ALIPIO N. CASILAN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. CONCEPCION KAPUNAN DE SALCEDO, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

In Civil Case No. 340 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, plaintiff-appellant Alipio
N. Casilan, in 1946, filed a complaint against Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo, Iluminada Fernandez Vda. de Kapunan
and Marita Antonia Sal­cedo,
to recover the title and possession of a parcel of land situated in Tacloban City.  Juanita, Trinidad, Ruper­to, Jr., Emma, Lilia, Socorro and Rosario, all
surnamed Kapunan, intervened in the case, claiming to be co-owners of the
land, being heirs of their late father, Ruperto Kapunan.

It appears that the land in question was originally owned by the
spouses Ruperto Kapunan and
Iluminada Fernan­dez. 
On October 2, 1935
the spouses Kapunan donated the land to their
daughter, Concepcion Kapunan
de Salcedo.  On
December 23, 1939, Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo exec­uted a deed of donation of the land in favor
of her daughter, Marita Antonia Salcedo.  The donation was ac­cepted by Iluminada Fernandez Vda. de Kapunan in her capacity as the
guardian of the donee Marita
Antonia Sal­cedo, who was then a minor.  On November 4, 1944, Concepcion
Kapunan de Salcedo and Alipio N. Casilan executed a deed
of conditional sale of the land in question where­in the former accepted the
latter’s offer to purchase the land for a price of P6,500.00;
the former thereby received from the latter the sum of P2,000.00 as part of the
purchase price, and the balance of P4,500.00 to be paid within three years from
that date.  The balance of P4,500.00 was actual­ly paid by Alipio
N. Casilan to Concepcion Kapunan de Sal­cedo on June 14, 1945.

Upon the issues having been properly joined, and after trial, the
Court of First Instance of Leyte rendered a de­cision
dismissing the complaint and declaring the sale of the land in question by Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo to Alipio N. Casilan null and void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
and declared Alipio N. Casilan
the owner of the land and entitled to the possession thereof.  An appeal was brought to the Supreme Court
from the decision of the Court of Appeals,^[1]
and this Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and declared that
the sale made by Concepcion Kapunan
de Salcedo to Alipio N. Basilan is null and void. 
This Court declared valid both the donation made by the spouses Ruperto Kapunan and Iluminada Fernandez to Con­cepcion
Kapunan de Salcedo, and the
donation made by Con­cepcion Kapunan
de Salcedo to Marita
Antonia Salcedo. 
The concluding part of this Court’s decision reads as follows:

“In conclusion, we find and so hold that the donation of the
property in dis­pute to Marita Antonia Salcedo by Concep­cion K. Salcedo was valid, and consequent­ly the sale thereof by
the latter in favor of respondent Alipio N. Casilan was null and void. 
Said respondent, however, may still recover what he has paid under
the equitable principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at
the expense of another.“^[2]

“Wherefore, the decision complained of is reversed and the
sale of the proper­ty in controversy in favor of respondent Alipio
N. Casilan declared null and void.

“Without costs.”

The above-mentioned decision of this Court became final and executory.

On May 22, 1963,
Alipio N. Casilan filed
with the Court of First Instance of Leyte, in the
same Civil Case No. 340, a motion entitled “Motion asking the return to the
purchaser of the selling price paid to the defendant Concepcion
Kapunan de Salcedo, with
interest”.  In the motion, Alipio N. Casilan, as plaintiff
in the case, al­leged that according to the decision of the Supreme Court, the
defendant Concepcion Kapunan
de Salcedo received from him the sum of P2,000.00 on November 4, 1944 as partial payment of the
purchase price of the land in question, and the sum of P4,500.00 on June 14,
1945 as the balance of the purchase price, or the total purchase price in the
sum of P6,500.00.  Invoking the portion
of the decision of this Court which says “Said respondent, however, may
still recover what he has paid under the equitable principle that no one shall
be unjustly enrich­ed or benefited at the expense of another”, Alipio N. Casilan prayed the
Court of First Instance of Leyte “that a writ of
execution be issued by the Clerk of Court, com­manding that of the personal and
real properties of de­fendant Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo the amount of
Six Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P6,500.00) be collected, plus the legal
interest of P2,000.00 from November 4, 1944, and the legal interest of
P4,500.00 from June 14, 1945, at the rate of 6% a year, until said amounts are
fully paid for.”^[3]

On August 10, 1963, defendant Concepcion
Kapunan de Salcedo filed an
opposition to the above-mentioned motion of plaintiff Alipio
N. Casilan, upon the ground that the decision of the
Supreme Court “contains no judgment or pronouncement specifically or
definitely ordering or re­quiring the defendant Concepcion
Kapunan de Salcedo to pay
to the plaintiff the sum of P6,500.00, much less the
interest thereof.”^[4]

