PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANASTACIO AGBAY, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
CONTRERAS, J.:
The Facts
On July 12, 2002, an Information[2] filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Iligan City, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 06-9588, charged appellant Anastacio Agbay (hereafter appellant) with Murder, thus:
That on or about June 22, 2002, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with deadly weapons, to wit: a scythe and a bolo, by means of treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and hit one Freddie Agbay thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries to wit:
Cardio respiratory arrest Hypovelemia Multiple wounds
which caused his death.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.
At the time of the filing of Criminal Case No. 06-9588, appellant was at large and cannot be located; thus, the case was ordered archived by the trial court.[3]
On May 14, 2009, appellant was arrested. After he was placed into custody, the criminal charge against him proceeded.[4] Hence, on June 5, 2009, appellant entered a plea of “not guilty” in Criminal Case No. 06-9588.[5]
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, as established by the prosecution, are summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in this wise:
On June 22, 2002, around 1:00 in the morning, the victim, Freddie Agbay, and Rudy Bahian, were walking along the road towards Lambaguhon after their duty at Pillsbury Milling Corporation (PILMICO) where both worked. Some 30 meters from the victim’s house, they were waylaid by appellant, Anastacio Agbay, brother of the victim. Suddenly, appellant hacked the victim from behind thrice with the use of a scythe. The victim was first hit on the left shoulder blade, then the right elbow, followed by a blow on the head.
Rudy, who was standing one (1) meter away, attempted to distrupt appellant’s attacks on the victim by throwing a dried banana leaf unto appellant. However, appellant directed his assault towards Rudy and tried to hack him as well. Then, Rudy opted to flee and ask for help.
Rudy went to the house of Barangay Kagawad Tranquilino Alivio shouting “Please help me, Yo (tiyo or uncle) because Freddie was hacked.” Tranquilino immediately proceeded to the house of Celestino Agbay, father of both the victim and appellant, which was a mere two (2) meters away. Together with Celestino, Tranquilino went to the scene of the crime.
Upon reaching the crime scene, Tranquilino witnessed appellant continuously hacking the victim. For fear of their lives, both Tranquilino and Celestino ran away to call for police help.
It was nearing morning when Tranquilino was able to go back to the scene of the crime with Purok President Jaime Cortes, Peddy Romina and Rudy Alivio. The victim was lifeless then and appellant was gone.
Dr. Elton Jay Canoy, a physician at the Iligan City Health Office, conducted post mortem examination on the victim and concluded that the cause of death of the victim was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemia and observed that the victim sustained multiple incise wounds at the following parts of the body: 1) back of the head, 2) back of the neck, 3) chest bone, 4) right scapular area, 5) right arm, 6) upper lip, and 7) left anterior thigh; all resulting in severe bleeding.[6]
For his part, appellant advanced the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that he had nothing to do with the death of the victim Freddie Agbay, his brother, and that he was nowhere near the locus criminis when the killing occurred. He maintained that a few days prior to the killing of the victim, he left for Medina, Misamis Oriental to work.[7] He alleged that he stayed in Medina from the year 2002 until the year 2009 and never had any communication with his family in Iligan City.[8] Hence, all those years that he stayed in Medina, he had no inkling that his brother Freddie was brutally killed.[9]
After weighing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court rendered Judgment[10] finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder; imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Hence, the present appeal where appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.[11]
Our Ruling
Appellants stand charged with, and convicted of, Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the present appeal, appellant’s defense hinges mainly on denial and alibi.
Appellant contends that on the fateful night of the killing of Freddie at Lambaguhon, Iligan City, he was in Medina, Misamis Oriental. He asserts that he stayed in Medina from the year 2002 until the year 2009, and was nowhere near the victim at the time of the latter’s killing. Thus, the trial court erred in holding him liable for Freddie’s death.
