NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF TRADE UNIONS (NORTU), PETITIONER, VS. HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR, HON. DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS AND THE “ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS” (ALU), RESPOND…

The specific question raised in this
certiorari and prohibition proceeding is whether or not respondent Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations^[1]
could order a certi­fication election if, as alleged by petitioner Union,
it is the recognized bargaining agent and is about to conclude a renewed
bargaining agreement with the employer, the Manila Rubber Corporation.^[2]
The matter was elevated to this Court, as respondent Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, in the assailed order, held:  “The Labor Code explicitly provides for
only two instances where a petition for certification is barred, namely:  An election held within the past twelve
months and the existence of a certified collective agreement.  None of the foregoing is applicable hereto.”^[3]
The correctness of such a ruling was sustained in the Answer of Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza.^[4]
It was made clear that there was neither a collective bargaining agreement in
existence and that no certification election had been conducted during the last
twelve months.  Respondent Union,
therefore, was within its right in filing a petition for certification
election, supported as it was by the written consent of more than 30% of the
employees in the bargaining unit.  It was
further pointed out in such Answer^[5]
that the pendency of negotiations to conclude a new
collective bargaining agreement is not a bar to such a petition for
certification election.^[6]

The facts are not in dispute. 
Petitioner labor Union, at the time of such petition for certification
election, being the duly recognized exclusive bargaining agent, was in the
process of negotiation leading to a new collective contract between it and the
employer.^[7]
That was, to repeat, the basis of its motion to dismiss when the petition for
certification election was filed.^[8]
Both the Med-Arbiter of the Bureau of Labor Relations as well as respondent
Director of such bureau ruled against it, for as specified in the appealed
order, the requisites necessary for such certi­fication were duly satisfied.  It moved to reconsider, but failed.10 Hence this petition.

It is quite apparent then why the order for certification
election must be upheld.

1. The controlling provision of the Labor Code reads as
follows:  “Any petition for
certification election filed by any legitimate labor organization shall be
supported by the written consent of at least thirty percent (30%) of all the
employees in the bargaining unit.  Upon
receipt and verification of such petition, it shall be mandatory for the Bureau
to conduct a certification election for the purpose of determining the
representative of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit and certify
the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the
employees in the unit.”11 The law cannot be any
clearer.  The 30% requirement was fully
met.  Such a finding of fact is well-nigh
conclusive on this Court.12 It becomes, therefore, in the
language of the law, “mandatory for the bureau to conduct a certification
election * * *.” Moreover, the assailed order pointed out that there was
no obstacle to such a petition for certification, no election having been held
the past twelve months and no certified collective agreement being in
existence.  When respondent Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations, therefore, acted as he did, he was merely
performing a duty imposed on him by law. 
This is not the first time that a labor union, understandably concerned
as to whether it could continue as the exclusive bargaining agent, had sought
to prevent the holding of a certification election.  The response was invariably in the negative.13 For certainly, it would be unwarranted to nullify an order of the
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations based on a plain and explicit command
of the law.

2. It cannot be stressed sufficiently that the Bureau of Labor
Relations as an agency of the executive branch is precisely charged with the
responsibility of faithfully executing the law. 
Where, as in this case, there is no ambiguity in the applicable
provision of the Labor Code, all that could have been done was to apply
it.  That was what respondent Director
did.  It would be unwarranted for him to
act in any other way.  There was no room
for interpretation.  Such a provision
speaks unequivocally.  There was the peremptory
need on the part of the official concerned to yield it obedience.14

3. The specific question raised in this certiorari and
prohibition proceeding as to whether or not respondent Director of the Bureau
of Labor Relations could order a certification election if, as alleged by
petitioner Union, it is the recognized bargaining agent and is about to
conclude a renewed collective bargaining agreement with the employer, must be
answered in the affirmative, assuming that the requisites, set forth in Article
258 of the Labor Code are duly met.

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition is
dismissed for lack of merit.  This
decision is immediately executory, and the
certification election ordered must be held forthwith.  The restraining order issued by this Court is
hereby lifted and set aside and declared to be without any force or effect.

Antonio, (Acting Chairman), Concepcion,
Jr., and Santos,
JJ.,
concur.

Aquino, J., concurs because petitioner’s CBA with the Manila Rubber Corporation expired on May 31,
1975 and petitioner’s right to represent the employees as a collective
bargaining agent was seriously assailed by the Associated Labor Unions, which
filed a petition for certification election on July 1, 1975.  Within twelve months before that date, there
had been no certification election.

Abad Santos, J., did not take part.

^[1]
The other respondents are the Secretary of Labor and the Associated Labor
Unions.

^[2] Petition, 4.

^[3] Ibid,
Annex H.

^[4]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato
S. Puno and Trial Attorney Joselito
B. Floro.

^[5]
Answer, 4 and 5.

^[6] Ibid, 5.

^[7] Petition, pars. 4 and 7.

^[8] Ibid, par. 8.

9 Ibid, par. 10.

10
Ibid, pars. 13 and 14.

11 Art. 258, Presidential Decree 442
(1974).

12 Cf. Antipolo Highway
Lines v. Inciong, L-38532, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA 441; Jacqueline Industries v. National Labor
Relations Commission, L-37034, Aug. 29, 1975, 66 SCRA
397; Federacion Obrera v.
Noriel, L-41937, July 6, 1976, 72 SCRA
24; Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Noriel, L-45475, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA
414; Monark International, Inc. v. Noriel, L-47570-71, May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA
414; Associated Trade Unions v. Noriel, L-48367,
January 16, 1979.

13 Cf. Federacion Obrera v. Noriel, L-41937, July
6, 1976, 72 SCRA 24; Today’s Knitting Free Workers
Union v. Noriel, L-45057, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 450; Benguet Exploration
Miners Union v. Noriel, L-44110, March 29,
1977, 76 SCRA 107; Kapisanan
ng mga Manggagawa
v. Noriel, L-45475, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA 414; Monark International,
Inc. v. Noriel, L-47570-71, May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA 414; National Mines and Allied Workers Union v.
Luna, L-46722, June 15, 1978, 83 SCRA 607; Scout
Ramon Albano v. Noriel,
L-48347, Oct. 3, 1978, Federation of Free Workers v. Noriel,
L-47182-83, Oct. 20, 1978.

14 Such a principle is traceable to the leading case
of Lizarraga Hermanos v.
Yap Tico, a 1913 decision, 24 Phil. 504.  In the latest case where such a doctrine is
reiterated, Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Manila
Railroad Company, L-25316, Feb. 28,
1979, Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,
L-27455, June 28, 1973, 51 SCRA 381, was cited.  In the opinion of such case, reference was
made to twelve decisions starting from People v. Mapa,
L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164 and ending with
Allied Brokerage Corp. v. Commissioner of Customs, L-27641, Aug. 31,
1971, 40 SCRA 555. 
These are the later cases:  Espino v. Cleofe, L-33410,
July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 93; Minlay
v. Sandoval, L-28901, Sept. 4, 1973, 53 SCRA
1; Vallongca v. Ariola,
L-29226, Oct. 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 139; Jalandoni v. Endaya,
L-23894, Jan. 24, 1974, 55 SCRA 261; Phil. National
Railways v. Court of Industrial Relations, L-30942, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 302; Aquino Jr. v.
Commission on Elections, L-40004, Jan. 31, 1975, 62 SCRA
275.