INTESTATE ESTATE OF SATURNINO FULE, DECEASED. CIRIACO FULE, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. ANASTASIO FULE ET AL., OPPONENTS AND APPELLEES.

JOHNSON, J.:

The record in this case presents two questions:

First. Was the appeal from the decision of the lower court perfected within
the time required by law? And,

Second. Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint an
administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased?

FACTS

Saturnino Fule died on the 4th day of April, 1923, intestate. On the 2d day
of July, 1923, Ciriaco Fule, one of the heirs, presented a petition in the Court
of First Instance of the Province of Laguna for the appointment of an
administrator of the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased, and prayed specially
for the appointment of Cornelio Alcantara as such administrator. The petitioner
further prayed that during the pendency of the petition for the appointment of
an administrator, the said Cornelio Alcantara be then and there appointed as
special administrator for said estate. The petitioner alleged that at the time
of the death of Saturnino Fule, he was the owner of real and personal property
located in the municipality of San Pablo, Province of Laguna, of the value of
P50,000 with a rental value of about P8,000 and that, in addition to said real
and personal property, he also left about P30,000 in cash. The lower court on
the day of the presentation of the petition appointed Cornelio Alcantara as
special administrator and required him to give a bond of P8,000. On the 26th day
of July, 1923, the special administrator presented in court an inventory of the
alleged property of the deceased.

On the 31st day of July, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney Mr.
Ramon Diokno, appeared and presented a motion alleging that they were children
of Saturnino Fule and that they were all of age; that they opposed the
appointment of an administrator upon the ground that the deceased had left no
debts and that his property had already been partitioned among his children
during his lifetime in conformity with article 1056 of the Civil Code; that the
special administrator had taken possession of property of large value belonging
to them, and had thereby deprived them of their means of livelihood, and prayed
that the order appointing a special administrator be denied. To said motion
there was annexed Exhibit A, containing a list of property, personal and real,
which the special administrator had taken possession of, belonging to the
oppositors.

On the 4th day of August, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney,
presented a further opposition to the appointment of an administrator for said
estate, alleging again that the heirs of Saturnino Fule were all of age; that
the deceased had left no debts; that the property had been divided among his
heirs during his lifetime; that the special administrator had been appointed
without any notification whatever, neither personal nor by publication, to the
heirs of the deceased, and that there was no necessity for the appointment of a
special administrator during the pendency of the question, nor for the
appointment of an administrator.

On the 14th day of August, 1923, the petitioner answered the motion of the
oppositors and opposed their petition for the revocation of the appointment of a
special administrator. He alleged that the oppositors had been requested to make
a partition of the property of the deceased; that no partition of the property
of the deceased had been made during the lifetime of the deceased; that the
property described in Exhibit A attached to the motion of the oppositors was the
exclusive and absolute property of the petitioner, who had for more than forty
years been in the quiet, public, and exclusive possession of the same, as owner;
and prayed that the motion of the oppositors be denied.

Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Isidro Paredes, judge, on the
15th day of August, 1923, revoked the appointment of the special administrator
and ordered him to render an account. On the same day (August 15, 1923) Judge
Paredes denied the appointment of an administrator, and suggested to the
petitioner that within thirty days from that date he should amend his petition
and present an ordinary action for the partition of the property of the estate
of the deceased, and in case he should fail to do so it would be understood that
the petition for the appointment of an administrator is denied.

On the 5th day of September, 1923, the petitioner excepted to the orders of
the court of the 15th day of August, 1923, and on the same day presented a
motion for reconsideration, or new trial, and prayed that the court declare
without effect the orders of the 15th day of August and proceed to the
appointment of an ordinary administrator who should present to the court a
project of partition of the property involved, for approval. On the 11th day of
September, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney, opposed the motion for
reconsideration or new trial upon the ground that the judgment of the court of
the 15th day of August had become final and non-appealable.

On the 17th day of September, 1923, the court a quo, considering said motion
for reconsideration or new trial and the opposition thereto, annulled and set
aside that part of the order of the court of the 15th day of August, which
granted to the petitioner the right to aniend his petition, and fixed the 4th
day of October, 1923, for a continuation of the proof upon the question of the
appointment of an administrator. On the 26th day of October, 1923, and after
hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Isidro Paredes, denied the
petition for the appointment of an administrator upon the principal ground that
all of the property of Saturnino Fule had been in the possession of his heirs
for many years before his death; and that at the time of his de&th there
were no debts and no property to be administered. From that judgment the
petitioner appealed.

