HEIRS OF AMPARO DEL ROSARIO, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, VS. AURORA O. SANTOS, JOVITA SANTOS GONZALES, ARNULFO O. SANTOS, ARCHIMEDES O. SANTOS, GERMELINA SANTOS RAVIDA, AND ANDRES O. …

The Court of Appeals,^[1]
in accordance with Section 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended,
certified to Us the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. No. 56674-R entitled “Amparo del Rosario, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. Spouses Andres Santos and Aurora Santos, defendants-appellants,” as
only questions of law are involved.

On January 14, 1974, Amparo del Rosario
filed a complaint against the spouses Andres F. Santos and Aurora O. Santos,
for specific performance and damages allegedly for failure of the latter to
execute the Deed of Confirmation of Sale of an undivided 20,000 square meters
of land, part of Lot I, Psu-206650, located at Barrio Sampaloc,
Tanay, Rizal, in malicious
breach of a Deed of Sale (Exhibit A or 1) dated September 28, 1964.

Amparo del Rosario died on Sept. 21, 1980 so that she is now
substituted by the heirs named in her will still undergoing probate
proceedings.  Andres F. Santos also died,
on Sept. 5, 1980, and he is
substituted by the following heirs:  Jovita Santos Gonzales, Arnulfo
O. Santos, Archimedes O. Santos, Germelina Santos Ravida, and Andres O. Santos, Jr.

The Deed of Sale (Exh. A or 1) is herein repro­duced below:

“DEED
OF SALE

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

I, ANDRES F. SANTOS, of legal age, married to Aurora O. Santos,
Filipino and resident of San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, Philippines,
for and in consideration of the sum of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, do hereby
SELLS, CON­VEYS, and TRANSFERS (sic) unto Amparo del
Rosario, of legal age, married to Fidel del Rosario but with legal separation,
Filipino and resident of San Dionisio, Paranaque, Rizal, Philippines
that certain 20,000 square meters to be segregated from Lot 1 of plan
Psu-206650 along the southeastern portion of said lot, which property is more
particularly described as follows:

‘A parcel of land (Lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-206650, situated in
the Barrio of Sampaloc, Municipality of Tanay, Pro­vince of Rizal.  Bounded on the SW., along lines 1-2-3, by Lot
80 of Tanay Public Land Subdivision, Pls-39; on the
NW., along lines 3-4-5, by Lot 2; and along lines 5-6-7-8-9-10-11, by Lot 6; on
the NE., along lines 11-12-13, by Lot 3; and along lines 13-14-15, by Lot 4,
all of plan Psu-206650; and on the SE., along line 15-1, by Lot 5 of plan Psu­206650
x x x; containing an area
of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED TWENTY (181,420) SQUARE
METERS.  All points referred to are
indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows; x x x,’

of which above-described property, I own
one-half (1/2) interest thereof being my attorney’s fee, and the said 20,000
square meters will be transferred unto the VENDEE as soon as the title thereof
has been released by the proper authority or authorities concerned;

That the parties hereto hereby agree that the VENDOR shall execute
a Deed of Confirmation of Deed of Sale in favor of the herein VENDEE as soon as
the title has been released and the subdivision plan of said Lot 1 has been
approved by the Land Registration Commissioner.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 28th day of
September, 1964, in the City of Manila, Philippines.

s/ ANDRES F. SANTOS

t/ 
ANDRES F. SANTOS

With My Marital Consent:

s/ Aurora O.
Santos (Wife)

t/ 
Aurora O. Santos (Wife)

SIGNED IN THE
PRESENCE OF:

s/ Felicitas C. Moro                                                                             s/
Corona C. Venal

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

) SS.

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in Rizal, Philippines,
personally appeared Andres F. Santos, with Res. Cert. No. 4500027 issued at Parañaque, Rizal, on Jan. 9, 1964, B-0935184 issued at Parañaque, Rizal on April 15, 1964, and Aurora O. Santos,
with Res. Cert. No. A-4500028 issued at Parañaque, Rizal, on Jan. 9, 1964, giving her marital consent to this
instru­ment, both of whom are known to me and to me known to be the same
persons who exe­cuted the foregoing instruments and they acknowledged to me
that the same is their free act and voluntary deed.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed this instrument and
affixed my notarial seal this 1st day of October,
1964, in Pasig,
Rizal, Philippines.