After the parties had been given opportunity to file their
memoranda in support of their respective con­tentions, the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, on Novem­ber 14, 1963, issued an order denying the motion of
Alipio N. Casilan which
prayed for a writ of execution against the properties of defendant Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo.  In its
order of denial, the lower court stated that the statement in the decision of
this Court which reads:  “Said
respondent, however, may still recover what he has paid under the equitable
principle that no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of
another” is not a part of the dispositive
portion of the decision but cons­titutes a part of the opinion or conclusion of
the Court, and that statement merely recognizes the existence of a right of the
plaintiff to recover what he had paid. 
In its order the lower court suggests that the proper action for the
recovery of the sum paid by the plaintiff be taken, conformable to the
recognition made by the Supreme Court of the right of the plaintiff to recover
said sum.

His motion for reconsideration of the order of Novem­ber 14, 1963 having been
denied, plaintiff Alipio N. Casilan
brought the present appeal to this Court from the said order, on a question of
law.

The only question to be resolved in the present ap­peal is
whether that statement in the decision of this Court, before the dispositive part thereof, which reads:  “Said respondent (referring to appellant
Alipio N. Casilan),
however, may still recover what he has paid under the equitable principle that
no one shall be unjustly enriched or benefited at the expense of another”
may serve as a basis for the lower court to issue a writ of execution against
the properties of defendant Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo, so said
appellant may thereby recover what he had paid to said defendant. In other
words, may that state­ment be considered a judgment against defendant Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo?

Let it be noted that the action brought by Alipio
N. Casilan, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 340 in the
Court of First Instate of Leyte, was for the recovery
of title and possession of a parcel of land. 
The recovery of the amount paid by Alipio to Concepcion was never an issue in
the case.  What was litigated in the case
was the validity of: (1) the donation of the land by the spouses Kapunan to their daughter Concepcion
Kapunan de Salcedo —
because this donation was questioned by the other children of the spouses who
intervened in the case; (2) the donation of the land made by Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo to her daughter Marita
Antonia Salcedo; and (3) the sale of the same land by
Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo to Alipio N. Casilan.  This Court
ruled that the two donations were valid and the sale by Concepcion to Alipio
was null and void.  But this Court did
not order Concepcion
to pay or return to Alipio the purchase price of the
land, with interest.  Thus, the dispositive portion of the decision of this Court simply
says:

“Wherefore, the decision complained of is reversed and the
sale of the proper­ty in controversy in favor of respondent Alipio
N. Casilan declared null and void.”

We agree with the contention of counsel for appellee
Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo — and as upheld by the lower court — that the
portion of the decision of this Court that is relied upon by appellant Alipio Casilan in his motion for
execution is simply an opinion of the Court and does not constitute the
judgment itself.

“In the case of a trial court a judg­ment must be
distinguished from an opinion.  The
latter is the informal expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail
against its final order or decision. 
While the two may be combined in one instrument, the opinion forms part
of the judgment.  So…. there is a
distinction between the findings and conclusions of a court and its judgment.
While they may constitute its decision and amount to a rendition of a judgment
they are not the judgment itself.  They
amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which, of course, must be
distinguished from the judgment.” (Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, 5th
Edition, page 6).

Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that what can be the subject
of execution is that which is ordained or decreed in the dispositive
part of the decision.  In the case of
Rosario Neri Edwards, et al., vs. Jose Arce, et al., 98 Phil. 688, 692, this Court said;

“… In fact, the only portion of the decision that became the
subject of execution is what is ordained or decreed in such dispositive
part.  Whatever may be found in the body
of the decision can only be considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of
the court and while they may serve as guide or enlightenment to determine the ratio
decidendi, what is controlling is what appears
in the dispositive part of the decision ….”^[5]

It appearing that the dispositive part
of the de­cision in question does not ordain or decree that appellee
Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo should pay appellant Alipio
N. Casilan the sum of P6,500.00
with legal interest, the court a quo committed no error when it
denied said appellant’s motion for a wit of execution against the proper­ties
of appellee Concepcion Kapunan de Salcedo.

WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First Instance of Leyte in its Civil Case No. 340, dated November 14, 1963, which is appealed from, is
affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant Alipio
N. Casilan.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez,
Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

^[1] Juanita Kapunan, et al., vs. Alipio N. Casilan, et al., G.R.
No. L-8178, October 31, 1960.

^[2]
Underscoring supplied.

^[3] As
quoted from the prayer of the motion; pp. 15-16, Record on Appeal.

^[4]
As quoted from the Opposition; p. 17, Record on Appeal.

^[5]
See also Philippine Sugar Institute vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
et al., L-18930, February 28, 1967,
and the cases cited therein; Magdalena Estate, Inc. vs. Caluag, L-16250, June
30, 1964; Castillo, et al., vs. Nagtalon,
L-17079, January 29, 1962,
and the cases cited therein.