THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. RODRIGO YORAC, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

The constitutional right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the
same offense^[1]
was the basis for a motion to quash filed by the accused, now appellee, Rodrigo Yorac.  He was prosecuted for frustrated murder
arising allegedly from having assaulted, attacked, and hit with a piece of wood
the offended party, for which he had been previously tried and sentenced for
slight physical injuries, his plea being one of guilt.  The later information for frustrated murder
was based on a second medical certificate after the lapse of one week from the
former previously given by the same physician who, apparently, was much more
thorough the second time, to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater
injury than was at first ascertained. 
The lower court, presided by the Honorable Judge Nestor B. Alampay, considering that there was no supervening fact
that would negate the defense of double jeopardy, sustained the motion to quash
in an order of June 21, 1968.  The People appealed.  As the order complained of is fully supported
by the latest authoritative ruling of this Tribunal, People v. Buling,^[2]
we have to affirm.

In the brief for the People of the Philippines, it was shown that
the accused Yorac was charged with slight physical
injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the
offended party being a certain Lam Hock who, according to the medical
certificate issued on April 10, 1968 by a Dr. Rogelio Zulueta,
a resident physician of the Occidental Negros
Provincial Hospital, was confined “since April 8, 1968 up to the present
time for head injury.”^[3]
Then came a plea of guilty by the accused on April 16, 1968 resulting in his being
penalized to suffer ten days of arresto menor.  He
started serving his sentence forthwith. 
On April 18, 1968,
the provincial fiscal filed an information, this time
in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental,
charging the same defendant with frustrated murder arising from the same act
against the aforesaid victim Lam Hock upon another medical certificate dated April 17, 1968 issued by the same Dr.
Zulueta.  In
the medical certificate of April 17,
1968, it was made to appear that the confinement of the offended
party in the hospital was the result of: “1. Contusion with lacerated
wound 4 inches parieto­occipital region scalp mid portion.  2. Cerebral concussion,
moderately severe, secondary.”^[4]
Moreover, it further contained a statement that the X-ray finding did not yield
any “radiographic evidence of fracture.” The healing period, barring
complications, was declared to be from eighteen to twenty-one days.^[5]

Afterwards, a motion to quash was filed by the accused on June
10, 1968 on the ground that, having been previously convicted of slight
physical injuries by the City Court of Bacolod and
having already served the penalty imposed on him for the very same offense, the prosecution for frustrated
murder arising out of the same act committed against the same offended party,
the crime of slight physical injuries necessarily being included in that of
frustrated murder, he would be placed in second jeopardy if indicted for the
new offense.^[6] In its well-reasoned resolution of June 21,
1968 granting the motion to quash and ordering the dismissal of a criminal case
for frustrated murder against the accused, Judge Alampay
relied on People v. Buling which, in his opinion, was
squarely applicable as “nothing in the later medical certificate
[indicated] that a new or supervening fact had developed or arisen since the
time of the filing of the original action” against the accused.  A motion for reconsideration being
unavailing, an appeal was elevated to us.

As succinctly set forth
in the brief of the People of the Philippines: 
“The sole issue in this case is whether the defendant, who had
already been convicted of slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod for injuries inflicted upon Lam Hock, and had
served sentence therefor, may be prosecuted anew for
frustrated murder for the same act committed against the same person.”^[7] The position taken by appellant is in the
affirmative but, as indicated at the outset, the controlling force of People v.
Buling would preclude us from reversing the
resolution of Judge Alampay.

1.  The Constitution, to
repeat, is quite explicit:  “No
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.”^[8] As Justice Laurel made clear in an
address as delegate before the Constitutional Convention, such a provision
finds its origin “from the days when sanguinary punishments were
frequently resorted to by despots.”^[9]
A defendant in a criminal case should there­fore, according to him, be adjudged
either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter
case the State being precluded from taking an appeal.^[10]
It is in that sense that the right against being twice put in jeopardy is considered
as possessing many features in common with the rule of finality in civil
cases.  For the accused is given
assurance that the matter is closed, enabling him to plan his future
accordingly, protecting him from continued distress, not to mention saving both
him and the state from the expenses incident to redundant litigation.  There is likewise the observation that this
constitutional guarantee helps to equalize the adversary capabilities of two
grossly mismatched litigants, a poor and impecunious defendant hardly in a
position to keep on shouldering the costs of a suit.

Then, as a member of the Supreme Court, Justice Laurel had the
first opportunity to give meaning to what, under the Constitution, should be
considered “the same offense.” In the case of People v. Tarok, decided in 1941,^[11]
the then comparatively new Rules of Court in its Section 9 of Rule 113 speaks of a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged after a defendant shall have been
convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent, “or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.”^[12]

In the Tarok case, the conviction for
parricide of the accused was sought to be set aside, as previously he had been
indicted for the crime of serious physical injuries, to which he had pleaded
guilty.  He was sentenced and was actually
incarcerated by virtue of such penalty imposed. 
The offended party was his wife whom he hacked with a bolo, his ire
being aroused by certain remarks made by her. 
While he was thus serving sentence, the victim died, resulting in the
new prosecution for parricide of which he was convicted.  On appeal to this Court, it was decided, over
the dissents of the then Justice Moran and Justice Diaz that the offense of
serious physical injuries of which he was found guilty being included in parricide,
his previous conviction was a bar to such subsequent prosecution for the more
serious crime.  The lower court judgment
of conviction was thus reversed. 
According to Justice Laurel, who spoke for the Court:  “To our mind, the principle embodied in
the New Rules of Court is a clear expression of selection of rule amidst
conflicting theories. 
We take the position that when we amended section 26 of General Orders
No. 58 by providing that the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense not
only necessarily therein included but which necessarily includes the offense
charged in the former complaint or information, we meant what we have, in plain
language, stated.  We certainly did not
mean to engage in the simple play of words.”^[13]

