RODOLFO CACHUELA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING MAYOR OF CALINOG, ILOILO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. NATALIO P. CASTILLO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ET AL., RICARDO …

On July 15, 1960, petitioner Rodolfo Cachuela (then Vice-Mayor of Calinog,
Iloilo) with five councilors of said municipality, filed with the Provincial
Board of Iloilo a complaint charging respondent Ricardo Provido (Mayor, at the
time of the same municipality) with neglect of duty and maladministration.
Acting on said complaint, Iloilo Provincial Governor Jose C. Zulueta, on July
20, issued an order suspending respondent Provido from office, pending action by
the board on said charges against him and, on the same date, reproduced said
complaint to the board, pursuant to Section 2188 of the Revised Administrative
Code.

Thereafter, respondent Provido appeared before the board, and was
investigated. On August 30, 1960, he was found guilty as charged, by the
Vice-Governor and one board member. The two other board members voted for his
exoneration. With the Governor concurring in the vote finding him guilty, the
Provincial Board ordered his suspension from office for a period of two months
effective upon receipt of the decision.

On September 8, 1960, respondent Provido filed with the board a notice of
appeal, manifesting his intention to appeal said decision to the Executive
Secretary, in accordance with the provision of Section 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code, and praying that the records of the case be forwarded to
said official. On September 16, the board forwarded the records of the case to
the Executive Secretary.

On September 21, 1960, petitioner Cachuela filed with this Court a petition
for prohibition with preliminary injunction (docketed as G. R. No. L-17470)
against respondents, seeking to restrain respondent Executive Secretary from
acting on the appeal of respondent Provido, but we dismissed the same by
resolution of September 26, “without prejudice to action, if any, in the court
of first instance.”

Thereafter, or on October 5, 1960, petitioner Cachuela filed with the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo the present action for prohibition with preliminary
injunction (Civil Case No. 5569) against respondents Executive Secretary and
Provido seeking to restrain respondent Executive Secretary from acting on the
appeal of respondent Provido.

On October 15, 1960, the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining respondent Executive Secretary from acting on respondent Provido’s
appeal; pending final determination of the case on the merits. However, upon
respondent’s motion for reconsideration, the court issued an order dissolving
the preliminary injunction.

After respondents have filed their answer to the petition, with a
counterclaim for damages on the alleged ground that the administrative complaint
was unfounded and frivolous, the case was tried.

On January 21, 1961, the court rendered judgment dismissing the petition for
prohibition, as well as respondent Provido’s counterclaim, with costs, whose
pertinent portion read:

“The main issue raised by the petition is—’that Section 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code is unconstitutional’. The petitioner argues that for the
Executive Secretary to review, revise, revoke, modify or affirm the decision of
the Provincial Board in this case, would be for it to exercise control over
local governments and invoked, therefore, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of the
Constitution—

‘The President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law * * *.’ (Italics supplied)

“Section 2191 of the Administrative Code reads:

‘SEC. 2191. Action by Secretary of the Interior.—Upon receiving the
papers in any such proceedings, the Secretary of the Interior shall review the
case without unnecessary delay and shall make such order for the reinstatement,
dismissal, suspension, or further suspension of the official, as the facts shall
warrant and shall render his final decision upon the matter within thirty days
after the date on which the case was received. Disciplinary suspension made upon
order of the Secretary of the Interior shall be without pay. No final dismissal
hereunder shall take effect until recommended by the Department Head and
approved by the President of the Philippines.

* * * * * * *

“As appears in the constitutional prohibition ‘The President shall have
control of all executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise supervision
over all local governments as may be provided by law and take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.’ Under what provision of the law does the
President exercise his supervision over all local governments? We see no other
law that can be invoked to govern the action of the President in the exercise of
his supervisory authority over local governments than Sections 2188 to 2191 of
the Revised Administrative Code. In the present case, to bring the matter
involving the decision of the Provincial Board to the Office of the President on
appeal, is not unconstitutional, and this was recognized and upheld in the case
of Hebron vs. Reyes (supra) [104 Phil., 175]. Indeed, it is, likewise,
well-settled that laws Governing the suspension or removal of public officers,
especially those chosen by the direct vote of the people, must be strictly
construed in their favor.’

