PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE ROBERTO ZURBANO, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH III, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ALBAY, RESPONDENT.

Where a written complaint for rape, subscribed under oath by the
offended party before the Fiscal, is filed with the court of competent
jurisdiction after the Fiscal had conducted the required preliminary
investigation, and a certification to that effect appears below the complaint,
is it still necessary for the Fiscal, after finding a prima facie case
against the respondents, to file with the court of first instance an
information in addition to the offended party’s sworn complaint?  This is the question We
are called upon to resolve in this original action of certiorari filed
by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Emmanuel R. Real of Albay
in the name of the People.

On January 13, 1970,
one Lea Cipoon filed with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Albay a complaint for rape
against three persons.  The fiscal’s office conducted a preliminary investigation
thereon and found a prima facie case against the respondents.  The investigating fiscal then procured and
caused to be filed with the court of first instance a sworn complaint for rape
subscribed by the offended party before the said fiscal, containing a list of
prosecution witnesses.  Below the
complaint was a certification by the fiscal to the effect that he had conducted
a preliminary investigation and that there was reasonable ground to believe
that the crime charged in the complaint had been committed and that the accused
were probably guilty thereof.  There was
also a recommendation for bail.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 101 of the Court of
First Instance of Albay and assigned to Branch III
presided over by respondent Judge Zurbano.  On September
28, 1970, respondent Judge issued an order directing the fiscal to
file an information within two days from receipt of
the order.  The fiscal moved for a reconsideration, but in an order dated September 29, 1970, the motion was
denied and the record of the case was ordered returned to the fiscal’s office so that the latter could file the
“necessary information.” Hence, the present
petition.

We find the petition meritorious in view of the fol­lowing
considerations:

1.  The filing with the
proper court of a complaint or an information is
sufficient to commence a criminal action. 
In Astero vs. Chief of Police of Dagupan City, L-26741, July 31, 1969 (28 SCRA 1078), We
said:

“The premise to the effect that a public crime, such as that
of corruption of minors ‘is not one of those which may be prosecuted x x x upon the complaint of the
offended party,’ is manifestly erroneous. 
Indeed, Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, explicitly provides
that ‘(a)ll criminal actions
must be commenced either by complaint or information x x x.”

In the said case We
quoted the following from our decision in U.S.
vs. Narvas, 14 Phil., 410:

“Under the provisions of those sections a criminal action or
prosecution may be instituted in the courts specified therein in either one
of two ways.  In the first place it may
be commenced by any person presenting to a court or to a magistrate the complaint
above defined.  Such complaint is the
process which begins the action and gives the court or magistrate
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and the subject-matter of the
action.  Where such complaint has been
presented no other or fur­ther pleading on the part of the government is
necessary.  The prosecution proceeds upon
the complaint alone.  In the second
place the action may be commenced by the promotor fiscal
by presenting to the court and filing with the clerk thereof the information defined
and set forth in the section above quoted. 
In that case such information is the process which institutes the action
and the prosecution proceeds upon it as the people’s pleading.  It is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute
the action, whether commenced by complaint or information.  This enables him to prevent malicious or
unfounded prosecutions by private persons.”

The sections referred to above are
Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the former Code of Criminal Procedure, which are si­milar
to Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:

“SECTION 1.  Commencement of criminal
action.  – All criminal
actions must be commenced either by complaint or information in the name of the
People of the Philippines
against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor.

“SEC. 2.  Complaint defined.  – Complaint is a sworn written statement
charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended par­ty, any peace
officer or other employee of the government or governmental institution in
charge of the enforcement or execution of the law vio­lated.

“SEC. 3.  Information defined.  – An information is
an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the
fiscal and filed with the court.”

It is true, as contended by respondent Judge, that a complaint need
not be filed with the court, unlike an in­formation which is required by
Section 3 of Rule 110 to be “filed with the court” (Cf. Espiritu vs. De la Rosa, 78 Phil., 829); but nothing in
Section 2 of said rule bars the filing of a complaint with the court.  Indeed, in certain cases, as will be seen
from Our discussion below, the filing of the complaint
with the court is considered the operative act that confers jurisdiction.

2.  The crime of rape being
one which is required by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and by Section
4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, to be prosecuted “upon a
complaint filed by the offended party x x x,” the filing with the court of first instance of a
sworn complaint charging such offense is sufficient to initiate criminal
prosecution.  As We
said in U.S.
vs. Narvas, supra, “the action can not be
prosecuted upon the information of the fiscal.” A fortiori, to
require the fiscal to file an information would be to call for the doing of an
act which the law and the rule themselves consider unnecessary, su­perfluous
and ineffectual.

Respondent Judge leans on Section 2 of Republic Act No. 732 to
buttress his position that even if the crime charged in the complaint which is
lodged with the fiscal’s office is a semi-public
offense, an information should still be filed with the
court.  Incidentally, the aforecited section must be deemed amended by Republic Act
No. 5180 (An Act Prescribing a Uniform System of Investi­gation by Provincial
and City Fiscals and their Assistants, and by State Attorneys or their
Assistants), which took ef­fect on September 8, 1967.  The particular provision re­lied upon by
respondent Judge is, however, retained sub­stantially in Section 1 of Republic
Act No. 5180, which in part provides that “no information for an offense
recognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial
fiscal or city fiscal x x x,
without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation
conducted by him x x x.”
Respondent Judge ar­gues that under this provision the fiscal is in duty bound
to file an information with the court of first
instance after finding a prima facie case against the respondents in a
preliminary investigation.  We find the
argument unmeritorious, because the provision in question in no way precludes
the filing of a complaint directly with the court after a preliminary investigation
thereon has been conducted by the fiscal or by the state attorney.

Considering that a complaint for rape sufficient in form was filed
with the proper court by the injured party thru the investigating fiscal after
the latter had found a prima facie case against the respondents in a
preliminary investigation, We see no reason why the filing of said complaint,
unaccompanied by an information, would not be sufficient to start the criminal
proceedings.  Of course, no law or rule
prevents the fiscal from filing an information for
rape if he elects to do so.  However,
since the filing of a complaint for rape or for any of the other offenses enu­merated
in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, by the person or persons mentioned
therein, is jurisdictional (Cf. People vs. Santos, et al., 101 Phil., 798), the
filing thereof is sufficient to initiate a valid prosecution, and no information
need be filed any longer by the fiscal.

In the present case the fiscal chose not to file an information.  While
We certainly do not begrudge him his right to exercise his option in this
manner, the thought comes to Us that much delay could have been avoid­ed, nay,
the interest of a speedy administration of justice would have been greatly subserved, had the fiscal simply complied with respondent
Judge’s order instead of taking the matter to this Court.  Since the case is before Us
anyway, We are left with no alternative but to assess its merits, and,
perforce, grant the petition.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is
granted, and the orders complained of are accordingly set aside.  No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.