DONATO LAJOM, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JOSE N. LEUTERIO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NUEVA ECIJA, AND RAFAEL VIOLA, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari and mandamus to set
aside certain orders, and reinstate another order, of respondent judge.

The factual background of this case may be found in our decision in G. R. No. L-6457, entitled “Donato Lajom vs. Jose Viola, et al.” (promulgated May 30, 1956), from which we quote:

“Maximo Viola died on September 3, 1938. Judicial
proceedings of his testate estate were instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan (Civil Case No. 4741) and closed on March 17, 1937.
An agreement of partition and distribution (dated October 25, 1935) was
executed by and between Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio Viola,
legitimate children of Maximo Viola and Juana Toura, whereby the
properties left by their father, Maximo Viola, were divided among
themselves. On March 17, 1939, Donato Lajom (plaintiff-appellee herein)
filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija a complaint,
amended on May 16, 1939, praying, among other things, that he be
declared a natural child of Maximo Viola, impliedly recognized and
acknowledged in accordance with the laws in force prior to the Civil
Code, thereby being a co-heir of Jose P. Viola, Rafael Viola and Silvio
Viola (defendants-appellants); that the agreement of partition and
distribution executed in 1935 by these three legitimate children of
Maximo Viola be declared null and void and after collation, payment of
debts and accounting of fruits, a new partition be ordered adjudicating
one-seventh of the estate left by Maximo Viola to Donato Lajom and
two-seventh to each of the three appellants. The latter filed a
demurrer to the amended complaint which was sustained by the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija in its order of July 31, 1939, holding
that the allegations of the amended complaint called for the exercise
of probate jurisdiction and that as the complaint showed that the will
of the deceased Maximo Viola had already been probated in the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan which had first taken cognizance of the
settlement of his estate., the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
could not subsequently assume the same jurisdiction. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court by the plaintiff-appellee, the order sustaining the
demurrer was reversed and the case was remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija for further proceeding.

“On December
21, 1942, the defendants-appellants accordingly filed an answer to the
amended complaint containing specific denials and setting up the
affirmative defenses that the appellants are the sole heirs of Maximo
Viola; that corresponding judicial proceedings of his testate estate
were duly instituted and terminated in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, of which plaintiff-appellee was fully aware; that the action
was fifed by the appellee two years after the termination of said
testate proceedings and almost six. years after the death of Maximo
Viola, without having previously asserted any right whatsoever to any
part of said estate, and he is therefore now barred from doing so; and
that assuming the appellee to be an acknowledged natural child of
Maximo Viola, his right of action had prescribed. After trial, the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered a decision in favor of
the plaintiff, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

‘EN VISTA DE LAS CONSIDERACIONES ARRIBA EXFUESTAS, el Juzgado falla
este asunto a favor del demandante y contra de log demandados,
declarando al demandante, Donato Lajom, hijo natural, implicita y
tacitamente, reconocido por su padre, el difundo Dr. Maximo Viola, do
acuerdo con la Ley de Toro; se declara la particion y distribucion
hecha por los demandados ‘Convenio de Particion y Adjudicacion de los
Bienes Dejados por el Difundo Dr. Maximo Viola, ilegal, nulo y de
ningun valor; se ordena la colacion de los bienes en cuestion, poniendo
los mismos en manos do un administrador judicial; se ordena a todos y
cada uno de los aqui demandados a presentar una liquidacion de los
frutos y productos provenientes de dichas propiedades asignadas a cada
uno de ellos desde el Octubre 25, 1935, con el fin de una nueva
distribucion; se ordena a los demandados Jose P. Viola y Silvio Viola a
someter una liquidacion de los frutos y productos de las tres parcelas
de terreno mencionadas en los parrafos 1 y 2 del Annex ‘A’ que han sido
puestas bajo su administracion en el Procedimiento Especial No. 4741
del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Bulacan a partir del 3 del
Septiembre de 1933; y flnalmente, se ordena la particion y adjudicacion
a favor del demandante de una septima (1/7) parte de dichas propiedades
y productos; dos septimas (2/7) partes a cada uno de los aqui
demandados, cuando todas esas propiedades pertenecientes al finado Dr.
Maximo Viola sean colados, todas las deudas pagadas y los frutos
rendidos. Con costas.’ “

Said decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija was, on
appeal, affirmed by this Court in said case No. L-6457 on May 30, 1956.

