FELILIBETH AGUINALDO AND BENJAMIN PEREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA,PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 8 AND REYNALDO P. VENTUS AND J…

Aguinaldo versus Olalia

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, brought by Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez against Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Presiding Judge of Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the private respondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson. The petitioners ask the Supreme Court to annul two orders of the trial court in a criminal case for estafa: the order reinstating the case and directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo, and the order denying her motion for reconsideration and motion to quash the warrant. The case matters because it fixes a hard ceiling on how long a criminal arraignment may be suspended on the ground that a petition for review is pending before the Department of Justice, and it reminds every reviewee that the remedy of certiorari demands grave abuse of discretion, not mere error.

Procedural History

The private respondents filed a complaint for estafa against the petitioners before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. After preliminary investigation, the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended the indictment of both petitioners for estafa under the Revised Penal Code, and an information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The trial court issued an order of arrest. The petitioners moved to recall or quash the warrants, then filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor a motion for reconsideration of the resolution with a motion to withdraw the information. The trial court recalled the warrant as to Aguinaldo pending resolution of that motion, and later deferred the proceedings. The Office of the City Prosecutor denied the twin motions, and the petitioners elevated the matter to the Department of Justice by a petition for review. On motion of the petitioners, and without objection from the prosecution, the trial court suspended the arraignment and further proceedings pending the resolution of the petition for review. Subsequently, the trial court issued the order of May 16, 2005 reinstating the case and directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo, and the order of August 23, 2005 denying her motion for reconsideration and motion to quash. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by this petition for certiorari.

Facts

On December 2, 2002, Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed a complaint for estafa against Benjamin Perez and Felilibeth Aguinaldo before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. Perez filed his counter-affidavit, the private respondents replied, and Perez rejoined. On February 25, 2003, Assistant City Prosecutor Renato F. Gonzaga issued a resolution recommending that both petitioners be indicted for estafa. Aguinaldo claimed she never received notice of the preliminary investigation and was never furnished a copy of the private respondents' affidavit before that resolution issued. An information was filed with the trial court in July 2003, and the court issued an order of arrest. The petitioners moved to recall or quash the warrants, and they also filed with the prosecutor a motion for reconsideration with a motion to withdraw the information. The trial court recalled the warrant as to Aguinaldo pending the resolution of that motion, and the proceedings were deferred.

On January 16, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor denied the twin motions for lack of merit. The petitioners filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice on February 27, 2004. On March 15, 2004, the trial court directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo and set the case for arraignment. Because the petition for review was pending, the petitioners moved to cancel the arraignment and suspend further proceedings, and the trial court granted the motion in its order of April 16, 2004, subject to the submission of a copy of the petition for review, which counsel complied with on May 31, 2004.

On June 23, 2004, a law firm filed, on behalf of Levita de Castro, a motion to reinstate the case and to issue a warrant of arrest, alleging that de Castro was the private complainant and that the case had been archived. The petitioners opposed, averring that de Castro was not a party and that the case remained in the active file awaiting the petition for review. De Castro later filed a manifestation and motion asking that defense counsel be required to explain why she should not be cited for contempt for allegedly concealing Aguinaldo, and she also manifested that the Secretary of Justice had denied the petition for review by a resolution dated September 6, 2004. The petitioners' counsel maintained that she had not received a copy of any such resolution, and a certification dated May 30, 2005 stated that the petition for review was still pending as of May 27, 2005. The trial court nonetheless issued the assailed orders, and this petition followed.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the motion to reinstate the case and issue a warrant of arrest, filed by Levita de Castro, who is not a party to the case.
• Whether or not the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion for reconsideration and the motion to quash the warrant of arrest.
• Whether or not the preliminary investigation of the case by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila had been completed.

Applicable Provisions

Section 11, paragraph (c), of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases: xxx xxx xxx (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, That the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.

This is the provision on which the entire ruling turns, because it both authorizes the suspension of arraignment and caps that suspension at sixty days.

Ruling

The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. On the first two issues, which the Court resolved together, it asked whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders. The Court explained that grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or the exercise of power in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to act at all. It is not enough that a tribunal abused its discretion; the abuse must be grave.

Turning to the suspension of arraignment, the Court held that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension, the rule limits the deferment to sixty days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. After that period expires, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. Here, the petition for review was filed with the Secretary of Justice on February 27, 2004, and the arraignment was deferred as early as April 16, 2004. The period of one year and one month from April 16, 2004 to May 16, 2005 was more than ample time for the petitioners to obtain a resolution. The Court added that the delay in the resolution of the petition for review does not extend the sixty-day period, and that the petitioners may be faulted for the delay, since counsel received a letter from the Department of Justice dated April 15, 2004 requiring the submission of pertinent pleadings, but complied only on October 15, 2004. The trial court therefore did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

Having so ruled, the Court found it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised, including the question of the completeness of the preliminary investigation.

Doctrine

A petition for certiorari lies only where a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in law. Grave abuse of discretion is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the abuse must be grave, not merely an error of judgment.

Under Section 11, paragraph (c), of Rule 116, the pendency of a petition for review of the prosecutor's resolution before the Department of Justice or the Office of the President suspends the arraignment, but only for sixty days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. After the sixty days lapse, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. Delay by the Department of Justice in resolving the petition does not extend the sixty-day period, and delay attributable to the accused does not help the accused.

Disposition

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit, and the assailed orders of the trial court were left standing.

Remember This

Memorize the rule: the suspension of arraignment pending a petition for review lasts only sixty days from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office, and after that the court must arraign or deny the deferment. Examiners use this case to test the sixty-day cap under Rule 116 and the strict standard of grave abuse of discretion in a Rule 65 petition.