FEDERICO DELA CRUZ, CORAZON MALLARI, ROQUE UGAYONG,RUBEN ALFARO AND JOSE PASION, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEY-AND IN-FACT, SONIA INFANTE, PETITIONERS, VS.ALFREDO DUEÑAS,…
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Dela Cruz versus Dueñas
The Case
This is a petition for review brought by Federico dela Cruz, Corazon Mallari, Roque Ugayong, Ruben Alfaro, and Jose Pasion against Alfredo Dueñas, Sr. Dueñas sued the petitioners for recovery of possession with damages over a parcel of land in Tarlac, claiming to be its registered owner. The petitioners, who occupy the land, insist they have a better right to possess it because of the history of the property under the agrarian reform program. The case matters because it settles two things a reviewee must know cold: when summary judgment is proper in an action for possession, and why a Torrens title cannot be attacked indirectly in a suit for possession.
Procedural History
Dueñas filed his complaint for recovery of possession with damages before the Municipal Trial Court of Tarlac City. The petitioners moved to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and litis pendentia, and in the alternative moved to suspend the proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question. After the pre-trial conference, where the petitioners made several admissions, Dueñas moved for summary judgment. The Municipal Trial Court granted the motion in a decision dated November 13, 2001, ordering the petitioners to vacate the premises, remove their improvements, restore possession to Dueñas, and pay monthly damages and attorney's fees.
The petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, which affirmed the decision in its entirety. Their motion for reconsideration was denied. The petitioners then came to the Supreme Court by petition for review, raising the propriety of summary judgment and the finding that Dueñas enjoys a better right to possess the property.
Facts
Dueñas claimed to be the registered owner of a lot of 2,010 square meters in Barrio Balincanaway, Tarlac, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 308057. He alleged that the petitioners occupied the property without his consent, and that demands to vacate went unheeded, prompting the suit.
The petitioners countered that the lot was formerly part of the Cojuangco estate, acquired by the government for redistribution to actual occupants under the agrarian reform program. Dueñas, then barangay captain of Balincanaway and tasked to identify the actual occupants, allegedly listed the lot in bad faith as part of his own farm holding. An emancipation patent and an original certificate of title were issued in his name on August 26, 1997. Barely three months later, that title was cancelled and a new one issued. Dueñas then sold the lot to Nature Realty and Development Corporation, which later reconveyed it to him in 1998, resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 308057 in his name again. The petitioners insisted that Dueñas never possessed or cultivated the lot.
At pre-trial, the petitioners admitted three things: that the lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 308057 in the name of Dueñas; that the property is covered by a tax declaration also in his name, and that the petitioners never declared it for taxation purposes; and that the case they had filed before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board had been dismissed, and they neither appealed nor moved for reconsideration, so that dismissal became final and executory.
Issues
- Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in affirming the rendition of summary judgment by the Municipal Trial Court.
- Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in finding that the respondent enjoys a better right to possess the subject property.
Applicable Provisions
Rule 35, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, as cited in the decision, provides:
For summary judgment to be valid, Rule 35, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, requires (a) that there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and (b) that the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
This is the test the Court applies to decide whether the Municipal Trial Court properly disposed of the case without a full trial.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that summary judgment was proper. Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, and not a genuine issue as to any material fact. A genuine issue is a question of fact that calls for the presentation of evidence; it is distinguished from an issue that is sham, contrived, set in bad faith, and patently unsubstantial. The only issue in an action to recover possession is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises. Here, the petitioners admitted that the lot was titled and declared for taxation purposes in the name of Dueñas, that they never paid the realty taxes, and that their case before the agrarian adjudication board had been dismissed with finality. No genuine factual issue remained.
On the second issue, the Court held that Dueñas, as the registered owner, has a better right to possess the property. It is well settled that a person who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled to its possession. Whatever right of possession the petitioners may claim cannot prevail over that of the registered owner. The alleged invalidity of Dueñas' title is not a hindrance to recovery of possession, because a certificate of title is not subject to collateral attack. The issue of whether a title was procured by falsification or fraud must be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. The presumptive conclusiveness of a Torrens title must be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder is considered the owner until the title is nullified in an appropriate ordinary action.
Doctrine
First, summary judgment is valid only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, except the amount of damages, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue is one that calls for the presentation of evidence, not one that is sham, contrived, or patently unsubstantial.
Second, in an action for recovery of possession, the sole issue is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the premises. A person holding a Torrens title is entitled to possession, and any claim of a better right by an occupant cannot prevail over that of the registered owner.
Third, a certificate of title is not subject to collateral attack. A claim that a title was procured by falsification or fraud must be raised in an action expressly instituted for the purpose, not in a suit for possession.
Disposition
The petition was denied due course and dismissed, so Dueñas prevailed and the orders to vacate, restore possession, and pay damages and attorney's fees stand.
Remember This
The line to memorize is that a Torrens title holder is entitled to possession, and the title cannot be collaterally attacked in a suit for possession. Examiners like to use this case to test the requirements of summary judgment and the rule against collateral attack on a certificate of title.