G.R. No. L-29209. August 25, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VIRGILIO SOLACITO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This case is before us en consulta,
defendant herein having been sentenced to the extreme penalty, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Dominador Castillon
in the sum of P6, 000, and to pay the costs.
Defendant Virgilio Solacito
is charged with murder. In the
information, filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, it is alleged:
“That on or about the 11th day of March, 1968, in the City of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, armed with a knife,
taking advantage of nighttime to better realize his purpose, with deliberate
intent to kill and without justifiable motive, with evident premeditation,
treachery and abuse of superior strength, the deceased being an old man, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally
stab, hit and wound Dominador Castillon
with the said knife with which the said accused was provided at the time,
hitting the latter and causing upon him stab wound on vital part of his body
which caused his death moments thereafter; that the accused in this case is, a
recidivist, having been previously convicted by final judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo in Criminal Case No. 10416 for Frustrated Homicide and
was sentenced on August 22, 1964, to one (1) year imprisonment plus the cost
and in Criminal Case No. 28522 for Malicious Mischief, committed on September
18, 1967 and was sentenced on September 18, 1967 to public censure.”
As stated in the decision of said Court:
“When this case was called for arraignment and trial this
morning, Atty. Dominador Gonzales, appearing in
behalf of Atty. Gualberto Opong,
the duly appointed attorney de oficio for the
accused, manifested that the accused is willing to enter a plea of guilty to
the crime charged and the Presiding Judge of this Court asked the accused
whether he understands the meaning of a plea of guilty and whether he is
admitting all the material averments in the information. To the questions of the Court, the accused
answered in the affirmative. The accused
was further asked whether anybody threatened, intimidated or persuaded him to
enter a plea of guilty and he answered in the negative. The accused was then arraigned and he pleaded
guilty freely and voluntarily to the crime charged, thus admitting all the
facts alleged in the information. x x x.”
Immediately after setting
forth the foregoing proceedings, said decision adds:
” x x x The information alleges two (2)
qualifying aggravating circumstances, to wit:
Treachery and evident premeditation and three (3) generic aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, abuse of superior strength and recidivism. Applying the provision of paragraph 4, Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of
guilty offsets one generic aggravating circumstance, thus leaving two more generic
aggravating circumstances. But only one
will be taken into account in the imposition of the proper period of the
penalty provided for by law because the generic aggravating circumstance of
nighttime is absorbed or inherent in treachery, as held by the Supreme Court in
the cases of People vs. Balagtas, 68 Phil. 675;
People vs. Mat silang, 46 O.G. No. 4, 1557; and,
People vs. Young, 46 O.G. (Sup.) No. 11, 154.
Under this state of facts, the proper penalty to be imposed upon the
accused is the maximum period of the proper penalty for murder as provided for
in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
“IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the accused, Virgilio Solacito,
is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and this
Court hereby sentences him to suffer the maximum penalty of death, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P6, 000. 00, and to pay
the costs.”
It is well settled that,
in all cases, especially those involving capital offenses:
” x x x
(t)he court should be sure that the defendant fully understands the nature of
the charges preferred against him and the character of the punishment to be
imposed before sentencing him. While
there is no law requiring it, yet, in
every case under the plea of guilty, where the penalty may be death, it is
advisable for the court to call witnesses for the purpose of establishing the
guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant. ” [1]
The importance of
adhering to this practice was stressed in subsequent cases, more particularly,
when dealing with an ignorant non-Christian[2] or “an ignorant person with little or
no education,”[3] as the defendant herein seems to be.
In People v. Acosta,[4] we declared that the question of whether or
not evidence should be taken, to determine the guilt of the accused who has
entered a plea of guilty, and the circumstances attendant upon the commission
of the crime, lies within the “sound discretion” of the court,
provided that it is “satisfied that the plea of guilty has been entered by
the accused with full knowledge of the meaning and consequences of his act.”
Thus, speaking through Mr. Justice Castro, this Court had occasion to advert to
the fact that “judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in
seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the
meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.
