IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HAO GUAN SENG TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. HAO GUAN SENG, PETITIONER, VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT.

Appeal by the Government from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, granting the petition of Hao Guan Seng for naturalization
as Philippine citizen.

Appellant maintains that the lower court erred:  (1) in finding that petitioner is exempt from
filing a declaration of in­tention; and (2) in granting the petition for
naturalization, despite petitioner’s failure to state in his petition one of his former place of residence.

The first alleged error is predicated upon the fact that, although petitioner has resided in the
Philippines since 1933, or more than 30 years before he filed the petition for
naturalization, on April 22, 1963, he went abroad three (3) times during said
period of time, namely:  (a) in 1946,
when he went to China, and stayed there for six (6) months; (b) in 1958, when
he went to Malaya, via Hongkong, to visit his wife
who is domiciled in the crown colony, where he stayed for three (3) months;
and, (c) in 1959, when he visited his wife in Hongkong,
although the record does not show how long he was away this time.

It is urged by appellant that petitioner is not exempt from the
obligation to file a declaration of intention, because the 30-year residence
required therefor must be “continuous,”
whereas appel­lee’s residence in the Philippines has
been, it is averred, interrupted by his aforementioned trips abroad.  Upon the other hand, appellee
asserts that these trips did not legally affect the continuity of his residence
in the Philippines, which is not necessarily depen­dent upon physical presence
therein.

As regards the second alleged error, petitioner’s applica­tion
alleges that his residences in the Philippines have been:  Zam­boanga City,
from 1934 to 1941; Ipil, Zamboanga
del Sur, from 1942 to 1945; Zamboanga
City, from 1945 to 1950; and, eventually, the City of Davao,
Philippines.  It appears, however, that
he arrived at the port of Manila, coming from China, on January 3, 1933, so
that, appellant concludes, he must have stayed in Manila from that date to the
year 1934 when he moved to Zamboanga City, and his
failure to mention such former place of residence in his petition for
naturalization warrants the dismissal thereof.

We do not deem it necessary, however, to pass upon these two
specific questions, for the following reason:

Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 provides that a petitioner
for naturalization must have, inter alia,
the following qualification:

“Third.  He must
be of good moral char­acter and believe in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation
with the constituted Government, as well as with the community in which he
lives.”

Moreover, Section 7 of the same Act
provides:

“x x x The
petition must be signed by the applicant in his own handwriting and
supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons stating that
they are citizens of the Philippines and per­sonally know the petitioner to be
a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act, and
a person of good repute and morally irreproachable and that said petitioner,
in their opinion, has all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of
the Philippines, and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of
this Act.”

Inasmuch as one of the
requisite qualifications is that peti­tioner “must have conducted himself
in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines,” it follows necessarily that his attesting witnesses must be in
a posi­tion to establish this circumstance.

In the case at bar, the
attesting witnesses were Dr. Ben­jamin Lacsamana and
Mr. Pantaleon Jayme, both
of whom claimed to have known the petitioner in the year 1951, and
testified to his good behaviour since then only, for
they could not supply any evi­dence about his conduct from 1933 to 1950.  In other words, they were not in a position
to know whether or not petitioner had the qualification demanding a proper and
irreproachable conduct “during the entire period of his residence.”

Furthermore, we have
repeatedly declared that the attest­ing witnesses must be “credible
persons,” and that to fall under this category, as said term is used in
Section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, it must be satisfactorily proven, not
only that the witnesses are not police characters, but, also, that they have
such a well-known reputation for honesty and integrity, in the community in
which they live, that their word can be taken on its face value.^[1] No proof to this effect, as regards
petitioner’s aforementioned witnesses, has been introduced.

Accordingly, the decision appealed from should be, as it
is hereby, reversed, and another one entered, dismissing the peti­tion, with costs
against the petitioner.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal,
Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Ong vs. Republic, 103 Phil., 964, 971, May 10,
1958; Antonio Go vs.
Republic, G.R. No. L-18068, October 30, 1962; and ‘O Ku Phuan vs.
Republic, G.R. No. L-23406, August 31, 1967.