AVELTO T. ORANTE, PETITIONER, VS. SALVADOR B. BANARIA, JR. AND HON. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.
DIMAAMPAO, J.:
The factual milieu of the case unfurls as follows:
Petitioner PO2 Avelto Orante (PO2 Orante) is a police officer detailed at the Balatan Municipal Police Station, Balatan, Camarines Sur (Balatan Station). Sometime in October 2005, private respondent PI Salvador Banaria, Jr. (PI Banaria) took his oath of office as Oficer-in-Charge (OIC) thereat. As standard procedure, he conducted an inventory of his personnel. For this purpose, a roll-call was convened during which PO2 Orante was absent. Forthwith, PI Banaria ordered that PO2 Orante be searched out at his given address. However, efforts exerted to locate PO2 Orante proved futile.[4] Thence, PI Banaria filed a Complaint[5] against PO2 Orante before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Philippine National Police (PNP) for serious neglect of duty for continuously being AWOL from 7 October 2005. The case was docketed as Administrative Case No. 2007-03.
In his Counter-Affidavit,[6] PO2 Orante vehemently denied the imputation against him and professed that he was confined at the PNP General Hospital (PNP-GH) and underwent an operation. Thereafter, he was in the continuous care of a PNP-GH doctor.
On 25 July 2008, the PNP Regional Office 5 rendered a Decision[7] dismissing PO2 Orante from police service for having accumulated 637 days of unauthorized absences. His Motion for Reconsideration thereof was subsequently denied.[8] On Appeal before the NAPOLCOM Regional Appellate Board 5, PO2 Orante maintained that his absences were justified as he suffered from rectum bleeding and was thrice confined at the PNP-GH for this medical condition. In light of his numerous awards from the PNP, he claimed that the dismissal meted on him was too harsh a penalty. Lamentably, his bid for reversal was turned down in a Decision[9] dated 13 August 2009.
Fulminating against the foregoing Decision, PO2 Orante ensuingly sought relief before the Office of the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). In its Decision[10] dated 28 January 2011, the DILG denied his Appeal.[11] When he sought for reconsideration,[12] his plea was denied.[13]
Unperturbed, PO2 Orante commenced another Appeal before the CSC impugning the Decision and Resolution of the DILG. In the assailed Decision, PO2 Orante’s Appeal was dismissed for being filed out of time. Moreover, the CSC ruled that PO2 Orante was shown to have been on AWOL as established by substantial evidence. The challenged Resolution denied his Motion for Reconsideration[14] thereof.
Unable to accept his defeat, PO2 Orante (now, petitioner) seeks refuge before Us through the instant Petition anchored on the following postulations:
I
THE HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN EMBRACING RIGID TECHNICALITY AND DISMISSING HEREIN PETITIONER’S APPEAL FOR HAVING BEEN FILED LATE, THEREBY DEFEATING SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION COM-MITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER FROM POLICE SERVICE UPON AN ERRONEOUS APPRECIATION OF FACTS AND APPLICATION OF LAW.
The Petition is meritless.
Perceivably, the lis mota of this Petition delves into the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner’s Appeal.
Petitioner avows that the CSC committed reversible error when it rigidly applied procedural rules and dismissed his Appeal, not taking into account that he was merely two days late in filing his Appeal, and that his failure to comply strictly with procedural rules was occasioned by the lack of financial resources to retain the services of a counsel.
Petitioner’s avowal of a liberal interpretation of the period to appeal has no leg to stand on. The non-observance of the periods to appeal on the basis of financial constraints is hardly persuasive. It is an age-old axiom that the right to appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right — it is a statutory privilege and of statutory origin and, therefore, available only if granted or as provided by statutes. It may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of the law.[15] The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements it imposes has been constantly underscored by the Supreme Court.[16] Petitioner having failed to appeal within the period provided by the rules, the CSC correctly dismissed his Appeal.
