SIMEON OLBES, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE FABRIKOID, INC., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review the February 13, 1976 decision of the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission which affirmed the order of the acting
referee dated October 17, 1975 dismissing petitioner’s claim for compensation
(pp. 14 and 17, rec.).

The initial facts as found by respondent Commission and
subscribed to by petitioner are the following:

“The facts of this case are as follows:  The claimant was employed by respondent as
laborers with a daily wage of P8.30, working 6 days a week.  On July 25, 1969, he contracted indirect
hernia (inguinal) left side, acquired and/or either aggravated by a result of
the nature of his employment (Physician’s Report of Accident or Sickness); that
he stopped working on September 14, 1971 and never returned to work anymore;
that claimant’s illness was known by respondent through Manuel Go; that this claim was filed on December 27, 1974; that
a copy of the claim was furnished to the respondent; that a letter of controversion was filed on April 1, 1975″ (pp. 17
and 18, rec.).

The year “1969”
in the above factual findings of the respondent Commission which was restated
in the petition for review, appears to be an error, since the notice of injury
and physician’s report indicate the year as “1966” (pp. 29 and 30,
rec.).

The records disclose that on October 2, 1975, respondent company,
Philippine Fabrikoid, Inc. filed its motion to dismiss on the ground that
claimant’s sickness is “not caused by accident due to and in pursuant of
the employment neither the result of the nature of such employment” (p. 31, rec.; p. 33, WCC rec.).

On October 17, 1975, the acting referee of Regional Office No. 4
(Workmen’s Compensation Unit) ordered the dismissal of petitioner’s claim upon
a finding that “claimant failed to present substantial and convincing
evidence to justify a favorable consideration of his claim for disability
benefits” (p. 14, rec.; p. 30, WCC rec.).

Acting on petitioner’s request for assistance in following up his
claim, the chief action officer of the Office of the President requested the
Regional Director of Region No. 4 to consider the claim in the light of
humanitarian consideration within the purview of the aims and purposes of the
New Society.  The Regional Office treated
the said request as a motion for reconsideration of the order of October 17,
1975 and thus finding nothing therein which warranted a reversal of the order
of dismissal, denied the request (motion) in an order dated January 30, 1976
and elevated the claim to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission (pp. 21 and 26,
WCC rec.).

In a separate motion for reconsideration dated February 7, 1976, petitioner requested
for reconsi­deration of the order of October
17, 1975 and of reopening of the case to allow him to present his
evidence.  He further requested therein
that the case be elevated to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for review
should the aforesaid request not be granted (p. 15, rec.).

On February 13, 1976,
respondent Commission handed down its decision affirming the order of dismissal
of petitioner’s claim on the ground that there was no other proof, aside from
the physician’s report of accident and sickness, presented by claimant to
substantiate his claim (p. 17, rec.; p. 19, WCC rec.).

Hence,
this petition.

Petitioner alleges that his ailment (indirect hernia) is
work-connected and the presumption of compensability under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act should favor him.  Also,
he alleges that respondent’s controversion which was filed beyond the
prescribed period of ten (10) days from notice and the latter’s failure to
reinstate its right to controvert the claim do not bar the right to
compensation benefits (pp. 10 and 47, rec.).

Respondent, upon the other hand, maintains that herein claim is
not compensable because petitioner’s illness was not directly caused by his
employment or was either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such
employment (p. 59, rec.).  Respondent has
firmed up his allegation with the physician’s report of sickness or accident
accomplished by claimant’s attending physician, Dr. Gregorio Mendiola (p. 30,
rec.; p. 50, WCC rec.).  Respondent
likewise contends that petitioner’s claim is barred by reason of the latter’s
failure to give notice of illness and to file the claim for compensation within
the period allowable (p. 58, rec.).

WE find the questioned
order of dismissal unwarranted and unjustified.

In finding that petitioner-claimant had not presented other proof
to substantiate his claim aside from the physician’s report, said Commission acted drastically without giving any
thought to the underlying philosophy behind compensation claims.  It even capitalized on the aforesaid report
when it decided against compensability of petitioner’s illness.  Having relied solely on the physician’s
report, the Commission irresponsibly ignored certain decisive facts which petitioner
has established and which have not been refuted by respondent.  There is no showing whatsoever that
respondent attempted to disprove the same. 
Thus, petitioner was employed as laborer by respondent company when he
initially contracted indirect hernia on July
25, 1969.  More importantly,
respondent had knowledge of petitioner’s illness through notice given to Manuel
Go and such knowledge was confirmed by the fact that respondent defrayed the hospitalization and medical
expenses of petitioner (per Notice of Injury or Sickness and Claim for
Compensation, p. 47, WCC rec.).  How can
respondent now refuse petitioner’s claim for benefits which arose from an
ailment for which it previously afforded hospitalization and medical expenses?  Simple logic, even common sense, would
dictate that the presumption of compensability should more than ever, favor
herein petitioner.