At the outset, the controversy in this case is reduced to one essentially of credibility, a weighing of the evidence of the prosecution against that of the defense. It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that findings of facts of the lower court are accorded due respect and weight unless it has overlooked material and relevant points that would have led it to rule otherwise. The time-honored rule is that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between truth and falsehood. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses, unless it be clearly shown that the latter court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the case.12 In the present case, the trial court gave credence and probative weight to the eyewitness account of Rudy Bahian and Tranquilino Alivio. After careful consideration of the records of the case, We find no justification to deviate from the findings of the trial court.
It bears to stress that appellant’s guilt is primarily anchored on the respective testimonies of Rudy and Tranquilino.
In the instant case, Rudy positively and categorically testified that on that fateful morning of June 22, 2002, appellant, without any provocation, unjustifiably hacked and killed Freddie with a scythe. Rudy’s eyewitness account specifically and unerringly points to appellant as the author of the crime charged. He testified, as follows: that at the time of the killing, he was living with Freddie and the latter’s family in Lambaguhon, Iligan City; that he worked with Freddie at PILMICO; that on that fateful morning, he and Freddie were on their way home after their shift at PILMICO; that when they were about thirty (30) meters from Freddie’s house, appellant waylaid his brother, Freddie, and proceeded to repeatedly hack the latter with a scythe; that he clearly saw appellant hack his brother on the left shoulder blade, then the right elbow followed by a blow on the head because the locus criminis is sufficiently illuminated; and that he attempted to stop appellant but when the latter also tried to hack him, he was forced to run and ask for help.[13]
Rudy’s testimony is further corroborated in its material points by another eyewitness, Tranquilino, who likewise categorically identified appellant as Freddie’s assailant. He testified, in this wise: that he is a barangay kagawad; that at 1 o’ clock in the morning of June 22, 2002, he was at home resting just after arriving from a barangay-sanctioned disco party; that he was disturbed by the calls for help of Rudy, who immediately informed him that Freddie is being hacked; that upon hearing about Freddie’s attack, he rushed towards the neighboring house of Celestino Agbay, Freddie and appellant’s father, to inform him about the incident; that he and Celestino immediately rushed towards the locus criminis; that since the locus criminis is well illuminated, he and Celestino saw appellant continuously hack his brother, Freddie; that he and Celestino got scared and ran away to seek police help.[14]
In both eyewitness accounts, Rudy and Tranquilino specifically and unerringly point to appellant as the author of the crime charged. Accordingly, this Court finds that there is scarcely any contest between appellant’s feeble and self-serving asseverations and the prosecution witnesses’ categorical and unwavering declaration that appellant committed the crime charged.
It must be reiterated that the respective testimonies of Rudy and Tranquilino were direct, clear, and candid. They were able to identify appellant as Freddie’s assailant. They appear to be well acquainted with appellant, being the brother of Freddie and likewise a resident of Lambaguhon, Iligan City. Nothing in the record allows the presence of any distraction that would have disrupted Rudy, as well as Tranquilino’s attention during the occurrence of the incident because they have consistently testified that the locus criminis was well illuminated thus enabling them to clearly see and identify Freddie’s assailant. More importantly, Rudy and Tranquilino never wavered in their identification of appellant as the victim’s assailant. Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to support a conviction, even in a charge of murder.[15]
In contrast, the defenses of denial and alibi proffered by appellants fail to inspire belief. It bears to stress that in this jurisdiction the defenses of denial and alibi are negative and self-serving and are always received with caution — not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable, but also because they are easy to fabricate. They cannot prevail over, and are worthless in the face of, positive identification by a credible witness or the positive and categorical statements of the victim.[16]
To be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability. Otherwise, it is purely self-serving and without merit.[17] This is especially true in this case since We find no motive on the part of Rudy and Tranquilino to prevaricate and testify falsely against appellant. Where there is nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, his/her positive declarations made under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence.18
The defense of alibi proffered by appellant must likewise fail. It cannot be gainsaid that appellant’s alibi is futile, in the wake of the two (2) eyewitness account positively identifying him as the author of Freddie’s death. To make matters worse, appellant’s alibi is rendered more dubious by the fact that such alibi was sought to be established by appellant himself, supported only by the testimonies of Celestino Agbay, his father, and Roberto Tagalog, brother-in-law of appellant’s common-law wife. In fine, appellant’s alibi is not buttressed by uninterested, unbiased persons, who would, in the natural order of things, be best situated to support the tendered alibi. It has been repeatedly observed that alibi is a defense easily fabricated especially among parents, children and relatives, or even among those not so related, so that great caution must be exercised in accepting it.[19] Furthermore, alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated by relatives whose motive is suspect.[20] Unfortunately, to Our mind, the respective testimonies of Celestino and Roberto are tainted with bias on account of their close relations to appellant.