When the decision of this Court became final, the records were
remanded to the lower court where plaintiff filed a motion for the
execution of the judgment, the collation of all properties of the late
Dr. Maximo Viola and the redistribution of his estate as indicated in
said judgment. Acting on the motion, respondent Judge issued an order
dated October 30, 1956, pertinent parts of which are of the following
tenor:

“The decision annulled the partition entered into by
the defendants and ordered the ‘collation of all the properties in
question’, placing the same in the hands of a judicial administrator.
What the properties in question are, do not clearly appear. In the
inventory attached to the original complaint, 75 parcels of land were
enumerated. In the agreement of partition which was annulled, the
inventory, of the estate of the late Dr. Maximo Viola enumerates only
47 parcels of land. These 47 parcels, according to the agreement of
partition, were all conjugal. In the motion for execution, plaintiff
now enumerates 84 parcels of land. The decision did not state what
properties belonged to the late Dr. Maximo Viola, but it did provide
for the partition of all the estate belonging to the late Dr. Viola
after the same had been’ collated and all the debts paid and the fruits
liquidated. It would be manifestly unfair to either party to consider
the 75 parcels of land enumerated in the inventory attached to the
amended complaint as the conjugal properties of the late Dr. Maximo
Viola and his deceased wife, or to limit the same to the 47 parcels
enumerated in the inventory of the estate of the late Dr. Maximo Viola
attached to the agreement, of partition. As a starting point, however,
½ of the 47 parcels enumerated in the agreement of partition and
marked, as Exhibit F-1, which is Exhibit A of the deed of partition,
are undoubtedly the properties of the late Maximo Viola which must be
partitioned among the plaintiff and the defendants in accordance with
the decision. Accordingly, the defendants, who are in possession of
each’ and everyone of these 47 parcels, are hereby ordered to deliver,
the same to the judicial-administrator to be hereinafter appointed, for
his administration until the final partition in accordance with the
decision of this Court. As there is a disagreement among the parties
with respect to the other properties, the plaintiff is hereby ordered
to submit within 15 days upon receipt of this order a list of such
other properties which he believes belong to the late Dr. Maximo Viola.
The defendants shall file their opposition thereto within a like period
after which the same shall be set for hearing to determine whether or
not such properties belong to the late Dr. Maximo Viola and which
should be partitioned among his heirs.

“The decision ordering
the defendants to collate is questioned by the defendants, first, on
ground that what has been left by will should not be collated, and
second, that what has been left by way of donation to some of the
defendants should not also be collated. The decision requires the
defendants to collate all the properties of the late Dr. Maximo Viola
so that they may be partitioned among the heirs. That decision is now
final, and it is not for this Court to say that the Court rendering the
decision had committed an error. If error there had been, it is now
beyond the power of this Court or any Court to correct the same.
However, the will having completely omitted the plaintiff who is a
compulsory heir, and having disposed of all the properties in favor of
the defendants, it naturally encroached upon the legitime of the
plaintiff. Such testamentary dispositions may not impair the legitime
(Art. 1037, Spanish Civil Code). In another sense, the plaintiff, being
a compulsory heir in the direct line, and having been preterited, the
institution is annulled in its entirety (Art. 814, Spanish Civil Code
now. Art. 854, N.C.C., Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil., 322).

“With
respect to the properties donated by the late Dr. Maximo Viola and his
wife to some of the defendants, the same must be collated, but the
donation having been made jointly by the spouses, only ½ thereof must
be brought into collation in accordance with Article 1046 of the
Spanish Civil Code. Moreover, the same things donated are not to be
brought to collation and partition, but only their value at the time of
the donation in accordance with Article 1045 also of the Spanish Code.

“In
accordance with the agreement of the parties, Mr. Manuel V. Gallego,
Jr. is hereby appointed administrator of the properties herein collated
and may take his oath and assume the performance of his duties upon the
filing of a bond in the sum of P20,000.

“In accordance with
the dispositive part of the decision, the defendants Jose V. Viola and
Silvio Viola are hereby ordered to submit a liquidation, of the fruits
and products of the three parcels of land mentioned in paragraphs 1 and
2 of Annex A. Each and everyone of the defendants is hereby ordered to
submit a liquidation of the fruits and products of the properties
assigned to each and everyone of them from October 25, 1935, all within
15 days from the receipt of this order.”

When Rafael Viola filed the report required in this order, Donato
Lajom noticed that nothing was said in the aforementioned report
concerning the fruits of a riceland, with an area of 215 hectares,
allegedly donated by Dr. Maximo Viola to said Rafael Viola. So, Lajom
asked that Rafael Viola be ordered to include the products of said
riceland in his report, in order that the property may be included in
the redistribution of the Viola Estate. Rafael Viola objected thereto
upon the ground that said property was not “mentioned or included in
the complaint filed in this case.” The objection was sustained and the
petition was denied in an order dated October 30, 1957, stating that:

“* * * In paragraph II of the amended complaint (p. 43 of the record) only the donation inter vivos
in favor of the defendants Jose Viola and Silvio Viola were questioned.
The dispositive part of the decision required the defendants to collate
the properties in question. The properties which were donated to Rafael
Viola had not been put in issue by the pleadings and they are not in
question and, therefore, cannot be deemed to have been embraced in the
dispositive part of the decision requiring the defendants to collate
the properties in question.”

