VICTORINA A. DE GAERLAN AND SALVADOR GAERLAN, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. FELIX MARTINEZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, JULIANA R. DE SANTOS, AND SIMPLICIO SANTOS, R…

De Gaerlan versus Martinez

The Case

This is a special civil action of certiorari brought by spouses Victorina A. de Gaerlan and Salvador Gaerlan against Judge Felix Martinez of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and against Juliana R. de Santos and Simplicio Santos. The petitioners were the defendants in an action of desahucio, an action for ejectment, over a lot on Barbosa street in Quiapo, Manila, which they occupied as tenants of Juliana de Santos. When the ejectment case was appealed to the Court of First Instance, the respondent judge ordered the petitioners to deposit the accrued rentals in court, and later gave them extensions of time to comply. The petitioners now ask that those orders be annulled. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules: the tenant is estopped from denying the title of the landlord who let him into possession, and a party who asks for and obtains an order cannot later attack that same order.

Procedural History

In September 1947, Juliana R. de Santos and Simplicio Santos commenced an action of desahucio in the municipal court of Manila against the petitioners. On February 5, 1948, the municipal court rendered judgment ordering the defendants to vacate the premises and to pay the plaintiffs 150 pesos a month until the premises were completely vacated. The petitioners appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila. While the case was pending there, the petitioners twice failed, before two different judges, to be exempted from depositing the rent in court. On their third attempt, the respondent judge, on November 20, 1948, relieved them from the obligation to deposit the monthly rentals on condition that they file a bond of 1,800 pesos. When the bond was presented for approval, the respondents opposed it and moved for reconsideration. On August 1, 1949, the respondent judge ordered the defendants to deposit the accrued rentals within three days in lieu of the bond, failing which a writ of execution would issue. The petitioners moved for reconsideration, and at the hearing their counsel prayed in the alternative for an extension of ten days, which was granted on August 13, 1949. On August 23, 1949, counsel asked for a further extension of twenty days, and on August 28 the respondent judge granted an additional fifteen days. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued on September 9, 1949.

Facts

On August 23, 1941, Juliana R. de Santos purchased at public auction from the Bureau of Lands a lot of 120.9 square meters on Barbosa street, Quiapo, Manila, which was patrimonial property of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, for 15,112.50 pesos. She paid 1,511.25 pesos then and there and obligated herself to pay the balance in not more than ten equal annual instalments, which she fully paid on August 1, 1944. One condition of the sale required the buyer to commence construction of improvements within six months and to complete them within eighteen months from the date of sale. Because of the war she could not comply, and after liberation the city authorities would not approve her application for a permit to construct a permanent improvement pending approval of a plan for the beautification of Manila. On March 17, 1948, upon recommendation of the Director of Lands, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources allowed her to commence construction within six months from the date the city authorities would permit it, and to finish within eighteen months from that same date.

In the meantime, in March 1945, Juliana de Santos leased the lot to the petitioners, who constructed a building thereon and paid her rent of 20 pesos a month up to August 1945, 40 pesos a month from September to November 1945, 100 pesos a month for December 1945 and January 1946, and 150 pesos a month from February 1946. In September 1947 the respondents commenced the action of desahucio, alleging that in December 1946 the plaintiff discovered that instead of the makeshift shelter she had permitted, the defendants had erected a building of strong materials consisting of four doors, and that although she had allowed them to hold the land until April 1947 upon their request, they did not vacate.

At the instance of the petitioners, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources later revoked his order of March 17, 1948, canceled the sale of the lot to Juliana de Santos, and declared the forfeiture of the purchase price she had paid, ordering that the lot be again sold at public auction. The validity of that order is the subject of a separate litigation pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Issues

• Whether or not the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources canceling the sale of the lot to Juliana de Santos removed her title, so that the rule requiring the deposit of rentals in court during the pendency of an appeal in a desahucio case no longer applies.
• Whether or not the petitioners, as tenants of Juliana de Santos, may deny the title of their landlord at the time the relation of landlord and tenant began between them.
• Whether or not the petitioners may ask for the annulment of orders that were issued with their consent and upon their own petition.

Applicable Provisions

Rule 123, section 68, paragraph b, of the Rules of Court, on the estoppel of a tenant, provides:

The tenant or lessee cannot deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

This provision is the basis for barring the petitioners from setting up the cancellation of the sale as a ground to escape the orders of the respondent judge.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition is completely devoid of merit. The order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources canceling the sale of the lot and ordering the forfeiture of the purchase price is not final, because it is contested by the purchaser in a civil case in the Court of First Instance of Manila which has not yet been decided. The petitioners therefore cannot rest their claim that the plaintiffs are no longer the owners on an order that is still under challenge.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petitioners, as tenants of the respondent Juliana R. de Santos, are estopped from denying the title of their landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. The Court cited Rule 123, section 68, paragraph b, and quoted it as follows:

The tenant or lessee cannot deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

On the third issue, the Court held that the orders complained of were issued by the respondent judge not only with the consent but upon petition of the petitioners themselves. Having sought and obtained those orders, the petitioners cannot turn around and ask for their annulment.

Doctrine

First, a tenant or lessee cannot deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. This is the rule of estoppel embodied in Rule 123, section 68, paragraph b, and it binds the tenant for as long as the relation subsists. Second, an order of an administrative official canceling a sale and ordering a forfeiture is not final while it is being contested in a pending civil case, and it cannot be made the basis for defeating the rights of the vendor in an ejectment proceeding. Third, a party who asks for and obtains an order from the court cannot afterwards attack that same order; the remedy of certiorari will not lie at the instance of one who consented to the act complained of.

Disposition

The petition was denied, with costs against the petitioners, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued on September 9, 1949, was dissolved.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the tenant cannot deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. Examiners use this case in ejectment and desahucio problems, and in questions on estoppel by a tenant and on certiorari being barred to a party who consented to the order he now attacks.