Significantly, it is well-entrenched that for alibi to prosper, appellants must prove that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed and that they were so far away that they could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission,[21] the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time.[22]
Regrettably, appellant himself established that Medina is just a mere four (4)-hour drive from Iligan City.[23] The foregoing, coupled by the fact that appellant appears to have been born and bred in Lambaguhon, Iligan City – where his family still maintains residence, does not preclude the possibility that appellant could have committed the felony. Notably, appellant took flight and went into hiding immediately after the killing of Freddie.[24] In fact, a warrant of arrest against appellant was issued on July 24, 2002,[25] but said warrant was never served because appellant had already absconded and was already at large. It was only on May 14, 2009, that appellant was taken into custody.[26] For a considerable period of time, appellant disappeared from view, until the long arm of the law caught up with him. As pointed out by the trial court, “the court is not convinced that he did not know about the death of Freddie. The accused was not telling the truth when he testified [that] he did not contact his wife or any member of his family for a span of seven years. Taking into consideration that the distance between Medina, Misamis Oriental and Iligan City is less than 200 kilometers, he could have easily gone home to visit his family if he wanted to. To the mind of the court, the accused did not intend to return to Iligan and purposely went into hiding for several years because he knew that there was a standing warrant of arrest issued against him.”[27] Indeed, in a catena of cases, the flight of the accused, in the absence of a credible explanation, would be a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be established “for a truly innocent person would normally grasp the first available opportunity to defend himself and to assert his innocence.” Flight evidences guilt and guilty conscience: the wicked flee, even when no man pursues, but the righteous stand fast as bold as a lion.[28]
Finally, this Court agrees with the trial court in appreciating treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing of the victim.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby, ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor.[29]
In the instant case, it has been sufficiently established that on that fateful night, Freddie was about to go home from work, oblivious to any danger, when he was attacked and slain by appellant.[30] No altercation preceded the incident.[31] More importantly, it appears that the victim was not in a position to put up any defense, since he never anticipated the attack.[32]
However, We disagree with the trial court in finding that there is evident premeditation in the commission of the crime charged.
According to Art. 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code, an offense is aggravated when it is committed with evident premeditation. Evident premeditation is present when the following requisites concur:
1. the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
2. an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and
3. sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[33]
Corollarily, evident premeditation must be proved as clearly as the crime itself and cannot be deduced from mere conclusions and inferences.[34] The evidence presented against the appellant failed to prove the foregoing requisites.
It must be emphasized that the eyewitness account of Rudy only shows that without any warning or provocation, Freddie was waylaid and hacked by appellant while the former was on his way home from work in the early morning of June 22, 2002. The documentary, as well as the testamentary records of the case did not show sufficient evidence to support the existence of the time when appellant determined to commit the crime and that sufficient lapse of time existed between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the circumstances of his act. To properly appreciate evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance, it is indispensable that the fact of planning the crime be established. Particularly, evidence must show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much time had elapsed before it was carried out. Absent such proof, evident premeditation cannot prosper. In this case, the records are bereft of evidence proving how and when the plan to attack the victim was hatched.[35]
To be sure, the essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[36] These circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar.