Nonetheless, even if We brush aside this procedural faux pas, petitioner’s thesis still falls through.
Scouring the records, there is sufficient basis to support the finding of the CSC that petitioner incurred absences without official leave. Accordingly, he must be meted the penalty of dismissal. This conclusion finds a codal hook in Section 63,[17] Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave which mandates that an employee’s absence without official leave for at least 30 working days warrants his separation from the service.[18]
It is not disputed that petitioner was absent from work for more than 400 days from April 2005 until March 2007 without filing the necessary application for leave. Despite the fact that he was hospitalized only three times, he still failed to account for his absences every time he was released from hospital confinement. Ineluctably, his non-compliance with the rules on filing of leave, as mandated by the PNP and the Civil Service Rules, merits his dismissal from service.
Petitioner asserts that mere failure to file a leave of absence in advance does not ipso facto render an employee administratively liable for gross neglect of duty. He avers that although he was not confined for the entire duration of his absence, he was suffering from concomitant pain, discomfort and enervation caused by on and off episodes of rectal bleeding justifying his absences. In actual fact, he was just prevented from filing his application for leave when he reported back to work as the case for gross neglect of duty was already filed against him.
Petitioner’s stance does not hold sway.
Gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. In the case of public officials, there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.[19]
Section 4(b) of Republic Act No. 6713[20] specifically provides that every public official and employee must at all times perform and discharge his duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill with utmost devotion and dedication to his duties.[21] As a member of the PNP, moreso as a government employee, petitioner should have observed such standards. By going on AWOL, he cavalierly disregarded and neglected the duties of his office. He failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability imposed on all those in government service.[22] This, to Our mind, is gross negligence. Invariably, if an erring private employee can be dismissed for being absent without leave, with more reason that an erring public employee must be dismissed from service.
Needless to state, petitioner’s belated effort to file an application for leave two years after he first incurred his absences will not save the day for him. The timeliness of petitioner’s intention to file the application for leave raises suspicion. If petitioner truly intended to file the appropriate applications for sick leave, he should have seasonably filed the same without awaiting this administrative charge to be lodged against him.
Therewithal, We cannot lend credence to petitioner’s assertion that he reported his whereabouts to station officers through radio communication[23] and that he participated in the programs of the station to justify his absences.
Petitioner’s notification of his actual condition through radio communication did not pass muster. As correctly opined by the PNP Regional Office 5 and affirmed by the DILG, a leave application is done through the filing of an accomplished leave form. Though petitioner was confined at the PNP-GH for his illness, prudence dictates that he should have reported to his immediate superior every time he was discharged from the hospital. Pursuant to the rules of the PNP, petitioner must dutifully account for his absences.[24]
So, too, petitioner’s alleged intermittent state of health which allowed him to momentarily report for work does not justify his continuous absence without official leave. The improvement of his physical condition after his hospital confinement should have impelled him to seasonably file the mandated application for leave. As it happened, petitioner miserably failed to account for his absences which at the time of his dismissal had accumulated to 637 days.[25]
Along this vein, We echo with approbation the disquisition of the CSC, viz:
“In assailing the July 28, 2008 Decision of Regional Director Bangui (which was affirmed by NAPOLCOM RAB No. 5 and Secretary Robredo in their respective Decisions), (petitioner) contends, in gist, that he cannot be considered AWOL during the period in question because his Office knows very well of his whereabouts as evidenced by several radio messages between PNP GH and Balatan Police Station during the periods where he was confined in said hospital.
