G.R. No. L-32950. July 30, 1971
JOSE C. LUCIANO AND FLORENTINO S. ROLLS, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL; HON. B. JOSE CASTILLO, AS INCUMBENT PROVINC…
TEEHANKEE, J.:
A petition for writs of certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition, pleading grave abuse of discretion and excess of jurisdiction on
the part of respondent court in issuing its questioned order of December 15,
1970 in that (a) no proper preliminary investigation or review of the criminal
anti-graft charge against petitioners was conducted by respondent provincial
fiscal and (b) respondent court, without holding the hearing on the validity of
the information previously ordered by this Court, prematurely and improperly
held the questioned information to be valid, paving the way for the imminent
wrongful suspension from office of petitioner Jose C. Luciano,
incumbent acting mayor of Makati, Rizal,
as a necessary consequence thereof.
The present action is a sequel case of Luciano
vs. Wilson,[1]
resolved by the Court on August 31,
1970, wherein Mr. Justice Reyes thus summarized the antecedent
facts:
“As a consequence of our decision in G. R.
No. L-30306 (Jose C. Luciano vs. Provincial
Governor of Rizal, et al.) promulgated on 20 June
1969, upholding the suspension from office, by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, of elected Mayor Maximo Estrella, Vice-Mayor Teotimo Gealogo, and Councilors Justino
Ventura, Pedro Ison, Ignacio Babasa
and Bernardo Nonato, among other accused, as a result
of their having been found guilty of violation of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), then ranking Councilor Jose C. Luciano
entered into the office of and duly qualified as Acting Mayor of Makati.
“The records show, however, that on 30 May 1969, or prior to
his assumption of the mayorship, petitioner Luciano, together with Florentino
S. Rolls, was himself charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Law before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in
an information signed by then Provincial Fiscal Benjamin H. Aquino
(Criminal Case No. 19346). To forestall
his suspension from public office, Luciano filed with
this Court on 3 June 1969 a petition for prohibition to restrain the Provincial
Fiscal from filing the information against him; the Court of First Instance of Rizal from accepting and/or giving due course to that
information; and to have said information declared null and void. The petition was based on the allegations
that the disputed information, although dated 29 May 1969, was actually
transmitted to the Court of First Instance of Rizal
only on 30 May 1969, the very day when the respondent fiscal took his oath of
office as judge of the Rizal Court of First Instance;
and that such criminal information was filed without the respondent fiscal
having conducted a preliminary investigation and without giving the accused
(petitioner) notice and opportunity to be heard. On 5 June 1969, this Court dismissed the
petition, but without prejudice to petitioner’s filing with the court a quo of
an appropriate motion for the conducting of a preliminary investigation and for
the suspension in the meantime of criminal proceedings.
“Conformably with the aforesaid resolution, petitioner filed with the lower court
a motion to allow the holding of a preliminary investigation of the case, on
the same ground of lack of preliminary investigation. On 14
June 1969, this motion was denied, the
court below pointing out that the information carried a verified certification
by the provincial fiscal that he had conducted the required preliminary
investigation on the case. Nevertheless, considering that said fiscal had been
appointed to the judiciary, the court ventured the opinion that there was nothing
wrong in the incumbent Provincial Fiscal’s conducting
a reinvestigation or review of the evidence in the hands of the
prosecution. Thus, the latter was given
30 days from receipt of the order within which to signify in writing whether or
not he deemed it necessary to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.
“As the Provincial Fiscal B. Jose Castillo, however,
manifested that no reinvestigation of the case could be made without any
petition to this effect from the accused, Luciano
filed on 12 July 1969 a
request for the fiscal to conduct a preliminary investigation and/or
reinvestigation. Because of these incidents, petitioner’s arraignment had to be
postponed several times. On 13
September 1969, the Provincial Fiscal granted petitioner’s request
for reinvestigation, the court being notified thereof. On 15
September 1969, petitioner Luciano was
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. Thereupon, the court
set the trial of the case for 15
October 1969 without prejudice to the outcome of the reinvestigation.