Doc.
No. 1792;

Page No. 85;

Book No. 19;

Series of 1964.

s/ FLORENCIO LANDRITO

t/  FLORENCIO LANDRITO

NOTARY PUBLIC

Until December 31, 1965″^[2]

Plaintiff claimed fulfillment of the conditions for the execution
of the Deed of Confirmation of Sale, namely: the release of the title of the
lot and the approval of the subdivision plan of said lot by the Land
Registration Commission.  She even
enumerated the titles with their corresponding land areas derived by defendants
from the aforesaid lot, to wit:

(a     )TCT 203580 – 30,205 sq. meters

(b)    TCT 203581 – 19,790 sq. meters

(c)    TCT 167568 – 40,775 sq. meters

In a motion to dismiss, defendants pleaded, inter alia, the defenses of lack of jurisdiction of the
court a quo over the subject of the action and lack of cause of
action allegedly because there was no allegation as to the date of the approval
of the subdivision plan, no specific statement that the titles therein
mentioned were curved out of Lot I and no clear showing when the demands were
made on the defendants.  They likewise
set up the defense of prescription allegedly because the deed of sale was dated
September 28, 1964 and supposedly ratified October 1, 1964 but the complaint
was filed only on January 14, 1974, a lapse of more than nine years when it
should have been filed within five years from 1964 in accordance with Article
1149, New Civil Code.

Defendants also claimed that the demand set forth in the
complaint has been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished.  It is alleged that the deed of sale was
“only an accommodation graciously extended, out of close friendship
between the defendants and the plaintiff and her casual business partner in the
buy and sell of real estate, one Erlinda
Cortez;”^[3]
that in order to allay the fears of plaintiff over the non-collection of the
debt of Erlinda Cortez to plaintiff in various sums
exceeding P2,000.00, defendants, who were in turn indebted to Erlinda Cortez in the amount of P2,000.00, voluntarily
offered to transfer to plaintiff their inexistent but expectant right over the
lot in question, the same to be considered as part payment of Erlinda Cortez’ indebtedness; that as Erlinda
Cortez later on paid her creditor what was then due, the deed of sale had in
effect been extinguished.  Defendants
thereby characterized the said deed of sale as a mere tentative agreement which
was never intended nor meant to be ratified by and acknowledged before a notary
public.  In fact, they claimed that they
never appeared before Notary Public Florencio Landrito.

Finally, defendants alleged that the claim on which the action or
suit is founded is unenforceable under the statute of frauds and that the cause
or object of the contract did not exist at the time of the transaction.

After an opposition and a reply were filed by the respective
parties, the Court a quo resolved to deny the motion to dismiss
of defendants. Defendants filed their answer with counterclaim interposing more
or less the same defenses but expounding on them further.  In addi­tion, they claimed that the titles
allegedly derived by them from Lot I of Annex A or I were cancelled and/or
different from said Lot I and that the deed of sale was simulated and
fictitious, plaintiff having paid no amount to defendants; and that the deed
was entrusted to plaintiff’s care and custody on the condition that the
latter:  (a) would secure the written
consent of Erlinda Cortez to Annex A or I as part
payment of what she owed to plaintiff; (b) would render to defendants true
accounting of collections made from Erlinda showing
in particular the consideration of P2,000.00 of Annex A or I duly cre­dited to Erlinda’s account.^[4]

Plaintiff filed a reply and answer to counterclaim and thereafter
a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground
that the defenses of defendants “either fail to tender an issue or the
same do not present issues that are serious enough to deserve a trial on the
merits,”^[5]
submitting on a later date the affidavit of merits.  Defendants filed their corresponding
opposition to the motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the
pleadings.  Not content with the
pleadings already submitted to the Court, plaintiff filed a reply while
defendants filed a supplemental opposition.

With all these pleadings filed by the parties in support of their
respective positions, the Court a quo still held in abeyance
plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings pending
the pre-trial of the case.  At the
pre-trial, defendants offered by way of compromise to pay plaintiff the sum of
P2,000.00, the consideration stated in the deed of sale.  But the latter rejected the bid and insisted on
the delivery of the land to her.  Thus,
the pre-trial pro­ceeded with the presentation by plaintiff of Exhibits A to Q
which defendants practically admitted, adopted as their own and marked as
Exhibits 1 to 17.  In addition, the
latter offered Exhibit 18, which was their reply to plaintiff’s letter of
demand dated December 21, 1973.