A motion for reconsideration of said order of October 30, 1957 was denied, on January 30, 1958, upon the ground that:

“The decision required the defendants to collate the
properties in question. The properties donated to Rafael Viola and
which are sought to be collated by the plaintiff are not in question,
not having been put in issue by the pleadings. Neither are they
mentioned in the Inventory of the 75 parcels which are annexed to the
complaint. If the court, in its previous orders, made mention of
collation of all the properties of the deceased, the court had
committed an error, and, therefore, corrects that error in accordance
with this order and in the order of October 30, 1957.”

Thereupon Lajom instituted the present case for certiorari and mandamus, with the prayer:

” * * * that the respondent Judge be ordered to set
aside his Order of October 30, 1957 and January 30, 1958 and reinstate
his original Order of October 30, 1956 requiring ‘the defendants to
collate all the properties of the late Dr. Maximo Viola so that they
may be partitioned among the heirs’ and ‘with respect to the property
donated by the late Dr. Maximo Viola and his wife to some of the
defendants the same must be collated.'”

Petitioner maintains that the riceland aforementioned was involved
in case G. R. No. L-6457, because respondents maintained in their brief
and in the motion for reconsideration filed by them in the Supreme
Court that the lower court had erred in ordering the collation of all
the properties of the deceased. Moreover, he urges that the order of
respondent Judge of October 30, 1956, had already declared that all
properties of the deceased, including those donated by him, were
subject to collation; that said order became final and executory, no
appeal having been taken therefrom; and that, consequently, said order
could not be validly modified or reversed by the aforementioned orders
of respondent Judge, dated October 30, 1957 and January 30, 1958.

We find no merit in this pretense. The decision affirmed by this
Court in G. R. No. L-6457 ordained the collation of the “properties in
question”. The properties in question were described in an inventory
attached to petitioner’s original complaint in case No. 8077 and did
not include the aforementioned riceland, with an area of 215 hectares.
Indeed, Lajom admits that he did not include, and could not have
included or mentioned it, in his complaint because, at the time of its
filing, he did not know of the existence of said property. Hence, the
same was not in question in case No. 8077, and was not covered by the
decision therein rendered and subsequently affirmed by the Supreme
Court in Case No. L-6457.

It is not accurate to say that the order of October 30, 1956, had
directed the collation of all property of the deceased. It did not even
require the collation of 75 parcels of land enumerated in the inventory
already adverted to. It expressed the view that one-half of the 47
parcels covered by the agreement of partition therein nullified, should
be delivered to the administrator to be herein after appointed. Then it
added:

” * * * As there is a disagreement among the parties
with respect to the other properties, the plaintiff is hereby ordered
to submit within 15 days upon receipt of this order a list of such
other properties which he believes belong to the late Dr. Maximo Viola.
The defendants shall file their opposition thereto within a like period
after which the same shall be set for hearing to determine whether or
not such properties belong to the late Dr. Maximo Viola and which
should be partitioned among his heirs.”

Thus, it left the question whether other properties should be
collated or not open for future determination. In any event, respondent
Judge was merely enforcing a decision that had already become final.
Any order directing what was, not required in said decision—and the
same contained no pronouncement with respect to the riceland adverted
to above—would be in excess of his jurisdiction and therefore, null and
void.

It is next alleged that petitioner having been the victim of
preterition, the institution of heirs made by the deceased Dr. Maximo
Viola became ineffective, and that Civil Case No. 8077 was thereby
converted into an intestate proceedings for the settlement of his
estate. This contention is clearly untenable. There might have been
merit therein if we were dealing with a special proceedings for the
settlement of the testate estate of a deceased person, which, in
consequence of said preterition, would thereby acquire the character of
a proceeding for the settlement of an intestate estate, with
jurisdiction over any and all properties of the deceased. But, Civil
Case No. 8077 is an ordinary civil action, and the authority of the
court having jurisdiction over the same is limited to the properties
described in the pleadings, which admittedly do not include the
aforementioned riceland.

Without prejudice, therefore, to the institution of the
corresponding intestate proceedings by the proper party, the petition
herein should, therefore, be, as it is hereby, denied, with costs
against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Endencia, JJ., took no part.