ESTER B. CEPEDA, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE LORETO CLORIBEL-PURUGGANAN,[] REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 3, TUGUEGARAO CITY, RESPONDENT.

Cepeda versus Cloribel-Purugganan

The Case

This is an administrative complaint filed directly with the Supreme Court by Ester Cepeda against Judge Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3, Tuguegarao City. The complainant charges the respondent judge with grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law. The charge arises from a written order postponing the demolition of improvements on land that the complainant had won in an unlawful detainer case. The case matters because it draws the line between a correctible judicial error and a disciplinable administrative offense. It reminds every reviewee that a judge may be wrong on the law and still keep his or her robe, so long as he or she acts in good faith.

Procedural History

The complainant won an unlawful detainer and damages case before the Municipal Trial Court of Baggao, Cagayan. The Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao affirmed on appeal. The defendants then went up to the Court of Appeals, but the appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the required docket fees. Judgment became final and executory, and entry of judgment was made in the Book of Entries of Judgment. The complainant moved for execution, and the motion was granted. The writ, however, could not be fully satisfied because the decision ordered the defendants to vacate but did not expressly order the destruction or removal of the improvements they had introduced. The complainant then asked the Municipal Trial Court for a special order of demolition, which that court granted.

The defendants responded by filing a separate civil case for annulment of the writ of execution and the writ of demolition, with an application for a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction and restraining order, with damages. That case was raffled to the sala of the respondent judge. The respondent judge issued an order postponing the implementation of the demolition. The complainant then filed this administrative complaint directly with the Supreme Court. The Office of the Court Administrator investigated and recommended dismissal for lack of merit, reasoning that the validity of the interlocutory order should be raised in a judicial proceeding, through a petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court agreed and resolved the case as an original administrative matter.

Facts

Ester Cepeda was the prevailing party in an unlawful detainer and damages case decided by the Municipal Trial Court of Baggao, Cagayan. The Regional Trial Court of Tuguegarao affirmed the decision. The defendants elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, but the appeal was dismissed for nonpayment of docket fees. The judgment became final and executory, and entry of judgment was made. The complainant obtained a writ of execution, but the writ could not be enforced against the improvements because the decision ordered only that the defendants vacate the premises. It said nothing about destroying, demolishing, or removing the houses the defendant-lessees had built. The complainant therefore secured a special order for demolition from the Municipal Trial Court.

On the day before the scheduled demolition, the defendants filed a civil case for annulment of the writ of execution and the writ of demolition, with an application for injunctive relief. The case was raffled to the respondent judge. According to the complainant, the respondent judge summoned Sheriff Silvino Malano and verbally ordered him to desist from implementing the writ of demolition. The complainant says the judge decided to inquire into the motion for a temporary restraining order on the excuse that the defendants had come to her and wept. The respondent judge then issued a written order postponing the implementation of the demolition so that the relevant facts could be heard in open court and the status quo maintained until both parties could be heard. She also relied on Supreme Court Circular No. 20-95, which prohibits courts from acting on applications for restraining orders without a summary hearing.

The complainant also alleged that the respondent judge absented herself from scheduled hearings twice without informing counsel, and that she was in fact working on a leave of absence in preparation for joining her husband in the United States. The respondent denied the charges as false and baseless. She maintained that even if her order was incorrect, it was at most an error of judgment. She retired from the judiciary on June 30, 2003. The Court later resolved to release her optional retirement benefits while retaining ten thousand pesos to answer for any penalty that might be imposed.

Issues

• Whether or not the respondent judge is administratively liable for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the order postponing the demolition.
• Whether or not an administrative complaint is the proper remedy to challenge the validity of an interlocutory order issued by a judge in the exercise of judicial functions.

Applicable Provisions

The decision does not quote a statute or rule verbatim. It applies the settled doctrine on the administrative liability of judges for judicial acts, which it states in the words of its own ruling:

As a matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are erroneous.

This principle governs both issues, because it determines when a judicial act may be disciplined and when it may only be reviewed.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the respondent judge is not administratively liable. A judge's failure to interpret the law or to properly appreciate the evidence does not necessarily render him administratively liable. Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. The Court explained that to hold otherwise would make the judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law can be infallible in his judgment. The Court found that the respondent judge did not act with malice. She issued a written order precisely so that the facts could be heard in open court, and she relied on Supreme Court Circular No. 20-95, which requires a summary hearing before acting on applications for restraining orders. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives, or improper considerations are sufficient defenses for a judge charged with ignorance of the law.

On the second issue, the Court held that an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available. The aggrieved party's remedy is not to file an administrative complaint but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction, whether by motion for reconsideration, appeal, or petition for certiorari. The exception is where the issuance of the assailed order is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty, and no such taint was shown here. The Court quoted its own formulation of the rule:

An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the issuance of the assailed order or decision is tainted with fraud, malice or dishonesty.

The Court thus adopted the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit.

Doctrine

A judge may not be held civilly, criminally, or administratively liable for official acts performed in good faith, no matter how erroneous. Administrative liability attaches only when the judicial error is tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt motives, or improper considerations are sufficient defenses. Correlatively, an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy where judicial recourse remains available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. These rules flow from the principle that no judge can be infallible, and that the remedy for error is review, not discipline.

Disposition

The administrative complaint against Judge Loreto Cloribel-Purugganan was dismissed for lack of merit, and the Fiscal Management Office was directed to immediately release the ten thousand pesos withheld from her retirement benefits.

Remember This

Memorize the line: in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, a judge's acts in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though erroneous, and the remedy is review, not an administrative complaint. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between a correctible error of judgment and a disciplinable offense, and to test whether an administrative complaint is the proper remedy against an interlocutory order.