In this court the oppositors renewed their motion to dismiss the appeal for
the reason that it had not been presented within the period of twenty days as
provided in section 783 of Act No. 190. Said section provides that: “Any person
legally interested in any other order, decree, or judgment (other than those
mentioned in sections 781 and 782) of a court of first instance in the exercise
of its jurisdiction in special proceedings in the settlement of the estates of
deceased persons or the administration of guardians and trustees, may appeal to
the Supreme Court from such order, decree, or judgment, when such order, decree,
or judgment constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties so
appealing, and the appeal shall be effected in the manner provided in the two
preceding sections: * * *” (within twenty days).

The appellees argue that the appeal was not perfected within twenty days from
the 15th day of August, 1923. They evidently overlooked the fact that the decree
was not a final decree for the reason that it gave the petitioner thirty days
within which to decide whether he would amend his petition or present an
ordinary action. Inasmuch, therefore, as the petitioner had thirty days within
which to decide just what course he would pursue, said decision could not become
final until after the expiration of thirty days or until the petitioner had
decided just what course he desired to take. That order of the court conceding
him thirty days to decide the option therein given, continued in force until the
17th day of September, when the court decided the motion for reconsideration and
granted to the petitioner a part of his prayer. From that date the cause
proceeded to a final hearing and judgment on the 26th day of October, 1923, and
the appeal from the final judgment of that date was perfected within the time
provided for in the above-quoted provision of Act No. 190.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the judgment of the 15th day of August,
1923, was not final; that the final judgment rendered in the cause was on the
26th day of October, 1923; that the appeal from the final judgment was perfected
within time, and therefore, the motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to
perfect the same within the statutory period is hereby denied.

Upon the second question—id the court a quo commit an error in
refusing to appoint an administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule?—it may be
said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the present action, that
at the time of his death no debts existed against his estate and (b) that all of
the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age. In this jurisdiction and by virtue of
the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all gf the
property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is
transmitted immediately to his heirs. (To Guioc-Co vs. Del Rosario, 8
Phil., 546; Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Marin
vs. Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238; Malahacan vs. Ignacio, 19
Phil., 434; Nable Jose vs. Uson, 27 Phil., 73; Bondad vs.
Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)

If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes immediately
to his heirs, as owners, and there are no debts, what reason can there be for
the appointment of a judicial administrator to administer the estate for them
and to deprive the real owners of tKeir possession to which they are immediately
entitled? In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad (34 Phil., 232), Chief
Justice Cayetano Arellano, discussing this question, said: ” ‘Under the
provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to the succession
of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the
heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The
property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the
same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the
heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If
they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to
partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also
have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an
estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually
agree in the division.’ ” (Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)

When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no
reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an
administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever
in the division of the estate among the heirs when they are adults and when
there are no debts against the estate. (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa,
supra; Bondad vs. Bondad, supra; Baldemor vs. Malangyaon,
supra.)

When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the
property left by their ancestor is the same as that of any other coowners or
pwners in common, and they may recover their individual rights, the same as any
other coowners of undivided property. (Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann., 502;
Mclntyre vs. Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et ux. vs. Ford, 29
Miss., 57.)

And even when there are debts against the estate, the heirs, all being of
age, may pay the debts and divide the property among themselves according to
their respective rights, as heirs or as legatees in case of a will, without
probating the same, and the effect of such division is to invest each party with
a complete equitable title to their particular share of the estate. (Carter
vs. Owens, 41 Ala., 217.)

The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exists
in the division of personal as well as the real property. If they cannot agree
as to the division, then a suit for partition of such personal property among
the heirs of the deceased owner is maintainable where the estate is not in debt,
the heirs are all of age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no
necessity thereof. (Jordan vs. Jordan, 4 Tex. Civ. App. Rep., 559.)

It is difficult to conceive of any one class or item of property susceptible
of being held in common which may not be divided by the coowners. It may be of
personal property as well as of real estate; of several parcels as well as of a
single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts; or of part
only of the lands of the co-owners as well as of the whole. (Pickering
vs. Moore, 67 N. H. 533; 31 L. R. A., 698 Pipes vs. Buckner,
51 Miss., 848; Tewksbury vs. Provizzo, 12 CaL, 20.)

