpose of logging therein, in gross violation of the conditions of the
agreement, thereby forcing the plaintiff to file this complaint to stop the
unlawful acts of trespass committed by the said defendant.
“The defendant answered the complaint, with general denial and
set up the defense that its logging operations had always been confined within
its concession area covered by its Ordinary Timber License No. 864-’59 and that
the area in question is definitely found in said concession area. It further stated that on October 8, 1959,
defendant built a road not for the purpose of logging but in order to gain
access to the other points of its concession, the same being conveniently
accessible thru a road traversing the area in question; that the plaintiffs are
instead the ones guilty of invading and encroaching upon the concession area of
the defendant, thereby causing enormous damages to the latter.
“After an exhaustive hearing of the petition for preliminary
injunction, it was found out that the contested area especially that place
known as Tagabaca is part of the province of Agusan and west of the Agusan-Surigao
boundary line, the same being west of the highest mountain ridge or crest,
between the two provinces which divides the watershed flowing west into the Agusan River Valley and that flowing east into the Pacific
Ocean, as defined by section 1 of Act 1693 of the Philippine Commission; that
the crest of the watershed crosses the Lianga, Surigao-Los Arcos, Agusan interprovincial road at kilometer 8.501 from Lianga. This point
of crossing and a line drawn therefrom southward is
the dividing line between the concession of the plaintiffs and the concession
of the defendant. Plaintiffs constructed
a logging camp west of this ridge and began their logging operation in that
place since 1956, and their operation was continuous and peaceful until the
month of September 1959, when the defendant and its men unlawfully entered a
portion of the area on the side west of the logging camp and began cutting
trees thereon.
* * * * * * *
* *
“Before the issuance of the injunction, the plaintiffs already
suffered damages because when the defendant corporation entered the contested
area in October 1959, it cut illegally 63 trees which were subsequently scaled
by the Bureau of Forestry. The total
volume of the timber cut is 454.50 cubic meters equivalent to 191,805 bd.
ft. At the price of $58.00 per thousand
board feet, the price of lumber in 1959, the value of the 63 trees cut, in
pesos would amount to P21,982.60 (Exh. D-1, auxiliary invoice covering 454.50 cubic meters of timber).
“When the defendant entered the concession of the plaintiff in
the month of October, 1959, the plaintiffs have already cut 100 trees more or
less, which when scaled by the Bureau of Forestry were found to have a total
volume of 707.31 cubic meters of timber (Invoice Exh.
D), equivalent to 299,889 board feet and valued at P33,538.74. Because the defendant corporation did not
allow the plaintiffs to haul these cut trees they got rotten and became a
total loss. This damage however cannot
be charged to the defendant because by virtue of the agreement of September 22, 1959, the plaintiffs
were not prevented from removing these logs.
The loss must be borne by them and not by the defendant.
“Because of the injunction, the defendant was restrained from
logging in the disputed area but in December 1960, the defendant surreptitiously
entered the eastern portion of the plaintiffs’ area and cut 135 trees. These were scaled by the Bureau of Forestry
to be 789.61 cubic meters in volume equivalent to 335,558.24 board feet and
valued at P49,295.53. The damage caused by this illegal cutting
should be charged to the defendant (Invoice, Exh. D-2).
* * * * * * * * *
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs and
against the defendant:
(a) declaring the contested area or the place invaded by the
defendant as part of the timber concession of the plaintiffs;
(b) making the
injunction herein issued final and permanent by perpetually restraining the
defendant from logging in the area covered by the concession
of the plaintiffs and from interfering with the possession and logging
operations of the plaintiffs;
(c) ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs by virtue of
an amended complaint and supplemental complaint, the sum of P47,578.75 as
actual damages; and
(d) sentencing the defendant to pay the costs.”[7]
Private respondent
appealed to the Court of Appeals.[8] This case was submitted for decision on
September 4, 1967,[9] and on February 19, 1971, a Decision of the
Appellate Court (penned by then Presiding Justice Salvador V. Esguerra and concurred in by Justices Edilberto Soriano and Lourdes P.
San Diego), affirming en toto the appealed Decision, was promulgated. The Court of Appeals said:
“The jugular vein of the controversy in this case is the
boundary line which separates the forest concessions of the two timber
corporations. Plaintiff-appellee Lianga Lumber Company
contends that the disputed area situated in Sitio Tagabaca, Los Arcos, is embraced within its timber license,
while defendant-appellant claims that it is a part of its concession. As proof of its assertion that the disputed
area is within the area granted it by the Director of Forestry, the plaintiff-appellee, Lianga Lumber Company,
invites attention to the fact that the sitio of Tagabaca where the logging controversy arose, is a part of
the Province of Agusan, and its timber license covers
a forest concession ‘situated in the province of Agusan.’
“Defendant Lianga Timber Company,
Inc. counters by alleging that the area in dispute is within its logging
permit. In spite of the fact that its
timber license states that the forest concession where it is allowed to
operate is ‘in the province of Surigao‘, defendant
points out that its ordinary timber license established as its corner ‘No. 6’
the intersections of the Agusan-Surigao boundary
line and the Los Arcos-Lianga Road which is about 10
kilometers to the town of Lianga. Defendant further claims that as indicated
in the official concession maps, the aforesaid intersection is exactly 9.7
kilometers by a straight line from Lianga town. Inasmuch as its license states 10 kilometers from the town of Lianga its logging area extends west of the interprovincial boundary line.
“There is abundant proof to show that the boundary line
between the two forest concession is the interprovincial boundary line of Agusan
and Surigao. The timber license of plaintiff-appellee Lianga Lumber Company
states that the forest concession awarded to it is in the province of Agusan, while that of the defendant, Lianga
Timber Company, Inc., indicates that its forest
concession is situated in the province of Surigao.
“The boundary between Agusan and Surigao is fixed by
law. Section 1 of Act 1693 of the
Philippine Commission provides as follows:
* * * *
* * * * *
“It is clear from the afore-quoted legal provision that the
crest of the watershed between the Agusan River
Valley and the Pacific Ocean is the boundary between the two provinces of Surigao and Agusan.
“Furthermore, the contested area known as Tagabaca
is part of the province of Agusan from being west of
the crest of the watershed between the Agusan River
Valley and the Pacific Ocean.
Defendant-appellant apparently overlooks the fact that the western
boundary of its concession is the physical ridge separating the province of Surigao from the province of Agusan
and their boundary ridge is 8.5 kilometers along the Los Arcos-Lianga road from Lianga
town. It is not 10 kilometers as stated
in defendant-appellant’s license. This
distance was merely calculated. The full
distance of 10 kilometers from Lianga town would run
into, and encroach on, the province of Agusan. This is shown in the timber license of the
defendant-appellant itself.
