SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY FACULTY ASSOCIATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SEVENTH DIVISION, AND SILLIMAN UNIVERSITY, RESPONDENTS.
QUIJANO-PADILLA, J.:
The Antecedents
Petitioner Silliman University Faculty Association (the Faculty Association) is the collective bargaining representative of the academic personnel of private respondent Silliman University (Silliman). It filed before the labor arbiter a complaint against Silliman for allegedly violating Republic Act (RA) No. 6728, otherwise known as An Act Providing Government Assistance To Students And Teachers In Private Education, And Appropriating Funds Therefor, specifically Section 5(2) thereof, which provides, thus:
Section 5. Tuition Fee Supplement for Students in Private High School. – xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(2) xxx tuition fees under subparagraph (c) may be increased, on the condition that seventy percent (70%) of the amount subsidized allotted for tuition fee or of the tuition fee increases shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel except administrators who are principal stockholders of the school, and may be used to cover increases as provided for in the collective bargaining agreements existing or in force at the time when this Act is approved and made effective: Provided, That government subsidies are not used directly for salaries of teachers of non-secular subjects. At least twenty percent (20%) shall go to the improvement or modernization of buildings, equipment, libraries, laboratories, gymnasia and similar facilities and to the payment of other costs of operation. For this purpose, [the] school shall maintain a separate record of accounts for all assistance received from the government, any tuition fee increase, and the detailed disposition and use thereof, which record shall be made available for periodic inspection as may be determined by the State Assistance Council, during business hours, by the faculty, the non-teaching personnel, students of the school concerned, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and other concerned government agencies. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied.]
The Faculty Association averred[4] that Silliman effected tuition fee increases for the school years 2008-2009, 2009-2010, and 2010-2011. However, Silliman did not maintain a record of accounts on the use and disposition of the 70% share of the employees in accordance with the above-cited provision of RA 6728 . Silliman’s record did not show that the 70% tuition increment was given to teaching and non-teaching personnel since such record did not show the names of the employees and how much they received. Also, there were items charged to the 70% tuition increment, like the coaching honorarium for non-employees of the university and hotel accommodation of one professor, which were not supposed to be charged thereto pursuant to the law. The Faculty Association asserted that per Section 5(2) of RA 6728, only employee benefits should be charged to the 70% tuition increment share of the employees.
For its part, Silliman countered[5] that it did not violate RA 6728 since the law had already been superseded and repealed by RA 8545, otherwise known as An Act Amending Republic Act No. 6728, or The Expanded Government Assistance To Students And Teachers In Private Education Act. Silliman contended that the requirement of maintaining a record of accounts relating to the tuition increments and the details of its disposition was no longer carried over to the amendatory law. Even assuming that RA 6728 was still in effect, Silliman had nevertheless complied with Section 5(2) thereof since it had maintained, and even made available to the Faculty Association the financial records containing the details of the disposition of the 70% tuition increment. Also, RA 6728 should not be construed as to require Silliman to keep individualized records showing the per peso and centavo share of each employee in the 70% tuition increment for the same would not be practical.
After evaluating the parties’ respective positions, the labor arbiter ruled in favor of the Faculty Association. It declared that the provision in RA 6728 on how the 70% tuition increment should be handled still remained effective and operative considering that the same had not been expressly repealed by RA 8545. The labor arbiter, however, ruled that the handling of such tuition increment was a management prerogative and Silliman had the discretion regarding its disposition. Nonetheless, the Faculty Association had the right to ask for the details of the disposition and the use of such amount, to the extent of having the recipient employees properly identified, and the amounts they received disclosed. According to the labor aribiter, Silliman’s evidence did not sufficiently reveal these details. Hence, it ordered Silliman to disclose to the Faculty Association the correct and true amounts of the proceeds of the tuition increments for the school years 2008-2009, 2009-2010 and 2010-2011, the names of the employees who received them, and the amounts that they received.
Silliman appealed[6] the labor arbiter’s decision to the NLRC. It insisted on its position that RA 8545 was intended to substitute and replace RA 6728.
Meanwhile, the Faculty Association was also discontented with the labor arbiter’s decision, hence, it appealed[7] to the NLRC. The Faculty Association claimed that it was not enough for the labor arbiter to only direct Silliman to disclose the details specified in the decision; but it was also necessary to order Silliman to distrubute the 70% share of the tuition fee increases for the covered school years, considering that the records presented by Silliman failed to show that such amount was actually distributed to the employees.
