ALBERT WRIGHT, JR., ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CO., AND VICTOR LEDNICKY, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Direct
appeal to this Supreme Court from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Mt. Province, Baguio City Branch, in its Civil Case No.
905, dismissing, after trial, the complaint for the recovery of
possession and ownership of and accounting of ores extracted from two
mining claims known as “Copper Placer Mining Claim” and “Lepanto
Fraction Mining Claims,” which are both situated at Mancayan,
Lepanto-Bontoc, Mt. Province.

The expediente of the appealed case did not show
the value of the properties in controversy; whereupon, on motion of the
appellees for the determination of appellate jurisdiction because the
appellants have raised questions of fact and law, this Court directed
both parties to comply with paragraph 5, Section 17, of the Judiciary
Act of 1918, as amended by Republic Act 2613. On their compliance, this
Court, on 6 April 1962, resolved to retain and decide the case, as the
value of the matter in controversy exceeds P200,000.

The
plaintiffs-appellants, Albert Wright, Jr., Gertrude Wright tie Herrero
and Robert Wright, 53*51, and 49 years of age, respectively, are the
children of the late spouses Albert Wright, an American citizen, and
Donay, a native of Mt. Province, Philippines. In 1959, they discovered
for the first time that their father owned the above-named mining
claims.

In a series of letters, the plaintiffs inquired into
the muniments of title of the defendants, and when the many inquiries
were partially answered by the defendants, the plaintiffs demanded the
delivery of the mining claims to themselves as the rightful owners. The
demand was rejected, and the plaintiffs filed the complaint on 9
November 1959, alleging that the acquisition by the defendants of the
mining claims in question was fraudulent and in bad faith.

The
properties are in the present possession and registered ownership of
the defendants-appellees, under transfer certificates of title which
were reconstituted under Republic Act 26, by final orders of the Court
of First Instance of Bontoc, issued on 23rd March, 1949.

The
plaintiffs-appellants rely on the survey plats of the claims of Albert
Wright on the two mining claims, which plats were approved in 1907 by
the Director of Lands and on a publication entitled “The Mineral
Resources of the Philippine Islands for the Years 1921, 1922 and 1923”
issued by the Division of Geology and Mines, Bureau of Mines, Manila,
and which was printed in 1925 by the Bureau of Printing. The
publication listed in tabular form “all the patented claims as well as
all coal and petroleum leases, to and including December 31, 1923,” in
accordance with the present mining laws”. Under the italicized heading
“List of mineral land concessions granted and in force to December 31,
1923”, Albert P. Wright appears as the “patentee, lessee, or permittee”
to a lode patent and a placer patent, both located in Mankayan-Bontoc
and with areas of 5.4953 and 5.5887 hectares, respectively.

The
plaintiffs’ theory is that since Albert Wright was the owner of the
mining claims in 1928, he could not have transferred, sold, or
alienated to anyone the two mining claims; nor could his heirs,
plaintiffs-appellants, at his death, since they were then minors, nor
have they done so after becoming of age.

The reconstituted
certificates of titles are four (4) in number, all transfer
certificates (RT-18(117), RT-17 (116), RT-25(52) and RT-26(50)], all
owner’s duplicate certificates, and all certify that the corresponding
land- “was originally registered on the 18th day of September, in
the year nineteen hundred and eight ***, pursuant to a patent granted
by the Governor-General of the Philippines, on the 7th day of July, in
the year nineteen hundred and eight, under Act No. 496.”

All the four reconstituted certificates bear on their page A a
certification by the provincial fiscal and ex-officio register of deeds
that reconstitution was effected pursuant to order of the Court of
First Instance of Mt. Province, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 26. Two (2) reconstituted certificates, RT-17 (116), as Exhibit
“8”, and RT-25(52), as Exhibit “9”, pertain to the “Lepanto Frac- tion
Mineral Claim”, the first being for 7/10 interest in the name of
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, and the second being for 3/10
interest in the name of V.E. Lednicky; the two (2) other reconstituted
certificates, RT-18 117), as Exhibit “8-A”, and RT-26(50), as Exhibit
“9-B”, pertain to the “Copper Placer Mining Claim”, the first being for
7/10 interest in the name of the company, and the second being for 3/10
interest in the name of Lednicky. On page B (for Memorandum of
Incumbrances) of both the titles in the name of Lednicky, there is an
entry above the signature of the provincial fiscal and ex-officio
register of deeds, as follows:

“Sold to
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company as per affidavit of V.E. Lednicky,
dated February 2, 1948, and Court order of the Court of First Instance
of Mt. Province, dated March 23, 1949.”

The
spaces intended for the signature of the register of deeds at the
bottom of the first page of these Lednicky titles were unfilled.

