ARSENIO L. CANLAS AND ADENA GONZALES-CANLAS, PETITIONERS, VS. THE JUDGE OP THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OP TARLAC AND JAIME TAYAG, RESPONDENTS.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an original petition for, certiorari filed by the spouses Arsenio L.
Canlas and Adena Gonzales-Canlas, questioning the order of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in Civil Case No. 3512 of said court, dated October 14, 1961,
dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein, on the ground that
the aforesaid order runs counter to the judgment already rendered by this Court
In 6. R. No. L-16815, entitled Arsenio L. Canlas, et al. vs. Hon. Bernabe de
Aquino, etc., et al. promulgated on July 24, 1961.

Civil Case No. 3512 was instituted by the spouses Canlas to enjoin Jaime
Tayag from constructing and operating h rice mill in front of their clinic and
private hospital, and pursuant to their prayer, the then presiding Judge Zoilo
Hilario of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, granted and issued a writ of
preliminary injunction. Subsequently, however, respondent Tayag, petitioned for
the dissolution of the injunction order. Judge Bernabe de Aquino who later took
cognizance of the case, granted the petition and dissolved the preliminary
injunction. Their motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid dissolution order,
having been denied, the spouses Canlas come to this Court (in G. R. No. L-16815)
and obtained a judgment on July 24, 1961, in effect reinstating the preliminary
injunction previously issued by the lower court against the construction of
Tayag’s rice mill, on the ground that Tayag’s petition (for dissolution of the
writ of preliminary injunction) was not verified and that the same was granted
by the lower court without hearing and based only on information that the rice
mill to be constructed would not constitute a nuisance to the neighborhood. :

At the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court as a result of our
decision, Tayag filed an alternative petition again asking for the lifting of
the writ of preliminary injunction. Considering the grounds given therein as
well as the affidavits attached thereto, the said Petition was granted by order
of the court of October 14, 1961, and the writ of preliminary injunction was
again order dissolved. The spouses Canlas came again to this court and brought
the instant petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the aforesaid order
and the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction issued, there- in, and
reaffirmed by our decision in the first certiorari proceedings, contending that
to again lift the original preliminary injunction before the final disposition
of the case on the merits would be contrary to the decision of the Supreme Court
and would amount to prejudging the case. As prayed for by petitioners, and upon
their filing of the required bond, 1ms Court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction in this case, enjoining the lower court from enforcing its order of
October 14, 1961.

On October 22, 1964, respondent Jaime Tayag filed a petition to lift the
preliminary injunction issued herein, for the reason that the lower court has
already rendered a final decision en the merits in the main case, dismissing the
original petition filed therein and dissolving the writ of preliminary
injunction issued in said action. Asked to comment on this motion, petitioner
Canlas objected alleging that the decision rendered in the main case has been
appealed by them to the Court of Appeals and that the lower court had no
authority to dissolve the preliminary injunction issued by this court at the
inception of this certiorari proceedings.

There seems to be a misconception of the import of (1) the decision of this
Court in G. R. No. L-15815 (supra) which annulled trio first order of the lower
court dated February 4, 1960, lifting the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by it, and (2) the writ of preliminary injunction issued by
this Court in this present case dated February 11, 1963.

As has been stated earlier, our decision in case G. R« No. Lr-16815, merely
annulled the lower court’s lust order of dissolution because the petition to
that effect was not in proper form and the circumstances then prevailing did not
justify such dissolution. This Court, in setting aside the order of dissolution,
stated that:

“Indeed, the main action was filed by petitioners herein for the purpose of
enjoining and prohibiting Tayag from constructing a ricemill, so that, upon the
conrtruction thereof, said action would become futile. Besides, the intention of
respondent Judge to prohibit the continuance of the operation of said ricemill,
Should it later be found to be a nuisance, is not sufficient to offset the harm
already done to the operation of the hospital, specially the injury suffered by
the patients therein and the public in general, which are hardly susceptible of
estimation or compensation, Needless to say, by permitting Tayag to construct
his building, and purchase and install the machinery for the operation of the
ricemill respondent Judge exposed him to much greater damage than that which
could possibly have resulted had the writ of preliminary injunction been
maintained until the final disposition of the case.”

“In effect, therefore, it was thought best that the preliminary injunction
originally issued should remain in force only until the main case has been
finally heard and decision therein rendered on the merits.

However, as also already mentioned above, after the promulgation of our
decision in G. R. No. L-16815, respondent Tayag renewed his petition in the
lower court for the lifting of the same original injunction reinstated by us in
said case G.R. No. L-16815. Acting upon said petition, and in view of the
rectification of the former defects and the affidavits attached to the new
petition, the lower court on October 14, 1961, ordered the dissolution of the
order of preliminary injunction. The herein petitioners, contending that this
last order of the lower court was contrary to our decision in G. R. No. L-1G815
and that the said dissolution constituted a prejudgment of the case on the
merits, again came up here and filed the present petition for certiorari asking
for the setting aside of this second order of dissolution. And, acting upon the
prayer in the petition, we issued a writ of preliminary injunction on joining
the enforcement of the second order of dissolution dated October 14, 1961. It is
this case for certiorari which is now before us and which has already been
submitted for decision on the merits.

However, in view of the decision on the merits now rendered by the Court of
First Instance in Civil Case No. 3512, dismissing the petition and consequently
the preliminary injunction originally issued therein, the maintenance of which
was ordered by this Court only pending the trial and final disposition of the
main case, it is clear that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this
Court on February 11, 1963 has become functus oficio as the purpose
thereof has already been attained. And this being the case, the issue before us
in the present certiorari proceeding has become academic.

In view thereof, the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein is hereby
dissolved and the case dismissed, for being moot. No. costs. So ordered.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. Paredes, Bengzon. J. P.
and Zaldivar, J.J. concur.