THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND STA. TERESITA WOOD INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. JUDGE FRANCISCO GERONIMO AND WOODRICH INDU…

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibi­tion with
preliminary injunction directed against certain proceedings in Civil Case No.
71798^[1]
of the Court of First Instance of Manila. 
The petitioners herein are the respondent public officials therein and
Sta. Teresita Wood Industries, Inc. (STAWOOD).

The petition questions the action of the respondent judge in (a)
admitting the Supplemental Peti­tion filed against STAWOOD; and (b) issuing the
supplemental writ of preliminary mandatory injunction setting aside the permits
for right-of-way, and for camp and log pond site made in favor of STAWOOD, stopping
logging operations within the contested area and, barring the issuance of any
license or permit to enter or utilize any part of said contested area.  The grounds asserted in the present petition
are that respondent Woodrich Industries, Inc.
(WOODRICH) is not a real party in interest considering that it has no
concession over the contested area; that the allegations of the Supplemental
Petition have no factual basis according to the findings of the Director of
Forestry, for the subject matter thereof is purely administrative in character
and WOODRICH has not exhausted administra­tive remedies; and that the
injunctive writ was improperly granted and was issued without any hearing.

The instant petition is directed against alleged abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent judge or the absence or excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the order and writ complained of.  But a review of the premises and arguments of
the Petition, and consider­ation of the Answer thereto, fail to impress this
Court that any such infirmities attached to the actions of the respondent
judge.

The main proceeding in the court a quo, Civil Case
No. 71798, is a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction which was instituted by WOODRICH against the Director of
Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and the Assistant
Executive Secretary, to annul the latter’s decisions dated December 15, 1967,
and March 1, 1968, denying its application for ordinary timber license and,
instead, to order the execution of a decision previously rendered by Executive
Secretary Ramon Diaz, dated December 10, 1965, approving its application for
ordinary timber license.

Apparently to preserve the status quo over the
contested area, the court a quo (presided by the herein
respondent judge) issued the writ of prelim­inary injunction prayed for, dated
May 7, 1968, enjoining the respondent public officials, pending the proceedings
in the case, “from issuing any advertisement for bids over the forestry
areas of 50,000 hectares located in the Municipality of Gonzaga,
Lal-lo, Gattaran, Baggas and Penablanca, all of the
province of Cagayan.”

Subsequently, WOODRICH filed, and the Court a quo
admitted, the Supplemental Petition, containing a prayer for the issuance of a
supplemental writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, impleading
STAWOOD as party-respondent and asserting new facts, namely: the issuance in
favor of STAWOOD of a road right-of-way traversing the contested timber area
and a camp site located in the vicinity of the right-of-way but also within the
contested area, on February 20, 1968, and May 8, 1968, respectively; the
illegal cutting of trees by STAWOOD not only within the right-of-way and camp
site but also in other areas inside the contested forestry area which,
allegedly, was being allowed by respondents Director of Forestry and Secretary
of Natural Resources, either intentionally or by deliberate laxity in the
enforcement of forestry laws and regula­tions; that the logs so far illegally
cut numbering two thousand, with a total value of P480,000, have been allowed
to be shipped abroad by the said res­pondents; and, that in the event the court
decides that WOODRICH is entitled to the forest concession, the right to the
logs shall pertain to it; and, finally, unless the said respondents are
enjoined to maintain the status quo the judgment in favor of
WOODRICH would become in­effective as the contested area would have been
denuded, either entirely or partially.

STAWOOD filed two
successive motions to recon­sider the admission of the Supplemental Petition
and to lift the injunctive writ, alleging several legal and factual
grounds.  Both motions were denied,
hence, the recourse to this Court.  This
Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent judge
from proceeding further on the Supplemental Petition and from implementing the questioned order and writ.

The point raised by petitioners that WOODRICH is not a licensee
of the contested area and, therefore, does not have the personality to complain
against the permits granted to STAWOOD merely iterates the defense of
respondent public officials, herein petitioners, in the main petition.  The issue, therefore, depends upon the
validity of the executive orders that are the subject matter of the main
petition.

The other grounds raised relative to the admission of the
Supplemental Petition as well as to the propriety and legality of the
injunctive writ, rest upon assertions of fact or inferences thereon, concerning
official action, which are either denied or their relevance to the main
petition would require the exercise of judgment by the court a quo
after a hearing on the merits.