We
find that the action was properly dismissed. We can but agree with the
trial court that one of the main obstacles to the maintenance of this
suit by appellants are the final orders of reconstitution of the
defendants’ certificates of title (Exhibits 8, 8-A, 9 and 9-B), issued
by the Court of first Instance as far back as 1949, conformably to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 26. The reconstitution proceedings that
culminated in said decrees were public proceedings in rem that bind all
persons, including plaintiffs-appellants. Under section 7 of Republic
Act No. 26, “Reconstituted titles shall have the same validity and
legal effect as the originals thereof” unless the reconstitution was
made extrajudicially, which is not the case. In view of said provision,
it was incumbent upon appellants to show a better title in themselves,
but they have not done so.

To overcome the force of the
reconstituted certificates of appellees, it is not enough for
appellants Wright to show that the title to the claims originally stood
in the name of their father. They have the burden of showing clearly
and positively that no transfer was ever made by him or by his agents,
successors, or assigns up to the present time. That the mining patents
should appear listed in the name of Albert P. Wright in the Bureau of
Science Bulletin for 1923 dors not preclude the existence of prior
transfers, since the Bureau of Science was not the proper registry for
them, and its data, at the most, would be hearsay and secondary in
character, bein^ derived from other sources.

In contrast
with the plaintiffs-appellants, who have not evon attempted to
reconstitute the original certificate in the name of Albert P. Wright
on which they base their claims, the defendants-appellees herein not
only reconstituted diligently their transfer certiflcates of title, but
have shown from clear documentary evidence that their right was derived
from the trustees appointed by Philip C. Whitaker, who held a
certificate of title to these claims, and defendants’ chain of title is
shown to be complete from Whitaker down. The original TCT Nos. 89 and
88 were canceled in 1934 and replaced by TCT No. 98 and 97; these, in
turn, were canceled and replaced by TCT Nos. 116 and 117, when the
claims were acquired by Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. in 1936. The
only missing link is that of Wright to Whitaker, but the hiatus is
adequately explained by the general and thorough destruction of title
records due to the Pacific War.

It thus appears that
appellee Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. acquired these claims on the
strength of certificates of title issued to its predecessors in
interest, so that its possession since 1936 must be held to be in good
faith, as the company was not required to look behind the certificates
of title exhibited by its vendors. Thus, the presumption of just title
established by the Civil Code in its Articles 433 and 541 in favor of
an actual possessor in concept of owner is reinforced by the respect
due to its Torrens certificates of Title, regular on their face.

We
can not give much weight to the fact that appellee Lednicky gave two
different versions of how he acquired his 3/10 interest in the mining
claims at issue from Philip C. Whitaker (which he later transferred to
its co-defendant Mining Co.). It is not unnatural for the memory of a
man over 70 years old to display inconsistencies. At any rate,
Lednicky’s recollections cannot overcome the fads appearing in the
authentic documents on record in this case.

Appellants lay
considerable emphasis on the fact that the reconstituted titles of V.
E. Lednicky (Exhibits 9-A and 9-B) do not show the signature of the
Register of Deeds that issued the destroyed certificate, nor the
particulars concerning the number and date of the preceding certificate
from which t!ie destroyed certificates were transferred. In thus
arguing, appellants ignore the fact that titles are not reconstituted
exclusively from certified copies; ths law (R.A. No. 26) authorizes
their reconstitution from whatever documents and evidence deemed
satisfactory by the Court. Very often where both original and duplicate
certificates have been destroyed, only the technical descriptions and
numbers can be reconstituted with certainty, since it is not the
notarial practice to reproduce verbatim in conveyances the
entire contents of a certificate of title. We are not called upon to
rule whether the order of reconstitution erred in permitting it without
the data sought by appellants; said orders of reconstitution have long
ago become final. Appellants could have intervened in the proceedings
but did not; it is now too late for them to complain in this respect.

It
is pertinent to note here that if the certificates (in the name of
appellee Mining Company were fully reconstituted it was because it
managed to secure a certified copy of it obtained from the Register of
Deeds by a Japanese named Aihara during the enemy occupation (Exh.
10-C).

The absence of a copy of the conveyance from Wright to
Whitaker in the records of the old Bureau of Archives (now Bureau of
Records Management) can not prejudice the parties to the conveyance or
their successors, since it was not their duty to forward the records.
That obligation devolved solely upon the notary that ratified the
deeds, and his acts were not under the control of the parties.

Outstanding
is the fact that appellants’ possession of the disputed properties was
under colour of title since 1936, if not earlier, and that from then
onward, defendants have operated and developed the mines, and invested
considerable sums of money in useful expenditures thereon, without
appellants’ lifting a finger to assert a contradictory title or right
for over twenty-five years. Assuming that Albert P. Wright ever held a
Torrens title to the claims (which is not adequately shown), and that
his ownership and that of his heirs may not be defeated by
prescription, still those rights have become barred by their inactivity
and laches for nearly thirty-years. This long inaction, coupled with
renewed activity after total destruction of official records, strongly
indicate an unmeritorious claim.

Premises considered, the decision appealed from is affirmed.Costs against appellants.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.