From the various pleadings filed in this case by plaintiff,
together with the annexes and affidavits as well as the exhibits offered in
evidence at the pre-trial, the Court a quo found the following
facts as having been duly established since defendant failed to meet them with
countervailing evidence:

“In February, 1964, Teofilo Custodio, owner of a parcel of unregistered land with an
area of approximately 220,000 square meters in Barrio Sampaloc,
Tanay, Rizal, hired
Attorney Andres F. Santos “to cause the survey of the above-mentioned
property, to file registration proceedings in court, to appear and represent
him in all government office relative thereto, to advance all expenses for
surveys, taxes to the government, court fees, registration fees x x x up to the issuance of title
in the name” of Custodio.  They agreed that after the registration of
the title in Custodio’s name, and “after
deducting all expenses from the total area of the property,” Custodio would assign and deliver to Santos
“one-half (1/2) share of the whole property as appearing in the
certificate of title so issued.” (Exh. B or 2).

On March 22, 1964,
Custodio’s land was surveyed under plan Psu-226650 (Exh. D or 4).  It was
divided into six (6) lots, one of which was a road lot.  The total area of the property as surveyed
was 211,083 square meters.  The
respective areas of the lots were as follows:

x x x

On December 27, 1965,
a decree of registration No. N-108022 was issued in Land Registration Case No.
N-5023, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, LRC
Record No. N-27513, in favor of Teofilo Custodio, mar­ried to Miguela Perrando, resident of Tanay, Rizal.  On March 23, 1966, Original Certificate
of Title No. 5134 (Exh. Q or 17) was issued to Custodio for Lots 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5, Psu-206650, with a
total area of 206,853 square meters.  The
areas of the five (5) lots were as follows:

April to May, 1966, a consolidation-subdivision survey (LRC)
Pcs-5273 (Exh. E or 5) was made on the above lots
converting them into six (6) new lots as follows:

TOTAL            – 206,853         “          “

On June 22, 1966,
the consolidation-subdivision plan (LRC) Pcs-5273 (Exh.
E or 5) was approved by the Land Registration Commission and by the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in an order dated July 2, 1966 (Entry No. 61037
T-167561, Exh. Q). 
Upon its registration, Custodio’s O.C.T. No.
5134 (Exh. Q) was cancelled and TCT Nos. 167561,
167562, 167563, 167564 (Exh. G), 167565 (Exh. H), and 167566 were issued for the six lots in the
name of Custodio (Entry No. 61035, Exh. Q).

On June 23, 1966,
Custodio conveyed to Santos Lots 4 and 5, Pcs-5273
with a total area of 90,775 square meters (Exh. B or
2) described in Custodio’s TCT No. 167564 (Exh. G or 7) and TCT No. 167565 (Exh.
H or 8), plus a one-half interest in the Road Lot No. 6, as payment of Santos’
attorney’s fees and advances for the registration of Custodio’s
land.

Upon registration of the deed of conveyance on July 6, 1966, Custodio’s
TCT Nos. 167564 and 167565 (Exhs. G and H) were
cancelled.  TCT No. 167568 (Exh. I or 9) for Lot 4 and TCT No.
167585 (Exh. J or 10) for Lot
5 were issued to Santos.

On September 2, 1967, Santos’ Lot 5, with an area of 50,000 square
meters was subdivided into two (2) lots, designated as Lots 5-A and 5-B in the
plan Psd-78008 (Exh. F or 6), with the following
areas:

Upon registration of Psd-78008 on October 3, 1967, Santos’
TCT No. 167585 (Exh. J) was cancelled and TCT No.
203578 for Lot 5-A and TCT No. 203579 for Lot
5-B were supposed to have been issued to Santos
(See Entry 6311 in Exh. J or 10).  Actually, TCT No. 203580 was issued for Lot
5-A (Exh. K or 11), and TCT No. 203581 for Lot
5-B (Exh. L or 12), both in the name of Andres F.
Santos.