“Finally, in a written manifestation dated 15 December 1969,
the Provincial Fiscal informed the court that he had conducted a preliminary
investigation and/ or reinvestigation of the case, with notice to the parties,
on 18 October 1969; that on said date, counsel for the petitioner manifested
that the evidence previously submitted to State Prosecutor Edilberto
Barot, Jr. be considered and upon receipt of the
respective memoranda of the Police Commission and the petitioner, the case be
deemed submitted for resolution; and that taking into consideration the
aforesaid evidence previously adduced together with the memoranda of the Police
Commission and the petitioner, the case be deemed submitted for resolution; and
that taking into consideration the aforesaid evidence previously adduced
together with the memoranda of the parties he (the fiscal) believed that there
existed sufficient evidence to establish prima facie the guilt of the
accused. On the same day, 15 December 1969, the court issued
an order in Criminal Case No. 19346, suspending the accused Jose C. Luciano from public office pursuant to Section 13 of
Republic Act 3019. ‘(I)t appearing that the information charging accused is
sufficient in form and substance and the validity of said information is
apparent.’ Immediately, the accused filed with the respondent court an urgent
motion for reconsideration of said order and for the holding in abeyance of the
suspension-directive. It also appears
from the record that at 2:45 in the
afternoon of that day, 15 December
1969, respondent Johnny Wilson, the Acting Vice-Mayor, took an oath
of office as Acting Mayor of Makati before a judge of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal. On 16 December 1969, Luciano
instituted the present proceeding in this Court, originally against Johnny
Wilson (who apparently did not press his intention to occupy the position of
Acting Mayor) and the Provincial Governor of Rizal
only, which was given due course on the same day. And, acting on petitioner’s prayer, we issued
a temporary restraining order against respondent Provincial Governor, to
prevent him from appointing respondent Wilson
as Acting Mayor of Makati, Rizal,
and the latter from usurping and intruding into the office of petitioner as
Acting Mayor. This Court likewise
directed petitioner to include as parties respondent
the Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
before whom Criminal Case No. 19346 was pending, and the People of the Philippines. This, the petitioner did; thus, on 19
December 1969, this Court issued another temporary restraining order to include
in the prohibition the enforcement by the respondent Judge of his automatic
suspension order of 15 December 1969 against the petitioner, and the ordering
or causing of the latter’s arrest for performing the duties of Acting Mayor of Makati.”
This Court’s resolution in said precursor case of Luciano vs. Wilson specified Luciano’s two grounds for assailing the legality of the
same respondent court’s “automatic suspension order of 15 December
1969” as follows: “(a) that he was denied his day in court when the
respondent Judge reached the conclusion that the information is valid, without
affording him opportunity to be heard; and (b) that the information does not
charge an indictable offense under Republic Act 3019, and that no preliminary
investigation was conducted in accordance with law.”
As further narrated therein, “(A)fter
the case was submitted and while pending decision by this Court, respondent
Johnny Wilson filed, on 30 June 1970, a motion to the effect that, abandoning
his previous stand, said respondent was willing to confess judgment in all
material points relevant to the issue of holding a hearing to determine the
validity of an information filed under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, x x x. Counsel for
other respondents,[2]
required to comment, manifested conformity to Wilson’s motion.”
This Court thereupon stated the following grounds and
considerations for granting Wilson’s motion: “(C)onsidering
that the basic stand of
petitioner Luciano, assented to by respondent Wilson
in his motion, that there should have been a hearing on the validity of the
information, appears conformable to the spirit of the law, taking into account
the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension of an elected public official even before his conviction;
and considering that public interest demands a speedy determination of the
issues involved in this case as well as in the case pending against petitioner
in the branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
presided by respondent Judge Herminio Mariano, this
Court is of the opinion that the motion should be granted. In the hearing thus to be held,
petitioner’s submission that
the information charges no indictable offense and that no due
preliminary investigation was made by the Provincial Fiscal, can be fully ventilated,“[3]
and accordingly resolved, inter alia,
x x x x x
“(2) To set aside the order of 15 December 1969, issued by
respondent Judge Herminio Mariano in Criminal Case
No. 19346 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, suspending
petitioner Jose C. Luciano from office;
“(3) To direct said respondent Judge Mariano to
forthwith hold a hearing on the validity of the information filed in said
Criminal Case No. 19346 and the claimed lack of proper preliminary
investigation, and determine such issues as soon as practicable; and
“(4) Should he find in favor of the prosecution, to hear and decide
the criminal case on its merits.”[4]
Accordingly, respondent court was called upon to hold a hearing
on the validity of the information[5]
for violation of the Anti-Graft Law, at which hearing “petitioner’s
submission that the information charges no indictable offense and that no
due preliminary investigation was made by the provincial fiscal, can be fully
ventilated,” as directed in this Court’s above-quoted Resolution of
August 31, 1970.