Petitioner suffered from
and was hospitalized for indirect hernia (inguinal) which he acquired when he
worked as laborer in respondent company. 
As such laborer his work included “the lifting of heavy plastic
products weighing hundreds of kilos and transferring them to the bodega and
placing them in trucks.” Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s hernia was
caused by the tedious manual job of carrying heavy loads of plastic products
(p. 15, rec.).  This becomes evident in
the report of Dr. Mendiola, the attending physician, wherein he stated that
petitioner could resume any work “as long as he does not carry very
heavy objects” (Item 15, p. 50, WCC rec.; underscoring supplied).

Inguinal hernia is hernia
occurring in the groin; protrusion of intestine or omentum, or both, either
directly through a weak point in the abdominal wall or downward into the
inguinal canal (p. 483, Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing,
Miller-Keane, 1972).

An indirect inguinal hernia (external or oblique hernia) leaves
the abdomen through the intestinal ring, and passes down obliquely through the
inguinal canal, external to the deep epigastric artery (p. 670, Dorland’s
Illustrated Medical Dictionary, 24th Edition). 
Acquired hernia is one brought on by lifting or by a strain or other
injury (ibid.).

This Court in many compensation cases has con­sistently and
repeatedly upheld the presumption of compensability.

In the recent case of LaO vs. Employees’ Com­pensation
Commission (No. L-50918, May
17, 1980, 97 SCRA 780), WE thus enunciated:

“It should be stressed that as early as 1960, this Court, in
the case of MRR vs. WCC and Pineda, ruled that compensability is not affected
by the presence of extraneous factors causing or accelerating a claimant’s
illness.  In reiteration, it further
stated that ‘while there is that possibi­lity that factors other than the
employment of the claimant may also have contributed to the aggravation of his
illness this is not a draw­back to its compensability.  For, under the law, it is not required that
the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of
claimant’s illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for.  It is enough that his employment has
contributed, even if a small degree, to the development of the disease.’ It has
been repeatedly held that under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, it is not
necessary for a claimant to carry the burden of proof to establish his case to
the point of demonstration.  It is
sufficient to show that the hypothesis on which he bases his claim is probable
(Abana, et al. vs. Quisumbing, L-23489, March 27, 1968, citing MRR vs. WCC
& Pineda, supra).  x x x.

“In the Abana case, this Court further stated that the mere opinion
of doctors regarding the non-causality of unknown illnesses cannot prevail over
the presumption established by law.  x x x.

“Furthermore, in the case of Flores vs. WCC, et al.  (L-43540, March 14, 1979), this Court
emphatically ruled that the exact medical cause of the illness of an employee
is not significant, for, granted for argument’s sake, that the evidence of the
claimant is insufficient to show a causal link between the nature of his
employment and his ailment, it is to be presumed that the claimant’s illness
which supervened at the time of his employment, either arose out of, or was at
least aggravated by, said employment, and that with this legal presumption, the
burden of proof shifts to the employer, and the employee is relieved of the burdens to show causation.”

As above-stated, the claimant does not merely rely on the legal
presumption that his ailment was caused or aggravated by his work and therefore
com­pensable, but also proves that his work included the lifting of heavy
plastic products weighing hundreds of kilos, transferring them to the bodega
and loading them on the trucks, which was not rebutted by private respondent.

It must be noted that respondent company did not present any
other evidence to substantiate its contention that petitioner’s illness was not
work-connected except the physician’s report. 
It was incumbent upon respondent to offset the presumption of
compensability of petitioner’s claim with stronger and conclusive evidence.  Respondent failed in this task.

To cast aside any doubt, this Court has faced squarely the
question of and ruled on the compensability of hernia.  In the case of Santos
vs. Workmen’s Com­pensation Commission (L-43243, February 28, 1977, 75 SCRA
364), this Court said:

“American courts have held that hernia due to strain over a
period of a few months (Mill’s case, 155 N.E. 423) or resulting from strain
suffered in such activities as lifting heavy timbers, lifting heavy bundles of
paper, pushing a heavy box of pipe across a floor, pushing a heavy wheelbarrow,
picking up a log, pulling a tong chain, lifting a bale of wire, and pushing a
coal car in a mine, have been held compensable even though the injury itself
constituted the only mishap (5 Schneider vs. Workmen’s Compensation Text,
578-579 /Permanent Ed./).”