‘* * * to Corner 5, a point on the Agusan-Surigao
boundary line in a general northerly direction about 3,500 meters to Corner 6,
the intersection of same Agusan-Surigao boundary
line and Los Arcos-Lianga Road.’
“In other words, the limit of the forest concession of
defendant-appellant Lianga Timber Company, Inc. on
the west begins from Corner 5 which is a point on the Agusan-Surigao
boundary line and passes northward over a span of about 3,500 meters to Corner
6 which is the intersection of same Agusan-Surigao
boundary line and Arcos-Lianga Road. This definitely shows that the boundary limit
of the defendant-appellant’s forest concession on the west is the Agusan-Surigao boundary line. In view of this, this Court is constrained to
recognize the interprovincial boundary of Agusan and Surigao beginning from
Corner 5 to Corner 6 of defendant-appellant’s timber license as the common
boundary of the two contending logging corporations; despite the distance of
‘about 10,000 meters from Corner 6 to Corner 1, the point of beginning in Lianga‘ as stated in the timber license of
defendant-appellant.
“The insistence of Lianga Timber
Company, Inc. that it owns the area up to Kilometer No. 10 on the Los Arcos-Lianga Road from Lianga town proper
made defendant-appellant encroach on a forest area west of the boundary line
belonging to the plaintiff-appellee situated in the province of Agusan. The area encroached upon by it is encompassed
by the lines connecting Corner 5 of the timber license of Lianga
Timber Company, Inc. to Kilometer No. 10 of the Los Arcos-Lianga
Road, to Corner 6, then back to Corner 5 of the defendant-appellant’s timber
license along the Surigao-Agusan boundary line. It is not denied that it cut down trees in
said place. The Lianga
Timber Company, Inc. must therefore account for the trees taken from the
disputed area.
“As to the amount of
damages awarded in favor of the
plaintiff-appellee, we fully concur with the
observation of the lower court on the matter, * * *.
“The above observation of the lower court
well-supported by the evidence on record. The same should not be disturbed.
“Anent the issue raised
by the defendant-appellant that the plaintiffs-appellees
have not exhausted their administrative remedies before bringing this action,
the same does not deserve serious consideration. The record shows that there was an agreement
between the parties to suspend operations on September 2, 1959, but on October
8, 1959, defendant-appellant’s agents entered the forest area in question with
the intention of logging therein, thus preventing the plaintiffs-appellees from conducting logging operations. To have appealed first to the Director of
Forestry would have been too late a move because before the matter could be
brought to his attention, the defendant-appellant shall have already started
its own logging operations. Appeal from
administrative action would have been too late and inadequate, not prompt,
adequate and speedy. The trespass to be
prevented had already started and was continuing. It could not be promptly stopped without
court intervention. One of the exceptions to the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is
when its application will cause great and irreparable damage like in the case
at bar. (De Lara, et al. vs. Cloribel, et al., G.
R. No. L-21763, May 31, 1965). Precisely,
the remedy of injunction was availed of to abate defendant-appellant’s illegal
actual entry into plaintiffs-appellees‘
concession. That was the only way to
stop the intrusion and prevent further felling of trees therein.”[10]
On March 9,
1971, private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration of said Decision of February
19, 1971,[11]
and the Court of Appeals (thru the same
Presiding Justice [Esguerra] and Justices [Soriano and San Diego]), denied the same in its Minute Resolution
of March 22, 1971
(Quoted on p. 23 of Petition).
On April
10, 1971, with leave
of court, the private respondent filed a second motion for
reconsideration on substantially the same grounds as its first motion for
reconsideration, namely:
“1. That, apart from
being contrary to the concession grant itself, the conclusion of this Honorable
Court to the effect that the interprovincial
boundary line of Agusan and Surigao,
as established on the ground by Justice Alejo Labrador
delimits to the West the concession area of defendant-appellant in spite of its
technical descriptions is contrary to the facts established during the trial.
“2. That this Honorable Court obviously failed to
appreciate the fact that the lower court had not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant-appellant as to the amendment to the complaint and
supplemental complaint and, therefore, acted without jurisdiction in rendering
judgment and awarding damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees
on the bases thereof.
“3. That this Honorable Court obviously
failed to consider the fact that the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion, equal to want of jurisdiction, in enjoining only the defendant-appellant
from logging in the timber concession area in dispute.
“4. That the facts admitted and
established at the trial of this case, which were ignored by the lower court,
clearly showed that it was the plaintiffs-appellees
who disregarded the agreement between them
and appellant; that it was they
who defied the orders of the Bureau of Forestry. Upon the other hand, the defendant-appellant
went out of its way to honor and
respect them, and that the appellant gave no cause to justify non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies by appellees.
“5. That, considering the facts
established during the trial, the defendant-appellant ought to have been
awarded the damages and the appellees denied
any.”[12]
On September 8, 1971, the
petitioners filed their opposition to the second motion for reconsideration
alleging, among others: (1) that said motion
was filed on April 12, 1971, two (2) days, beyond the period granted by the
court, the due date being April 10, 1971, for private respondent received on
March 31, 1971 the respondent Court’s Resolution, dated March
30, 1971, giving said private respondent ten (10) days from notice thereof
within which to file said second motion for reconsideration; and (2) the
grounds of said motion are, in substance, a rehash of what private respondent
had already raised in its brief.[13]
After oral arguments were
heard from, and memoranda were filed by, the parties, the respondent Court of
Appeals issued a Resolution on June 15, 1972,[14] reversing its decision of February
19, 1971, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, the second motion for reconsideration is
granted. Our decision, dated February 19, 1971, affirming the
judgment appealed from is hereby vacated and a new one-entered dismissing the
complaint, and declaring:
1. That the forest area in question is a part of
the forest concession of the defendant-appellant; and
2. That plaintiffs-appellees
be ordered to pay the defendant-appellant the sum of $1,218,000.00 representing
the value of logs cut down and appropriated by plaintiffs-appellees
from the area in dispute. The amount is
to be computed at the prevailing rate of exchange of the Philippine pesos. (Art. 1250, New Civil Code.)
“The plaintiffs-appellees are
ordered to pay to the defendant-appellant as attorney’s fees the amount of P3,000.00 and the costs of the suit.”[15]
This Resolution of June 15, 1972, is referred to by the private
respondent as the Esguerra Resolution.