At a preliminary hearing held on October 12, 1970 in connection with petitioner’s urgent
motion for production and copying of documents, respondent court expressed
doubts as to the nature of and procedure at the hearing to be held by it in
compliance with this Court’s Resolution, thus:
“Court: You will note that order of the Supreme Court
did not lay down the necessary ruling to be adopted by this court to determine
the validity of the information or if there is a preliminary investigation.
Neither is there a provision in the Supreme Court to determine the invalidity
of the information and lack of preliminary investigation, then this court will
resolve as to how. Under Rule 135,
Section 6, it is provided for therein how this court shall determine the
validity of the information. That is in
answer to this. I think you will not
deny this court has already jurisdiction.
What means or the procedure to be followed or adopted so by tomorrow the
court will invite the parties. How would
you like to determine the validity. Would you like to present your evidence or
would you like to argue? Because there is no specific rule. So we are going to adopt suitable ways. The Court will ask the prosecution if it is
the turn of the prosecution in this case.
Is there preliminary investigation? Is there a valid
information? (sic).
What is the stand of the defense?
Is there a preliminary investigation?
Whatever is the answer,
he who will claim there is none should prove the same.
That is the process that we will adopt tomorrow.”[6]
Petitioners’ counsel submitted that the
proper procedure “to determine the validity of the information …. is to hear the motion to quash” dated December 16, 1969 and left
unresolved during the pendency in this Court of Luciano vs. Wilson.[7]
Respondent court gave respondent fiscal, if he so wished, up to the afternoon
of that same day, October 12, 1970, within which to submit his answer thereto.[8]
The required hearing was finally commenced by respondent court in
the afternoon of October 26, 1970.
The hearing centered on discussions whether there had been due preliminary
investigation of the graft charge against petitioners,[9]
since the complaint filed against them was admittedly for falsification which was dismissed by the investigating fiscal, State
prosecutor Barot with the concurrence of then provincial
fiscal (now judge) Benjamin Aquino, who, however,
considered the evidence sufficient to sustain the filing of the graft charge.
As to the other issue of the validity of the information, petitioners’ counsel
submitted that it depended on respondent court’s resolution on the first issue
of whether there had been due preliminary investigation and “then we can
meet again depending on the resolution that the court may hand down on this
first incident.”[10]
Respondent court terminated the hearing after securing the parties’ stipulation “that at
first instance, the case which was filed is falsification against the accused
in this case. That it was dismissed
after Fiscal Barot conducted the preliminary
investigation; that then Provincial Fiscal Benjamin Aquino,
now Judge of the Court of First Instance considered the evidence that while it
may not sustain the charge of falsification it can sustain the charge of
violation of the Anti-graft (Law);[11]
and asking as to what would be done on the rest of the scheduled dates of
nearing, to which petitioners’ counsel, by way of reply, “pray(ed) to
cancel these hearings until your honor has resolved this issue,”[12]
and the incident was declared submitted.
Without further ado, respondent court thereafter issued its disputed
order of 15 December 1970,
wherein it “holds and so rules that there has been a preliminary
investigation held in this case, and that the information is valid.”
