EVANGELINE LEDA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, RESPONDENT.

Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty.
Trebonian Tabang’s good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed
against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January 1982,
and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for
Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983.

It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant
contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was
performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code^[1]
as one of exceptional character (Annex “A,” Petition).

The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until
after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in 1977), and had taken
the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for
them. Com­plainant admits, though, that
they had not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January
1982).

Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter
applied to take the Bar. In his
application, he declared that he was “single.” He then passed the examinations
but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No.
78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his
application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer’s Oath for lack of good
moral character. Complainant also
alleged that after Respondent’s law studies, he became aloof and “abandoned”
her (Petition, par. 5).

The Court deferred Respondent’s Oath-taking and required him to
answer the Complaint.

Respondent filed his “Explanation,” dated 26 May 1982 which was
received on 7 June 1982. Said
“Explanation” carries Complainant’s conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was “legally
married” to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage “was not as yet
made and declared public” so that he could proceed with his law studies and
until after he could take the Bar examinations “in order to keep stable our
future.” He also admitted having indicated that he was “single” in his
application to take the Bar “for reason that to my honest belief, I have still
to declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not
as yet made and declared public.” He further averred that he and Complainant
had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the “Explanation,” for which
reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed.

Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June
1982. Attached to it was Complainant’s
Affidavit or Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a
misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from
pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed
Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated
20 August 1952.

On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this
Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent’s disbarment based on the
following grounds:

“a. For having made use of his legal knowledge
to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not
valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution.

“b. For having misrepresented himself as single
when in truth he is already married in his application to take the bar exam.

“c. For being not of good moral character
contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme Court;

“d. For (sic) guilty
of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing the affidavit of
desistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to
his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only
befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends
and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my
complaint against him with the Supreme Court.”

Attached to Complainant’s Petition for Disbarment, as Annex “F,”
is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written
by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that
while he was grateful for Complainant’s help, he “could not force myself to be
yours,” did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void
for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code,
among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration
of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and
that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were
not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything
more so as not to put her family name “in shame.” As for him, he had
“attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing
you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any court.”
According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent’s
initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh.
“8-A-1”).

Respondent denies
emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant
who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.

In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and
Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted
to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said
marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of
Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the
marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any
person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived
together as husband and wife. When he
applied for the 1981 Bar Examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of
the law, he was single.

On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with
the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him
since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges
but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements
in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court.

On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General’s
Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended
the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is
settled.

Upon the facts on record, even without testimonial evidence from
Complainant, we find Respondent’s lack of good moral character sufficiently
established.

Firstly, his declaration in his application for admission to the
1981 Bar Examinations that he was “single” was a gross misrepresentation of a
material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made
answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter
II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly
making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with
his application for admission to the bar.” That false statement, if it had been
known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as
it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character.

Respondent’s protestations that he had acted in good faith in
declaring his status as “single” not only because of his pact with Complainant
to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the
Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely
wanting of merit. Respondent can not
assume that his marriage to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a
marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have
been met and that the Judge’s official duty in connection therewith has been
regularly performed.

Secondly, Respondent’s conduct in adopting conflicting positions in
the various pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is
duplicitous and deplorable.

The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had
submitted an “Explanation,” in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having
been “legally married” to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under
oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead
that it is only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to
admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely of
Complainant’s own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes
reference to such “Explanation” (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]).

Again, while in said “Explanation” he admitted having been
“legally married” to Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the
legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage
contract.

In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of
marriage was not to be made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and
take the Bar. In this case, however, he
contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was “not in order
from the beginning.”

Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter
(Annex “F,” Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in
his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for failure
to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code.

Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows
that Respondent had reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to
put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer’s
Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a
“full-fledge (sic) lawyer,” he again refused to honor his marriage to
Complainant.

Respondent’s lack of good moral character is only too
evident. He has resorted to conflicting
submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to
serve his purpose. In so doing, he has
violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that “a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court” as well as
Rule 1001 thereof which states that “a lawyer should do no falsehood nor
consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court
to be misled by any artifice.” Courts are entitled to expect only complete
candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez
v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been
lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also
as an officer of the Court.

It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of
law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice
of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA
622). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice
George A. Malcolm: “As good character
is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when
the attorney’s character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe
and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the
power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]).

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly
unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED
from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.

Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record
as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of Philippines and the Court
Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, and Nocon, JJ., concur.

^[1]
ART. 76. No marriage license shall be
necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who,
being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an
affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of
the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.