NELIA F. CARVAJAL, PETITIONER, V. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. VICTOR C. FERNANDEZ, HON. ARLENE A. NAZARENO, RAMIL I. BEATO AND VIVENCIO G. ANDAYA, RESPONDENTS.

Carvajal versus Office of the Ombudsman

The Case

This is Carvajal versus Office of the Ombudsman, a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction, filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner, Nelia F. Carvajal, the City Accountant of Sta. Rosa City, Laguna, assails the Consolidated Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon that preventively suspended her from office without pay for a period not exceeding six months, during the pendency of three administrative cases. She sues the Office of the Ombudsman and the private complainants, Ramil I. Beato and Vivencio G. Andaya. The case matters because it gathers in one decision the settled rules on the Ombudsman's power to preventively suspend, on the necessity of a motion for reconsideration before resort to certiorari, and on the reach of the rule against forum shopping.

Procedural History

The case began in the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, where three complaint-affidavits were filed against the petitioner. The Ombudsman docketed them as administrative cases and, on January 31, 2007, issued the Consolidated Order preventively suspending the petitioner. That recommendation was approved by then Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez on October 13, 2008. Instead of moving for reconsideration, the petitioner went straight to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65, asking that the Consolidated Order be declared void, that the administrative cases be dismissed or declared to have prescribed, and that the Ombudsman be prohibited from proceeding. On December 23, 2008, while the petition was pending, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Decision dismissing two of the administrative cases. The Supreme Court resolved the petition directly, as an original action.

Facts

On November 6, 2006, private respondents Ramil I. Beato and Vivencio G. Andaya filed three complaint-affidavits against the petitioner before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. The first charged malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g), of Republic Act Number 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The second charged violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), of the same law. The third charged malversation under Article 217 in conjunction with Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code, and violation of Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g), of Republic Act Number 3019.

The Ombudsman found that these allegations gave rise to administrative charges, and docketed them as cases for gross neglect of duty, grave misconduct, and grave misconduct or gross neglect of duty. On January 31, 2007, the Ombudsman issued the Consolidated Order preventively suspending the petitioner during the pendency of the cases, but not to exceed six months, without pay, and directing the City Mayor of Sta. Rosa City to implement the order immediately.

The petitioner had earlier been charged by then Mayor Joey Catindig before the Local Adjudication Board of Sta. Rosa City for dishonesty and insubordination, and for gross and habitual neglect of duty. She argued that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction because of the pendency of those local cases, that the suspension came two years after the complaints were filed, and that there was no strong evidence of her guilt. The Ombudsman found strong evidence of guilt for grave misconduct, citing nineteen foreign trips from 1999 to 2005 without the required authority to travel, and found that suspension was necessary to prevent her from tampering with financial records in her official custody.

Issues

• Whether or not the petition should be dismissed for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the Consolidated Order before resorting to certiorari.
• Whether or not the Ombudsman had jurisdiction over the administrative cases despite the pendency of similar cases before the Local Adjudication Board, and whether or not the petitioner was guilty of forum shopping.
• Whether or not the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the preventive suspension order, considering the alleged absence of strong evidence of guilt and the supposed lack of need to prevent tampering of evidence.
• Whether or not the enforcement of the preventive suspension order violated the petitioner's right to due process and speedy justice.

Applicable Provisions

Section 24 of Republic Act Number 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:

Section 24. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

This is the very provision the Court construes, and it supplies the three conditions that justify preventive suspension.

Section 13, paragraph (1), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

This is the constitutional source of the Ombudsman's jurisdiction, which the petitioner questioned.

Section 16 of Republic Act Number 6770 provides:

The Ombudsman shall have the duty and function to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient, and to perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

This extends the Ombudsman's authority to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance, answering the jurisdictional objection.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition was defective and dismissible because the petitioner failed to file a motion for reconsideration before coming to court. Parties may not arrogate unto themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not, and the petitioner showed no concrete, compelling, and valid reason to dispense with it. The filing of a motion for reconsideration on time is not a mere technicality but a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement.

On the second issue, the Court held that the Ombudsman properly exercised jurisdiction. The Ombudsman may investigate on its own or on complaint any act or omission of a public official that appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient, and its duties extend to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance. There was no forum shopping, because the rule against forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases. The Court quoted its own ruling:

The Court held therein that the rule against forum shopping applied only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases.

On the third issue, the Court held that the Ombudsman complied with the requirements of Section 24 of Republic Act Number 6770. The Ombudsman found strong evidence of guilt for grave misconduct, and whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman in his judgment. The Court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the Ombudsman absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. The argument that the documents were already in the complainants' hands did not persuade the Court, which held that the prosecution must be given the opportunity to gather and prepare the facts under conditions ensuring nonintervention and noninterference from the accused's camp.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that since the Consolidated Order was validly issued as a preventive measure and a preliminary step to an administrative investigation, its enforcement did not violate the petitioner's right to due process and speedy justice. The Ombudsman was shown not to have committed grave abuse of discretion, which means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the Ombudsman may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and any of the three conditions in Section 24 of Republic Act Number 6770 is present: the charge involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty; the charges would warrant removal from the service; or the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. Second, the question of whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman, and courts will not substitute their judgment absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. Third, the rule against forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to administrative cases. Fourth, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 must be preceded by a motion for reconsideration, and the petitioner may not decide for himself that it is unnecessary.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the petition, and the Consolidated Order of the Ombudsman preventively suspending the petitioner was sustained.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the strength of the evidence of guilt in a preventive suspension is for the Ombudsman to judge, and the Court will not substitute its own judgment absent grave abuse of discretion. Examiners use this case on the Ombudsman's preventive suspension power under Section 24 of Republic Act Number 6770, and on the rule that forum shopping does not apply to administrative cases.