Therefore, and for all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from
is hereby affirmed, without any finding as to costs, and without prejudice to
the right of the petitioner to commence a new action for a partition of any
property left by Saturnino Fule which had not already been partitioned among hid
heirs. So ordered.

Avanceña, Villamor, and Romualdez, JJ.,
concur.

DISSENTING

MALCOLM and OSTRAND, JJ.:

There are cases where the insignificance of the estate and the
disproportionate expenses of the administration proceedings, together with the
fact that the parties are of age and that there appear to be no debts, may
justify the denial of a petition for an administration, but such is not the
present case. Here the estate is alleged to be worth P80,000. The inventory
shows a very large quantity of personal property, thirty-one parcels of land,
and outstanding credits to the amount of P13,454. It is asserted that the
deceased left no debts, but it is not unreasonable to suppose that a person with
such large property interest may have had dealings with others from which claims
against the estate may arise, the existence of which cannot be definitely
ascertained until the publication of notice to claimants and creditors has been
made, pursuant to the provisions of section 687 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
In these circumstances it would seem to be to the interest of all parties
concerned to have the estate definitely settled and that can only be done
properly through administration proceedings.

That the distribution of the property which is alleged to have been made by
the deceased by means of informal donations a few years before his death can be
of no legal effect, will not be disputed and it clearly appears from the record
that there is no probability of an amicable distribution of the estate and that
it will be necessary to have recourse to the courts ipr a settlement of the
dispute. Considering the character of the property, partition proceedings are
likely to be more complicated and expensive than administration proceedings and
will settle nothing definitely. Claims against the estate may be presented at
any time within the Statute of Limitations and may lead to litigation and
possibly to the subsequent throwing of the estate into administration when a
redistribution of the property may have to be made. In the meantime some of the
distributees may have become insolvent or the property received by them
otherwise dissipated, thus rendering an equitable settlement of the estate
difficult if not impossible.

An examination of the cases cited in the decision of the court reveals that
only three of them have any bearing on the question here discussed. These cases
are Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa (17 Phil., 321); Bondad vs.
Bondad (34 Phil., 232) and Baldemor vs. Malangyaon (34 Phil., 367). The
case of Mclntyre vs. Chappell (4 Tex., 187), which, at first sight,
appears to be in point, is based on a statute which requires the appointment of
an administrator only in case one or more of the creditors of the estate demands
it. We have been unable to find any decision of a court in the United States
where, under a statute similar to ours, the existence of known debts has been
regarded as a necessary prerequisite for the appointment of an administrator in
cases where the heirs are of age.

It may further be observed that in none of the cases in this jurisdiction in
which the appointment of an administrator has been held unnecessary, has the
court gone as far as it has in the present case. In the case of Ilustre
vs. Alaras Frondosa the heirs were of age and had made an amicable
partition of the property left by the deceased, and the petition for the
appointment of the administrator was presented nearly six years after the death
of the deceased. In the case of Bondad vs. Bondad, supra, there had
also been an amicable partition of the property and the administrator was
appointed nine years after the death of the deceased; and in the case of
Baldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra, it also appears that there had been a
partition by agreement among the heirs. In all three of the cases it is admitted
that there were no debts and considering the long period which had elapsed since
the death of the deceased, there could be but little probability of any new
claimants appearing. Under such circumstances the court might well be justified
in holding that the appointment of an administrator was unnecessary. In the
present case we are confronted with an entirely different situation. Here there
has been no partition or distribution by agreement among the heirs, the petition
for administration was presented within three months after the death of the
deceased, and the estate is large and its settlement may give rise to unexpected
complications.

The Code of Civil Procedure devotes one hundred sixty-nine sections to
proceedings for the settlement of the estates of deceased persons. The remedies
there provided are founded on experience and are undoubtedly the most
practicable for a definite settlement of all estates of any importance. It seems
to us that the court is going beyond its proper sphere when it, by what amounts
to judicial legislation, makes the remedies prescribed by the Code unavailable
to persons interested in such estates. Instead of discouraging definite and
final settlements the courts should encourage them.

The order appealed from should be reversed and the petition for the
appointment of an administrator granted. Judgment affirmed.