Out of Custodio’s original Lot
1, Psu-206650, with an area of 181,420 square meters, Santos
was given a total of 90,775 square meters, registered in his name as of October 3, 1967 under three (3) titles,
namely:

plus one-half of the road lot, Lot
6, Pcs-5273, with an area of 5,303 square meters, which is registered jointly
in the name of Santos and Custodio (Exh. B & E)”^[6]

The court a quo thereupon concluded that there are
no serious factual issues involved so the motion for summary judgment may be
properly granted.  There­after, it
proceeded to dispose of the legal issues raised by defendants and rendered
judgment in favor of plaintiff.  The dispositive portion of the decision states as follows:

“WHEREFORE, defendants Andres F. Santos and Aurora O. Santos
are ordered to execute and convey to plaintiff Amparo
del Rosario, within ten (10) days from the finality of this decision, 20,000
square meters of land to be taken from the southeastern portion of either Lot
4, Pcs-5273, which has an area of 40,775 square meters, described in TCT No.
167568 (Exh. I or 9) of from their Lot
5-A, with an area of 30,205 square meters, described in TCT No. 203580 (Exh. K or 11).  The
expenses of segregating the 20,000 square meters portion shall be borne equally
by the parties.  The expenses for the
execution and registration of the sale shall be borne by the defendants (Art.
1487, Civil Code).  Since the de­fendants
compelled the plaintiff to litigate and they failed to heed plaintiff’s just
demand, they are further ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as
attorney’s fees and the costs of this action.

SO ORDERED.”^[7]

Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the defendants filed an
appeal to the Court of Appeals submitting for resolution seven assignments of
errors, to wit:

“I.    The lower court erred in depriving the
appellants of their right to the procedural due process.

II.    The lower court erred in holding that the appellee’s claim has not been extinguished.

III.   The lower court erred in sustaining appellee’s contention that there are no other unwritten
conditions between the appellants and the appellee
except those expressed in Exh. “1” or
“A”, and that Erlinda Cortez’ conformity is
not required to validate the appellants’ obligation.

IV.   The lower court erred in holding that Exh. “1” or “A” is not infirmed and
expressed the true intent of the parties.

V.   The lower court erred in declaring that the
appellants are co-owners of the lone registered owner Teofilo
Custodio.

VI.   The lower court erred in ordering the
appellants to execute and convey to the appellee
20,000 sq. m. of land to be taken from the southeastern portion of either their
lot 4, Pcs-5273, which has an area of 40,775 sq. m., described in T.C.T. No.
167568 (Exh. 9 or I), or from their lot No. 5-A, with
an area of 30,205 sq. m. described in T.C.T. No. 203580 (Exh.
11 or K), the expenses of segregation to be borne equally by the appellants and
the appellee and the expenses of execution and
registration to be borne by the appellants.

VII. The lower court
erred in ordering the appellants to pay to the appellee
the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney’s fee and costs.”^[8]

The first four revolve on the issue of the propriety of the
rendition of summary judgment by the court a quo, which
concededly is a question of law.  The
last three assail the summary judgment itself. 
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, with whom the appeal was filed, certified
the records of the case to this Court for final determination.

For appellants herein, the rendition of summary judgment has
deprived them of their right to procedural due process.  They claim that a trial on the merits is
indispensable in this case inasmuch as they have denied under oath all the
material allegations in appellee’s complaint which is
based on a written instrument entitled “Deed of Sale”, thereby
putting in issue the due execution of said deed.

Appellants in their opposition to the motion for summary judgment
and/or judgment on the pleadings, how­ever, do not deny the genuineness of
their signatures on the deed of sale. 
(Par. 3 of said Motion, p. 101, Record on Appeal).  They do not contest the words and figures in
said deed except in the acknowledgment portion thereof where certain words were
allegedly cancelled and changed without their knowledge and consent and where,
apparently, they appeared before Notary Public Florencio
Landrito when, in fact, they claimed that they did
not.  In effect, there is an admission of
the due execution and genuineness of the document because by the admission of
the due execution of a document is meant that the party whose signature it
bears admits that voluntarily he signed it or that it was signed by another for
him and with his authority; and by the admission of the genuineness of the
document is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that at the
time it was signed it was in the words and figures exactly as set out in the
pleading of the party relying upon it; and that any formal requisites required
by law, such as swearing and acknowledgment, or revenue stamps which it
requires, are waived by him.^[9]

As correctly pointed out by the court a quo, the
alleged false notarization of the deed of sale is of no consequence.  For a sale of real property or of an interest
therein to be enforceable under the Statute of Frauds, it is enough that it be
in writing.^[10]
It need not be notarized.  But the vendee
may avail of the right under Article 1357 of the New Civil Code to compel the
vendor to observe the form required by law in order that the instrument may be
registered in the Registry of Deeds.^[11]
Hence, the due execution and genuineness of the deed of sale are not really in
issue in this case.  Accordingly,
assigned error I is without merit.

