MATEO H. REYES AND JUAN H. REYES, PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. MATEO RAVAL REYES, RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

Reyes versus Reyes

The Case

This is a direct appeal on a pure question of law, brought by Mateo H. Reyes and Juan H. Reyes against their relative Mateo Raval Reyes. The petitioners are the registered owners of several parcels of land in the Laoag Cadastre, and they asked the trial court to compel the respondent to surrender to them the owners' duplicates of their certificates of title. The trial court refused, and the Supreme Court had to decide who between a registered owner and a person claiming a share under an unrecorded sale has the better right to the custody of the owner's duplicate. The case matters because it fixes a simple, memorable rule: the owner's duplicate belongs to the person in whose name the land is registered, and a claimant who is not on the title must first establish his right in a separate action.

Procedural History

The dispute began in the cadastral cases before the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The petitioners moved for writs of possession over the lots covered by the two certificates of title. The respondent opposed, claiming a one-third share which he said he had bought from the petitioners' brother. The trial court granted the writ of possession, and later amended it to cover all the lots under both titles. The respondent did not appeal from that amended order.

The petitioners then filed an ordinary civil action for the products of the lots and for moral damages. The respondent answered and set up a counterclaim for partition. While that civil case was pending, the petitioners filed a motion in the cadastral cases to compel the respondent to surrender the owners' duplicates of the two certificates of title. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that the lots were the subject of litigation in the pending civil case. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, and the denial was reiterated. The petitioners then brought this direct appeal on a pure question of law to the Supreme Court.

Facts

Three brothers, Mateo H. Reyes, Juan H. Reyes, and Francisco H. Reyes, all surnamed Reyes, were the registered owners of several parcels of land in the Laoag Cadastre. Four lots were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22161, and two lots were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 8066, both of the Registry of Deeds of Ilocos Norte. These titles were issued pursuant to a decree of registration dated 31 May 1940.

On 17 July 1962, the petitioners filed a motion in the cadastral cases for writs of possession over all the lots. The respondent opposed, admitting possession of the lots under the first title but denying possession of the lots under the second title. He nevertheless claimed a right to possess those lots because he had acquired, by an unrecorded absolute sale, the undivided one-third share of Francisco H. Reyes. After hearing, the trial court issued the writ of possession, and later amended it to cover all the lots under both titles. The respondent did not appeal.

The petitioners then filed an ordinary civil action for the products of the lots or their value, and for moral damages. The respondent answered and pleaded a counterclaim for partition, repeating his claim as a co-owner by purchase. While that case was pending, the petitioners moved in the cadastral cases to compel the respondent to surrender the owners' duplicates of the two certificates of title. The trial court denied the motion because the lots were in litigation in the civil case. Hence this appeal.

Issues

• Whether or not the pendency of the civil case, in which the respondent had pleaded a counterclaim for partition, justifies withholding from the registered owners the custody and possession of the owners' duplicates of the certificates of title.
• Whether or not the respondent is barred and estopped, under the principle of res judicata, from raising the issue of ownership and possession of the lots after failing to appeal from the order granting and amending the writ of possession.

Applicable Provisions

Section 41 of the old Land Registration Act, as amended, is the provision the Court relies upon, and it provides:

Según el artículo 41 de la Ley No. 496, conforme ha sido enmendado, el duplicado para el dueño debe expedirse por el Registrador a nombre de la persona a cuyo favor se ha decretado el terreno y dispone, además, que dicho duplicado debe entregársele al dueño inscrito.

This provision bears on the case because it makes clear that the owner's duplicate is issued in the name of the person in whose favor the land was decreed, and must be delivered to the registered owner.

Section 24 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, on notice of lis pendens, is also invoked by the Court, and it provides:

Section 24, Rule 14, of the Revised Rules of Court

This provision bears on the case because it gives the respondent a way to protect his claimed rights by recording the fact that the lots are in litigation, without retaining the owners' duplicates.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court agreed with the trial court that the lots were in litigation in the civil case, because the respondent had pleaded a counterclaim for partition. But the Court found no valid reason to justify, on that ground, the withholding from the registered owners of the custody and possession of the owners' duplicates. The Court held that the owner of the land in whose favor and in whose name the land is registered has a more preferential right to the possession of the owner's duplicate than one whose name does not appear in the certificate and who has yet to establish his right. The Court quoted its earlier ruling in the case of the Director of Lands against Abacahin, which held that the duplicate must be delivered to the registered owner, and that a person claiming to participate in the lot as a co-heir must bring an independent action to obtain her participation.

The Court also noted that the respondent had already availed of an independent civil action to recover his alleged share by filing a counterclaim for partition, so his rights appeared amply protected. He could further protect them by availing of the notice of lis pendens under Section 24 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. For these reasons, the Court saw no justifiable reason for the respondent to retain the custody of the owners' duplicates.

On the second issue, the Court deemed it unnecessary to pass on the merits of the petitioners' contention on res judicata and estoppel, having resolved the case on the first ground.

Doctrine

The registered owner in whose name the land is decreed and inscribed has a more preferential right to the possession and custody of the owner's duplicate of the certificate of title than a person whose name does not appear on the certificate and who has yet to establish his right. A claimant who is not on the title must pursue an independent action to establish his share, and may protect his claim by registering a notice of lis pendens. The pendency of a case in which such a claimant pleads a counterclaim for partition does not by itself justify depriving the registered owner of the owner's duplicate.

Disposition

The Court reversed the orders appealed from and ordered the respondent, Mateo Raval Reyes, to deliver to the petitioners the owners' duplicates of Original Certificates of Title No. 22161 and 8066, with costs against him.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that the owner's duplicate belongs to the registered owner, and a claimant not on the title must first establish his right in a separate action. Examiners like to use this case on questions of who has the better right to the owner's duplicate, and on the proper remedy of a person claiming an unrecorded share in registered land.