ALHAMBRA INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ALHAMBRA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (FTUP), RESPONDENTS.

Appeal by certiorari from respondent court’s decision in an
unfair labor practice case that the fifteen drivers and helpers not recognized by petitioners are in truth and in fact its
employees, and not separate and independent employees of its salesmen and propagandists, and are therefore entitled retroactively to
all the privileges, rights and benefits provided for all its other regular employees under its collective
bargaining agreement with respondent union.

The complaint for unfair labor practice^[1]
for violation of section 4(a) subsection (4) and (6) of the Industrial Peace
Act, was filed by the acting prosecutor
of respondent court against petitioner, upon the charges of respondent union that fifteen of the union members,
employed as drivers and helpers of petitioner, were being discriminated against
by petitioner’s not affording them the benefits and privileges enjoyed by all
the other employees for no justifiable reason other than their union membership; and that
the union had asked petitioner to negotiate with respect to said fifteen
drivers and helpers who were being excluded from the benefits of their
subsisting collective bargaining agreement, but petitioner refused to do
so.  The union prayed for a desistance
order and that petitioner be ordered to bargain collectively in good faith and
to grant the drivers and helpers the same benefits and privileges extended to
and enjoyed by all its other employees.

In answer, petitioner denied the unfair labor practice imputed to
it and countered that the fifteen drivers and helpers were not its employees,
but separate and independent employees of its salesmen and propagandists who
exercised discretion and control over their selection, employment,
compensation, suspension and dismissal.

It is admitted that respondent union is the sole and exclusive
collective bargaining representative for all the employees of petitioner and
that collective bargaining agreements had been successively signed between the
union and petitioner on March 14, 1962
and on February 18, 1964.  Both the union and petitioner exhausted steps
1 to 3 of the grievance machinery provided in the collective bargaining
agreement with regard to the union’s claim that the benefits thereof should be
extended to the fifteen drivers and helpers and the petitioner’s contrary stand
that they were not its “employees. ” Hence, as they could not resolve
by conferences this dispute, the union invoked the final step in the grievance
machinery, after written notice thereof, and elevated the issue of the true
status of said drivers and helpers to respondent court through its complaint
for unfair labor practice.

Respondent court in its decision affirmed by its resolution en banc of April 11, 1966, categorically held petitioner’s disclaimer
of the employee status of the drivers and helpers to be baseless and untenable,
as follows: “In accordance with the ‘memorandum of instructions’, Exhibit ’24’,
which the respondent corporation issues to the salesman or propagandist, it is
really from here that the latter is authorized by the former to engage the
services of a driver or helper.  So that
even when the driver or helper does not apply directly to the respondent corporation for the job but to the salesman
or propagandist, nevertheless, the authority of the salesman or propagandist to
employ the driver or helper emanates from the respondent corporation.  It is, therefore, apparent that in truth and
in fact, the respondent corporation is the ’employer’ of the driver or helper
and not the salesman or propagandist who is merely ex­pressly authorized by the
former to engage such services.

“The salary of the driver or helper also comes from the
respondent corporation in the form of ‘driver allowance’ which is appropriated
for the purpose.  This allowance is given
to the salesman or propagandist who in turn pays the same to the driver or
helper for salaries or wages.  Of course,
we realize that this mode of paying the salaries or wages of the driver or
helper indirectly through the salesman or propagandist will save the respondent
corporation the burden of record keeping and other similar indirect costs.  Nevertheless, it could not be denied that it is the respondent
corporation that pays the wages and salaries of the driver or helper.

“The duties and obligations of the driver or helper do not
come from the salesman or propagandist but are expressly stated by the respondent corporation in the
‘memorandum of instructions.’ He does not only accompany the salesman or
propagandist in all the trips, but also drives or watches the truck which is
the property of the respondent corporation. 
He also assists the salesman in making deliveries to different stores
and in the preparation of inventories. 
These duties are the dictates of respondent corporation
and not of the salesman or propagandist. 
It is therefore clear that the terms and conditions of employment of the
driver or helper are those fixed and determined by the respondent
corporation.  From all the foregoing
considerations we are convinced that the driver or helper is an ’employee’ of respondent corporation.”

It therefore rendered the following judgment against petitioner:

“IN CONCLUSION, THEREFORE, we rule and so hold that all the
fifteen (15) drivers and helpers whose names are listed in the ‘Partial Stipulation of Facts’
are employees of the respondent Alhambra Industries, Inc., and as such they
should be given and/or extended all the privileges, rights and benefits that
are given to all the other regular employees, including those fringe benefits
provided for in
the Collective
Bargaining agreement signed and concluded between the complainant union and the
respondent corporation, retroactive as of the effectivity
of the first agreement of March 14, 1962 up to the present.”

Petitioner, in this appeal, does not dispute the respondent
court’s basic ruling that the fifteen drivers and helpers are in truth and in
fact its employees and that its making use of its salesmen and propagandists, as the ostensible
“employers” of the drivers and helpers was in effect but an elaborate
artifice to
deprive the drivers and helpers of their status as employees of petitioner,
entitled to enjoy all the privileges, rights and benefits provided for all other
employees under the collective bargaining agreements.