I. On the first issue of whether there had been a proper preliminary
investigation of the graft charge prior to the filing of the information therefor against petitioners, respondent court, in ruling
affirmatively, relied on the same written manifestation dated 15 December 1969
of respondent fiscal Castillo of his having conducted on October 18, 1969
“a preliminary investigation and/or reinvestigation” (which had
already been considered and in effect found far from conclusive in Luciano vs. Wilson) and declared that:
“x x x At the
reinvestigation conducted by Provincial Fiscal B. Jose Castillo by virtue of
their aforementioned petition, the accused instead of presenting evidence in
their defense in order to offset the evidence of the prosecution, merely submitted
the evidence presented at the preliminary investigation conducted by State
Prosecutor Barot, and rested their fate in the hands
of Provincial Fiscal Castillo, knowing that he may decide the matter for or
against the accused. Indeed,
notwithstanding the fact that all the opportunities were open at the
reinvestigation for the accused to exercise their rights afforded them by law,
probably carried by over confidence and belief that the Provincial Fiscal would
render a verdict in their favor, the accused folded their arms and chose not to
exercise such rights. Perhaps if the resolution of the Fiscal was in their
favor, the accused would no longer complain. Now that the Fiscal has manifested
that based on the evidence presented at the reinvestigation, he believes that a
prima facie case exists against the accused, they cannot anymore invoke the
same rights and press for another preliminary investigation. The Provincial Fiscal is not bound by the
qualification of the crime designated in the complaint filed with his
Office. Rather, he is guided by the
evidence presented in the course of a preliminary investigation and on the
basis of which he may formulate and designate the offense and file the
corresponding information.
“x x x x The Provincial Fiscal may simply
rely on the records of the case on the basis of which he can draw his
conclusion, which was exactly what then Provincial Fiscal Aquino
did. Certainly, even granting that an
error had been committed in that the accused were given a preliminary
investigation on the charge of falsification but were subsequently charged with
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act under the same
preliminary investigation, which the Court does not subscribe to be an error,
yet such alleged error had been cured by the reinvestigation conducted by
Provincial Fiscal Castillo which lasted for three months and which partook of
the nature of a preliminary investigation.”[13]
Respondent court had reason to fault petitioners and their
counsel for their imprudence and “overconfidence” in “folding
their arms” and apparently choosing not to exercise their rights of
confronting and cross-examining the complainant and witnesses against them and
adducing their own evidence, when respondent Castillo called the case for
reinvestigation on October 18, 1969. But respondent court’s factual conclusions
that fiscal Castillo had indeed conducted a reinvestigation and reviewed the
evidence were far from accurate. As late
as the date the present petition was heard by the Court on January 19, 1971, the stenographic notes of all
testimonial evidence given before state prosecutor Barot[14]
during the hearings at the preliminary investigation of the original charge for
falsification had not yet been transcribed and could not therefore be
reviewed. Upon interpellation, Fiscal Castillo
confirmed this fact, as well as the further fact that neither Fiscal Aquino nor the stenographer had apprised him of the
contents of said notes. Fiscal Castillo
could not therefore inform this Court of the factual and legal bases for the information
filed by his predecessor in office[15]
and consequently manifested in open court his readiness and willingness to
conduct a preliminary investigation in fairness to petitioners.
Legally, respondent court’s theory that under the same
preliminary investigation for the crime of falsification which was ordered dismissed
by the investigating fiscal with the approval of then provincial fiscal Aquino and fiscal Castillo as being “without any
factual or legal basis”, that petitioners could nevertheless be charged on
the basis of the records with the graver crime of violation of the Anti-graft
and Corrupt Practices Law, the pendency of which
under a valid information carries mandatory suspension from office,[16]
has been rejected by this Court. In Bandiala
vs. Court of First Instance of Misamis
Occidental,[17]
where the preliminary investigation was for robbery in band (with one of the
two accused waiving the” second stage), the Court held that the provincial
fiscal could not file against the accused an information for the graver crime
of robbery with kidnapping, without giving the accused “ample
opportunity at a full-blown preliminary investigation to demonstrate that
what the fiscal regards as ‘kidnapping’ in the legal sense was merely an
incident of, and is therefore absorbed in the crime of robbery.” The Court
noted once again that “(A) preliminary investigation, it must be borne in
mind, is a practical device created by statute and by mandate of our Rules of
Court, principally for the purpose of preventing hasty, malicious and
ill-advised prosecutions,” and pointedly emphasized that “(T)he
Rules of Court on the matter of preliminary investigation, construed in their
integrated entirety, direct that, in the circumstances here obtaining, the
Fiscal, if he believes that he should
raise the category of the offense, must conduct a preliminary investigation
anew as to the entire charge.