2.  Such a ruling was however
re-examined and set aside in Melo v. People,^[14]
where it was held that an accused who pleaded guilty to the offense of
frustrated homicide, the offended party thereafter dying in the evening of the
same day, could not rely on a plea of double jeopardy if, as a result thereof,
the information was amended to charge him with homicide.^[15]
As was clarified in the opinion of this Court through the then Chief Justice
Moran, one of the dissenters in the Tarok case:  “This rule of identity does not apply,
however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility
for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense
that was then inexistent.  Thus, where
the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured
person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him
twice in jeopardy.”^[16]
Stated differently, if after the first prosecution “a new fact super­venes”
on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of
the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, “the accused
cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.”^[17]
It is noteworthy, however, that in the Melo ruling,
there was a reiteration of what was so emphatic­ally asserted by Justice Laurel
in the Tarok case in these words:  “As the Government cannot begin with the
highest, and then go down step by step, bringing the man into jeopardy for
every dere­liction included therein, neither can it begin with the lowest and
ascend to the highest with precisely the same result.”^[18]

3.  There is then the
indispensable requirement of the existence of “a new fact [which]
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible” changing the character
of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously
constituting a new and distinct offense. 
The conclusion reached in People v. Buling,^[19]
the latest case in point, relied
upon by Judge Alampay in the resolution now on
appeal, war thus predictable.  As set
forth in the opinion of Justice Labrador in that case, there was a medical
certification that the wounds for which the accused Buenaventura Buling was first prosecuted for less serious physical
injuries would require medical attendance from a period of from ten days to
fifteen days.  He pleaded guilty and was,
on December 8, 1956,
sentenced by the Justice of the Peace of Cabalian, Leyte, to one month and one day of arresto mayor.  He started serving his sentence on the same
day.  On January 18, 1957, however, another physician examined the
offended party and with the use of an X-ray apparatus, certified that he did
suffer a fracture requiring a treat­ment of from one and one-half months to two
and one-half months, barring complications. 
As a result, on February 20,
1957, an information was filed against the
same accused, this time before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, charging him with serious physical injuries.  He stood trial and was found guilty of such
an offense and sentenced to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor as minimum to one year
of prision correccional
as maximum.  On appeal to this Court, his
invocation of the defense of double jeopardy struck a responsive chord, and he
was acquitted.

4.  The opinion of Justice
Labrador explained with clarity why the constitutional right against being put
twice in jeopardy was a bar to the second prosecution.  Thus: 
“If the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must
have existed when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956.  There is, therefore, no new or super­vening
fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the
original action, which would justify the application of the ruling enunciated
by us in the cases of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, * * *.  We
attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of
healing of the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made
on December 10, 1956.  Had an X-ray examination [been] taken at the
time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed.  The wound causing the delay in healing was
already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was
caused by the very superficial examination then made.  As we have stated, we find therefore that no
supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in
the case of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, for which reason we are constrained to apply the
general rule of double jeopardy.”^[20]
It is quite apparent, in the light of the foregoing, why the lower court,
submitting to the compulsion of the Buling decision,
had to sustain the motion to quash and to dismiss the information against appellee Yorac.  No error could therefore be rightfully
imputed to it.

WHEREFORE, the resolution of June 21, 1968 of Judge Nestor B. Alampay
granting the motion to quash, ordering the dismissal of the case and the
immediate release of the appellee Rodrigo Yorac, is affirmed.  Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L.,  Makalintal,
Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., no part.

^[1]
According to the Constitution:  “No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.  If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.” Article III, Section 1, paragraph 18.

^[2]
107 Phil. 712 (1960).

^[3]
Brief for the
Appellant People of the Philippines, p. 2.

^[4]
Ibid, p. 3

^[5]
Ibid.

^[6]
Ibid, pp. 3 and 4.

^[7]
Ibid, p. 5.

^[8]
Article III, Section 1, paragraph 20.

^[9]
III S. Laurel, ed., Proceedings of the
Philippine Constitutional Convention, p. 667 (1966).

^[10]
Ibid, pp. 667-668.

^[11]
73 Phil. 260.

^[12]
This is now Section 9 of Rule 117, the original wording being retained
thus:  “When a defendant shall have been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid com­plaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a con­viction, and after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution
for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.”

^[13]
People v. Tarok, 73 Phil. 260, 265-266 (1941).  The Tarok case was cited with approval in People v.
Villasis, 81 Phil. 881 (1948).

^[14]
85 Phil. 766 (1950).

^[15]
The Melo
doctrine was followed in People v. Manolong,
85 Phil. 829 (1950) and People v. Petilla, 92
Phil. 395 (1952).

^[16]
85 Phil. 766, 769.

^[17]
Ibid, pp. 769-770.

^[18]
Ibid, p. 769.

^[19]
107 Phil. 712 (1960).

^[20]
Ibid, pp. 717-718.