On June 27, 1972,
the petitioners filed a motion for rehearing or reconsideration of the Esguerra Resolution, on the grounds that the interprovincial line delimiting the Agusan-Surigao
boundary must prevail over the technical description; and that the award of
$1,218,000.00 in favor of defendant-appellant is not supported by competent
evidence and not pleaded in the court a quo.[16]
By Resolution of August
16, 1972, the
respondent Court of Appeals required the private respondent to comment
on the aforesaid motion within fifteen (15) days from notice. Private respondent filed a motion for an
extension of time to file comment, which was granted. However, respondent did not file any comment,
but instead filed a manifestation on February 7, 1973 that, in lieu of a
written opposition, it will sum up its arguments in opposition to the motion
during the oral argument on February 9,
1973. After the oral
arguments, both parties were required to submit their respective memoranda,
which they did.
On April 30, 1973, the respondent Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution (penned by Acting Presiding Justice Juan P. Enriquez and concurred
in by Justices Manuel P. Barcelona and
Emilio A. Gancayco), reversing the Esguerra Resolution of June 15, 1972 and
declaring, as in its original decision of February 19, 1971, that the forest area in dispute is part of the concession of the petitioners and awarding the amount of P32,863.62 as actual damages. The dispositive portion of this Resolution
reads:
“WHEREFORE, the motion for rehearing/reconsideration is granted. Our resolution dated June 15, 1972 reversing the decision of February 19, 1971 which affirmed that of the court below
is hereby set aside and a new one entered, declaring:
1. That the forest area in dispute is part of
the concession of plaintiffs-appellees;
2. Ordering defendant-appellant to pay
plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P32,863.62
as actual damages;
3. And the further sum of P3,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and the costs of the suit.”[17]
This
Resolution of April 30, 1973 is referred to by the private respondent as
the Enriquez Resolution.
On May 21, 1973, private
respondent filed a “Motion for Reconsideration of 30 April 1973 Resolution
and Motion to Assign Subject Motion for Reconsideration to Special Division of
Five Members” on the grounds that:
(1) the alleged August 1964 agreement between parties — basis of Enriquez
Resolution of April
30, 1973 — is spurious because no
such agreement was introduced or offered or admitted in evidence during the
entire trial court proceedings; (2) the genuine agreement, undisputed on
record, is the February 1959 accord of parties whereby their common forestry
boundary was established by them on the ground pursuant to Forestry Control Map (Exhibit “1”) and
timber licenses (Exhibit “3”) by forestry officials and the
parties-litigants’ respective duly authorized representatives; (3) the
findings of fact of the Enriquez Resolution are patent distortions of
evidentiary facts on record; and (4) the official interpretation by issuing
administrative agency — the Bureau of Forestry — as to the meaning of the
term “Agusan Surigao
Provincial Boundary” as mentioned in Parties’ Timber Licenses should
prevail and control.[18]
On June 27,
1973, petitioners
filed their opposition to the foregoing motion for reconsideration.[19] Both parties submitted their respective
memoranda. Thereafter, or on February
19, 1974, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its appealed Resolution
(penned by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco and concurred in
by Justices Mateo Canonoy and Guillermo S. Santos) setting
aside the Enriquez Resolution of April 30, 1973 and ordering
the remand of the records
of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
“WHEREFORE, the resolution of this Court of April 30, 1973 is
set aside, the record of this case is remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings, with the instruction that a resurvey of the disputed area, of the Agusan-Surigao boundary as provided for by law, as well as
of the area covered by the respective licenses of the parties must be conducted
by the District Engineers and District Foresters of Surigao
and Agusan or their representatives, in the presence
of the parties, or their representatives, the expenses to be shouldered by the
parties equally, and thereafter further proceedings should be held to enable
the parties to adduce additional evidence if they so desire. Thereafter, the trial court should render a
new decision based on the evidence on the record, and such additional evidence
and facts as may be adduced. The writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the lower court enjoining the appellant from
logging in the contested area is maintained until these proceedings are
terminated. No pronouncement as to
costs.”[20]
This
Resolution of February 19, 1974 is referred to by private respondent as the Gancayco Resolution.
On March 14, 1974, the
petitioners filed their Motion for Rehearing or Reconsideration of the
aforesaid Gancayco Resolution of February 19, 1974,
praying that this Resolution be set aside and vacated, and that the Decision
dated February 19, 1971 or the Enriquez Resolution of April 30, 1973 be
revived.[21] Private respondent filed its opposition
thereto.[22] On May 9, 1974, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the
other appealed Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for rehearing or
reconsideration by Minute Resolution (Quoted on p. 28 of Petition, par.
15). Hence, the present appeal.
This case is unique in
the sense that the decisions/resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals,
during a period of four (4) years, had swayed from one side to the other, finally ending in an order for the remand of the case to the
trial court for a rehearing.
We deplore such judicial vacillation. This Court has emphasized that:
“* * * Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the
risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some
definite date fixed by law. The very
object for which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversies. To fulfill this purpose and to do so
speedily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to
spur on the slothful. ‘If a vacillating,
irresolute judge were allowed to thus keep causes ever within his power, to determine
and redetermine them term after term, to bandy his
judgments about from one party to the other, and to change his conclusions as
freely and as capriciously as a chameleon may change its hues, then litigation
might become more intolerable than the wrongs it is intended to redress. (See Arnedo
vs. Llorente and Liongson
[1911], 18 Phil., 257.)”[23]
While there are several
issues raised by both parties, nevertheless, the same can be reduced ‘into two
(2), namely:
1. Is there necessity for remanding the case to
the trial court for further proceedings as declared in the Court of Appeals’
Resolution of February 19, 1974?
2. In the negative, is there sufficient
evidence to affirm the decision of the trial court?
In the appealed Resolution
of the respondent Court of Appeals of February 19, 1974,[24] the records of this case are ordered
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings with instruction that a
resurvey of: a) the disputed area; b)
the Agusan-Surigao boundary as provided for by law;
and c) the area covered by the respective licenses of the parties be conducted
by the District Foresters of Surigao and Agusan and, thereafter, further proceedings; should
be held to enable the parties to adduce additional evidence if they so desire.
This case has been litigated by the parties since 1959, or for
almost eighteen (18) years now.
Public interest demands its early disposition.
I
We find that there is no necessity for the remand of the case to
the trial court for further proceedings.