It is important to consider that the action in the court a
quo was a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court (Sections 1 and 3) to reinstate the decision of
Executive Secretary Ramon Diaz granting the application of WOODRICH for timber
license over the contested area.  In this
respect, the factual allegations of the Supplemental Petition, of facts within
the knowledge of WOODRICH, are that STAWOOD was granted permits for
right-of-way, and camp and log pond site within the contested area and that it
was conducting alleged illegal logging operations thereon.  These allegations constituted the factual
basis for admitting the Supplemental Petition and for issuing the injunctive
writ.  The petitioners have posited the
Order of the Director of Forestry, dated July
5, 1968, dismissing the complaint of WOODRICH against the alleged
illegal logging operations of STAWOOD, as an administrative determination on
the issue.  But, on the contrary, the
Order acknowledged the existence of logging operations within the contested area and the question as to its
legality or illegality was for the court a quo to decide
after a hearing on the merits as it appears that the factual allegations of the
Supple­mental Petition are relevant to the main petition.  The admission of the Supplemental Petition
and issuance of the injunctive writ as a provisional remedy there­for,
did not constitute abuse of discretion or lack of or excess of jurisdiction.

Moreover, it appears from
the Answer that the Order of the Director, dated July 5, 1968, who is a
petitioner herein, was preceded by another order, obviously contradictory, cancelling the road right-of-way in favor of STAWOOD and by a directive of the
President of the Philippines stopping all logging operations within the
contested area; that STAWOOD has
two logging roads available to it; and, that the Supplemental Petition was
admitted and the injunctive writ issued after due hearing.

Considering that there are factual issues involved,^[2]
this Court is not disposed to rule that the respondent judge acted improperly
in admitting the Supplemental Petition dated May 23, 1968, and in issuing the supplemental writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction on July
6, 1968.

It should be stated in this connection that the Solicitor General
who is counsel for petitioner public officials in this case has not made any
manifestation before this Court regarding further developments in the main
proceeding – Civil Case No. 71798.  However, it appears from the archives of this
Court in G. R. No. L-40023 entitled “Woodrich
Industries, Inc. versus the Court of Appeals, Director of Forestry, Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Executive Secretary” which was
dismissed by this Court for lack of merit in a minute resolution dated June 4,
1975, that a decision in Civil Case No. 71798 was rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dismissing the “petition and supplemental
petition” of WOODRICH; that the dismissal was appealed to the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 47693-R, which affirmed the dismissal.  This decision of the Court of Appeals was the
subject of G.R. No. L-40023 above-mentioned and, for this reason, this instant
petition would also appear to be moot and academic.  Had the Solicitor General who is counsel for petitioner public
officials in this instant petition and who was also the counsel for the same
public officials – as party respondents – in G.R. No. L-40023 or the counsel
for WOODRICH who was also counsel in Civil Case No. 71798 and CA-G.R. No.
47693-R promptly informed this Court as to the above-mentioned developments,
this instant petition could have been easily disposed of long ago by this Court
and, as stated in the case of Chan Kian v. Angsin, G.R. No. L-28131, February 28, 1972,^[3] “the time needed by it to devote to the
prompt disposition of meritorious cases need not have been thus
dissipated.” It was the duty of counsels, especially counsel for
petitioners, to inform this Court regarding the progress of Civil Case No.
71798 considering that the subject of the present petition relates to the
Supplemental Petition in said case and further proceedings on the supplemental
petition was restrained by this Court’s injunctive writ.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed.  No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion,
Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., took no part.

Aquino, J., see concurring opinion.

^[1]
“Woodrich Industries, Inc., petitioner versus
Teofilo A. Santos, Director of Forestry, Hon.
Fernando Lopez, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Jose Leido, Jr. Assist­ant Executive Secretary,
Respondents” for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus with In­junction.

^[2]
See BCI Employees and Workers
Union v. Marcos L-21104, May 31,
1971, 39 SCRA 178 at 183 where this Court added as a ground for dismissing the
petition for certiorari that the questions raised involve many facts
alleged in the petition and denied in the answers.

^[3]
43 SCRA 295 at 300

150
Clean

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