All told, the trial court correctly found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Under Article 248[37] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty imposed for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since only the qualifying circumstance of treachery is found to be present, the trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 63[38] of the Revised Penal Code.[39]
This Court, however, adds that appellant shall not be eligible for parole. Under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346, “[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”[40]
As to damages, the award by the trial court of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity in favor of the heirs of the victim must be raised to P75,000.00, in order for the award to conform with current jurisprudence.[41] Such award is mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide.[42]
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the moral damages awarded by the trial court in the amount of P50,000.00 must likewise be increased to P75,000.00.[43] Moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder and homicide.[44]
We also sustain the award of temperate damages; however, the same must be reduced from P50,000.00 to P25,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Prevailing judicial policy dictates that temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00 is proper “in homicide or murder cases when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court.” Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.[45]
Finally, Freddie’s heirs are indeed entitled to exemplary damages since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established by the prosecution. It is well-entrenched that if a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P30,000.00 as exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code.[46] This kind of damages serves as deterrent to serious wrongdoings, as vindication of undue suffering and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured person, and as punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.[47]
One final note. In addition and in conformity with current policy, this Court also imposes on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.[48]
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6 in Iligan City finding appellant Anastacio Agbay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION, in that appellant is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of Freddie Agbay, the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages and interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum on all the monetary awards for damages from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Lloren, J., Ch., and Santos, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo, pp. 63-69.
[2] Record, p. 1.
[3] Record, p. 13.
[4] Record, p. 22.
[5] Record, p. 37.
[6] Rollo, pp. 90-91.
[7] TSN, September 2, 2010, pp. 5-6.
[8] TSN, September 2, 2010, pp. 11, 18, and 22.
[9] TSN, September 2, 2010, p. 21.
[10] Rollo, pp. 63-69.
[11] Rollo, p. 32.
[12] People v. Piedad, et al., G.R. No. 131923 (December 5, 2002).
[13] TSN, May11, 2010, pp. 4-7.
[14] TSN, June 1, 2010, pp. 5-9 and 18.
[15] People v. Visperas, Jr., G.R. No. 147315 (January 13, 2003).
[16] People v. Montes, G.R. Nos. 148743-45 (November 18, 2003).
[17] Velasco v. People, G.R. No. 166479 (February 28, 2006).
[18] People v. Cabinan, G.R. No. 176158 (March 27, 2007).
[19] People v. Cadag, G.R. No. 93899 (May 8, 1992).
[20] People v. Cabanela, G.R. No. 127657 (November 24, 1998).
[21] People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 128105 (January 24, 2001).
[22] Velasco v. People, supra.; see note 18.
[23] TSN, September 2, 2010, p. 25.
[24] Record, p. 13.
[25] Record, p. 12.
[26] Record, p. 19 (dorsal portion).
[27] Rollo, p. 67; Decision, p. 5.
[28] People v. Moriles, Jr., G.R. No. 153248 (March 25, 2004).
[29] People v. Romero, G.R. No. 145166 (October 8, 2003).
[30] TSN, May 11, 2010, pp. 4-5.
[31] TSN, May 11, 2010, p. 5.
[32] TSN, May 11, 2010, pp. 5-7.
[33] People v. Gabrino, G.R. No. 189981 (March 9, 2011).
[34] People v. Pral, et al., G.R. Nos. L-68311-13 (January 30, 1992).
[35] People v. Maglente, et al., G.R. No. 201445 (November 27, 2013).
[36] People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 153591 (February 23, 2004).
[37] ART. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity; xxx (omission supplied)
[38] ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties. – In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: xxx
2. When there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesses penalty shall be applied. xxx (omission supplied)
[39] People v. Mamaruncas, et al., G.R. No. 179497 (January 25, 2012).
[40] People v. Dejillo, et al., G.R. No. 185005 (December 10, 2012).
[41] People v. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 186528 (January 26, 2011).
[42] People v. Elarcosa, et al., G.R. No. 186539 (June29, 2010).
[43] People v. Balauitan, G.R. No. 200053 (October 23, 2013).
[44] People v. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 186528 (January 26, 2011).
[45] People v. Dolorido, G.R. No. 191721 (January 12, 2011).
[46] People v. Angelio, G.R. No. 197540 (February 37, 2012).
[47] People v. Gannaban, Jr., G.R. No. 173249 (November 20, 2007).
[48] People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 190340 (July 24, 2013).