IGNACIO SANTIAGO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT VS. EULOGIA NIZA, FRANCISCA TABLADA AND ERIBERTO UNSON, THE LATTER IN HIS CAPACITY AS CITY AND PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO, DEFENDANTS …

This is a case certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the appeal involves purely legal questions.

The antecedent facts may be summarized as follows—

Sometime in 1949, the defendants-appellees Eulogio Ceniza and
Francisca Tablada instituted two civil actions against
plaintiff-appellant Ignacio Santiago, one for unlawful detainer and
collection of rentals and another for collection of rentals only (Civil
Cases No. 245 and 428, respectively, CFI Davao). After a joint trial,
the lower court, in February, 1951, handed down a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads—

“Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the complaint and declaring the two story house as belonging in common
between plaintiffs and defendant, the former occupying the second floor
and the latter the first or ground floor; ordering the defendant to pay
P25.00 in the concept of monthly rental for the land where the two
story house in question is constructed from September 1, 1946 to April
30, 1948, and from May, 1948 henceforth to pay the plaintiffs P50.00 as
monthly land rentals for his share for land rental in the two story
house and for the camarin which the defendant has constructed on the
land in question; ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P100.00 as rentals due on the small house (House N. II) and ordering
the plaintiffs to pay the costs.”

On July 30, 1955, the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. Nos. 8102 and 8103-R), affirmed the above judgment, stating—

“* * * Wherefore, the errors committed by the court
below having been found to be harmless, and considering that the
conclusion of the court a quo is correct, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.”

The said judgment having become final and executory, was returned to the Court of origin for execution.

Alleging that the affirmed decision, in so far as it required him
(Ignacio Santiago) to pay to Eulogio Ceniza a “certain amount in Ihs
concept of monthly rental for the land” is contrary to law,
“particularly the provisions of the Public Land Act”, Santiago on
January 8, 1959, filed the present action for annulment of judgment
with injunction, with the Davao GFI, directed against Ceniza and the
Sheriff of Davao. The Sheriff was joined as defendant, for the purpose
of enjoining him from executing the decision in Civil Cases Nos. 245
and 428 (CA-G. R. Nos. 8102 and 8103-R).

On January 28, 1957, the lower court, upon motion presented by defendants, dismissed the action for annulment declaring—

“The present complaint seeks to annul a final and
executory judgment on matters which this Court had jurisdiction to try.
The decision might be erroneous, but this point does not justify for
the annulment of a final decision, because, under such circumstances,
the remedy of the injured party should have been to appeal and not to
annul the decision. The Court of First Instance and the Court of
Appeals having jurisdiction over the case, their decision could not be
annulled now. Consequently, no writ of preliminary injunction could be
issued against the defendants.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
complaint filed by Ignacio Santiago on January 8, 1957, is hereby
dismissed without special pronouncement as to costs.”

In his appeal from the above judgment, Santiago assigns four (4)
errors, supposedly committed by the lower court, all of which revolve
on the propriety of the Order of Dismissal. Principally, appellant
anchors his case on the argument that the instant proceeding is not for
a correction of the decision but an annulment thereof, which is
sanctioned by both law and jurisprudence, citing Reyes vs.
Barreto, 94 Phil., 446; in support thereof. There is no question that a
final judgment may be annulled. There are, however, certain requisites
which must be established before a judgment can be the subject of an
action for annulment. “Under the present procedure, aside from the
reliefs provided in these two sections (Secs. 1 & 2, Rule 38),
there is no other means whereby the defeated party may procure final
and executory judgment to be set aside with a view to the renewal of
the litigation, unless (a) the judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law, or (b) it has been obtained by fraud.” (I Moran’s Rules of Court 1950 Ed. p. 697, citing Anuran vs. Aquino, 38 Phil., 29; Banco Espanol-Filipino vs.
Palanca, 37 Phil. 921). Reason of public policy which favors the
stability of judicial decisions are mute in the presence of fraud which
the law abhors (Garchitorena vs. Sotelo, 74 Phil., 25). There
is no allegation in the present complaint to the effect that judgment
in the former cases was secured thru fraud. The only statement
impugning the decision is that the same is contrary to law,
particularly the Public Land Act, because the plaintiff-appellant was
required to pay to the herein defendants-appellees certain monthly
rentals for the land. This particular aspect of the cases was, however,
passed upon definitively by the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Annulment of said judgment is not, therefore, justified, under the
circumstances obtaining and on the ground alleged in the present
complaint. Plaintiff should not be allowed to drag the matters which
have already been set at rest by the final and executory decision in
Civil cases Nos. 245 and 428 (CA-G.R. Nos. 8102-8103-R).

Conformably with all the foregoing, the order appealed from is
hereby affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant Ignacio
Santiago.

Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Dizon, Regala, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.