CARLOS PIÑERO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MARCELO ENRIQUEZ, PEDRO ENRIQUEZ, PAZ ENRIQUEZ, AND RANDOL INGAN, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

The plaintiff-appellant instituted this action in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Oriental for the partition of two parcels of land
described in his amended complaint, alleging as cause of action the following
facts:

That he is the natural child of Francisca Piñero, born on
November 4, 1895, when his mother could have legally married his father with or
without dispensation; and that he has been legally acknowledged by his mother as
such natural child, and has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status
of a natural child of said Francisca Piñero, justified by her own conduct and
that of her family, specially the defendants herein;

That long after plaintiff’s birth Francisca Piñero married the
defendant Marcelo Enriquez; that the defendant Pedro Enriquez and Paz Enriquez
are the legitimate children of Marcelo Enriquez and Francisca Piñero; that the
defendant Randol Ingan is their legitimate grandson, being the only child of
their daughter Soledad Enriquez, who died on March 14, 1940; and that Francisca
Piñero died on August 29, 1929, leaving the two parcels of land described in the
complaint, which she had acquired during her marriage to Marcelo Enriquez;

That after Francisca Piñero’s death, the defendants took
possession of the parcels of land in question and have since then enjoyed them
to the exclusion of the plaintiff, and that notwithstanding repeated requests
the defendants have refused to partition the properties in question or to give
to the plaintiff his corresponding share in the yearly produce thereof.

The plaintiff prayed for the partition of said properties in
the proportions provided by law and for his share in the produce thereof from
1929 at the rate of P325 per annum.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
That motion was sustained by His Honor Judge Sotero B. Cabahug on the theory
that the plaintiff could not inherit from his deceased mother without having
been legally acknowledged by her as her natural child, and that since his mother
had died long after he had reached the age of majority, the plaintiff could not
in the present action ask for such compulsory recognition in order to be
entitled to the inheritance in question.

In reaching that conclusion the trial judge considered as
insufficient proof of recognition the documents attached to the record
consisting of plaintiff’s certificate of birth and baptism and certain letters
written by the defendants to the plaintiff. Thus in effect the trial judge
practically decided the case on the merits in resolving defendants’ motion to
dismiss.

We think that the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint. The motion to dismiss was based on the ground that the complaint did
not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. It having been
expressly alleged in the complaint “that the said plaintiff has been legally
acknowledged by the late Francisca Piñero as such natural child,” and
that allegation having been hypothetically admitted by the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, the court could not dismiss the complaint on the theory that that
allegation is not true.

It seems that after the plaintiff had filed an opposition to
defendants’ motion to dismiss, the trial court ordered him to submit his proofs
of his status as a natural child of Francisca Piñero, and in compliance with
said order the attorney for the plaintiff filed a “manifestation” submitting
five documents consisting of the certificate of birth and baptism (Exhibit A)
and certain letters marked as Exhibits B, C, C-1, and C-2. In said,
manifestation counsel for the plaintiff stated: “These are the doctunentary
evidence in support of the complaint. The oral evidence is ready to be presented
if the Honorable Court so desires.” The trial court resolved the motion to
dismiss upon said documents and not upon the allegations of the complaint.

We find such procedure to be irregular and not authorized by
the Rules. The question submitted to the court upon the motion to dismiss was
whether the facts alleged in the complaint were sufficient to constitute a cause
of action, and not whether those allegations of fact were true. If the court
thought said allegations to be sufficient but doubted their veracity, it should
deny the motion to dismiss and require the defendants to answer and then proceed
to try the case on the merits. Section 3 of Rule 8 provides: “After hearing [the
motion to dismiss] the court may deny or grant the motion or allow amendment of
pleading, or may defer the hearing and determination of the motion until the
trial if the ground alleged therein does not appear to be indubitable.” The
trial court should have heard all the evidence before deciding the case on the
merits.

Finding that plaintiff’s amended complaint states facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, we reverse the trial court’s order
of dismissal and order the case remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, with the costs of this instance against the appellees.

Paras, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, and
Torres, JJ., concur.