What appellants really intended to prove through the alleged
false notarization of the deed of sale is the true import of the matter, which
according to them, is a mere tentative agreement with appellee.  As such, it was not intended to be notarized
and was merely entrusted to appellee’s care and
custody in order that:  first, the
latter may secure the approval of one Erlinda Cortez
to their (appellants’) offer to pay a debt owing to her in the amount of
P2,000.00 to appellee instead of paying directly to
her as she was indebted to appellee in various
amounts exceeding P2,000.00; and second, once the approval is secured, appellee would render an accounting of collections made
from Erlinda showing in particular the consideration
of P2,000.00 of the deed of sale duly cre­dited to Erlinda’s
account.

According to appellants, they intended to prove at a full dress
trial the material facts:  (1) that the
aforesaid conditions were not fulfilled; (2) that Erlinda
Cortez paid her total indebtedness to appellee in the
amount of P14,160.00, the P2,000.00 intended to be paid by appellant included;
and (3) that said Erlinda decided to forego, renounce
and refrain from collecting the P2,000.00 the appellants owed her as a counter­vailing
reciprocity of the countless favors she also owes them.

Being conditions which alter and vary the terms of the deed of
sale, such conditions cannot, however, be proved by parol
evidence in view of the provision of Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
which states as follows:

“Sec. 7.  Evidence of
written agreements. – When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms, and, therefore,
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence
of the terms of the agreement other than the con­tents of the writing, except
in the following cases:

(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure
to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the
agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;

(b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing.

The term “agreement” includes wills.”

The parol evidence rule forbids any
addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony
purporting to show that, at or before the signing of the document, other or
different terms were orally agreed upon by the parties.^[12]

While it is true, as appellants argue, that Article 1306 of the
New Civil Code provides that “the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, pub­lic
order, or public policy” and that consequently, appel­lants and appellee could freely enter into an agreement imposing as
conditions thereof the following:  that appel­lee secure the written conformity of Erlinda Cortez and that she render an accounting of all
collections from her, said conditions may not be proved as they are not
embodied in the deed of sale.

The only conditions imposed for the execution of the Deed of
Confirmation of Sale by appellants in favor of appellee
are the release of the title and the approval of the subdivision plan.  Thus, appellants may not now introduce other
conditions allegedly agreed upon by them because when they reduced their
agreement to writing, it is presumed that “they have made the writing the
only repository and memorial of truth, and whatever is not found in the writing
must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.”^[13]

Neither can appellants invoke any of the exceptions to the parol evidence rule, more particularly, the alleged failure
of the writing to express the true intent and agreement of the parties.  Such an exception obtains where the written
contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of
the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument.  In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the
subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other,
and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the
contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of
the instrument.^[14]
In the case at bar, the Deed of Sale (Exh. A or 1) is
clear, without any ambiguity, mistake or imperfection, much less obscurity or
doubt in the terms thereof.  We,
therefore, hold and rule that assigned errors III and IV are untenable.

According to the court a quo, “(s)ince Santos, in his Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment failed to meet the plaintiff’s evidence with counter-vailing evidence, a circumstance indicating that there are
no serious factual issues involved, the motion for summary judgment may
properly be granted.” We affirm and sustain the action of the trial court.

Indeed, where a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on
the pleadings has been filed, as in this case, supporting and opposing
affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as
may be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify as to the matters stated therein.  Sworn or certified copies of all papers or
parts thereof referred to in the affidavit shall be attached thereto or served
therewith.^[15]

Examining the pleadings, affidavits and exhibits in the records,
We find that appellants have not submit­ted any categorical proof that Erlinda Cortez had paid the P2,000.00 to appellee, hence, appellants failed to substantiate the
claim that the cause of action of appellee has been
extinguished.  And while it is true that
appellants submitted a receipt for P14,160.00 signed by appellee,
appellants, however, have stated in their answer with counterclaim that the
P2,000.00 value of the property covered by the Deed of Sale, instead of being
credited to Erlinda Cortez, was conspicuously
excluded from the accounting or receipt signed by appellee
totalling P14,160.00. 
The aforesaid receipt is no proof that Erlinda
Cortez subsequently paid her P2,000.00 debt to appellee.  As correctly observed by the court a quo,
it is improbable that Cortez would still pay her debt to appellee
since Santos had already paid it.

Appellants’ claim that their P2,000.00 debt to Erlinda Cortez had been waived or abandoned is not also
supported by any affidavit, document or writing sub­mitted to the court.  As to their allegation that the appellee’s claim is barred by prescription, the ruling of
the trial court that only seven years and six months of the ten-year
prescription period provided under Arts. 1144 and 1155 in cases of actions for
specific perfor­mance of the written contract of sale had elapsed and that the
action had not yet prescribed, is in accordance with law and, therefore, We
affirm the same.