In ruling on both appeals, the NLRC, vacated and set aside the labor arbiter’s decision and dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The NLRC ruled that the matters involved were generally within the province of the State Assistance Council (SAC), or on a more specific scale, with the Department of Education for private secondary education concerns; the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) for post-secondary vocational and technical concerns; or the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) for higher education concerns. Although the Faculty Association’s cause of action appeared to be a money claim, it was however very clear that it arose from the enforcment and/or application of RA 6728, as amended by RA 8545, hence, jurisdiction thereof was with the SAC and/or the CHED.
The Faculty Association moved for reconsideration[8] but the NLRC stood pat on its decision. Aggrieved, the Faculty Association brought this petition on the following grounds, viz.:
A) THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE INSTANT CASE FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION; B) THAT THE LABOR ARBITER COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN MERELY ORDERING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO DISCLOSE THE AMOUNTS OF THE INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS AND THE NAMES OF THE EMPLOYEES WITH THE AMOUNTS THEY RECEIVED FROM THE 70% OF THE INCREMENTAL PROCEEDS OF THE TUITION FEE INCREASES FOR THE SCHOOL YEARS SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE DESPITE THE FINDING THAT THE RECORDS PRESENTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOES NOT SUFFICIENTLY DISCLOSE A DETAIL AS TO WHO IN PARTICULAR RECEIVE THE AMOUNTS.
On the first ground, the Faculty Association contended that its claims for the 70% share of the employees in the tuition increments effected by Silliman arose from the employer-employee relations between the members of the Faculty Association and Silliman. Hence, pursuant to Article 217[9] of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the same. Allegedly, it was not the first time that the Faculty Association brought a complaint for money claims arising from RA 6728. In NLRC Case No. V-000612-2003, the NLRC promulgated a decision dated December 15, 2004 ordering Silliman to pay its teaching and non-teaching personnel the 70% tuition fee increase for the year 1998-99. The decision was ultimately affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 175376 dated January 17, 2007. Besides, the issue on jurisdiction was never raised by either parties in their respective appeals with the NLRC.
On the second ground, the Faculty Association insisted that aside from ordering the disclosure of the details of the disposition of the 70% tuition increment, Silliman should be ordered to distribute such amount to the employees considering that the records it presented failed to show that the same was actually distributed.
This Court’s Ruling
The petition is without merit.
The core issue for resolution is whether or not the NLRC had jurisdiction over the Faculty Association’s case against Silliman.
The NLRC correctly declared that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the case lodged by the Faculty Association. This Court perused the Faculty Association’s Position Paper and found that the question therein presented for resolution was whether or not Silliman violated Section 5 of RA 6728.[10] Specifically, the Faculty Association wanted the labor tribunal to determine if Silliman: 1) had properly used and disposed the 70% share of the employees in the tuition increments for the inclusive school years; and (2) had complied with the reportorial requirements under the law.
The questions sought to be resolved, however, were not within the ambit of the labor court’s authority. As correctly found by the NLRC, matters involving the implementation, enforcement, application and compliance of RA 6728, as amended by RA 8545, were with the SAC; and the implementation of sanction for any violation thereof was lodged with the Department of Education, upon the recommendation also of the SAC. This is obvious from a reading of Sections 14 and 16 of RA 6728, the very law invoked by the Faculty Association, thus:
Section 14. Program Administration/Rules and Regulations. – The State Assistance Council shall be responsible for policy guidance and direction, monitoring and evaluation of new and existing programs, and the promulgation of rules and regulations, while the Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall be responsible for the day to day administration and program implementation. Likewise, it may engage the services and support of any qualified government or private entity for its implementation.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 16. Penalties. – In case of any violation of the provisions of this Act or the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto by an institution, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, upon the recommendation of the Council, may bar the institution from participating in or benefiting from the programs of this Act, and from other programs of the Department, without prejudice to administrative and criminal charges as may be filed against the school and/or its responsible officers under existing laws.
Any school who shall refuse, as required under paragraph (1) (c) of Section 5, Section 8 (b) and Section 9 (b), to furnish copies of their audited financial statements to concerned sectors with whom they are having consultations prior to tuition fee increases, shall forfeit the right to increase their tuition fees, in addition to other penalties or sanctions as may be imposed under the preceding paragraph or by existing laws. [Emphasis and underscoring supplied.]
In this case, the Faculty Association’s concern could not be considered a mere money claim arising from their employment relations with Silliman. The said association itself pleaded that it was complaining against Silliman’s violations of the provision of RA 6728.
