ILDEFONSA CORONADO, PETITIONER VS. HONORABLE BIENVENIDO A. TAN, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, CATALINA ESTEBAN AND PELAGIO VICTORINO, RESPONDENTS.

Statement.—Petition for certiorari to annul the two orders of the respondent
judge of January 26 and 27, 1953 allowing the other respondent Catalina Esteban
to operate the Makati-Jolo Ferry, and for mandamus to return to the petitioner
the possession of the same ferry.

Facts.—The pleadings and their annexes disclose the following material
facts:

1. Pursuant to a lease contract properly executed, Catalina Esteban was the
   lessee and operator of the Makati-Jolo Ferry in the municipality of Makati,
   Rizal during the fiscal year July 1, 1951 to June 30, 1952;
2. On September 15, 1952 the municipality advertized for bids for the operation
   of said ferry during the fiscal year October 1, 1952 to September 30, 1953;
3. At the public bidding Ildefonsa Coronado, the petitioner, offered the
   highest bid;
4. Consequently, by authority of the council, the mayor formalized the
   corresponding lease contract with petitioner (marked Annex 6) which was ratified
   and approved by the council on October 19, 1952;
5. Immediately thereafter and until January 26, 1953. the petitioner operated
   the aforesaid ferry in accordance with the terms of her lease contract;
6. On January 22, 1953, the respondent Catalina Esteban, assisted by her
   husband Pelagio Victorino filed, in the court of first instance of Rizal,
   against herein petitioner and the mayor and councilors of Makati, Rizal, a
   complaint alleging that the lease contract Annex B was illegal and void, and
   requesting that her previous contract be declared subsisting. Catalina also
   prayed for a preliminary writ enjoining the aforesaid defendants from making use
   or enforcing the contract with Ildefonsa Coronado;
7. By his order of January 26,1953 the respondent judge issued the writ as
   prayed for; and on the next day he amended such writ “to the effect that the
   plaintiff is allowed to operate the ferry service * * * during the pendency” of
   the case;
8. After failing in a move to reconsider, the petitioner came to this Court
   with a petition, which, rejected at first for lack of supporting papers, was
   subsequently amended to meet procedural requirements;
9. As requested in the amended petition, we issued a writ of preliminary
   injunction to prevent the execution of the complained of directives of the
   respondent judge.

Discussion.—It is not denied that the notice calling for bids on
September 15, 1952 contained this essential condition:

“That the fares per crossing to be collected shall not exceed the
following:

For adult …………………………………………………….	P0.05
For children ……………………………………………………	.03
For every bicycle ……………………………………………….	.08
For every head of pig, goat, etc…………………………………..	.10
For every sack of rice, corn, camote, darak, etc……………………	.10,”

It is also admitted that the contract (Annex B) extended in favor of
Ildefonza Coronado, after she had won the public bidding, contained in addition
to the above quoted condition the special stipulation,

“Provided however that from 7:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. the Second Party
(Ildefonsa Coronado) may collect twice the amount of rates” (above
itemized).

When the municipal council ratified the contract, it passed a resolution (No.
144) taking notice of the additional provision; but it explained it was
prevailing custom since time immemorial of ferry concessionaries to charge such
double rates for night work.

However, prosecuted later for falsification of public document—on account of
such addition—the mayor of Makati and Ildefonsa Coronado were convicted after
trial, by the Honorable Bienvenido Tan, who branded the resolution No. 144 as
“of doubtful creation” and expressed the opinion that it could not legalize an
act illegal per se. The conviction has been appealed to the Court of
Appeals, where it is presently pending.

In issuing the preliminary mandatory injunction commanding petitioner to
desist from operating the ferry and placing Catalina Esteban in possession
thereof, the respondent judge obviously acted upon the strength of two legal
propositions, to wit: (a) by reason of the falsification, the contract
of lease in favor of petitioner became null and void and (b) Catalina
Esteban has a valid contract of lease, which must be enforced.

As to the first, it appears that in the criminal cake for falsification the
defense was that the insertion or addition merely expressed a well-known
practice of concessionaries, and that the municipal council had approved it. The
judge did not need such defense, being of the opinion that the council had no
power to approve the “amendment”. Without in any way reviewing the criminal
case, we can appreciate the argument of defense that such circumstances belie
any criminal intent of the accused. Perhaps it is also plausible to contend on
behalf of Ildefonsa Coronado that even if there was falsification by
the insertion of additional provisions, such insertion did not avoid the
whole contract; only the additional stipulation may be
disregarded. Wherefore, the least that may be said on the first legal
proposition is that it is a fair subject of debate that should be decided after
the hearing of the case on the merits.

The second proposition is still more debatable. Catalina’s contract expressly
referred to the year 1951-1952. It is true she alleged that the Mayor had agreed
to renew it for another year. But the Mayor has no authority to grant such
extension; and she knows it, because notwithstanding such alleged renewal, she
participated in the bidding, in which Ildefonsa turned out to be the highest
bidder.

It may therefore be concluded that the issuance of the preliminary writ by
the respondent judge rested upon two debatable legal propositions. And
considering your doctrines,

“The writ of injunction is not, as a general rule, proper where its purposes
is to take property out of the possession or control of one person and place the
same in the hands of another, whose title has not been clearly
established.” (Asombra vs. Dorado-36 Phil., 883; Wagan vs.
Sideco 60 Phil., 685 and many cases. See Moran, Rules of Court 1952 ed. Vol. 2
p. 70)

“Since an injunction mandatory in nature usually tends to do more than to
maintain the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an
injunction prior to the final hearing except in cases of extreme urgency or
where the right is very clear” (Manila Electric Co. vs. Del Rosario 22
Phil., 433;.Eusebio vs. Aguas 47 Phil., 567.)

Judgment. We must declare that the issuance in the lower court of
the mandatory injunction herein discussed was improper and constituted an abuse
of discretion.

Wherefore, the petition is granted,, with costs against respondents Catalina
Esteban and Pelagio Victorino. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

Petition granted.