It must be noted that the trial court, in its Order of November 12,
1959, granting the application for the issuance of a preliminary injunctive
writ, already found as clearly-established by the evidence that the contested
area known as Tagabaca is part of the Province of Agusan, and that the claim of the defendant that the
contested area is part of its lumber concession is not supported by the
evidence. Again, the trial court, in its decision on the merits of June
1, 1965, found as established by the evidence that “on September 13, 1959,
the defendant corporation, thru its agents, entered the concession of the
plaintiffs at Sitio Tagabaca,
Los Arcos, Agusan, and, on September 18, 1959, the
defendant posted armed men in said sitio and thru force,
threats and intimidation, prevented the laborers of the plaintiff from entering
and logging therein”, and that “after an exhaustive hearing of the
petition for preliminary injunction, it was found out that the contested area;
especially that place known as Tagabaca, is part of
the Province of Agusan * * *”[25]
and “the evidence further established that the contested area is an
integral part of the lumber concession of the plaintiff, which ‘the latter has
possessed since 1956 and the defendant corporation merely intruded therein
thru the use of force on October 8, 1959 * * *”. The decision of the Court of Appeals of
February 19, 1971, affirming en toto the
appealed decision of the trial court of June 1, 1965, also stated “that
there is abundant proof to show that the common boundary lines between the two
forest concessions is that provincial boundary line of Agusan
and Surigao* * *” and that “the contested
area known as Tagabaca is part of the province of Agusan * *”, which conclusion of the lower court
“is well supported by the evidence on record.”
The decision of the Court
of Appeals of April 30, 1973,[26] likewise found as sufficiently established
by the evidence that:
“* * * the boundary line delimiting the two adjacent
concessions is the Agusan-Surigao Provincial
Boundary Line located at the highest ridge, 8.5 km. along the Los Arcos-Lianga Road (Exhibits ‘A-1’; ‘A-2’). The result therefore is that the disputed
area which is 9.7 km. along the road is within the plaintiffs-appellees‘ concession and within the province
of Agusan.
“The foregoing conclusion finds support in the technical
description of the parties’ concessions which shows that plaintiffs’
concession is in Agusan while that of defendant is in
Surigao.
Moreover, the disputed area is in Los Arcos, Agusan,
as is provided for in Section 40 of the Revised Administrative Code showing,
that Los Arcos is one of the municipalities within the territorial
jurisdiction of Agusan
Province. Furthermore, there is the admission of
Senator Tolentino that Tagabaca
where the disputed area is, is located in Los Arcos, Agusan (tsn, pp. 225, 229, June 25, 1962). Even the findings of Forester Macabeo of the Bureau of Forestry fixed the highest point
of ridge marking the boundary between the two provinces at 8.501 kms. (Exhibit ‘A-2’)
Finally, if the plaintiffs had really encroached on 420 hectares of valuable
timber land in April 1959, defendant would not have sought the dismissal of
the case (pp. 68-82, Rec. on Ap.), instead of having
the case tried and decided on the merits without any delay and thus soon
recover damages therefor, unmasking thereby Justice
Labrador as trespasser and intruder.
Indeed, it is incomprehensible why defendant did not initiate the present
case or another action for redress. Finally, there is the strong presumption as to
the correctness of the decision appealed from, especially after it was
affirmed and the first motion for reconsideration thereof had been denied by
this Court.” (at pp. 6-7).
Even
the Gancayco Resolution[27] stated that:
“We have carefully reviewed the entire records of this case
including the transcript of stenographic notes and exhibits, and We find that there is no dispute as to the following
–
1. The appellee’s
concession is covered by an ordinary timber license with a total forested
area of about 10,000 hectares in the province
of Agusan
(Exh. C), while the license of the appellant
covers a total forested area of about 5,800 hectares in the province
of Surigao
(Exhibit 2).
* * * * * * *
* *
3. The disputed area as referred to in the
complaint as the Sitio Tagabaca,
Los Arcos, is in the province of Agusan, in accordance with the provisions of
Sections 38 40 of the Revised Administrative Code.” (Resolution,
pp. 20-21, Italics supplied.)
It is likewise significant to note that even
private respondent agrees in its answer (p. 20) that to remand the case is unnecessary, since what is being sought by the Resolution of February 19, 1974 had already been
accomplished. It is true that the Court
of Appeals, in its Resolution of February
19, 1974 (Gancayco Resolution),
sought to remand the case to the lower court, in order to ascertain where the Agusan-Surigao provincial boundary line is located. There is no question, however, that the Agusan-Surigao provincial boundary line has already been
specifically fixed and described by law. As correctly found by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution of April
30, 1973 (Enriquez Resolution), the Surigao-Agusan
provincial boundary line as described in Section 1 of Act 1693 of the
Philippine Commission is “the crest of the watershed between Agusan River
Valley and the Pacific
Ocean.” There appears, therefore, to be no justification of
remanding the case only for the purpose of locating the political boundary between
the two provinces. Besides, appellants
claim now that they do not rely on the political boundary between the two
provinces but on the boundary as fixed by the control map (Exhibit ”1”) of
the Bureau of Forestry which should prevail over the provincial boundary line
established by Act No. 1693.
Indeed, it is not disputed that the trial court had received all
the ‘evidence presented by both parties.
As a matter of fact, the aforementioned trial court,
as well as the Appellate Court, were able to pass upon the said evidence
and decide the case on its merits. To
remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings, therefore, will
only prolong the termination of a case
that has been pending in the courts for almost two decades, and thus subvert
the very interests of justice.
II
Private respondent now
claims that it has been its theory even before the trial court that the
boundary between the two concessions is not the political boundary between the
provinces of Agusan and Surigao
but the forestry boundary indicated in the control map of the Bureau of
Forestry, which may not actually coincide with the political boundary mentioned
by law. Private respondents
position, in effect, is that the location of the political boundary of the two
provinces is not relevant to the issue since the area of its concession may extend
beyond such political boundary. This is,
however, not fully supported by the records.
Except for its statement in its Motion to Dismiss Proceedings which it
filed on February 19, 1960, private respondent has always insisted in the court
a quo that its timber concession was entirely located in the Province of
Surigao, while that of petitioner is
situated within the Province of Agusan, It cannot be
denied that private respondent never alleged in their answer that its timber
concession extended to the province of Agusan, since
its forestry boundary is not necessarily delimited by the political boundary
of the two provinces. Thus, in paragraph
5 of its amended answer, private
respondent specifically alleged that “the subject area is within defendant’s concession
and is territorial part of the Province Surigao.”[28] That
the principal issue litigated by the parties before the court a quo
is whether or not the disputed area falls within the province
of Surigao
is further shown by the recitals contained in the orders issued by the court a quo. Thus, in its Order of November 12, 1959, the trial court
specifically stated that the concessions covered by the timber licenses of
both parties “are adjacent to each other, and their common boundary is
the provincial boundary line of Agusan
and Surigao.
