PAZ PEREZ ORANTES, PRIMITIVA DELA CRUZ-ABARRA, HEIRS OF ESTER P. BALTAZAR-VILLANUEVA AND ANITA P. BALTAZAR-BUNUAN, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. JULIETA IGADUA, DOMINGO MADDAWAT, JU…
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Orantes versus Igadua
The Case
This is a suit for accion publiciana — the plenary action to recover the right of possession of real property — brought by four registered owners, Paz Perez-Orantes, Primitiva Dela Cruz-Abarra, the Heirs of Ester Baltazar-Villanueva, and Anita Baltazar-Bunuan, against Julieta Igadua, Domingo Maddawat, and a long list of co-defendants who, they say, entered their pasturelands by force and intimidation during the insurgency years and squatted there. The defendants answered that they had possessed the land since 1985, believing it to be public land, and that they had even been encouraged by government offices to keep improving it. The case matters for two reasons: it is a clean statement of what an accion publiciana is for and what a Torrens title proves, and it collects in one decision the procedural rules on certification of non-forum shopping, misjoinder of parties, reopening of trial, and the limits of counsel's authority to admit facts.
Procedural History
The complaint for accion publiciana with damages was filed in 1995 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya. The defendants moved to dismiss by an Omnibus Motion, but the trial court rejected it because it was filed after they had already filed their Answer. After pre-trial and trial, and after a relocation survey was decreed and admitted, the trial court rendered its decision on December 4, 2008. It declared that legal ownership belonged to the plaintiffs and ordered the defendants and their successors-in-interest, agents, privies, and representatives to vacate the properties, to remove whatever improvements they had introduced, and to deliver peaceful possession to the plaintiffs, with the provisions of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 on demolition and eviction to be strictly followed. It also assessed additional filing fees against the plaintiffs. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, assigning both procedural errors and the insufficiency of the plaintiffs' evidence.
Facts
The subject matter is four lots in Upper Magsaysay, formerly a portion of Busilac, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, each covered by a separate Torrens certificate of title in the name of one of the four sisters who are the plaintiffs. The titles were issued in 1955 and 1956, and they were never cancelled.
The plaintiffs alleged that the lands were formerly devoted to pasture. In 1984, when the insurgency problem worsened, cattle were butchered in the pasturelands, public officials were kidnapped and killed, and pasturelands were squatted upon. The plaintiffs lost interest in the cattle business and were afraid to go to the land. The defendants, who came from nearby provinces, entered and squatted on the properties one after the other, in growing numbers, building temporary shelters and planting fruit trees and vegetables. When peace and order improved, the plaintiffs brought the matter to the barangay captain for conciliation, but the defendants refused to vacate and threatened the plaintiffs, so a certification to file action was issued.
The defendants claimed possession since 1985, saying they occupied the land with the consent of barangay officials because it was idle, that there was no insurgency problem, and that they had petitioned the government, through their congressman, for priority in the distribution of the land as members of national cultural communities. They also invoked a letter from the Office of the President advising them to continue improving the lots. At pre-trial, their former counsel admitted that the properties were titled in the names of the plaintiffs.
Issues
- Whether or not the complaint should be dismissed because the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed by counsel rather than by the plaintiffs themselves.
- Whether or not the case should be dismissed because the four plaintiffs, owning separate titled properties, jointly sued all the defendants.
- Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error in reopening the case for the presentation of the plaintiffs' evidence after it had long been submitted for resolution.
- Whether or not the trial court erred in considering the admission made by the defendants' former counsel at pre-trial.
- Whether or not the plaintiffs proved their case for accion publiciana by a preponderance of evidence.
Applicable Provisions
Administrative Circular Number 04-94, which governed the filing of the complaint, provides:
The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not the same issue in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no such action or proceedings is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed.
The same Circular supplies the remedy the defendants failed to invoke:
Any violation of this Circular shall be a cause for the dismissal of the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading, upon motion and after hearing.
These provisions bear on the first issue, because dismissal for a defective certification requires a motion, and none was filed.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that when the complaint was filed in July 1995, the 1964 Rules of Civil Procedure governed and required no certification of non-forum shopping; only Administrative Circular Number 04-94 applied, and it expressly makes violation a cause for dismissal upon motion and after hearing. No such motion was filed below, so the objection came too late.
On the second issue, the Court held that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties can cause dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage, and any claim against a misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. Misjoinder does not involve jurisdiction, and the defendants raised it only for the first time on appeal.
On the third issue, the Court held that reopening the case was not reversible error. While the Rules prescribe an order of trial, deviation is not an abomination; the court, for good reasons in the furtherance of justice, may permit a party to offer evidence upon its original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
On the fourth issue, the Court agreed that an attorney's authority to bind his client by admissions of fact is limited to matters of judicial procedure, and an admission that operates as a waiver, surrender, or destruction of the client's cause is beyond the scope of that implied authority. The pre-trial admission that the lands were titled in the plaintiffs' names was therefore prejudicial. Even so, ignoring that admission, there was other evidence on record in the plaintiffs' favor.
On the fifth issue, the Court held that in accion publiciana the principal issue is possession, and ownership is merely ancillary; only where possession cannot be resolved without resolving ownership may the trial court delve into the claim of ownership. The plaintiffs presented their titles, issued in 1955 and 1956 and never cancelled, and as registered titleholders they are entitled to possession. The Court restated the rule:
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of the land described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession.
Doctrine
First, a Torrens title is conclusive evidence of ownership in favor of the person named in it, and the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership, including possession. Second, in accion publiciana the principal issue is possession and ownership is merely ancillary; the court delves into ownership only when possession cannot be resolved without it. Third, misjoinder or non-joinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal; it does not affect jurisdiction and is cured by dropping or adding parties at any stage. Fourth, a violation of the certification of non-forum shopping requirement is a cause for dismissal only upon motion and after hearing. Fifth, the court may reopen a case for further evidence in the furtherance of justice, absent grave abuse of discretion. Sixth, counsel's implied authority to admit facts covers only matters of judicial procedure; an admission that surrenders the client's cause is beyond it.
Disposition
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, and the plaintiffs won: the defendants and their successors-in-interest were ordered to vacate the properties, remove their improvements, and deliver peaceful possession to the plaintiffs, subject to the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 on demolition and eviction.
Remember This
Memorize the line that the person who has a Torrens title over land is entitled to possession of it, and that in accion publiciana possession is the principal issue while ownership is ancillary. Examiners use this case for the Torrens title rule in recovery of possession, and for the procedural point that a defective certificate of non-forum shopping is a ground for dismissal only upon motion and after hearing.