JOSE ORELLANO, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ROMUALDO ALVESTIR, DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Civil Case No. 55129, Jose Orellano vs. Romualdo Alvestir, dated November
18, 1963 dismissing appellant’s action of unlawful detainer
against appellee upon the ground that there is
another action pending between the same parties, Civil Case No. 53664, also in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Romualdo
N. Alvestir et al. vs. Jose Orellano
et al., as well as the order of December 12, 1963 denying reconsideration of
the previous order of dismissal.

Appellee Alvestir
is the occupant of a lot partly previously owned by the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, who sold the same to appellant Orellano.  Upon
consummation of this sale, Orellano wrote letters to Alvestir to formalize his occupancy of the part of
appellant’s land he was occupying by agreeing to pay corresponding
rentals.  Alvestir
promised to do so, but even after several years had passed, he made no definite
arrangement as requested.  Apparently
tired of waiting for appellee, appellant filed an ejectment suit in the City Court of Manila on June 4, 1963.  On August
21, 1963, Alvestir filed his answer with
af­firmative defenses and a counterclaim as follows:

“And by way of SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES, the defendant
alleges:

“A.  That defendant hereby incorporates and repleads all the grounds in the Motion to Dismiss dated July 30, 1963, namely:

(1)  That the complaint does not state a cause of
action;

(2)  That the plaintiff has no legal capacity to
sue; and

(3)  That this Honorable Court has no jurisdiction
to hear the case.

“B.  That defendant’s house has been partly
constructed on a piece of land, described as Road Lot No. 34, situated in what
is known as the ‘HACIENDA NUESTRA SEÑORA
DE LOS REMEDIOS‘ situated along Leveriza
Street, District of Malate, Manila, the registered
owner of which is The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila as per Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 48101, issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila, and
partly on a piece of land owned by Dr. Enrique Esquivel, Sr., where he has
actually been occupying for the last ten years.

“C. That
defendant, through his spouse Ernestina E. Alvestir
and jointly with other occupants of Road Lot No. 34, wrote on October 26, 1958
a letter-petition to the owner, The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, making
known their desire to buy the area on which their respective houses had been
constructed, and one day later on October 27, 1958, defendant’s spouse who
again together with other occupants of said Road Lot No. 34 wrote a letter to
the owner’s agents and administrators, The Philippine Realty Corporation, to
its manager, offering to buy the area on which they built their respective
houses, but which letters were never answered or acted upon, copy of said
letters are hereto attached as Annexes ‘A’ and ‘B’, which clearly shows that
defendant has been longer in possession of the property subject of this action
than the plaintiff;

“D. That this
case is Sub Judice in view of a pending
suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 53664 for partial
recission and conveyance and/or damages, entitled ‘Romualdo N. Alvestir and
Ernestina E. Alvestir, Plaintiffs, versus The Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, The Philippine Realty Corporation, and the
Spouses Jose Orellano and Lorenza
Aparis-­Orellano, Defendants’, and that whatever be
the decision in Civil Case No. 53664 above will greatly affect this case.

“And By Way of COUNTERCLAIM against the plaintiff, defendant
alleges:

“I.   That when plaintiff improved his house near
defendant’s house in October and November, 1962, he not only closed an existing
2-1/2 meters wide passageway between defendant’s house and plaintiff’s house
but also encroached and continues to encroach upon defendant’s backyard, tore
down the wooden fence, deprived the defendant totally of the use of the said
backyard, put-up structures which presenting ugly sight thereof to the public,
and placed other obstructions to the damage, prejudice and great discomfort of
defendant and his family, and as a result of the plaintiff’s acts of encroachment, depredation, obstructions and deprivation
of defendant’s use of his holdings, defendant and his family has been subjected
to ridicule and contempt and for which he now claims for moral damages and
injury in an amount to be proven and given at the discretion of this Honorable
Court;

“II.  That because defendant has to defend his
right, he has engaged the services of the undersigned counsel and has obligated
himself to pay the amount of P500.00 as and for attorney’s fees, and so stands
to suffer the said amount, and for which plaintiff should be made liable.”  (Pp. 11-14, Record on Appeal.)