“[5]
In the case at bar, we
are not satisfied that His Honor, the trial Judge, had properly discharged such
duty. According to his decision, he
“asked the accused whether he understands the meaning of a plea of guilty
and whether he is admitting all the material averments in the information”
and “the accused answered in the affirmative.” The foregoing
statement does not sufficiently show that the defendant was well aware
of the import of his plea and fully realized the consequences
thereof. The questions propounded by the
lower court in this case are a far-cry from the precautions taken by Judge Alo, which merited the commendation of this Court, in the Apduhan case, 6 from which we quote:
“When the case was called for trial on August 9, 1961, Atty. Tirol
informed the court a quo that he was appearing also for Apduhan, but only as counsel de oficio. In view of this manifestation, the trial
court appointed Atty. Tirol as counsel de oficio for the said accused. Forthwith, Atty. Tirol
manifested that Apduhan would change his former plea
of not guilty to a plea of guilty. The
record discloses that after the trial judge had repeatedly apprised Apduhan of the severity of the offense for which he was
indicted and the strong possibility that the capital penalty might be
imposed upon him despite a plea of guilty, Apduhan
persisted in his intention to plead guilty with the request, however,
that the death penalty be not imposed.
Then after hearing the arguments of Provincial Fiscal Jesus N. Borromeo and Atty. Tirol on the
effect of articles 295 and 296 of the Revised Penal Code on the case at bar, the
trial judge advised the herein accused anew that he could be sentenced to
death notwithstanding his projected plea of guilty, but the latter
reiterated his desire to confess his guilt on the specific condition
that he be sentenced to life imprisonment.
Eventually, however, Apduhan desisted from
pleading guilty and let his previous plea stand on record after further
warnings that he faced the grave danger of being sentenced to death in view
of the circumstances of his case. But
the aforesaid desistance was merely momentary as it did not end the accused’s equivocation on the matter of his plea. After a five-minute recess requested by
Atty. Tirol in order to confer with the accused, the
former informed the court a quo that his client would insist
on entering a plea of guilty. The
following appears on record:
” ‘Atty. D. TIROL:
” ‘Your Honor,
please, I had a conference with the accused and I apprised him with the
situation of the case and after hearing our apprisal
he manifested that he will insist on his entering a plea of guilty, Your
Honor. I made it clear to him that we
are not forcing him to enter the plea of guilty.
” ‘COURT (To
accused Apolonio Apduhan,
Jr.)
” ‘Q. Is it true
that you are withdrawing your plea of not guilty?
” ‘A. I will just enter the
plea of guilty.
” ‘Q. Have you
been forced to enter the plea of guilty by your lawyer?
” ‘A. No, Sir.
” ‘Q. And why
do you said ‘I will JUST enter the plea of not guilty’?
” ‘A. I have proposed to enter
the plea of guilty even before.
“‘Q. Now the
Court warns you again. Are you conscious
of the fact that notwithstanding your plea of guilty the Court may impose upon
you the penalty of death?
” ‘A. I will just
enter the plea of guilty, at the discretion of the Court.
” ‘Q. Even with all those
dangers mentioned by the Court to
you?
” ‘A. Yes,
Sir.’ (t. s. n. pp. 23-25)”
“Subsequently, the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel de
oficio resumed their oral arguments regarding
the effect on the instant case of articles 295 and 296, particularly the use of
unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance under the latter
article. Also discussed were the
existence and effect of the alleged mitigating and aggravating
circumstances. All of these points will
be later analyzed.
“When the lower court subsequently reviewed the proceedings,
it found that the accused’s plea of guilty was ambiguous. Hence, on August 30, 1961, the case was reopened with
respect to Apduhan, and on said date the latter
entered a categorical plea of guilty, as evidenced by the record:
” ‘COURT (To Accused Apduhan, Jr.):
” ‘The Court
reopened this case because after a review of the proceedings it found that your
plea was not definite. In answer to
a question of the Court you simply said ‘I will just enter the plea of
guilty’. The Court wants to know
whether you enter the plea of guilty of the crime charged in the second amended
information.
” ‘ACCUSED
APDUHAN:
‘I enter the plea of guilty.
” ‘COURT (To same accused Apduhan):
” ‘Q.
Therefore, you admit that you have committed the crime charged in the second
information?
” ‘A. Yes, Your
Honor.
” ‘Q. Is it necessary for you that the
second amended information be read again?
” ‘A. No more; it is not necessary.
” ‘Q. Do you
want that the second amended information be read to you again?
