MARIA PALMA AND ABUNDIO LOS BAÑES, PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. FENANDO CELDA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

PERFECTO, J.:


Appellants’ complaint was filed on June 8, 1946, to collect sums of money
based on commitments made by defendant in a document executed on July 21, 1934t
that is, 11 years, 10 months and 17 days before the filing of the complaint.

Invoking Sections 43 and 44 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 1
(e) of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint oh the ground that plaintiffs cause of action is barred by the statute
of limitations.

On August 30, 1946, the lower court held that plaintiffs’ cause of action
had prescribed and dismissed the complaint, with costs against plaintiffs, who
appealed.

Appellants seek our support in favor of the theory that war suspends the
running of the statute of limitations. If the theory is upheld, by deducting the
more than three years’ duration of the war, there would be less than ten years
from ;the time of the execution of the document to the filing of, the complaint,
hence, the complaint should not have been dismissed.

No showing has been made why vie should reverse the doctrine that the statute
of limitations is suspended by war, rebellion, or Insurrection, “when the
regular course of justice is Interrupted to such an extent that courts cannot be
kept open.” (España vs. Lucido, & Phil. 419.) The reason of the doctrine is
obvious. When there are no competent courts to take cognizance of an action,
failure to file it cannot be held against a plaintiff. Nemo tenetur
ad impossible Plaintiff having been precluded without his fault from
filing his complaint, it is evident that there is no sense of justice in not
suspending the statute in his case.

In the present case the lower court took judicial notice of the fact, not
disputed by appellants, that in the uninvaded parts of Iloilo, where the
majority of the municipalities are situated, the Commonwealth courts continued
functioning regularly for the duration of the war, while in the occupied areas
there were courts established by the Philippine Excecutive Commission and the
occupation Republic of the Philippines. There was no material obstacle to
plaintiffs’ filing their complaint before the expiration of the period
prescribed by the statute of limitations.

The appealed order is affirmed, with costs against appellants.

Paras, Acting C. J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla, and
Tuason, JJ., concur.