Fundamental principles of fair play dictate this course of action. The Fiscal is not allowed by the Rules of
Court to wait in ambush; the role of a Fiscal is not mainly to prosecute, but
essentially to do justice to every man and to assist the courts in dispensing
that justice. “
II. On the second issue of the validity of the information, respondent
court evidently failed to appreciate the full import of this Court’s resolution
of August 31, 1970 that it hold a hearing at which “petitioners’
submission that the information charges no indictable offense… can be fully
ventilated.” Respondent court
held no hearing whatsoever on this second issue, disregarding petitioners’
prayer at the hearing of October 26, 1970 that it reset the issue for the
required hearing should it resolve adversely, as it did, the first issue of
whether there had been due preliminary investigation. Relying simply on the
ritualistic recitation of the necessary averments for sufficient information,[18]
respondent court summarily ruled in its questioned order as follows:
“No doubt a cursory reading of the information filed in this
case will show that it is sufficient in form and substance because it contains
all the elements prescribed by law, to wit: the designation of the offense by
the statute, the name of the accused, the act or omission complained of as
constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time
of the commission of the offense, and the place where the offense was committed. The Court cannot, therefore, but rule that
the information is valid and the Court having found, as above stated, that proper
preliminary investigation had been conducted, what remains for the Court to do
is to try the case on the merits.”[19]
Respondent court’s premptory ruling and
advance pronouncement that what remained for it to do “is to try the case
on the merits” rendered moot the petitioners’ pending motion to quash and
its scheduling the same for hearing on December 21 – 23, 1970, in the light of
its frequent references at the preliminary hearing of October 13, 1970,[20]
to this Court’s “overwhelming statements” in Luciano
vs. Prov. Governor,[21]
to the effect that “suspension is a sequel to that finding (of a valid
information), an incident to the criminal proceedings before the Court”
and that “under section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
once a valid information upon the provisions thereof is lodged with the Court
of First Instance, that court has the inescapable duty to suspend the public
official indicted thereunder.” These statements
were however taken by respondent court out of context, for in the said case of Luciano vs. Prov.
Governor, the suspension order against Mayor Estrella,
et al. as upheld by this Court came only in the trial court’s judgment of
conviction and the validity of the information could no longer be questioned
and was not in issue.
III. (a) Under the facts and circumstances here obtaining, as
discussed hereinabove, the Court finds that since the information for alleged
violation of the Anti- graft Law was filed without any previous notice to
petitioners and due preliminary investigation thereof, and despite the
dismissal of the original charge for falsification as being “without any
factual or legal basis”, petitioners are entitled to a new preliminary
investigation for the graft charge, with all the rights to which they are
entitled under section 1 of Republic Act No. 5180, approved September 8, 1967,
as invoked by them anew from respondent court, viz,
the submittal of the testimonies in affidavit form of the complainant and his
witnesses duly sworn to before the investigating fiscal, and the right of
accused, through counsel, to cross-examine them and to adduce evidence in their
defense. In line with the settled doctrine as restated in People vs. Abejuela,[22]
respondent court shall hold in abeyance all proceedings in the case before it
until after the outcome of such new preliminary investigation.
(b) Should respondent fiscal, after such preliminary investigation,
find sufficient evidence to establish prima facie the guilt of the
accused and therefore maintain the information for violation of Republic Act
No. 3019 as filed and so inform the lower court, then the trial court must hold
a hearing on the validity of the information and make an affirmative finding of
validity thereof, before it can issue the order of suspension from office of
petitioner Luciano.
This procedure was first indicated in the leading case of Luciano vs. Prov.
Governor, supra, where we stated that “in line with the
statutory text of Section 13, the suspension spoken of follows the pendency in court of a criminal prosecution under a ‘valid information’. Adherence to this rigoristic requirement funnels us down to no other conclusion
than that there must, first of all, be a determination that the information
filed is valid before suspension can be effected. This circumstance militates strongly against
the notion that suspension is automatic.