‘Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is
specified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in
the absence of express or clear provision to the contrary—which does not exist
with respect to municipal officers. What is more, the language of sections
2188 to 2191 of the Revised Administrative Code leaves no room for doubt
that the law-in the words of Justice Tuason-frowns upon prolonged or indefinite
suspension of local elective officials”. (Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil., 456; 49
Off. Gaz. 93), (Italics supplied.)

“By the theory of the petitioner herein, he wants to make it clear and thus
upholds that the decision of the Provincial Board cannot be appealed, on the
ground that to do so would make the President exercise direct control over the
actuations of the Provincial Board. The office of the President to exercise
jurisdiction over the decision of the Provincial Board on appeal, would only be
exercising its supervisory authority over the same. The appellate authority of
the office of the President is best recognized in the very case of Hebron vs.
Reyes (supra) * * *

“Regarding the counterclaim filed by the respondent Ricardo Provido, the
Court has found that charges were filed against the said Ricardo Provido as
Municipal Mayor of Calinog, Iloilo, for Neglect of Duty and Maladministration by
the petitioner, Rodolfo Cachuela, Vice-Mayor and Felix Catoto, Luis Ortizo,
Guillermo Castro, Jesus Carbon, and Ildefonso Pasaporte, Municipal Councilors of
Calinog, Iloilo. This same complaint is embodied in the administrative charges
filed by the Provincial Governor of Iloilo, Hon. Jose C. Zulueta (Annex A to the
petition). * * *

“By virtue of said administrative case against the respondent Ricardo
Provido, the Provincial Board on August 30, 1960, after investigation, found the
respondent Ricardo Provido guilty as charged in the complaint, and ordered his
suspension from office for a period of two (2) months effective upon receipt of
the decision (Annex B).

“Under this set of facts, the Court finds that the counterclaim is
unjustified. Private citizens, as well as public officials in a government like
ours, where the authority of governing officials emanates from the governed, it
is the duty of the citizens to bring to the attention of the corresponding
authorities the abuses, the omissions, or maladministration committed by such
officials. Complaints filed by them, therefore, in this connection against any
misconduct in any public office are qualifiedly privileged and, as such, they
cannot serve as basis for counterclaim against the complainants.

“FOR ALL THE THE FOREGOING, the petition for prohibition, as well as the
counterclaim of the respondent Ricardo Provido, are hereby dismissed with costs
against the petitioners.

“SO ORDERED.”

Dissatisfied with said decision, petitioner Cachuela appealed to us.
Respondent Provido also appealed from that portion of the decision dismissing
his counterclaim against petitioner Cachuela.

As heretofore stated, the present action is for prohibition, seeking to
restrain the respondent Executive Secretary from acting on the appeal of
respondent Provido on the alleged ground that Section 2191 of the Revised
Administrative Code authorizing such an appeal is unconstitutional insofar as it
empowers the President to review the decision of the Provincial Board because
such power of review, which includes the power to correct, alter, modify,
revise, or annul amounts to an exercise by the President, of “control” over
local governments forbidden by the Constitution. It appears, however, from the
records of this case that the Executive Secretary, upon being advised of the
dissolution of the preliminary injunction by the lower court acted on the appeal
and, rendered on November 23, 1960 a decision exonerating the respondent Provido
from the charges of negligence of duty and maladministration. It, likewise,
appears that the suspension imposed by the Provincial Board was for a period of
two months effective upon receipt by the respondent Provido of such a decision.
Provido was notified of the order of suspension on September 6, 1960 and the
two-month period of suspension expired on November 6, 1960. Under the
circumstances, as the act sought to be enjoined in this prohibition proceedings
has already been performed and there is nothing more to restrain, the case has
become academic and moot. And since the question of the unconstitutionality of
the statute involved is not so clear and its resolution not so peremptorily
necessary under the present facts of the case, this Court, pursuant to
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, should now decline to pass judgment on
the controversy which, for practical purposes, has become abstract or
non-existent.

The appeal of the respondent Provido against the decision of the lower court
dismissing his counter-claim for damages predicated on the claim that the
administrative complaint was unfounded and frivolous, is without merit. We agree
with the lower court that the administrative complaint is a qualified privileged
communication and since the lower court found no evidence of malice or bad faith
on the part of petitioner Cachuela, the dismissal of the counter-claim is
justified.

In view of the foregoing, the appeal of petitioner Rodolfo Cachuela is hereby
dismissed as presenting an already moot question, and the decision of the lower
court dismissing the counterclaim of respondent Provido is hereby affirmed. No
costs. So ordered.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla,, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.
B. L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.