ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC., PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANILA RAILROAD CO. (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAIL­WAYS) AND MANILA PORT SERVICE, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

On February 1, 1964,
plaintiff-appellee filed in the City Court of Manila, Branch III, a complaint
for the recovery of the sum of P2,691.18 for loss and damage caused to four
shipments of goods consigned to it which arrived from abroad on four different occasions
in the year 1962 and which were handled by defendants-appellants as arrastre
operators for the port of Manila.  Almost
a year later, on January 7, 1965, the said City Court rendered, on the basis of
the stipulation of facts (p. 32, Original CFI Records) entered
into on November 20, 1964 by both parties and of the annexes thereto, a
decision dismissing the complaint.  A
motion for reconsideration of this decision was denied.

Thereafter,
plaintiff-appellee appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
V.  On the basis of another stipulation
of facts (p. 69, id.) entered into on September 2, 1965 by both parties and
of the annexes to the stipulation of
facts submitted before the City Court of Manila which were adopted by them as
part of their respective evidence before the Court of First Instance of Manila,
said Court of First Instance rendered on September 23, 1965 a decision
reversing that of the City Court of Manila. 
Hence, this appeal.

The basic issue in this
appeal in whether plaintiff ­appellee’s right to bring this action has already
prescribed, the same having been brought beyond one (1) year from the dates of
discharge of the shipments in question. 
Necessarily involved in this issue is the determination of whether the
provisional claims herein involved (Exhibits A, D and G, pp. 1, 6 and 12,
respectively, Folder of Exhibits) satisfy the condition set forth in Section 15
of the Management Contract (pp. 24-25, Folder of Exhibits) that the “claim
for the value” should be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of
discharge of the last package of the said shipments.

Defendants-appellants
contend that the said provisional claims are not in compliance with Section 15
of the-Manage­ment Contract because the latter requires the filing not merely
of a “provisional claim” but of a “claim for the value” (p.
12, Appellants’ Brief).  This argument
lays much stress on the terminological difference between a “provi­sional
claim” and a “claim for the value,” which distinction is, in our
opinion, of no consequential import.  The
test in determining whether the said section of the Management Contract has
been complied with is whether a claim, be it called a “provisional
claim” or a “claim for the value,” has served the purpose of
giving the arrastre operator(s) reasonable opportunity to check the validity of
the claim while the facts are still fresh in the minds of the persons who took
part in the transaction and while the pertinent documents are still available
(Consunji v. Manila Port Service, L-15551, November 29, 1960, 110 Phil.
231).  Upon perusal of the said
provisional claims, We find that
they contain descriptions of the shipments in question sufficient to have
allowed defendants-appellants to make a reasonable verification, consistent
with our ruling in a long line of cases^[1] involving this same argument.  Accordingly, We hold that the filing of the
said provisional claims is a suffi­cient compliance with the requirement of
said section of the Management Contract.

In furtherance of their
stance that the provisional claims herein involved fall short of the claims for
the value contemplated and required by the said section of the Management
Contract, defendants-appellants contend that the said provisional claims do not
claim for actual and itemized goods lost or damaged but, instead, merely advise
that the entire shipments stated therein have been damaged and/or
short-delivered ex their respective carriers (p. 13, Appel­lants’
Brief).  Stated otherwise,
defendants-appellants argue that inasmuch as the provisional claims do not
state an itemized specification of the value of the loss or damage suffered by
the shipments in question, said provisional claims cannot be categorized as
“claims for the value,” and, hence, cannot be said to comply with the
requirement of the afore­said section of the Management Contract.  We cannot subscribe to this argument.  In the first place, it is not necessary that
the said provisional claims should state a detailed list of the loss or damage
suffered by the said shipments; they only have to meet the test We have
earlier mentioned.  The reason behind
this is that the determination and pre­paration of the specific amount of
damages claimed should be done carefully and without haste, and these can be
done practically only in a formal claim which can be filed even long after a
provisional claim has been filed. 
Secondly, Our holding that “[t]he circumstance that the provisional
claim did not specify the value of the loss still substan­tially fulfills the
requirement of the contract…, and is not a defense against the claim of the
consignee for recovery after it shall have ascertained later its actual loss or
damage”^[2]
is clearly applicable to this case where plaintiff-appellee, at first, filed
provisional claims advising defendants-appellants that the shipments stated
therein have been damaged and/or shortdelivered, then followed the same with
formal claims (Exhibits B, E and H, pp. 2, 7 and 13, respectively, Folder of
Exhibits) specifying the value of the loss or damage suffered by the said
shipments (Stipulation of Facts,
p. 69 ff., Original CFI Records).