The Court further stated:

“There is furthermore in favor of petitioner the well-settled
doctrine that when an illness supervened during the course of employment, like
petitioner’s illness, there is the rebuttable presumption that the same arose
out of or at least was aggravated in the course of his employment.  And with that presumption the burden of
proving by substantial evidence that the illness was not work-connected shifts
to the employer and the claimant is relieved of the burden to show
causation.  In the
instant case, there was patent failure on the part of respondent company to
discharge that burden” (p. 369, supra).

Likewise, in the case of
Alabat vs. WCC (L-43942, September 30, 1978, 85 SCRA 468), this Court awarded
compensation benefits to petitioner public school teacher, who was afflicted
with several illnesses including hernia.

Respondent’s contention
that petitioner’s claim is barred by the latter’s failure to give notice of his
illness and file the claim within the period allowable does not hold water in
the light of OUR previous rulings resolving this issue.  It must be borne in mind that petitioner did
notify respondent company of his illness through Manuel Go who, as appearing in
the records, never denied nor refuted that such notice was given to him.  In fact, said notice was properly
acknowledged by respondent company when it paid for petitioner’s
hospitalization expenses.  In the
following cases, this Court thus held:

“It is now settled in this jurisdiction that failure on the
part of the employee to comply with the requirements of Section 24 of Act 3428
– that of giving notice and filing of claim within the time prescribed in said
section, is non-jurisdictional” (Philippine Graphic Arts, Inc. vs.
Mariano, L-30979, October 26, 1973, 53 SCRA 409).

“Where the evidence shows that the company had actual
knowledge of the illness of the employee and of his death, as well as the cause
thereof, it is held that the absence of a formal notice of either cannot exempt
the company from its liability under Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act (Insular Lumber Company vs. WCC, L-25756, January 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 105,
citing Manila Railroad Co. vs. Vda. de Chavez, L-20103, September 30, 1964).

“Respondent employer
cannot escape liability by asserting that no notice was given by petitioner of
his claim for compensation, for failure to give such notice assuming that there
was no such notice, is not a bar to the proceedings for compensation if it is
shown that the employer had knowledge of the illness, and such was the case
here (Section 27, Workmen’s Compensation Act)” /Justo vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, L-43681, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 220; Gallemnit vs.
Republic, L-43390, February 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 382).

“The contention that the claim is barred because the notice of
claim of compensation was filed beyond the reglementary period of two months as
provided in Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, is
without merit.  It has been held that
said defense is not jurisdictional and that the statutory right to compensation
prescribes in ten years (Art. 1144 /2/ New Civil Code)” /St. Anne’s
Hospital vs. WCC, L-42694, October 24, 1978, 85 SCRA 721/.

And finally, respondent company’s alleged controversion was filed
only on April 1, 1975,
beyond the period allowed by law.  Having
received notice of petitioner’s ailment, respondent company should have filed
its notice to controvert the right to compensation on or before the fourteenth
day of disability – or 14 days from July
25, 1969 – or within ten days after it had knowledge of the illness
as required under Section 45 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.  Instead of giving notice of its intention to
controvert the claim, respondent company acknowledged responsibility for
petitioner’s ailment by assuming payment of the latter’s medical expenses.  The failure of respondent company to comply
with the required notice of controversion constituted a renunciation of its
right to controvert the claim.  Neither
was there any request for reinstatement of the right to controvert the claim.

Accordingly, WE have ruled that “what is undeniable is that
the ‘failure to controvert’ is fatal to the defense of the claim having been
filed out of time” (Pampanga Sugar Mills vs. Vda. de Espeleta, 22 SCRA 325 /1968/).

In Bachrach Motor Co.,
Inc. vs. WCC, et al. (L-8589, May
25, 1956), this Court said:

“Where the employer not only did not file any opposition to
the claim for compensation within the prescribed period, but admittedly paid
compensation by reason of the accident, the compensability of the claim could
no longer be disputed.”

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION
COMMISSION IS HEREBY REVERSED AND SET ASIDE AND RESPONDENT COMPANY IS HEREBY
DIRECTED –

1. TO PAY THE CLAIMANT –

A.     
THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND
(P6,000.00) PESOS AS DISABILITY COMPENSATION; AND

B.    
THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOUR
(P344.00) PESOS AS REFUND FOR MEDICAL EXPENSES INCURRED;

2. TO PROVIDE THE
CLAIMANT WITH SUCH MEDICAL, SURGICAL AND HOSPITAL SERVICES AND SUPPLIES AS THE
NATURE OF THE AILMENT REQUIRES; AND

3. TO PAY THE SUM OF
SIXTY-ONE (P61.00) PESOS AS ADMINISTRATIVE FEE.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Vasquez, Relova, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.