” ‘A. No more, Your Honor. ‘ (T. s. n.
pp. 50-51)”
“On the same day, the court a quo rendered its decision, the pertinent dispositive
portion of which reads:
” ‘PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment finding
accused Apolonio Apduhan,
Jr., alias Junior guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide,
punished by Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 296
of the same Code, as amended, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of death.
‘ “7
In the Acosta case,8 the trial
court had, similarly, taken pains to assure itself “that the accused was well
aware of the consequences of his plea” and “the full
import” thereof.
‘No comparable assurance is imparted by defendant’s affirmative
answer to the questions propounded by the lower court “whether he understands
the meaning of a plea of guilty and whether he is admitting all the material
averments in the information.” The questions were, apparently, formulated
in such a technical language that a layman is likely to miss the far-reaching
implications thereof. There is every
reason to believe that the accused, who claims to be an “ice-plant
delivery boy” is not capable of understanding the precise connotation of
the term “material averments” of the information, used by His Honor
the trial Judge, without any explanation
thereof, which, seemingly, was not given. Indeed, candidly confessing that the record
hardly offers him anything to cast light
thereon, Attorney Benjamin L. Bargas had this to say, in his brief, as counsel de oficio
for the accused:
“Faced with this grave
task, this representation
interviewed the accused at Muntinglupa for whatever
information he could gather that may shed some light on the circumstances
surrounding the killing. Briefly, the
accused gave the following information:
“1. The accused was an
ice-plant delivery boy.
“2. He and the deceased
lived on the same street.
“3. The deceased was a
carpenter, about 55 years of age, but very husky and strong.
“4. The deceased was some
sort of a bully in the area and on many occasions in the past had verbally
abused him when he (deceased) was drunk.
“5. Prior to the incident in
question, he was manhandled by the deceased, while the latter’s son-in-law
stabbed him on the back requiring his hospitalization.
“6. On the night in
question, he had had several drinks and was in fact drunk. He chanced upon the deceased at the market
place who was also drinking with several other men. The deceased again heaped abusive language
upon him; not being able to contain himself any longer for the bullying tactics
of the deceased and blinded by hatred, the accused stabbed the deceased once on
the chest causing the latter’s death.
“7. The accused claims that
when he talked with Atty. Opong, his Court appointed
counsel, he admitted having killed the deceased but he did not understand
nor was he made to understand the
meaning or effect of the aggravating
circumstances alleged in the Information.
On this contention, it would be well not to lose sight of the fact that Atty.
Opong did not attend his arraignment but a
certain Atty. Dominador Gonzales (Decision, p.
1). It was precisely with the
realization that he had killed another human being without legal
justification that he pleaded guilty.
He vehemently denies however that he understood the meaning of
treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and the other
aggravating circumstances alleged in the Information. He even went so far as to state that the
Court interpreter was a “Compadre” of the
deceased.
“We do not know if the information alleged above is
true. Certainly, however, most of it can
be verified. On the chance that it may
be true, it would seem that the accused may only be guilty of homicide and not
of murder, and indeed had no precise understanding of the meaning and effect of
a guilty plea to the Information which alleges five (5) aggravating
circumstances. It is submitted that this
possibility is fraught with such grave consequences that a remand of the
case to the lower Court for the taking
of evidence appears justified and necessary.”9
Under the circumstances, we are inclined to agree with Atty. Bargas – whose earnestness and sense of responsibility as
counsel de officio and as an officer of the Court should be
complimented and deserve emulation – that there is no reasonable certainty
that, in pleading guilty to the charge against him, the defendant did not
intend to admit merely that he had killed the offended party, overlooking the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances alleged in the information or, at
least, without a fair notion of the implications thereof.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby set aside
and the case remanded thereto for further proceedings in conformity with the
views expressed in the cases above referred to.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dizon, Makalintal,
Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Reyes and Zaldivar, JJ., are on
official leave abroad.
[1]
U. S. v.
Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541; U.S.
v. Rota, 9 Phil. 426; U.
S. v. Agcaoili,
31 Phil. 91.
[2]
People v. Sabilu, 89 Phil. 283.
[3]
People v. Bulalake, 106 Phil. 767.
[4]
98 Phil. 642.
[5]
People v. Apduhan, G.R. No. L-19491, Aug. 30, 1968.
6
Supra.
7
Underscoring supplied.
8
Supra.
9
Underscoring supplied.