The lone error assigned by petitioner in its brief is that
respondent court “acted in excess of jurisdiction in entering judgment
against petitioner in spite of its finding that the petitioner had not
committed any act of unfair labor practice.”^[2]
Petitioner uses as props for this lone assigned error respondent court’s statements
in the body of its decision that “(S)ince
the grant of benefits to the drivers and helpers will depend on a finding by
the Court that they are ’employees’ of the respondent corporation and not on account of
their membership with the complainant union or activities therein, then the
charge of discrimination against the respondent corporation is without basis in
fact and in law.  Settled is the rule in
this jurisdiction that in order to adjudge an employer of discrimination in
accordance with the Act, it must be due to the union affiliation or activities
of the employee concerned” and that “both parties tried their level best
to decide the issue extra judicially. 
The elevation of the issue before the Court is the last step provided
for in their grievance machinery, Step No. 4. …Since the grant of benefits to
the drivers and helpers hinges on the decision of the Court that they are
’employees’ of the respondent corporation, then the latter could not have been
guilty of refusal to bargain in accordance with the Act. ” Petitioner,
invoking section 5(c) of the Industrial Peace Act,^[3] thus contends
that “it is mandatory upon the respondent court to order the dismissal of
the complaint, once it finds out that no unfair labor practice has been committed,” and it
should have “left the parties alone to settle their differences through
conciliation, mediation and recourse to the ordinary courts.”

Petitioner’s appeal must be dismissed.  It is speciously grounded on mere form rather
than the realities of the case.  In form,
respondent court gently treated petitioner’s scheme to deprive the fifteen
drivers and helpers of their rightful status as employees and did not denounce it as a betrayal of the salutary purpose and
objective of the Industrial Peace Act,^[4] but instead
remarked that since the grant of employees’ benefits hinged on the court’s
decision on their status as such employees, petitioner “could not have
been guilty of refusal to bargain in accordance with the Act.” The
reality, however, is that respondent court expressly found that “in truth
and in fact, (petitioner) corporation is the ’employer’ of the driver or helper
and not the salesman or
propagandist who is merely expressly authorized by the former to engage such services.” Petitioner’s failure to comply with its duty
under the collective bargaining agreement to extend the privileges, rights and
benefits thereof to the drivers and helpers as its actual employees clearly
amounted to the commission of an unfair labor practice. 
And consequently respondent court properly ordered in its judgment that
said drivers and helpers “should be given and/or extended all the
privileges, rights and benefits
that are given to all the other regular employees … retroactive as of the effectivity of the first agreement of March 14, 1962 up to
the present.” In so ordering, respondent court was but discharging its
function under section 5(c) of the Act, supra, to order the cessation of
an unfair labor practice and “take such affirmative action as will
effectuate the policies of this Act.”

Failure on petitioner’s part to live up in good faith to the
terms of its collective bargaining agreement by denying the privileges and
benefits thereof to the fifteen drivers and helpers through its device of
trying to pass them off as ’employees’ of its salesmen and propagandists was a
serious violation of petitioner’s duty to bargain collectively and constituted
unfair labor practice in any language.^[5]
As succinctly stated by Mr. Justice
Castro in Republic Savings Bank vs. Court of Industrial Relations,^[6] in unfair labor practice cases, “(T)he
question is whether the (respondent) committed the act charged in the
complaint.  If it did, it is of no
consequence, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive law, what the act
is denominated — whether as a restraint, interference or coercion, as some
members of the Court believe it to be, or as a discriminatory discharge as
other members think it is, or as refusal to bargain as some other members view
it, or even as a combination of any or all of these.”

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed.  The writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued on May 17, 1966 is lifted and set aside.  With costs against
petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.

Villamor, J., no part.

Makasiar, J., on leave.

^[1]
Case No. 3805-ULP, “Alhambra
Employees Ass’n (FTUP) vs. Alhambra Industries, Inc.”

^[2]
Petitioner’s brief, p. 4.

^[3]
“If, after investigation, the Court shall be of the opinion that any
person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor
practice, then the Court shall state its findings of fact and shall issue and
cause to be served on such person an order requiring
such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice and take such
affirmative action as will effectuate the policies of this Act, including (but
not limited to) reinstatement of employees with or without backpay and including rights
of the employees prior to dismissal including seniority.  Such order may further require such person to
post the Court’s order and findings in a place available to all the employees
and to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which the Court’s
order has been complied with.  If after
investigation the Court shall be of the opinion that no person named in the
complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor prac­tice,
then the Court shall state its findings of fact and shall issue an order
dismissing the said complaint. If the complaining party withdraws its
complaint, the Court shall dismiss the case.”

^[4]
See Social Security System vs. Court of Appeals, L-25406, Dec. 24,
1968 (26 SCRA 458).

^[5]
See Security Bank Employees Union vs. Security Bank & Trust Co., L-28536, Apr. 30,
1968 and cases
cited.

^[6]
L-20303, Resolution, October 31, 1967, (21 SCRA, 661).