ERNESTO M. NOMBRADO, PETITIONER, VS. ATTY. JUANITO T. HERNANDEZ, RESPONDENT.

This is an administrative
case for disbarment instituted by Ernesto M. Nombrado
against Juanito T. Hernandez, a member of the
Philippine Bar, charging to latter with malpractice on two counts, namely:  (1) for having appeared as counsel for Crispin Nazareno
in a civil case for forcible entry against Arsenio Pansaon, his former client, being the offended party and
complainant, in a criminal case for serious physical injuries wherein Eufemio Velasco (Nazareno), a son
of Crispin, was the accused; and (2) for having appeared as counsel for the
accused and also for the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 329 of the
Justice of the Peace Court (now municipal Court) of Baganga, Davao (now Davao Oriental).

In
our resolution of January 14, 1963, we referred this case for investigation to the Solicitor General, who in turn
endorsed it to the Provincial Fiscal of Davao for the same purpose, both complainant and
respondent being residents of Baganga, Davao Oriental.  
When the case was set for hearing by the First Assistant Provincial
Fiscal of Davao respondent manifested and requested
that since the charges were the same as- those filed by the same complainant
against him in Disbarment Case No. 37 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, wherein a decision had already been rendered, the
records of said proceeding, together with the evidence adduced by the parties,
be forwarded to this Court, through the Solicitor General, for final
disposition.  Complainant in turn
submitted his evidence in support of the charges against respondent.

With respect to the first
count, it is undisputed that sometime in 1952 respondent was engaged by Arsenio Pansaon as his counsel in
the prosecution of a criminal case for serious physical injuries entitled
“People vs. Eufemio Nazareno”
of the Justice of the Peace Court of Baganga, Davao.  In that case
the accused was charged with having mauled Arsenio Pansaon when the latter was seen within the perimeter of
the land then being disputed between said Arsenio Pansaon and Eufemio’s father,
Crispin Nazareno.  
However, the case was dismissed when the complaining
witness failed to appear on the day of the trial.  Several years thereafter Crispin Nazareno, through respondent, filed a complaint for
forcible entry against Arsenio Pansaon
and two other persons, involving the same parcel of
land which was the root cause of the mauling incident.  The defendants moved to disqualify respondent
from appearing as counsel for the plaintiff on the ground that he had
previously acted as counsel for Arsenio Pansaon in the criminal case for physical injuries, but the
motion was subsequently withdrawn.  In
the Justice of the Peace Court the plaintiff lost, but won in the Court of
First Instance of Davao on appeal.

When Disbarment Case No.
37 against respondent was heard in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Arsenio Pansaon testified for petitioner and said that perhaps he
lost the forcible entry case because respondent had become privy to valuable
information about his claim of ownership of the parcel of land in question in
the course of their attorney-and-client
relationship and must have used such information against him, including a
document obtained by respondent from notary public Abellanosa.    Respondent denied the truth of the foregoing
testimony and in turn declared that the only information he obtained from complainant Pansaon was about the
mauling incident itself – how it happened and why he sustained the injuries; that he did not ask Pan­saon for any papers or documents in connection with
that criminal case, except a medical certificate issued to him by the attending physician; that in handling the forcible
entry case for Crispin Nazareno against his
former client, he did not use against the latter any fact or information he
acquired in the course of their attorney-and-client relationship; and that if
there was any document he pre­sented in the forcible entry case it came from
Crispin Nazareno and not from notary public Abellanosa.

The Solicitor General is
of the opinion, and we find no reason to disagree with him, that even if
respondent did not use against his client any information or evidence acquired
by him as counsel it cannot be denied that he did become privy to information
regarding the ownership of the parcel of land which was later litigated in the
forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the land that triggered the
mauling incident which gave rise to the criminal action for physical
injuries.  This Court’s remarks in Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 571, are apropos:

“Communications between attorney and client are, in a great
number of liti­gations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant
and irrelevant, secret and well known facts: 
In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between an
attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the
revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further
prejudice the complainant’s cause.”

Whatever may be said as
to whether or not respondent utilized against his former client information
given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their pre­vious
relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the other
side in the forcible entry case.  In the
same case of Hilado vs. David, supra, this
Tribunal further said:

“Hence the necessity of setting down the
existence of the bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for
testing incompatibility of interests. 
This stern rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practicioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded
suspicion of unprofessional practice.  x x x It is founded on principles
of public policy, of good taste.  As has
been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one
of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to
proper professional standard.  With these
thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife, not only to keep
inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing.  Only thus
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys which
is of paramount importance in the administration of Justice.”

This Court went even
further in San Jose vs. Cruz, 57 Phil. 792, wherein the respondent was charged
with mal­practice for having represented a new client whose interests were opposed to those of his former client in
another case:

“x x x .  An attorney owes loyalty to his client not
only in the case in which he has represented him but also after the relation of
attorney and client has terminated and it is not good practice to permit him
afterwards to defend in another case other person against his former client
under the pretext that the case is distinct from, and independent of the former
case.”^[1]

Under the first count,
respondent has shown a departure from
the strict norms of professional conduct laid down for members of the bar.

Under the second count,
it appears that respondent was counsel for the defendants Sotero
Pontawe and Teofilo Aumada in Criminal Case No. 329 for theft of large cattle
before the Justice of the Peace Court of Baganga.  Before the scheduled hearing on
September 18, 1959, upon request of complaining witness Ramon Morales,
respondent prepared a motion to dismiss on the ground that the “real
accused in this case are not the above-named persons.” Notwithstanding the
motion to dismiss, the complaining witness was cited to appear on September 25,
1959 “to find out why Mr. Ramon Morales, the complainant of Criminal Case
No. 329, did not appear on September 18, 1959, the date designated for pre­liminary
investigation proper of this case, and to find out whether the manifestation of
counsel of the defense that there is such amicable settlement in this case,
Criminal Case No. 329, is true.” During the hearing on September 25, 1959, a heated exchange
of argument arose between respondent and the private prosecutor, Atty. Danao, because of the latter’s insistence on calling
Morales to the Witness stand despite his expressed desistance to prosecute the
criminal case.  Respondent manifested his
intention to “intervene in behalf of the complaining party in connection
with the action of Atty. Danao in this particular
case.”

We concur with the Solicitor General’s view that under the
foregoing circumstances, respondent’s act of preparing the motion to dismiss
and stating in the course of the hearing thereof that he was intervening
“in behalf of the complaining party”, did not constitute simultaneous
appearance in behalf of the contending parties since there was no longer any
con­flict to speak of, the complainant having desisted from prosecuting the
case against the accused.  Consequently,
there was nothing improper in respondent’s conduct.

Upon the facts established in connection with the first count the
Solicitor General has recommended that the penalty of reprimand and warning be
administered, citing the decision of this Court in a comparable case, Caoibes vs. de la Rosa, 27 Phil. 265.  We believe the recommendation is justified.

WHEREFORE, respondent Juanito T.
Hernandez is hereby reprimanded
and warned that a repetition of unprofessional conduct on his part will be
dealt with more severely.  Let this
decision be noted in respondent’s record as a member of the Bar.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Reiterated in Sumangil vs.
Santo Roman, 84 Phil. 777.