G.R. No. L-21676. February 28, 1969
VICENTE ALDABA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, CESAR ALDABA, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in case
CA-G.R. No. 27561-R, entitled
“Vicente Aldaba, et al., plaintiffs-appellants, versus Cesar Aldaba, et al., defendants-appellees”,
affirming the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 41260.
When Belen Aldaba, a rich woman of Malolos, Bulacan, died on February
25, 1955, she left as her presumptive heirs her
surviving husband Estanislao Bautista, and her brother Cesar
Aldaba. Belen Aldaba was childless. Among the properties that she left were the two lots involved in
this case, situated at 427
Maganda Street, Santa Mesa, Manila.
Petitioners Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba, father and
daughter respectively, lived during the last war in their house in Malate,
Manila. Belen Aldaba used to go to their
house to seek the advice and medical assistance of Dr. Vicente Aldaba. When the latter’s house was burned during the liberation of
Manila in 1945, Belen Aldaba invited Dr. Aldaba and his daughter, who was then a student in medicine, to live in one
of her two houses standing on the lots in question, and the Aldaba father and
daughter accepted the offer of Belen and they actually lived in one of those
two houses until sometime in 1957 when respondent Emmanuel Bautista filed an
ejectment case against them in the city court of Manila. Dr. Vicente Aldaba continued to act as a sort
of adviser of Belen, and Jane, after becoming a qualified doctor of medicine,
became the personal physician of Belen until the latter’s death on February 25,
1955.
On June 24, 1955, the presumptive heirs, Estanislao Bautista and
Cesar Aldaba, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition of the properties
left by the deceased Belen Aldaba, by virtue of which deed the two lots in
question were alloted to Cesar Aldaba.
Subsequently, on August 26, 1957, herein respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel
Bautista, the latter being a grandson of Estanislao Bautista by his first
marriage, executed a deed whereby the two lots that were alloted to Cesar
Aldaba were ceded to Emmanuel Bautista in exchange of the latter’s lot situated
at San Juan, Rizal. By virtue of the deed or extra-judicial
partition and the deed of exchange, Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 1334
and 1335 respectively covering lots Nos. 32 and 34 – now in question – both in
the name of Belen Aldaba, were cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Manila,
and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel
Bautista were issued in lieu thereof.
Emmanuel Bautista then required Dr. Vicente Aldaba to vacate the
lots in question and, upon the latter’s refusal, filed an ejectment case
against him in the City Court of Manila.
Without awaiting the final result of the ejectment case, herein
petitioners filed, on August 22, 1959, a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 41260, against herein
respondents Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista and the Register of Deeds of
Manila, alleging that they had become the owners or the two lots in question,
and praying that the deed or partition entered into by Estanislao Bautista and Cesar Aldaba be declared null
and void with respect to Lot No.32, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 1334, and lot No. 34 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1335;
that said
lots be declared the property of
therein plaintiffs (herein petitioners); and that the Register of Deeds of
Manila be ordered to cancel TCT Nos. 49996 and 49997 in the name of Emmanuel
Bautista and in lieu thereof issue two new TCT’s in the name of therein
plaintiffs.
After hearing, the court a quo rendered a decision
dismissing the complaint, and declaring, among others, that if the deceased
Belen Aldaba intended to convey the lots in question to Vicente Aldaba and Jane
Aldaba, by way of donation, the conveyance should be considered a donation inter
vivos, for the validity of which a public instrument was necessary pursuant
to Article 749 of the Civil Code. The
dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court reads as follows:
“IN VIEW WHEREOF both complaint and counterclaim dismissed;
the Court holds Emmanuel Bautista to be the absolute owner of the property in
question, land and improvement, but with
the right of plaintiffs to stay until they should have been reimbursed
of P5,000.00 but without any obligation, until such reimbursement, to pay any
rental unto defendant Emmanuel Bautista.
No pronouncement as to costs.”
From this decision, therein plaintiffs appealed to the Court of
Appeals, and the latter court rendered a decision, on June 21, 1963, raising from
P5,000 to P8,000 the amount to be reimbursed to plaintiffs-appellants, but
affirming in all other respects the decision of the lower court. Herein petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals,
they forthwith filed the present
petition in this Court.
