. March 03, 1923
IN RE SUSPENSION OF VICENTE PELAEZ, ATTORNEY.
MALCOLM, J.:
Instance Wislizenus for a period of one year, the case has been elevated to this
court as provided by law, for full investigation of the facts involved, and for
the rendition of the appropriate order.
The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine Bar, residing at
Cebu, Cebu. On March 20, 1918, he was appointed guardian of the minor Gracia
Cabrera. As such guardian, he came into possession of certain property,
including twenty shares of the E. Michael & Co., Inc., and ten shares of the
Philippine Engineering Co. While Pelaez was still the guardian of the minor, he
borrowed P2,800 from the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank. Shortly
thereafter, to guarantee the loan, Pelaez, without the knowledge or consent of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu, deposited with the Cebu branch of the
Philippine National Bank the shares of stock corresponding to the guardianship.
On April 13, 1921, Pelaez executed a written agreement in favor of the Cebu
branch of the Philippine National Bank, pledging, without the authority of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, the shares of stock in question, to guarantee
the payment of the loan above referred to.
These are the facts, taken principally from the memorandum filed in this
court on behalf of the respondent, which caused the judge of First Instance to
suspend him from the legal profession. To quote counsel for the respondent, “the
misconduct of which the respondent in this case is guilty consists of having
pledged the shares belonging to his ward, to guarantee the payment of his
personal debt.”
Two questions present themselves for resolution. The first question is this:
Are the courts in the Philippines authorized to suspend or disbar a lawyer for
causes other than those enumerated in the statute? The second question is this:
May a lawyer be suspended or disbarred for non-professional misconduct?
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for
any of the causes therein enumerated. It will be noticed that our statute merely
provides that certain causes shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or
suspension of an attorney’s license. It does not provide that these shall
constitute the only causes for disbarment, or that an attorney may not be
disbarred or suspended for other reasons.
It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of the grounds of
disbarment is not to be taken as a limitation of the general power of the court
in this respect. Even where the Legislature has specified the grounds for
disbarment, the inherent power of the court over its officers is not
restricted.
The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the
conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office
as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the statute is so phrased as
to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer.
Passing now to the second point—as a general rule, a court will not assume
jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have
been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many
exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown,
through misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such
professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit
and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. The reason why such a
distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to
the bar, and the court requires for such admission the possession of a good
moral character.
The principal authority for the respondent is the case of People ex rel.
vs. Appleton ([1883], 105 Ill., 474). Here it was held, by a divided court,
that where property is conveyed to an attorney in trust, without his
professional advice, and he mortgages the same, for the purpose of raising a sum
of money which he claims is due him from the cestui que trust, and the
trustee afterwards sells the property and appropriates the proceeds of the sale
to his own use, the relation of client and attorney not being created by such
trust, his conduct, however censurable as an individual occupying the position
of a trustee, is not such as to warrant the summary disbarring of him on motion
to the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys, but the injured
party must be left to his proper remedy by suit. The Illinois court, however,
admits that although the general rule is, that an attorney-at-law will not be
disbarred for misconduct not in his professional capacity, but as an individual,
there are cases forming an exception where his misconduct in his private
capacity may be of so gross a character as to require his disbarment.
The Attorney-General relies principally on the case of In re Smith
([1906], 73 Kan., 743). In the opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Johnston, it
was said:
“It is next contended that some of the charges against Smith do not fall
within the causes for disbarment named in the statute. As will be observed, the
statute does not provide that the only causes for which the license of an
attorney may be revoked or suspended are those specified in it, nor does it
undertake to limit the common-law power of the courts to protect themselves and
the public by excluding those who are unfit to assist in the administration of
the law. It merely provides that certain causes shall be deemed sufficient for
the revocation or suspension of an attorney’s license. (Gen. Stat., 1901, sec.
398.) In the early case of Peyton’s Appeal (12 Kan., 398, 404), it was
held that this statute is not an enabling act, but that the power of the court
to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; that ‘it is
a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; that it may be
exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases,
unless positively prohibited by statute; and that it may be exercised in any
manner that will give the party to be disbarred a fair trial and a full
opportunity to be heard.’ If there is authority in the Legislature to restrict
the discretion of the courts as to what shall constitute causes for disbarment,
or to limit the inherent power which they have exercised from time immemorial,
it should not be deemed to have done so unless its purpose is clearly expressed.
It is generally held that the enumeration of the grounds for disbarment in the
statute is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of the court,
but that attorneys may be removed for common-law causes when the exercise of the
privileges and functions of their high office is inimical to the due
administration of justice * * *.“The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney
and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule
prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney
shall be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition
precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it
would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and
the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed
not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be
unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the
law confer upon him.”
We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of
Kansas are sound.
The relation of guardian and ward requires of the guardian the continual
maintenance of the utmost good faith in his dealings with the estate of the
ward. The bond and the oath of the guardian require him to manage the estate of
the ward according to law for the best interests of the ward, and faithfully to
discharge his trust in relation thereto. Moreover, it has not escaped our
attention that in the petition by Vicente Pelaez, asking the court to appoint
him the guardian of Gracia Cabrera, he begins his petition in this manner: “El
abogado que subscribe, nombrado tutor testamentario, etc.” (The undersigned
attorney, appointed testamentary guardian, etc.), which indicates that
petitioner might not have been named the guardian in this particular case had he
not at the same time been a lawyer.
Counsel argues that the misconduct for which the respondent has been
suspended by the lower court is single and isolated. “It forms,” he says, “the
only blot upon the escutcheon.” We feel, however, that the trial court has been
extremely considerate of the respondent, and that were we sitting in first
instance, we would probably incline to a more severe sentence.
Judgment affirmed. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Street, Avanceña,
Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
DISSENTING
JOHNS, J.:
Upon the facts shown the period of suspension
should be for the period of two years.