Suspension is, however, mandatory.” In the subsequent case of Luciano vs. Wilson, supra, the Court,
in requiring such pre-suspension hearing, held definitely that “a hearing on
the validity of the information appears conformable to the spirit of the law,
taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences of a suspension
of an elected public official, even before his conviction and that public
interest demands a speedy determination of the issues involved in (the)
case.” The Court has again this month reiterated such requirement in Oliveros vs. Villaluz,
L-33362, wherein we set aside the suspension order issued without prior hearing
by the trial court against petitioner mayor of Antipolo,
Rizal, as being “premature and in grave abuse of
discretion.”
(c) By way of broad
guidelines for the lower courts in the exercise of the power of suspension from
office of public officers charged under a valid information under the provisions
of Republic Act 3019 or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on
bribery, pursuant to section 13 of said Act,[23]
it may be briefly stated that upon the filing of such information, the trial
court should issue an order with proper notice requiring the accused officer to
show cause at a specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended
from office pursuant to the cited mandatory provisions of the Act. Where either the prosecution seasonably files
a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a motion to
quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order
of the trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that
the trial court duly hear the parties at a hearing held for determining the
validity of the information, and thereafter hand down its ruling, issuing the
corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of the
information or withholding such suspension in the contrary case.
(d) No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension
hearing. Suffice it to state that the
accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
validity of the criminal proceedings against him, e. g. that he has not been
afforded the right of due preliminary investigation; that the acts for which he
stands charged do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act
No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which would
warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he
may present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The
mandatory suspension decreed by the Act upon determination of the pendency in court of a criminal prosecution for violation
of the Anti-graft Act or for bribery under a valid information requires at the
same time that the hearing be expeditious, and not unduly protracted such as to
thwart the prompt suspension envisioned by the Act. Hence, if the trial court, say, finds the
ground alleged in the quashal motion not to be
indubitable, then it shall be called upon to issue the suspension order upon
its upholding the validity of the information and setting the same for trial on
the merits.
(e) In the case at bar, ruling on the validity of the information
is to be held in abeyance until after the outcome of the preliminary
investigation to be conducted by respondent provincial fiscal of the graver
charge of alleged violation of the Anti-Graft Law, and hence no suspension
order can issue. Should the fiscal find
no case, he will then so inform respondent court and move to dismiss the
case. In the contrary case, respondent
court will then have to hear and decide petitioners’ pending motion to quash
before it, which squarely raises the question that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense and are not punishable under section 3 (a) and (e) of
Republic Act No. 3019, contrary to the information’s averment.
(Investigating prosecutor Barot’s
resolution of May 14, 1969 recommending the dismissal of the charge of
falsification of public documents against petitioners found “that the
investigation conducted by the Police Commission was half-hazardly
done and that it did not fully bring to the attention of the investigating
officer the existing supporting documents attesting to the regularity of the
appointment of Florentino S. Rolls as patrolman of
the Makati Police Department.”[24]
[The complaint had charged that Rolls had collected and received salaries as patrolman
“without having been previously qualified and appointed as such.”]
Then provincial fiscal, now judge, Aquino, in his
last-act-in-office resolution of May 30, 1969,[25]
in sustaining prosecutor Barot’s dismissal of the
charge of falsification, however, considered that the appointment of Rolls, Luciano’s brother-in-law [admittedly a civil service
eligible with chief of police eligibility] to the Makati
Police Department and his assignment to then councilor Luciano,
as vice-chairman of the municipal council’s police committee, was a case of
“rampant nepotism, favoritism and misuse of influence which shakens the confidence of the people in their police
forces” and that since “there is no evidence to establish that Pat.
Rolls had actually performed this work” [of following up the approval of
pending appointments of members and employees of the police department, awaiting
process and review by the Civil Service Commission],[26]
ordered the filing under his signature on the same day of the information for
violation of Republic Act No. 3019 against petitioners. )
The prejudicial legal question raised by the pending quashal motion that respondent court would then have to
rule upon may be thus formulated: did then Mayor Estrella’s
appointment of Rolls (Luciano’s brother-in-law) as
municipal patrolman, upon then Councilor Luciano’s
recommendation and influence and Rolls’ assignment by the then chief of police
to Luciano’s office constitute a violation of section
3 (a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019[27]
as charged in the challenged information?[28]
ACCORDINGLY, the writ of certiorari is granted and
respondent court’s order of 15 December
1970 in Criminal Case No. 19346 is set aside and annulled.
