VICENTE G. CRUZ, AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, JOSEFINA R. PHODACA, SALVADOR MARIÑO, ISAURO M. SANTIAGO, AND SEGUNDO AGUSTIN, PETITIONERS, VS. PLACIDO RAMOS, FERNANDO MONLEON, AND LUIS VI…

This is an original petition of Quo Warranto (1) to
declare “that the respondents are illegally usurping, intruding into, and/or
exercising or holding the office of Members of the Manila Municipal Board,” and
(2) to oust them from that office.

The six petitioners allege that they are members of the
municipal board of the City of Manila, they having been elected in the general
elections of 1947 together with Gregorio Garcia, Andres Santamaria, Pedro
Arenas, and Eustaquio Balagtas (who are not parties in this case) to compose the
ten members of the Board, for a term of four years expiring on December 31,
1951, and that as such elected members they have the absolute and exclusive
right to exercise the prerogatives and privileges of the office of members of
said board; that only one vacancy in the board was created by the appointment of
Eustaquio Balagtas in March, 1949, as Director of Prisons; that on June 22,
1949, the President of the Philippines appointed the respondents Placido Ramos,
Fernando Monleon and Luis Villaceran members of the municipal board to fill the
vacancy caused by the appointment of Eustaquio Balagtas as Director of Prisons
and two new additional positions created by Republic Act No. 409, known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila; that said Republic Act No. 409, which
increases the congressional districts of the City of Manila from two to four and
the membership of the municipal board from ten to twelve, is unconstitutional
because section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution authorizes the Congress to
apportion legislative districts throughout the Philippines by a general law and
not by piecemeal legislation; that at least any two of the respondents are
illegally usurping, intruding into, and/or holding or exercising the rights and
privileges and discharging the duties exclusively pertaining to the petitioners
and other members of the municipal board elected in the general elections of
1947 because the creation of the office and the appointment of at least any two
of the respondents are contrary to section 55 Article VI of the Constitution;
and that the unconstitutional appointment and qualification of at least any two
of the respondents increases the number of a majority to constitute a quorum to
do business in the deliberation of the municipal board, thereby depriving any
six of the elective members of the board to do business, inasmuch as the minimum
number to constitute a quorum of a 12-member board under Republic Act No. 409 is
seven, instead of six.

The respondents in their answer contend (1) that the
petitioners have no legal capacity to bring the present action for usurpation of
public office, inasmuch as the petitioners do not claim to be entitled to occupy
the office now held by the respondents, and that an action for usurpation of
office may be brought only by the Solicitor General or by a fiscal in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines; (2) that the respondents are lawfully
holding the office in question, they having been duly appointed thereto by the
President of the Philippines; and (3) that Republic Act No. 409 is
constitutional.

The exercise of the prerogative writ of Quo Warranto is
governed by Rule 68 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of said rule provides that
an action for the usurpation of office may be brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines against any person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. Section 3 provides that the
Solicitor General or a fiscal, when directed by the President of the
Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe
that any case specified in sections 1 and 2 [the latter referring to actions
against corporations] can be established toy proof, must commence the action.
Section 4 provides that the Solicitor General or fiscal may, with the permission
of the court in which the action is to be commenced, bring such an action at the
request and upon the relation pi another person; but in such case the officer
bringing it may first require an indemnity for the expenses and costs of the
action to be given to him by the person at whose request and upon whose relation
it is brought. And section 6 provides that “a person claiming to be entitled to
a public office usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an
action therefor in his own name.”

The present petition is not authorized by section 6 because the
petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the public office alleged to be
unlawfully held or exercised by the respondents. As a matter of fact the
petitioners allege that they are elected members of the municipal board and that
their term of office will not expire until December 31, 1951. They do not and
cannot claim that the respondents have supplanted them. Their contention that
they and the other elected members of the board who are not parties in this case
“have the absolute and exclusive right to exercise the prerogatives and
privileges and discharge the duties of the office of members of said board,”
does not bring their case within the purview of section 6. Moreover, such
contention is untenable because if the elected councilors had “the absolute and
exclusive right” to the membership of the board, then no other person could
become a member of the board even if vacancies should be created therein by law
or by the death or resignation of an elected member during the four-year term of
office of the petitioners; and that is untenable because the councilors are
elected individually, each to fill one seat in the board, and not collectively
as a body to constitute the board. And if the petitioners should admit as they
must that vacancies may be filled by other persons, because an elected councilor
cannot fill more than one seat in the board, they must necessarily admit also
that their right to membership therein is not exclusive.

The mere fact that the membership of the board was increased
from ten to twelve and the quorum from six to seven does not in any way diminish
the rights and prerogatives of the individual petitioners as members of the
board. Such increase does not result in the diminution of the emolument or in
the curtailment of the participation in the deliberations and of the vote of
each of the petitioners as a member of the board. The petitioners are bringing
this action as individuals and not as a group or juridical entity recognized by
law as having a corporate or collective right to assert. As members of the
municipal board the six petitioners are not bound to vote solidly to a man on
any measure or motion that may come up before the board. Indeed, they are
supposed to express their individual opinions and cast their individual votes.
Therefore, the increase of the membership of the board and of the quorum
necessary to do business does not constitute any invasion of petitioners’ right
which would entitle them to bring this action.

If, as petitioners contend, Republic Act No. 409 increasing the
membership of the board is unconstitutional—a question which we cannot inquire
into unless a proper action is brought before us—the remedy available to them as
well as to any other citizen is that provided for in section if of Rule 68;
namely, to relate the matter to the Solicitor General and request him to bring
the action in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The reason of the law
is that a public office or a franchise is created or granted by law, and its
usurpation or unlawful exercise is the concern primarily of the Government.
Hence the latter as a rule is the party called upon to bring the action for such
usurpation or unlawful exercise of an office or franchise. The only exception in
which the law permits an individual to bring the action in his own name is when
he claims to be entitled to the public office alleged to be usurped or
unlawfully held or exercised by another. That, however, is not the present case,
as we have hereinabove demonstrated.

It resulting from foregoing that the petitioners have no cause
of action, it is neither necessary nor proper for the Court to pass upon the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 409.

The petition is dismissed, with costs.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.