Lastly, defendants-appellants, relying on the statement in the
provisional claims that the shipments stated therein have been damaged and/or
shortdelivered ex their respective carriers, argue that they cannot be
held liable by the said provisional claims inasmuch as being arrastre
operators, they are not responsible for loss or damage aboard, or under the
control of the said carriers.  This
argument is belied by the Stipulation of Facts (supra) submitted before the
Court of First Instance of Manila. 
Stipulation Nos. 2, 3, and 4 categorically state that the shipments
therein stated have all been discharged in good order unto the custody of
defendant-appellant Manila Port Service, implying thereby that the loss or
damage to said shipments occurred only, when they were already within its
safe-keeping.

The foregoing discussion next brings up the question of whether
the said provisional claims have been seasonably filed.  Upon examination of the aforementioned
Stipulation of Facts, We find that the dates of last discharge from the vessels
“Genevieve Lykes,” “Pioneer Moor,” and “Pioneer
Main” are May 10, 1962, May 7, 1962, and May 30, 1962, and that the
provisional claims therefor have been filed on May 14, 1962, May 14, 1962, and
May 30, 1962, respectively.  It is
obvious, then, that the said provisional claims have all been filed within the
requisite 15-day period.

We now discuss the basic issue We have earlier adverted to.

Defendants-appellants claim that “it is illegal to shift to
[them] the duty of proving [plaintiff-appellee’s] case, i.e., to show that
claims for the value were rejected or denied so as to extend further the
running of the pre­scriptive period.“^[3]
It is apparent from this
argument that defendants-appellants
invoke prescription in their favor but would rather have placed on
plaintiff-appellee the burden of proving that the suit has not yet
prescribed.  The claim that the suit has
prescribed is an affirmative allegation. 
According to Rule 131, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court,
“Each party must prove his own affirmative allegation,” and evidence
need not be given in support of a negative allegation. Hence, the defendants-appellants
have the burden of proving that the suit has prescribed.^[4]

Defendants-appellants
also contend that Section 15 of the Management Contract should be interpreted
to mean that “in cases where there is no denial or rejection of the claim
or when the denial or rejection is made after the lapse of one year from the
date of discharge of the goods, the pre­scriptive period shall commence from
the date of discharge and not from the date of rejection..”^[5] We have already had occasion to rule on this
point.  In Delgado Brothers, Inc., et
al. v. Manila Port Service, et al., L-21781, June 30, 1966; 17 SCRA 471,
where herein defendants-appellants insisted therein that “while there are
two periods provided for in the contract, in any event the suit must be filed
within one year from the date of arrival of the goods,” We rejected the
same, holding that “[t]o uphold this contention would [be] unfair to the
consignee, for all that the arrastre contractor would [do would] be to assure
the [former] that his claim is under consideration and that he would be informed
of its decision in due time; wait for one year; and then send notice that the
claim has prescribed.”^[6]
We have, thus, adopted the rule that in cases where the arrastre contractor
does not act on the claim one way or the other within the period of one year
from the date of discharge of the last package, the claim should be deemed
constructively denied or rejected upon the expiration of one year therefrom.^[7]

As earlier pointed out,
the dates of discharge from the vessels “Genevieve Lykes,”
“Pioneer Moor,” and “Pioneer Main” are May 10, 1962, May 7,
1962, and May 30, 1962, respectively; that provisional claims therefor have all
been seasonably filed but that the same have not been acted upon by,
defendants-appellants.  Applying the
above-stated rule, said claims are then deemed constructively denied upon the
expiration of one year from May 10, 1962, May 7, 1962, and May 30, 1962 or more
exactly on May 10, 1963, May 7, 1963, and May 30, 1963, respectively.  Counting from
these dates the one-year period within which action may be filed, We find that
this suit which has been filed on February 1, 1964 has not yet been barred by
prescription.