Unfortunately, the labor tribunals were not the proper bodies to ascertain the matters sought to be resolved by the Faculty Association. The labor arbiter or the NLRC had no power to determine if Silliman had properly used and disposed the 70% share of the employees in the tuition increments for the inclusive school years; or if the reportorial requirement regarding the details of the disposition of such 70% employees’ share was still required, considering the amendment omitting the same under RA 8545; and if Silliman had properly complied with such requirement should the same be adjuged as still necessary. Indeed, these matters had to be resolved first by the SAC.
The NLRC appropriately explained the inchoate nature of the Faculty Association’s purported money claim with the following discussion, viz.:
Suffice it to say, that inasmuch as the fund or money claimed by complainant is a result of the enforcement and/or application of RA 6728, as amended by R.A. 8545, it is imperative that that same pass through the proper determination of the agency or body administering said law, premised on its specialized area of competence thereon. Absent such proper determination, the ‘money claim’ referred to by complainant is still inchoate by way of cause of action in a labor case, as it has not yet redounded into one which directly arises from employer-employee relationship. Resort to the labor court’s jurisdiction on this matter, is therefore, premature. Flowing from the same vein, the Commission is precluded from laying down its resolution on the issues at hand.[11]
It was immaterial if none of the parties raised the issue on jurisdiction in their appeals before the NLRC. The fact that the issue of jurisdiction was not raised before it did not prevent the NLRC from taking cognizance of the same as the issue of lack of jurisdiction was apparent upon the face of the record.[12] Jurisdiction is not subject to the whims of the parties involved, but to what the law says. Since the labor arbiter was devoid of jurisdiction at the time he took cognizance of the complaint, the decision he promulgated was null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction, and the same may be struck down any time — even on appeal to the Supreme Court.[13]
Anent the Faculty Association’s claim that it had previously brought a complaint for money claims arising from RA 6728 in NLRC Case No. V-000612-2003, and the said case was allegedly decided in its favor, this Court notes that this matter had been thoroughly scrutinized by the NLRC in its resolution of the Faculty Association’s motion for reconsideration. The NLRC had this to say:
xxx the purported Supreme Court Decision with G.R. No. 175376, dated 17 January 2007 is suspect. So far, in the records of Philippine Jurisprudence for the year 2007, the earliest date of promulgation by the Honorable Supreme Court was on 22 January 2007. Such G.R. No. is also non-existent.
Be that as it may, the subject matter of the NLRC Case cited by complainant is the payment of the seventy percent (70%) share of the academic personnel in the tuition fee increase for school year 1998-1999, which respondent university failed to release.
In contrast, the subject matter of the case at hand is the alleged violation by respondent university of R.A. 6728, on the use and disposition of the seventy percent (70%) share of the employees in the tuition fee increases for the school years 2008-2009 onwards 2010-2011. Parallel to this, complainant asserts that respondent university failed to comply with Sectin 5(2) of R.A. 6728, on maintaining a separate record of accounts for any tuition fee increase, as well as the detailed disposition and use thereof.[14]
Per research of the alleged Supreme Court decision, and also after analyzing the attached decision in NLRC Case No. V-000612-2003,[15] this Court finds that the NLRC’s observations were correct. Thus, the statement of the Commission is hereby adopted to address the Faculty Assocation’s reiteration of the issue in this petition.
In the light of all the above pronouncements regarding the issues covered by the first ground, a discussion on the second ground advanced by the Faculty Association is no longer necessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 27, 2013 and Resolution dated June 14, 2013 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC Case No. VAC-02-000062-2013, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hernando, Chairperson and Azcarraga-Jacob, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 18-23.
[2] Rollo, pp. 321-341.
[3] Rollo, pp. 24-28.
[4] See Position paper of the Faculty Association, rollo, pp. 29-35.
[5] See Position Paper for Silliman, rollo, pp. 53-
[6] See Memorandum of Appeal, rollo pp. 352-371.
[7] Rollo, pp. 342-349.
[8] Rollo, pp. 379-381.
[9] Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
1. Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
- Unfair labor practice cases;
- Termination disputes;
- If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;
- Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations;
- Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
- Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement.
2. The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters.
[10] See Issue stated in Position Paper, rollo, p.33.
[11] Rollo, p. 22.
[12] See Paguio v. NLRC. G.R. No. 116662. February 1, 1996.
[13] See Phil-Singapore Ports Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 67035. January 29, 1993.
[14] Rollo, p. 25.
[15] Rollo, pp. 384-305.