West of this line is the forestry concession of the plaintiffs located
in the Province of Agusan, while east thereof is
the concession of the defendants which lies within the Province of Surigao.” Private respondent did not question
the correctness of this statement of the issue of the case. As a matter of fact, private respondent
conceded that such was the issue when it insisted in its Motion for Reconsideration,
filed on December 4, 1959,
that “the contested area is
a territorial part of
Surigao
Province.“[29]
This theory of private respondent was continued in the brief which it filed
with the Court of Appeals. Thus, it
stated that “the lower court actually had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter as the area in dispute is beyond its territorial jurisdiction”
considering that on the basis of the
technical description of its
concession the disputed area is within the municipality of Lianga,
Surigao.[30]
As correctly contended by
the petitioners; the circumstance that the counsel for private respondent
invoked “the theory of forestry boundary” in its Motion to Dismiss
Proceedings and to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction on February 19,
1960 does not necessarily imply that such was the issue of the case when it was
being tried before the trial court. The
issues in each case are limited to those presented in the pleadings.[31] Generally speaking, issues are raised by
affirmative allegations in the pleadings of one party which are denied by the
pleadings of the adversary. Since ‘ the
object of the pleadings is “to draw the lines of battle between the
litigants and to indicate fairly the nature of the claims or defenses of both parties * * *” and “a party
cannot subsequently take a position contrary to, or inconsistent with, his
pleadings * * *”,[32] the rule requires that every pleading
“shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for
his claim or defense, as the case may be * * *.”[33]
The complaint filed by
petitioners before the Court of First Instance of Agusan
on October 13, 1959 specifically alleged, among others, that “on or
about September 13, 1959, defendant corporation, thru its agents, entered into the above-described concession of
plaintiff, more particularly the place known, as Sitio
Tagabaca, Los Arcos, * * * outside the limits of
defendant’s concession * * *” which “sitio
of Tagabaca is in the Province of Agusan,
west of the Surigao-Agusan boundary, outside of defendant’s
concession, and within that of plaintiff’s,” As stated heretofore, private
respondent directly traversed this, by insisting in its answer of
October 24, 1959, as well as its afore-quoted amended answer, that the
disputed area is within defendant’s concession and is a territorial part of the
Province of Surigao.
Since the issue raised in
the court a quo, on the basis of the evidence presented and upon
which the court rendered its judgment, is whether or not the contested area is
located within the province of Surigao, such question
could not now be changed by private respondent on appeal. Well-settled is the rule that questions which
were not raised, in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal. In order that the question may
be raised on appeal, it is essential that it be within the issue made by the
parties in their pleadings. Consequently,
when a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is tried and
decided upon that theory in the lower court, he will not be permitted to
change his theory on appeal because to permit him to do so will be unfair to
the adverse party.[34] Indeed, the petitioners would have no more
opportunity to present further
evidence, mate rial to the new theory, which
they could have done had they been
aware earlier of the new theory
at the time of the hearing before the trial court, since a reopening for that purpose would be out of
the question after the appeal. In other
words, in the interest of justice and within the sound discretion of the
appellate court, a party may change his legal theory on appeal only when the
factual bases thereof would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in
order to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory.
III
Having found no
justification, on the basis of the evidence of record, for the remand of the case
for further proceedings with the lower
court as held by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of February
19, 1974, the next
question to be resolved is: Did the
Appellate Court err in affirming the decision of the trial court?
There is no question that
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of
February 19, 1974, found as an undisputed
fact that: (a) petitioners’ concession, with a total
forested area of about ten thousand (10,000) hectares, is situated in the province of Agusan, while private respondent’s concession, with
a total forested area of about five thousand eight hundred (5,800) hectares, is
located in the province of Surigao; (b)
that both licenses of the parties specify the “Agusan-Surigao
Boundary line” as the dividing line between the two concessions; and (c)
that the disputed area as referred to in the complaint as the Sitio Tagabaca, Los Arcos, is
in the province of Agusan in accordance with the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of the Revised Administrative Code, It is
also important to note that the Court of Appeals in the same Resolution found
that “By and large, the evidence * * * tends to support the claim of the appellees * * *” and at the same time refused to give
credence to the Forestry Control Map (Exhibit “1”) which was
submitted in support of private respondent’s claim that their forestry boundary
is different from the political or statutory boundary of the two provinces,
considering that said document was obviously prepared only in the year 1959, or
some years after the issuance of the timber licenses to the parties,
“since appearing and reflected thereon are the areas covered by licenses
issued as late as 1959, as O.T.-181-59 of Butuan
Lumber Manufacturing Co. and O.T.-864-59 of the Lianga
Lumber Company, Ltd.” and “no evidence has been adduced to show that the same control map was the basis of the issuance of the
ordinary timber license of the appellees (Exhibit
“C”) of January 28, 1954 or of the ordinary timber license of the
appellant issued on September 3, 1956 (Exhibit “2”).[35] The same Court of Appeals also declared the
opinion of the Acting Director of Forestry, Tiburcio
Serevo,[36] upon which appellant also relies for
support, as a mere opinion of one “who had nothing to do with issuance of said licenses, and
who had not demonstrated in court the technical basis of his opinion”,
apart from the fact that the same official had “advanced an earlier and
inconsistent opinion upholding the political boundary.” These findings may be deemed as accepted by
private respondent, considering that said party did not file any motion for the
reconsideration of the aforementioned Resolution, much less appeal therefrom. The net
result is that private respondent cannot now impugn the correctness of the
findings of fact contained in the afore-mentioned judgment. Settled is the rule that an appellee cannot impugn the correctness of a judgment not
appealed from by him, and while he may make counter assignment of errors, he
can do so only to sustain the judgment on other grounds but not to seek
modification or reversal thereof.[37]
The afore-mentioned findings of the Court of Appeals support and buttress, rather than
detract from, the Appellate Court’s decisions of February 19,
1971 and of April 30,
1973 (Enriquez Resolution). Thus, the Decision of the Court of Appeals of
April 30, 1973, which was a re-affirmance of
the original decision of the
Court of Appeals of February 19, 1971, summarized the factual basis of the conclusion that the “common
boundary line between the two forest concessions is the interprovincial
boundary, line of Agusan and Surigao,
as found by the trial court — which was Sustained by our resolution of March 22, 1971, denying
appellant’s first motion for reconsideration”, thus —
“The boundary of defendant’s timber concession upon which
defendant-appellant rests its case started at Corner 1, a point in the town of Lianga where Los Arcos-Lianga
road begins and proceeds to Corner 6, the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao boundary line and to Los Arcos-Lianga Road …. about 10,000
meters and Corner 1 (Exhibit ‘2’).
“But this Corner 6 is identical to Corner 3 of appellee’s timber concession, which is the crossing of the
Los Arcos-Lianga Road and Surigao-Agusan
Provincial boundary, 3,700 meters to point 6 (Exh. ‘A’).
“The meeting point between the two concessions is clearly the
Surigao-Agusan boundary line.
“Our inquiry is thus shifted to this. Where is the Surigao-Agusan
provincial boundary line? Section 1, of
Act 1693 of the Philippine Commission described this line to be the crest of
the watershed between Agusan
River Valley
and the Pacific Ocean.
