PREMIER PRODUCTIONS INC., PETITIONER, PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURE WORKER’S ASSOCIATION, RESPONDENT.

Premier Productions versus Philippine Movie Picture Workers Association

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Premier Productions, Inc., which the Court calls the Company, against the Philippine Movie Picture Workers Association, which the Court calls the Union, seeking review of a resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations sitting in banc. The Company asks the Supreme Court to reverse a resolution that set aside, as premature, a decision of the trial judge of the industrial court which had upheld the genuineness of certain lease contracts and denied the Union's petitions for contempt. The case matters because it teaches a single, clean procedural rule: an interlocutory resolution that merely defers the determination of the issues, so that further evidence may be received, is not appealable, and the Supreme Court will not, through an appeal, express any opinion on its merits.

Procedural History

The controversy began in the Court of Industrial Relations, where the Company filed a petition to enjoin an intended strike and to have the Union's demands heard and settled. A series of incidents followed, including petitions for contempt filed by the Union and petitions by the Company for authority to hire temporary workers, to lay off employees, and to lease its outfit and premises. The Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision on the original petitions for contempt, finding no substantial evidence of a fictitious lease, declaring the contracts valid and binding, and denying the petitions for contempt. On the Union's motion for reconsideration, the Court of Industrial Relations sitting in banc, by a vote of three members against two dissenters, passed a resolution reconsidering and setting aside the decision of the trial judge as premature, on the ground that the Union's supplemental petition to annul the leases on the ground of simulation had not yet been heard. The Company then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by certiorari.

Facts

In September 1951 the Company asked the Court of Industrial Relations to enjoin the Union from staging a strike to enforce demands for better terms and conditions of employment, and to settle the issues raised by those demands. The Union countered with a petition to have the Company declared in contempt for acts allegedly violative of Section 19 of Commonwealth Act Number 103 and of an agreement made before the court as a condition for calling off the strike, and to restore privileges and reinstate members. Further incidents followed, including the Company's petitions for authority to engage temporary workers, to lay off employees, and to lease its outfit and premises.

Between February and March 1952 the Union filed three urgent petitions for contempt, alleging that the Company's equipment had been surreptitiously withdrawn at night and used by Artemio Marquez, a former director, to shoot a film with persons other than Union members; that equipment had been leased to Efren Reyes, an actor of the Company purporting to be an independent producer; and that other appliances had been leased to Manuel Vistan, Jr., a stockholder and former production manager, and used in shooting other films. The Union claimed these acts constituted unfair labor practice and contempt, and prayed that the Company's officers be dealt with for contempt and that the leases be declared illegal.

The Company answered that the pictures were being filmed by bona fide independent producers. After a hearing in October 1952, the cases were submitted for decision. Before decision, the Union filed a supplemental petition to annul the lease contracts as simulated and fraudulent. The Presiding Judge then rendered a decision on the original petitions, finding no substantial evidence of a fictitious lease and declaring the contracts valid and binding. On reconsideration, the Court of Industrial Relations sitting in banc set aside that decision as premature because the supplemental petition had not yet been heard.

Issues

• Whether or not the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations sitting in banc, which set aside the decision of the trial judge as premature and deferred determination of the issues until after evidence on the supplemental petition, is interlocutory in nature.
• Whether or not an interlocutory resolution of that kind may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

Applicable Provisions

Section 19 of Commonwealth Act Number 103 was invoked by the Union as the basis for its contempt petitions, and it provides:

Section 19. No employer shall, during the pendency of a labor dispute, change the status quo of the employees or make any change in the terms and conditions of employment, without the approval of the Court.

This provision bears on the case because the Union's original petitions for contempt rested on the theory that the leases tended to change the status quo in violation of that section, regardless of whether the leases were real or fictitious.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the contested resolution does not settle any of the issues before the Court of Industrial Relations. It merely defers the determination of those issues until after the presentation of evidence on the supplemental petition to annul the leases in dispute upon the ground that they are fictitious. In other words, the contested resolution is interlocutory in nature.

On the second issue, the Court held that an interlocutory resolution cannot be appealed, irrespective of the Court's opinion on its merits, which the Court expressly declined to express. The Court dismissed the appeal, with costs against the Company, and remanded the records to the Court of Industrial Relations for further proceedings.

Doctrine

A resolution that does not settle any of the issues before the court, but merely defers their determination until after the presentation of further evidence, is interlocutory in nature. An interlocutory resolution cannot be appealed, and the appellate court will not, through such an appeal, express any opinion on its merits. The remedy of an aggrieved party against an interlocutory order is not appeal but to await the final judgment and then raise the error on appeal. The doctrine is tied to Section 19 of Commonwealth Act Number 103 because the Union's contempt theory under that provision did not depend on whether the leases were genuine, and the genuineness of the leases was precisely the matter left for further evidence.

Disposition

The appeal taken by Premier Productions, Inc. was dismissed, with costs against it, and the records were remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations for further proceedings.

Remember This

Memorize this line: an interlocutory resolution that merely defers the determination of the issues until further evidence is presented is not appealable. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between interlocutory and final orders, and the rule that the remedy against an interlocutory order is to await final judgment and assign the error on appeal.