Before
this Court, petitioners now contend that the Court of Appeals erred: (1)
in affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance; (2) in holding that
the donation, as found by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, was a simple donation inter vivos and not a donation “con causa
onerosa” and so it was void
for it did not follow the requirements of
Article 749 of the Civil Code; (3) in
not holding that the property in question had already been donated to herein
petitioners in consideration or the latter’s services; (4) in not declaring
petitioners to be the absolute owners of the property in dispute; and (5) in
considering testimonies which had been stricken out.
The errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated, We are
going to discuss them together.
Petitioners contend that petitioners
Dr. Vicente Aldaba and Jane Aldaba had rendered services to the deceased
Belen Aldaba for more than ten
years without receiving any compensation, and so in compensation for their services
Belen Aldaba gave them the lots in dispute including the improvements
thereon. It is the stand of petitioners
that the property in question was conveyed to them by way of an onerous
donation which is governed by Article 733, and not Article 749, of the Civil
Code. Under Article 733 of the Civil
Code an onerous donation does not have to be done by virtue of a public
instrument. The petitioners point to the
note, Exhibit 6, as indicating that a donation had been made, which note reads
as follows:
“June 18, 1953
“Jane,
Huag kayong umalis diyan.
Talagang iyan ay para sa inyo.
Alam nila na iyan ay sainyo.
Belen A. Bautista.”
Petitioners maintain that the note,
although it could not transmit title, showed, nevertheless, that a donation had
already been made long before its writing, in consideration of the services
rendered before the writing and to be rendered after its writing. And the donation being with an onerous cause,
petitioners maintain that it was valid even if it was done orally. Petitioners further maintain that if Exhibit 6 labors under some
ambiguity, this ambiguity is cured by Exhibit
7, which reads as follows:
“June 27, 1956
“Dear Nana Tering,
“Narito po ang notice tungkol sa amillaramiento na
pagbabayaran diyan sa lupa at bahay na kinatatayuan ninyo. Sa Malolos po ito tinanggap. Ang pagbabayaran po ng Inkong ay bayad
na.
“Gumagalang,
“Cely.”
The addressee, Tering, was the
wife of Dr. Vicente Aldaba, and the sender, Cely, was the wife of respondent
Emmanuel Bautista. This note,
petitioners argue, proves that respondents had recognized the ownership of the
petitioners of the house and lot, for,
otherwise, Cely should have sent the notice of real estate tax to respondent
Cesar Aldaba, to whom was alloted the property in question by virtue of the
extra-judicial partition.
Respondents, Cesar Aldaba and Emmanuel Bautista, on the other
hand, contend that the evidence of the plaintiff does not disclose clearly that
a donation had been made. Respondents
point out that the note, Exhibit 6, as worded, is vague, in that it could not
be interpreted as referring to
the lots in question, or that which was given therein was given for a valuable
consideration. And finally, respondents
contend that if the property had really been given to petitioners, why did they
not take any step to transfer the property in their names?
The Court of Appeals, in
its decision, made the following findings and conclusions:
(1) The
note Exhibit 6 did not make any reference to the lots in question, nor to the
services rendered, or to be rendered, in favor of Belen. The note was insufficient as a conveyance,
and hence could not be considered as
evidence of a donation with onerous cause.
This note can be considered, at most, as indicative of the intention to donate.
(2)
There is no satisfactory explanation why from
1945 to 1955, no notarial document was executed by Belen in favor of petitioners who were educated persons. The reason given was “extremada
delicadeza” which reason the Court of Appeals considered as unsatisfactory.
(3)
The evidence regarding the value of the services (P53,000.00) rendered by
petitioners (father and daughter) to Belen does not improve the proof regarding
the alleged donation. If petitioners
believed that the gratuitous use or the property
was not sufficient to compensate them for their services, they could
have presented their claims in the intestate proceedings, which they themselves
could have initiated, if none was instituted.
The conclusion of the Court or Appeals, as well as that of the
trial court, that there was no onerous donation made by Belen Aldaba to
petitioners is based upon their
appreciation of the evidence, and this Court will not disturb the factual
findings of those courts.