The parties recognized this line established by the foregoing Act. For it must be stressed that the parties have
stipulated and/or agreed during the survey made in the presence of
representatives of both plaintiffs-appellees and
defendant-appellant, that this point is situated at the highest crest of Agusan-Surigao Surigao-Agusan
Provincial Boundary (See Annexes A and B to Motion for Rehearing or
Reconsideration, pp. 181-182, Rollo). It is the duty of the Court to abide by that
stipulation even if in its opinion it may appear
at variance with the previous agreements (Martinez vs. Villanueva, L-7256,
August 17, 1954). We are of the opinion that the Court erred in holding that the boundary line
for the simple reason that the same is
a deviation from what was agreed upon by the parties.
“Appellant’s claim that the boundary line delimited in the
technical description contained in the timber license should prevail over the
provincial boundary line established by Act 1693, relying mainly on the letter
of the Bureau of Forestry (Exhibit ’11’) and we quote:
‘….. this office considers the technical
description contained in the timber license it issues to appellant for timber
concessions as controlling in the delimitation of the area within which a
particular license may legally operate …. natural or
political landmarks are merely descriptive
and incidental (Exh. ’11’).’
“We cannot however close our eyes to the fact that the boundary line
established by Act 1693 is a natural landmark – a ridge. There is no evidence that this mark has been
changed by the interplay of natural forces; that there has been any alteration
in the course of the Agusan
River, considering the character of
the monument and the practical impossibility of secretly removing them or
changing their position. The technical
description appearing in Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘2’ can hardly be relied upon for
determination of the boundary line as the result of the
survey of the concessions were not accurate. In fact the sketch, guide map Exhibit ‘1’,
has not been presented and approved by the Bureau of Forestry’s
authorities. And even granting that it
was so approved, the survey was made on the basis of courses and distances.
Courses and distances will yield to known, visible and definite object (Sayoc vs. Alarcon, CA-G.R. No.
3735-R, June 19, 1950); monuments control courses and distances as well as the
calculated area (Scot vs. Abad, 47 Phil. 573; 8 Am. Jur. 780-781; Columbian Rope Co. vs. Bangoy,
CA-G.R. 16543-R, July 31, 1958; 56 O.G. 452; Heguera
vs. U.S., 18 Law Ed. [US] 469; Connelson vs. Hammon, 224 N. C. 757, 235 F 2d 326; Cotabato
Timberland Co., Inc. vs. Plaridel Lumber Co., Inc.,
L-19432, Feb. 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 235).
‘Where the calls for the Location of boundaries to land are inconsistent,
other things being equal, resort is to be had first to natural objects
of landmarks, next to artificial monument, then to adjacent boudaries and thereafter
the course distances.
‘The reason for the rule is
that mistakes in courses and distances are now probable and frequent than in
marked trees, mountains, rivers and other objects capable of being clearly
designated and accurately described; course and distances are usually
descriptive of the designated monument and depend for their accuracy upon the
skill and experience of the surveyor (8 Am. Jur. 781-782).’ (Emphasis our)
“All things considered, we are satisfied that the boundary
line delimiting the two adjacent concessions is the Agusan-Surigao
Provincial Boundary Line located at the highest ridge, 8.5 km. along the Los
Arcos-Lianga Road (Exhs. ‘A-1′; ‘A-2’). The
result therefore is that the disputed area which is 9.7 km. along the road is
within the plaintiffs-appellees‘ concession and within
the province of Agusan.
“The foregoing conclusion finds support in the technical
description of the parties’ concessions which shows that plaintiffs’
concession is in Agusan while that of defendant is in
Surigao.
Moreover, the disputed area is in
Los Arcos, Agusan, as is provided for in Section 40
of the Revised Administrative Code showing that Los Arcos is one of the
municipalities within the territorial jurisdiction of Agusan
province. Furthermore, there is the admission of Senator Tolentino
that Tagabaca where the disputed area is, is located
in Los Arcos, Agusan (tsn., pp. 225, 229, June 25, 1962). Even the findings of Forester Macabeo of the Bureau of forestry fixed the highest point
or ridge marking the boundary between the two provinces at 8.501 kms, (Exhibit ‘A-2’).
Finally, if the plaintiffs had really encroached on 420 hectares of
valuable timberland in April 1959, defendant would not have sought the dismissal
of the case (pp. 68-82, Rec. on Ap.), instead of
having the case tried and decided on the merits without any delay and thus soon
recover damages therefor, unmasking thereby Justice
Labrador as trespasser and intruder.
Indeed, it is incomprehensible why defendant did not initiate the present
case or another action for redress.
Finally, there is the strong
presumption as to the correctness of the decision appealed from, especially
after it was affirmed and the first motion for reconsideration thereof had been
denied by this Court.” (Enriquez Resolution pp.
3-7).
Private respondent assails
this Resolution of the Court of Appeals, contending that Annexes
“A” and “B”, which were adverted to in said Resolution, are “spurious”, as said
documents were not presented at the trial of the case before the Court of
First Instance of Agusan which ended sometime in February,
1964 and the purported authority of the alleged representatives of private
respondent to sign said documents were repudiated by the President and Chairman
of the Board and Treasurer-Director of private respondent as shown by their
affidavits of May 18, 1973. As explained
by petitioners, these documents were submitted as annexes to their Motion for
Rehearing or Reconsideration in CA-G. R. No. 37365-R, and were intended to show
that pursuant to a directive of the Bureau of Forestry to “fix the boundaries”
of both concessions a survey was made for that purpose sometime in August,
1964. This was after the trial of the
case before the court a quo was terminated. According to petitioners, these documents
were never questioned by private respondent during the oral argument nor in
its memorandum at the time of the consideration of said motion, Annexes
“A” and “B” are xerox copies of
affidavits executed before Forester and Officer-in-Charge Melecio
S. Agra by Delfin Alamban,
on behalf of Lianga Lumber Company, and Coleto G. Campos and Gorgonio Alegre, as representatives of Lianga
Timber Company, dated August 4 and 9, 1964, respectively. Annex “B” is attested to by Wenceslao Ortiz of the Bureau of Forestry. The afore-cited documents certified to the
correctness of the “fact-finding survey of the Bureau of Forestry
officials and representatives of the adjacent licensees concerned” of the
boundary of the two licensees
“starting from the junction of Los Arcos-Lianga
Road and the highest ridge thence following the highest ridge in a general southeast erly and southwesterly direction that divides the watershed
of the province of Agusan and Surigao
del Sur.”