From an unfavorable decision of the City Court which made no
reference at all to the above affirmative defenses and counterclaim, Alvestir appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila,
wherein upon reproduction of Orellano’s complaint, he
filed a motion to dismiss on two grounds: (1) “That the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant case for ejectment filed by plaintiff; and (2) That there is a pending
action between the same parties involving the same subject matter, namely, the
better right of possession.”

The trial court sustained the jurisdiction of the City Court and
its own, but granted the motion to dismiss on the second ground in an order dated
November 18, 1963 as
follows:

“Paragraph 5 of the complaint alleges that the defendant
failed to keep his ‘several promises to voluntarily move out his improvements
or pay the rentals due.’ These promises legalized the occupancy of the land
until the final demand made on the defendant on April 30, 1963 (Cruz v. Hon. Gregorio A. Atencio, SC-G.R. No. L-11276,
February 28, 1959).  The case cited by
the defen­dant (Oppen vs. Bayer, CA-G. R. No. 483-R,
Jan. 28, 1948) is not controlling as the ruling therein made is inconsistent
with a decision later rendered by our Supreme Court in the aforecited
case.

“There is, however, merit in defendant’s contention that there
is a pending action between the same parties involving the same subject
matter.  Thus in Civil Case No. 53664
pending before Branch VI of this Court, the plaintiff Romualdo
N. Alvestir there (defendant here) alleges that among
others, the defendant Jose Orellano there (plaintiff
here) has encroached upon and continue to encroach upon the land involved in
both cases in view of the contract to sell, dated March 4, 1959, questioned in
said Civil Case No. 53664.  As the last
mentioned case was filed ahead of the instant case, it is obvious that the
matter here sought to be litigated is already being litigated and can be
decided in said case.  There is,
therefore, no sense in two branches of this Court considering the same dispute
as to right of possession of the land involved.

“WHEREFORE, this Court sustains the second ground advanced by
the defendant and dismisses the instant case, leaving the matter for decision
in Civil Case No. 53664 of Branch VI of this Court.

“Without finding as to costs.

“SO ORDERED.” (Pp. 100-101, Rec. on Appeal.)

A motion for reconsideration was filed by appellant on December
4, 1963, and after the appellee had filed his
opposition, the trial court denied said motion on December 12, 1963 thus:

“Defendant’s motion to dismiss, dated October 21, 1963, taken as
a whole, alleges that there is a pending action between the same parties
involving the same cause (erroneously referred to as subject matter).  There is merit in this contention.

“Thus, in Civil Case No. 53664 filed in Branch VI of this
Court, ahead of the filing of the instant illegal detainer
case before the Municipal Court of Manila, the cause of action was the
purported violation of the alleged superior right of herein defendant Romualdo N. Alvestir to the
possession of the 70 square meters of land involved in said Civil Case No.
53664, in view of the provisions of Sec. 5 of Republic Act No. 1162, which it
is contended, renders invalid the contract to sell executed by and between the
herein plaintiff Jose Orellano and the Catholic
Archbishop of Manila; while in the instant case the action for ejectment alleges, as a cause the violation of plaintiff’s
alleged superior right as against the defendant to the possession of said 70
square meters, premised on the same contract to sell the validity of which is
in question in Civil Case No. 53664.

“WHEREFORE, plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, dated
December 3, 1963, is hereby denied, and the Order of this Court of November 18,
1963 is hereby reiterated as here clarified.

“SO ORDERED.” (Pp. 137-138, Rec. on Appeal.)

In brief, what happened here is this:  Before Orellano
could file his unlawful detainer case against Alvestir in the city court, the latter had already
commenced Civil Case No. 53664 in the Court of First Instance, alleging as
cause of action substantially the matters alleged by him in his affirmative
defenses in the case before the city court. 
In other words, in his action in the Court of First Instance, Alvestir claimed the right to continue in posses­sion of
the land in dispute for according to his theory, he, being an occupant of said
land, long before the sale thereof to Orellano, is
entitled to priority over Orellano in purchasing the
same from the Archbishop of Manila, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
1162 as amended by Republic Act No. 1599 to the effect that: “That no lot
or portion thereof actually occupied by a tenant or occupant shall be sold by
the landowner to any other person than such tenant or occupant, unless the
latter renounces in a public instrument his right under this Act.” He
prayed for the rescission of the Archbishop’s sale to Orellano.  As already stated in his answer in the ejectment case, he already pleaded the pendency
of this action as an affirmative defense. 
Later, in the Court of First Instance to where he appealed from the
adverse decision of the city court, he made the same matter as a ground for a motion to dismiss, invoking in
effect Section 1, par. (d) of Rule 8 of the Rules of Court of 1940, that is,
“that there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause.” The trial judge sustained his motion and dismissed the
complaint of Orellano.