Respondent court is further directed to hold in abeyance all proceedings in
said case until after the outcome of the new preliminary investigation herein
ordered, and thereafter to proceed in accordance with law as hereinabove
indicated. The writ of mandamus
is granted against respondent provincial fiscal who is hereby directed to
conduct in accordance with law a preliminary investigation of the charge
against petitioners for violation of Republic Act No. 3019 as alleged in the
information in Criminal Case No. 19346. No costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., Makasiar,
Fernando, and Villamor,
JJ., did not take
part.
Dizon, J., on official leave.
[1]
L-31347, reported in 34 SCRA 638.
[2]
These other respondents were Hon. Isidro S. Rodriguez, as provincial governor
of Rizal; Hon. Herminio C.
Mariano, judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, and
People of the Philippines.
[3]
Emphasis supplied.
[4]
Idem.
[5]
This information dated May 29, 1969 alleges: “(T)hat on or about and
between November 12, 1966 and February 15, 1967, in the municipality of Makati, province of Rizal, a
place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Jose Luciano, being then a municipal councilor of Makati, Rizal, with the use of
the influence of his office, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously procure, persuade, induce and influence the appointment of the
accused Florentino Rolls as a member of the police
department of said municipality, and once appointed, also with the influence
of his office, had said Florentino Rolls detailed
with him as municipal councilor of Makati until the
date of the resignation of said Florentino Rolls on
February 15, 1967 as a patrolman of Makati, Rizal, even without said Florentino
Rolls reporting for duty on the date that he assumed office and until he
resigned therefrom as aforestated,
without actually performing any function or duty as a police officer of Makati, but in conspiracy with the accused Jose Luciano, the two of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, at one time and on several occasions, were able to collect his
salaries as patrolman during the same period at the rate of P200.00 a month in
violation of the rules and regulations promulgated by the police commission for
the efficiency of all police forces of the Philippines, and by such acts caused
unwarranted benefit, advantage and preference to be obtained by the accused Florentino Rolls and causing undue injury to the municipal
government of Makati and to the efficiency of the
public service expected to be rendered by the police force of said municipality,
in violation of Section 3, paragraphs (a) and (e), of Republic Act No. 3019.
“
[6]
T. s. n., pp. 44-46, Annex F, Petition.
[7]
Idem, pp. 47-49.
[8]
Idem, p. 53.
[9]
T. s. n. of October 26, 1970, Annex C,
Petition.
[10]
Idem, p. 32.
[11]
Idem, pp. 35-36.
[12]
Idem, p. 37.
[13]
Order of 15 Dec. 1970,
Annex A, Petition.
[14]
Annex L, Petition.
[15]
He, however, expressed a theory that suspended Mayor Estrella
and the municipal chief of police might have conspired with petitioners in the
commission of the crime charged and might have to be included in the
information.
[16]
Luciano vs. Prov.
Governor, 28 SCRA 517 (June 20, 1969).
[17]
35 SCRA 237 (Sept. 30, 1970), per Ruiz
Castro, J.
[18]
See Rule 110, sec. 5.
[19]
Annex A, petition; emphasis furnished.
[20]
See T. S. N. of Oct. 13, 1970,
p. 50 et seq., Annex B, petition.
[21]
Supra, fn. 16.
[22]
38 SCRA 324 (Mar. 31, 1971).
[23]
Section 13 of the Act provides:
“SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of
benefits. – Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him. “
[24]
Annex M, petition.
[25]
Annex I, Answer.
[26]
Petitioners had cause to complain of this cited void of evidence, since Rolls
had never been charged on this point nor given an opportunity to present the
evidence.
[27]
The punishable acts are thus defined in the Act:
“(a)
Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter,
or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such
violation or offense.
“(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. ” (Sec. 3, R.
A. 3019)
[28]
These guidelines for the case at bar are specifically made, since this is the
second time that the same issues have reached this Court, and to obviate
respondent court’s doubts thereon, supra, pp. 6-7.