While it is true that private respondent submitted evidence
repudiating the authority of Coleto G. Campos to
enter into any agreement on behalf of Lianga Timber
Co., Inc., it has not been shown that the allegation that a fact-finding survey
to locate the boundary of the two concessions was made by the Bureau of
Forestry officials and the persons mentioned therein is not true. Be that as it may, the findings of the
aforesaid survey as to the location of the boundary between the two concessions
is merely confirmatory of the findings of the trial court in the appealed
decision and the holding of the Court of Appeals in its Decision of February
19, 1971, which was affirmed by the same Appellate Court in its Resolution of
March 22, 1971, denying private, respondent’s first Motion for Reconsideration.
Upon the other hand, this Court cannot
place much reliance on the so-called “Forestry Control Map” (Exhibit
“1”) which is one of the principal props of the case of private
respondent. In the first place, the
Ordinary Timber License of Lianga Lumber Company
(Exhibit “C”) clearly and specifically referred to a grant to said
licensee of a forested area within the district of Azpitia,
Los Arcos and Prosperidad, in the Province of Agusan, while the license of private respondent (Exhibit
“2”) likewise specifically referred to a forested area in the
Municipality of Lianga, Province of Surigao. Pursuant to Section 40 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Azpitia, Los Arcos, and Prosperidad are municipal districts within the Province
of Agusan,
while under Section 38 of the same Code, the municipality
of Lianga
is part of the Province of Surigao. If the purpose of
the forestry officials was to include a part of a forested area in Agusan in the timber license granted to private respondent,
no logical explanation had been given why such matter was not clearly and
specifically stated therein. Consider
also the fact that both licenses were subsequently renewed and yet no
correction or amendment in the description of the timber area granted to either
party to conform to the forestry control map was ever made. Thus, Exhibit “C” was renewed on June 28, 1954 (Exhibit
“C-1”), August 26, 1955
(Exhibit “C-2”), August 24,
1956 (Exhibit “C-3”), September 24, 1958 (Exhibit “C-4”) and August 17, 1959 (Exhibit
“C-5”) without any changes or alterations of the description of the
forested area in the two timber concessions.
Secondly, no less than private respondent’s counsel, Atty. Arturo C. Mojica, admitted that the Forestry Control Map (Exhibit
“1”) was not yet prepared when the boundary of the concessions of
both parties were laid allegedly on the ground.[38]
Thirdly, it was found as an established fact by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that Exhibit “1” was not prepared earlier than 1959
and, consequently, could not have been the basis of the technical descriptions
appearing in the timber licenses originally issued to Lianga
Lumber Company on January 28, 1954 (Exhibit “C”) or of the timber
license issued to Lianga Timber Company, Inc. on
August 28, 1956 (Exhibit “2”).
Neither are We persuaded that the phrase “Agusan-Surigao Provincial Boundary” in the timber licenses (Exhibits “C” and
“2”) was not intended to mean the Agusan-Surigao
provincial boundary line as provided by law but an artificial or imaginary line
fixed by the forestry officials. It must
be noted that both timber licenses mentioned existing natural or other well
known monuments as landmarks to indicate the respective limits of each
concession. Thus, the Ordinary Timber
License of petitioners (Exhibit “C”) refers to the Sibung River, the Los Arcos-Lianga
Road
and Tinanguanan Creek, while the license of private
respondent refers also to the Los Arcos-Lianga Road and the mouth of
the Wakat River
to indicate the boundaries of each concession.
Considering that the “Agusan-Surigao
boundary line” has already been fixed by law and is of public knowledge to
all concerned, since everyone is presumed to know the law, is it not more
logical to assume that when the Director of Forestry stated as the common
boundary of each concession the “Agusan-Surigao
boundary line” he was referring to the boundary line fixed by law, and not
to an imaginary line, the location of which is not known to the parties or to
the public? Certainly, the Director of
Forestry, at the time he issued the license, could not have been referring to
the technical boundary in the Forestry Control Map considering that said document was not yet then in existence. It must be
presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.[39] There is also the report of Forester Marcelino Macabeo (Exhibit
“A-1”) to the District Forester of Butuan
City. In his report, said official
stated that in order to determine on the ground the approximate boundary line
dividing the two provinces of Agusan and Surigao, he conducted a survey and found that the boundary line between the two provinces
is located at Km. 8.501 from the beach of Lianga,
Surigao, “which is the highest point of the
ridge or divide wherein the drainage is divided between the two provinces * *
*”. This report was forwarded to
the Director of Forestry by the District Forester of Butuan
City on August 6, 1959
(Exhibit “A-2”), informing the Director of
Forestry that according to said findings the highest point is located at 8.501
km. of the Los Arcos-Lianga
Road, and this should be the point through which
the Agusan-Surigao boundary should pass. These findings
corroborate those of witness Esmeraldo Osin, Forest Guard of the Bureau of Forestry who was front
Chairman of the survey team which found that the highest ridge is at Km. 8.501.[40] These are written statements in the performance
of duty by public officers, with official knowledge of the facts stated
therein, and should be prima facie evidence of the facts thus stated.[41]
The boundary line
provided by law specifically referred to the crest of the watershed or the
highest ridge between the Agusan River Valley and the Pacific Ocean.
Having been in existence in the statute books since 1907, it could be
assumed that this highest ridge adverted to is known to the public as a
clearly identifiable natural landmark to indicate the boundary of the
two provinces. As correctly stated by
the Court of Appeals, natural objects will ordinarily, in case of conflict in
the description of boundaries to land, control all other calls. Thus, it is settled that “calls for
courses and distances, * * * will, in case of conflict, be controlled by and
will yield to, one for a natural object or landmark or permanent artificial
monument. The reason for the rule is
that mistakes in courses and distances are more probable and frequent than in
marked trees, mountains, rivers, and other objects capable of being clearly
designated and accurately described * * *”[42]
We are, therefore,
satisfied that the aforementioned Resolutions of the Court of Appeals affirming
the trial court’s judgment are supported by substantial evidence.[43]
On the contention of
private respondent that this Court has no power to revive the original decision
of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s judgment, suffice it to
state that such power is necessarily implied from the authority conferred
upon this Court by the Constitution and by the law to review, revise, reverse,
modify or affirm the final judgment or a decision of inferior courts.[44] Moreover, the Court need not actually revive
the original decision of the Court of Appeals of February 19, 1971. By
reversing the Resolution of February 19, 1974 (the Gancayco
Resolution), the Court can just as well merely affirm the decision of the
trial court and virtually treat the Esguerra
Resolution and the Enriquez Resolution as
non-existing, the same having been superseded in contemplation of law by the Gancayco Resolution. Stated otherwise, what is before Us for
review only are the Gancayco Resolutions
of February 19, 1974 and May 9, 1974, and since it is Our conclusion that the
same are erroneous, the necessary consequence is that We must as We do affirm
the decision of the trial court, just like in any other ordinary case where
We reverse the Court of Appeals in favor of the trial court’s judgment.