We hold that His Honor acted correctly.  In the final analysis, the real bone of
contention between the parties is the right of possession over the land in
controversy.  In his complaint for ejectment appellant predicates his right to such possession
on the sale to him of the said land by the Archbishop.  On the other hand, appellee
claims that that sale is violative of existing law
which grants him, as occupant thereof, a right to priority in the purchase
thereof, hence the sale to Orellano should be
rescinded.  Undoubtedly, as to who
between appellant and appellee has the better right
of possession depends on whether or not the sale to Orellano
may be rescinded for being violative of the legal
provisions relied upon by Alvestir.

It must be borne in mind that here the original action in the
City Court of Manila was one of unlawful detainer,
not of forcible entry.  In the latter
kind of action, the only issue is who has prior possession de facto.  In unlawful detainer,
however, the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, for in such
action, the defendant is the one in actual possession, and the cause of action
of the plaintiff is the termination of defendant’s right to continue in
possession.  Of course, it is elementary,
in actions of forcible entry, that mere allegation of ownership by defendant in
his answer does not deprive the inferior court of jurisdiction, but the moment
it appears at the trial that the question of possession is inextricably
connected or intertwined with the issue of title or ownership, the inferior
court is ousted of jurisdiction to continue the case as one of unlawful detainer only.  (3
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 308, 1970 ed.) Similarly, when the
defendant contends in his answer to a complaint of unlawful detainer
that the claim of superior right of possession of the plaintiff is legally
baseless or unfounded, the inferior court can continue trying the case only if
at the trial, the matter on which such defense is grounded or predicated is one
within its jurisdiction; otherwise, it must dismiss the case in order that the
defendant’s defense may be passed upon by a court of proper jurisdiction.  (Cf. Aquino v. Deala, 63 Phil. 582.)

In the instant case, outside of the allegations in the answer of Alvestir to the complaint in the city court, there is no
indication in the record on appeal as to what happened at the trial.  All that We can see is that the city court
did not pass on the affirmative defenses of the defendant.  Apparently, the city court paid no heed to
the defendant’s allegation that the issue of better right of possession was
already being litigated in the Court of First Instance.

It is Our considered opinion that as held by the trial court, Orellano’s claim of better right of possession in his
complaint for ejectment is already in issue in Alvestir’s action for res­cission pending in the Court of
First Instance.  It does not matter that Orellano is defendant in that case whereas he is plaintiff
in the city court, as long as the issues raised in the pleadings by either of
the parties require the resolution of the same cause.  There is no question here that the same
parties are involved in both cases, albeit in Civil Case No. 53664, there are
other parties who are not parties in the ejectment
suit.  (Alzua
vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Juan vs. Go Cotay, 26
Phil. 328.) The subject matter is possession of the identical land in
dispute.  And the cause of Alvestir in the Court of First Instance case is the same
cause he alleged as affirmative defense in the detainer
case.  In any event, it is beyond cavil
of doubt that until the question of whether or not Alvestir
has a right of priority, under the laws invoked by him, over Orellano to purchase the land in dispute is decided, the
matter of who between appellant and appellee has the
better right of possession over it cannot be determined.  We are not in any way suggesting that appellee’s action for rescission is clearly
meritorious.  What is apparent is that it
is not on its face groundless.  The
contention of appellant that Alvestir cannot have any
standing in law, even under the provisions of Republic Act 1162, as amended,
invoked by him is a matter that We cannot resolve here.  It is but proper, therefore, from any point
of view, that Civil Case No. 53664 be allowed to follow its course and the ejectment suit be dismissed.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are
affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Fernando, (Chairman), Antonio, Aquino,
and Martin,* JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., J., did not take part.

* Mr. Justice Ruperto
G. Martin was designated to sit in the Second Division.