This contention is untenable. The filing and approval of an Application for Leave is not a mere ministerial act. In the case at bar, while it is an undisputed fact that (petitioner) suffered from sickness, he was nonetheless duty bound to file an Application for Leave with attached supporting documents either prior to or immediately upon reporting to work after his confinement/medical examination pursuant to Sections 53 and 54 of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by CSC MC Nos. 41, s. 1998 and 14, s. 1999. As established in the investigation, (petitioner) did not file any Application for Leave either before he was confined or after such confinement. It was likewise found that out of the total period of 410 days in issue, (petitioner) was only confined for a total period of thirty-five (35) days from the year 2005 to December 2006.
x x x x x x
xxx (Petitioner’s) liability for the 410 days of AWOL was established by substantial evidence. Likewise, considering the very nature of his duties and responsibilities as a police officer, and the extremely long period he went on AWOL, the penalty of dismissal is proper.”[26]
Finally, We find no merit in petitioner’s asseveration that the CSC should not have meted him the severe penalty of dismissal as he rendered years of dedicated service with the PNP from 1990 until he contracted illness in 2005.
In certain instances, length of service may be considered as an alternative circumstance which can mitigate or possibly even aggravate the penalty imposed upon an erring public official or employee.[27] Here, We discern no compelling reason to consider petitioner’s length of service in extenuating his liability.
In sooth, petitioner having shown to have absented himself without official leave, the CSC unerringly imposed the penalty of dismissal. Petitioner should be held accountable for gross neglect of duty.
While We commiserate with the sentiments of petitioner who was allegedly suffering from a malady before his dismissal, We cannot but frown upon his deliberate acts of not reporting to work and failing to file his official leave of absence. As a public official tasked to maintain peace and order in the community, it is petitioner’s duty to be present at the place of his assignment, and he is duty-bound to promptly account for his absences.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 17 April 2012 and the Resolution dated 22 August 2012 of the Civil Service Commission, in Case No. 120226, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Ybañez and Manahan, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 4-23.
[2] Id., pp. 25-28.
[3] Id., pp. 30-33.
[4] See Affidavit; Rollo, p. 53-54.
[5] Id., p. 50.
[6] Id., p. 103.
[7] Id., pp. 55-60.
[8] Id., p. 63.
[9] Id., pp. 63-76.
[10] Id., pp. 78-84.
[11] Id., pp. 78-84.
[12] Id., pp. 105-118.
[13] See Resolution dated 27 July 2011; Id., pp. 120-122.
[14] Rollo, pp. 34-49.
[15] See Yu v. Samson-Tatad, 642 SCRA 421, 425-426 (9 February 2011).
[16] See Anderson v. Ho, 688 SCRA 8, 16 (7 January 2013).
[17] Sec. 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. – An official or employee who is continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or dropped from the rolls without prior notice. However, when it is clear under the obtaining circumstances that the official or employee concerned, has established a scheme to circumvent the rule by incurring substantial absences though less than thirty working (30) days 3x in a semester, such that a pattern is already apparent, dropping from the rolls without notice may likewise be justified.
[18] See Re: Dropping from the Rolls of Cornelio Reniette Cabrera, Utility Worker I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 1, Lipa City, 653 SCRA 695, 698 (13 July 2011).
[19] Gonzales, III v. OP, G.R. No. 196231 and Barreras-Sulit v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No. 196232 (28 January 2014).
[20] Known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
[21] SEC. 4. Norms of Conduct of Public Officials and Employees.–(A) Every public official and employee shall observe the following as standards of personal conduct in the discharge and execution of official duties:
x x x x x x
(b) Professionalism. – Public officials and employees shall perform and discharge thier duties with the highest degree of excellence, professionalism, intelligence and skill. They shall enter public service with utmost devotion and dedication to duty. They shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of thier roles as dispensers or peddlers of undue patronage.
[22] Re: Dropping from the Rolls of Cornelio Reniette Cabrera, Utility Worker I, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 1, Lipa City, 653 SCRA 695, 699 (13 July 2011).
[23] See Certification; Rollo, p. 86.
[24] Id., pp. 73-75 and 82.
[25] See Decision dated 19 August 2009; Id., pp. 63-76.
[26] Rollo, p. 27-28.
[27] See Gannapao v. Civil Service Commission, 649 SCRA 595, 614 (31 May 2011).