In view of the foregoing conclusions and the final result
favorable to petitioners, We consider it superfluous to discuss the issue
raised by them that the second motion for reconsideration of private
respondent which gave rise to the Esguerra
Resolution was pro forma and unauthorized and, therefore, could not
have suspended the period for the finality of the Decision of February 19,
1971.
We prefer to treat the present action as an appeal thru petition
for review, rather than as an original action for certiorari.
WHEREFORE, the resolution-decision of the Court of Appeals
of February 19, 1974[45] and its Resolution of May 9, 1974[46] denying reconsideration thereof are
REVERSED, and, instead, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the sole modification that private respondent shall pay petitioners the
sum of P32,863.62 as actual damages, instead of
P47,578.75, plus P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and private respondent to pay
the costs.
Fernando, (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, Jr., no part.
[1]
Entitled “Lianga Lumber
Company and North Zambales Lumber Company,
Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus Lianga Timber Company, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.”
[2]
Record on Appeal, pp. 2-5; SC Rollo, p. 265.
[3]
Ibid., p. 6.
[4]
Ibid., pp,
35; 39-40.
[5]
Ibid., pp. 41-42.
[6]
Ibid., pp
43-47.
[7]
Ibid., pp. 127-134.
[8]
CA-G. R. No. 37365-R,
entitled “Lianga Lumber Company and North Zambales Lumber Co., Plaintiff-Appellees,
versus Lianga Timber Company, Inc.,
Defendant-Appellant.” Record on Appeal, p. 135.
[9]
CA Rollo, p. 43.
[10]
CA Decision, pp. 5-11; SC Rollo, pp. 72-78.
Italics supplied.
[11]
Annex A-1 of Petition, SC Rollo, pp. 79-80.
[12]
Annex A-2, Ibid.; pp: 81-92, SC Rollo.
[13]
Annex A-3, Ibid.; pp. 93-104, SC Rollo.
[14]
Penned by then Presiding Justice Salvador V. Esguerra
and concurred in by Justices Edilberto Soriano and Lourdes P. San Diego, the same Justices that
rendered the decision dated June 19,
1971, affirming the appealed decision of the lower court, and the
Resolution dated March 22, 1971,
denying the motion for reconsideration of said decision.
[15]
Annex B of Petition;pp
105-121, SC Rollo.
[16]
Annex C, Ibid.; pp. 122-151, Ibid.
[17]
Annex D, Ibid.; pp. 151A-159, SC Rollo.
[18]
Annex E, Ibid.; pp. 160-179, SC Rollo.
[19]
Annex F, Ibid.; pp. 180-214, Ibid.
[20]
Annex G, Ibid.; pp. 216-245, SC Rollo.
[21]
Annex H, Ibid.; pp. 246-258, Ibid.
[22]
Annex I, Ibid.; pp. 259-264, Ibid.
[23]
Dy
Cay v. Crossfield and O ‘Brien,
38 Phil. 521, 526-527; Albert
v. Court of First
Instance, 23 SCRA 948.
[24]
Gancayco Resolution, Annex “G” of the
Petition.
[25]
Record on Appeal, p. 130.
[26]
Enriquez Resolution, Annex D of the Petition.
[27]
Annex “G” of the Petition.
[28]
Record on Appeal, p. 35. Italics supplied.
[29]
Ibid., p. 55.
Italics supplied.
[30]
Brief for the defendant-appellant, pp. 37, 41-44.
[31]
Palmer v. Humiston, 87 Ohio St.
401, 101 NE 283; Shapiro v. Kornicks, 103 Ohio App. 49,
124 NE 2d. 175.
[32]
The Mentholatum Co.,
Inc., et al. v. Anacleto Mangaliman,
et al., 72 Phil. 524, 529.
[33]
Section 1, Rule 8, Revised Rules of Court.
[34]
Hautea v. Judge Magallon, 12
SCRA 514, 517; City of Manila v. Ebay,
1 SCRA 1086, 1089; Jimenez v. Bucoy,
103 Phil. 40, citing American Express Co. v. Natividad 46 Phil, 207; San Agustin v.
Barrios, 68 Phil. 475, 480; and Toribio
v. Dacasa, 55 Phil. 461.
[35]
This Ordinary Timber License of appellant Lianga
Timber Co., Inc. was originally in the name of Diez
and Dumlao, first obtained in 1951 in a public
bidding.
[36]
Exhibit “11”, letter dated August
25, 1961.
[37]
Gorospe v. Peñaflorida,
101 Phil. 886 Lapuz v. Sy Uy, L-10079, May 17, 1957; Pinada & Ampil Manufacturing
Co. v. Bartolome, 95 Phil. 930; David
v. De la Cruz, 103 Phil. 380, 383.
[38]
T.s.n., pp. 271, July 22, 1963.
[39]
Section 5(m), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court.
[40]
T.s.n., pp. 18-19, November 3, 1959.
[41]
Sec. 38, Rule 130, Rules of Court;
30 Am, Jur. 2d 277.
[42]
12 Am. Jur. 2d 604.
[43]
The general rule is that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is conclusive as
to the facts and cannot be re viewed by this Court, except on questions of law (Cabrera v. Lopez, 84 Phil.
834-835; Pacheco v. Arro, 85
Phil. 505, 515; Abeto v. People, 90 Phil. 581,
582.) In order that the findings of
facts of the Appellate Court may not be reviewed by this Court it must be
supported by substantial evidence. (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil.
259).
“Substantial evidence has been
defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, and its absence is not shown by stressing
that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, * * *for
the appellate court cannot substitute its own judgment or criterion for that
of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what
evidence is entitled to belief.” (Picardal vs. Lladas,
21 SCRA 1483, 1489, citing Chavez
v. CAR, et al., 9 SCRA 412; Lustre, et al. v. Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., 10
SCRA 659)
Justice Laurel, in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635, 642), defined substantial evidence as “‘*
* * more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.’ Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations
Board, 4 Cir. 93 F. 2d 985; 989* * *)”
Substantial evidence has been described “as such evidence as will
establish a substantial basis of fact from which the fact at issue can be
reasonably inferred * * *. The test is
whether the administrative decision finds reasonable support in substantial
evidence, whether the evidence reasonably tends to support the findings, or,
it has been indicated whether the decision is not clearly contrary to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence.” (2 Am.
Jur. 2d pp. 573-579, Sec. 688).
[44]
Section 5, Article X, New
Constitution; Section 17, Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 5440.
[45]
Gancayco Resolution.
[46]
Resolution denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.