Defendants also find as
error the trial court’s adop­tion of the rates of exchange of the U.S. dollar
appearing in the so-called formal claims. They argue that even if the said
formal claims have been filed, the facts stated therein, especially with
respect to the rates of exchange of the U.S. dollar are not admitted to be true
and correct; that while in the stipulation of facts submitted before the City
Court of Manila there appeared provisions regarding said rates of exchange (p.
32 ff., Original CFI Records), the same have been discarded or deleted in the
stipulation of facts submitted before the Court of First Instance of Manila
because there has been no reliable proof to support them; and that as
plaintiff-appellee has failed to prove said rates of exchange despite its
reservation to do so, the international rate of exchange of P2.015 to a dollar
should be applied in this case (p. 14 ff., Appellants’ Brief).

In an order dated September 2, 1965 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila (p. 74, Original CFI Records), this case was submitted for
decision on the basis of the stipulation of facts submitted before said court,
together with the annexes to the stipulation of facts submitted in the City
Court of Manila which have been adopted by the parties as part of their
respective evidence.  Among these annexes
are the so-called formal claims (supra) and the Central Bank Release Certificates
(Exhibits B-1, E-1, and H-1, pp. 3, 8, & 14 respectively, Folder of
Exhibits) wherein are stated the rates of exchange applicable to the value of
the shipments therein mentioned.  Nowhere
in the records can We find anything which supports the contention of
defendants-appellants that the rates of exchange stated in said exhibits are
not true and correct. Otherwise, defendants-appellants could have easily
submitted evidence proving their own version of the true and correct rates of
exchange.  They have not done so.  Hence, applying by analogy Section 23, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules of Court, We may say that this seeming silence on
their part can only be interpreted as an admission of the truth and correctness
of the rates of exchange appearing in the exhibits aforementioned.

The contention that there was no reliable proof to support said
rates of exchange because although there appeared provi­sions on them in the
stipulation of facts submitted before the City Court of Manila, the same were
later discarded or deleted in the stipulation of facts submitted before the
Court of First Instance of Manila is without basis, plaintiff-appellee having
submitted the aforesaid Exhibits B, B-1, E-1, H and H-1 to prove the said rates
of exchange.

It is true that in the stipulation of facts submitted before the
Court of First Instance of Manila, plaintiff-appellee made the reservation to
prove the rates of exchange applicable to the invoice value of the shipments in
question.  Contrary to appellants’
allegation, plaintiff-appellee has, in
fact, submitted exhibits as proof of said rates of exchange, failing perhaps to
avail of the reservation to prove rates of exchange greater than those already
appearing in the aforesaid exhibits, which is the real import of the
reservation made in the stipulation of facts submitted before the Court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez,
Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

^[1]
To mention a few:  State Bonding
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Manila Port Service, et. al., L-22395, December 17, 1966, (18 SCRA 1139); Domestic
Insurance Co. of the Phil. v.
Manila Railroad Co. and Manila Port
Service, L-24066, August 30, 1967, (20 SCRA 1190); Philippine Education Co.
Inc. v. Manila Port Service and/or Manila Railroad Co., L-23521, October
29, 1971; (42 SCRA 31); Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. v. Manila Port
Service and/or Manila Railroad Co., L-23128, September 30, 1978, (85 SCRA 320).

^[2]
Domestic Insurance Co. of the Phil. v. Manila Rail­road Co., 20 SCRA
1190, 1194 citing State Bonding & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Manila Port
Service and/or Manila Railroad Co., L-25833, February 28, 1966, (16 SCRA 324).

^[3]
p. 8, Appellants’ Brief.

^[4]
Bollozos v. Court of Tax Appeals, L-16441, March 31, 1965; (13 SCRA 469,
475).

^[5]
p. 9, Appellants’ Brief.

^[6]
at p. 473.

^[7]
Continental Insurance Co. v. Manila Port Service, et al., L-22208, March
30, 1966; (16 SCRA 425) Delgado
Brothers Inc., et al. v. Manila Port Service, et al., L-21781, June 30,
1966; (17 SCRA 471); Philippine Education Co. Inc.  v. Manila Port Service, L-23444,
October 29, 1971; (42 SCRA 31).