The question to be resolved in the instant case is: Was there a
disposition of the property in question made
by the deceased Belen Aldaba in favor of herein petitioners? The note, Exhibit 6, considered alone, was,
as held by the Court of Appeals, confirming the opinion of the lower court,
only an indication of the intention of Belen Aldaba to donate to the
petitioners the property occupied by the latter. We agree with this conclusion of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals. The
note, in fact, expressed that the property was really intended for the
petitioners, “taIagang iyan ay para sa inyo.” If the property was
only intended for petitioners then, at the time of its writing, the property
had not yet been disposed or in their favor.
There is no evidence in the
record that such intention was effectively carried out after the
writing of the note. Inasmuch as the
mere expression of an intention is not a promise, because a promise is an
undertaking to carry the intention
into effect[1],
We cannot, considering Exhibit 6 alone, conclude that the deceased promised,
much less did convey, the property in question to the petitioners. That the note, Exhibit 6, was only an
indication of an intention to give
was also the interpretation given by petitioners themselves, when they said in
their memorandum, dated February 2, 1960, in the lower court[2]
thus:
“Legally speaking, there was a contractual relation created
between Belen Aldaba and the plaintiff since 1945 whereby the former would give to the
latter the two parcels of land, together with the house standing thereon, upon the rendition of
said services. This
fact can be gleaned from the note (Exh. “6”,
Plaintiffs) which in part says: TALAGANG IYAN AY PARA SAINYO.”
We have said that Exhibit 6
expressed only the intention to donate.
Let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that previous to the writing
of the note there had already been a disposition or the property in favor of the petitioners. This
disposition alone, would not make the
donation a donation for a valuable consideration. We still have to ask: What was the consideration of such disposition? We do not find in the record that there had been an express agreement
between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the latter would pay for the services
of the former. If there was no express
agreement, could it not be at least implied?
There could not be an implied contract for payment because We find in the record that Jane did not expect to be paid
for her services. In the memorandum of
counsel for the petitioners in the trial court We find this statement:
“For all she did to her aunt she expected not to be
paid.”[3]
When a person does not expect to be paid
for his services, there cannot be a contract implied in fact to make compensation
for said services.
“However, no contract implied in fact to make compensation for
personal services performed for another arises unless the party furnishing the
services then expected or had reason to expect the payment of compensation by
the other party. To give rise to an
implied contract to pay for services, they must have been rendered by one party
in expectation that the other party would
pay for them, and have been accepted by the other party with knowledge of that
expectation.” (58 Am. Jur. p. 512 and cases cited therein).
In the same manner, when the person
rendering the services has renounced his fees, the services are not demandable
obligations.[4]
Even if it be assumed for the sake or argument that the services
of petitioners constituted a demandable debt, We still have to ask whether in
the instant case this was the
consideration for which the deceased made the (alleged) disposition of the property to the petitioners. As we have adverted to, we have not come
across in the record even a claim that there was
an express agreement between petitioners and Belen Aldaba that the latter would
give the property in question in consideration of the services of
petitioners. All that petitioners could
claim regarding this matter was that “it was impliedly understood”
between them.[5]
How said agreement
was implied and from what facts it was implied, petitioners did not make
clear. The question of whether or not
what is relied upon as a
consideration had been knowingly accepted by the parties as a consideration, is
a question or fact[6],
and the Court of Appeals has not
found in the instant case that the lots
in question were given to petitioners in consideration of the services rendered by them to
Belen Aldaba.
We find, therefore, that the conditions to constitute a donation
cum causa onerosa are not present in the instant case, and
the claim of petitioners that the two lots in question were donated to them by
Belen Aldaba cannot be sustained.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Castro,
Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., did not take part.
[1]
17 American jurisprudence, 2d. p. 334.
[2]
Record on Appeal, pp. 87-88. Underscoring
supplied.
[3]
Record on Appeal, p. 83.
[4]
Manresa,
Commentaries al Codigo Civil Español, 5th ed. Vol. V, p. 73.
[5]
Brief for
petitioners, p. 14.
[6]
17 American Jurisprudence 2d. pp. 434-435.