The action of the court a quo in rendering a summary
judgment has been taken in faithful compliance and conformity with Rule 34,
Section 3, Rules of Court, which provides that “the judgment sought shall
be rendered forth­with if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file
together with the affidavits, show that, except as to the amount of damages,
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Resolving assignments of errors V, VI, and VII which directly
assail the summary judgment, not the pro­priety of the rendition thereof which
We have already resolved to be proper and correct, it is Our considered opinion
that the judgment of the court a quo is but a logical consequence
of the failure of appellants to present any bona fide defense to appellee’s claim. 
Said judgment is simply the application of the law to the undisputed
facts of the case, one of which is the finding of the court a quo,
to which We agree, that appellants are owners of one-half (1/2) interest of Lot
1 and, therefore, the fifth assignment of error of appellants is without merit.

By the terms of the Deed of Sale itself, which We find genuine
and not infirmed, appellants declared them­selves to be owners of one-half
(1/2) interest thereof.  But in order to
avoid appellee’s claim, they now contend that Plan
Psu-206650 where said Lot I appears is in the exclusive name of Teofilo Custodio as the sole and
exclusive owner thereof and that the deed of assignment of one-half (1/2)
interest thereof executed by said Teofilo Cus­todio in their favor is strictly personal between
them.  Notwithstanding the lack of any
title to the said lot by appellants at the time of the execution of the deed of
sale in favor of appellee, the said sale may be valid
as there can be a sale of an expected thing, in accordance with Art. 1461, New
Civil Code, which states:

“Art. 1461.  Things
having a potential existence may be the object of the contract of sale.

The efficacy of the sale of a mere hope or expectancy is deemed
subject to the con­dition that the thing will come into existence.

The sale of a vain hope or expectancy is void.”

In the case at bar, the expectant right came into existence or
materialized for the appellants actually derived titles from Lot
I.

We further reject the contention of the appellants that the lower
court erred in ordering the appellants to execute and convey to the appellee 20,000 sq.m. of land to
be taken from the southeastern portion of either their Lot
4, Pcs-5273, which has an area of 40,775 sq.m.,
described in T.C.T. No. 167568 (Exh. 9 or I), or from
their Lot No. 5-A, with an area of 30,205 sq.m. described in T.C.T. No. 203580 (Exh.
11 or K), the expenses of segregation to be borne equally by the appellants and
the appellee and the expenses of execution and registration
to be borne by the appellants.  Their
argument that the southeastern portion of Lot 4 or Lot
5-A is no longer the southeastern portion of the bigger Lot
I, the latter portion belonging to the lone registered owner, Teofilo Custodio, is not impressed
with merit.  The subdivision of Lot
I between the appellants and Teofilo Custodio was made between themselves alone, without the
intervention, knowledge and consent of the appellee,
and therefore, not binding upon the latter. 
Appellants may not violate nor escape their obligation under the Deed of
Sale they have agreed and signed with the appellee by
simply subdividing Lot I, bisecting the same and
segregating portions to change their sides in relation to the original Lot
I.

Finally, considering the trial court’s finding that the
appellants compelled the appellee to litigate and
they failed to heed appellee’s just demand, the order
of the court awarding the sum of P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees is just and
lawful, and We affirm the same.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto,
with costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Acting Chairman),
Fernandez, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Seventh Division; Gancayco, J., ponente; Escolin and Agrava, JJ., concurring.

^[2]
Record on Appeal, pp. 13-16.

^[3] Ibid.,
p. 21.

^[4] Ibid.,
p. 43.

^[5] Ibid.,
p. 75.

^[6]
Record on Appeal, pp. 153-163.

^[7] Ibid.,
p. 168.

^[8]
Brief for the Appellants, pp. 1-3.

^[9]
Moran, Manuel V., Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. I, p. 327 (1970)

^[10]
Civil Code, Article 1403.

^[11] Ibid.,
Art. 1406.

^[12]
Francisco, Vicente J.; The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines,
Vol. VII, p. 152 (1973).

^[13]
Moran, op. cit., Vol. V, p. 104.

^[14]
Francisco, op. cit., Vol. VII, pp. 161-162 (1973).

^[15]
Rule 34, Sec. 5, Rules of Court.